DF:
International Law is not 'law' in a strict sense, as it can be followed or ignored at the free will of the states.
For instance. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights received a petition from the Inter-American Comission, in which it was asked to declare that the rights of Mr. Winston Caesar, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, had been violated.
Mr. Caesar had been convicted of rape, and sentenced to flogging with a cat o' nine tails. In order to avoid the penalty that would be imposed on them, Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the American Convention of Human Rights. This, to the Court, did not matter, because the violation of human rights had occured before Trinidad had withdrawn its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court
held, unanimously, that Mr. Caesar had been subjected to degrading punishment, in violation of the Convention. The country was ordered to pay 50.000 dollars to Mr. Caesar, and provide medical and psychological attention, in order to repair the damages caused to him.
However, it seems that Trinidad and Tobago will not comply with the judgement, as they do not recognize it as a legitimate judgement.
Judge Antonio Cancado Trindade, in his separate opinion, stated the following:
68. Despite its non-appearance , Trinidad and Tobago remains bound by the Court's Judgments in all these cases: though rendered after its denunciation of the American Convention, they pertain to acts taken by the State before the denunciation, in accordance with the terms of Article 78 of the American Convention. Together with the subsequent Judgments on the merits and reparations, the Court's decisions remain all binding upon the respondent State, and an eventual failure of this latter to comply with the Court's Judgments on the merits and reparations in those previous cases and with the present Judgment in the Caesar case, would amount to an additional violation of the American Convention (Article 68), as well as of general international law (pacta sunt servanda), with all the juridical consequences attached thereto.
Now, what are those juridical consequences? More judgements coming from the Court? What happens if Trinidad simply decides to ignore the Court and keep on flogging its people? Absolutely nothing, as there is no physical force to back up the decisions made by the Court, which differs from 'national' law in which the consequences can also be physical. For instance, in Colombia, if one does not comply with a
tutela judgement, one can be arrested and sent to prison.
Another example: Guantanamo. What would have happened if the United States Supreme Court had ruled the other way in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? The United States would have kept on violating International Law (Geneva Convention and the like) unpunished. Only political pressure, in the form of rhetoric, would have served to stop human rights violations, and that is very different from law enforcement.
What about the Iraq war? It was an illegal war, seeing as the UN Security Council did not approve the invasion. But, who stopped the US from invading?
International law only exists insofar as the states will find it convenient to comply with it. The efectiveness of International Law relies on the good will of the states.
Therefore, I agree on the following:
Zagadka wrote:there is no such thing as international law, only agreements between nations, which, even if broken, really can only be enforced by signatories
Also, as Zagadka said, bear in mind that the ICJ statute is an international treaty from which the system of sources you just described comes from. The existence of
jus cogens, as a binding international custom, is derived from treaties such as the Vienna Convention and the Statute of the ICJ. Therefore, the the validity of International law derives from some basic treaties, and International Law can be reduced to such treaties. Proof of that is your argumentation based on the text of the Statute of the ICJ and nothing else.
To me, International Law is more political rhetoric than law.
Now, going on to the original post.
I am personally against the death penalty because I find such kind of punishment as violating the most basic human right; this is the right to life.
That is a weak argument. If held
ad absurdum you could easily conclude that criminal punishment is wrong, because it violates another basic human right: liberty.
Your statement comes from an underlying assumption of human rights as legal rules. They are not rules but principles. The difference is that a rule is followed or broken, whereas a principle is fulfilled to its maximum extent.
Constitutional law and Human Rights law is all about balancing out the principles, as principles tend to collide with each other. So you have a murderer's right to live, and you have a whole society's right to be protected from crime. One useful way to protect from crime would be to implement the death penalty in order to deter future criminals.
There is no easy answer to this, and the search for an answer would take us to a political, sociological and economical debate, which is not what the Law Forum is about. So, we'll just take for an answer that the individual's right of life tends to prevail, based on the dispositions of international law, and the national law of many states.
Death penalty was
found unconstitutional in South Africa:
The South African Constitutional Court wrote:[144] The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in Chapter Three. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights above all others. And this must be demonstrated by the State in everything that it does, including the way it punishes criminals. This is not achieved by objectifying murderers and putting them to death to serve as an example to others in the expectation that they might possibly be deterred thereby.
[145] In the balancing process the principal factors that have to be weighed are on the one hand the destruction of life and dignity that is a consequence of the implementation of the death sentence, the elements of arbitrariness and the possibility of error in the enforcement of capital punishment, and the existence of a severe alternative punishment (life imprisonment) and, on the other, the claim that the death sentence is a greater deterrent to murder, and will more effectively prevent its commission, than would a sentence of life imprisonment, and that there is a public demand for retributive justice to be imposed on murderers, which only the death sentence can meet.
[146] Retribution cannot be accorded the same weight under our Constitution as the rights to life and dignity, which are the most important of all the rights in Chapter Three. It has not been shown that the death sentence would be materially more effective to deter or prevent murder than the alternative sentence of life imprisonment would be. Taking these factors into account, as well as the elements of arbitrariness and the possibility of error in enforcing the death penalty, the clear and convincing case that is required to justify the death sentence as a penalty for murder, has not been made out.
It later
held that no one could be extradited to another country that does impose the death penalty, without a safeguard against the implementation of it.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the death penalty can be applied, as long as it is preceded by a fair trial, and is applied restrictively, in the fashion of the Protocols signed by the members of the EU. See
Ocalan v. Turkey.
Just as the South African court did in the cited case, the European Court, in the case of
Soering v. The United Kingdom, protected a German citizen from being extradited to the United States, as there were no effective safeguards to prevent him from suffering the death row phenomenon.
There is a general trend in abolishing the death penalty, but some States, such as the USA, continue to give it a widespread use, which is just proof of what I wrote before about the ineffectiveness of international law.