[Watermoon]

How it become so poweful and strong?

[Figlio di Moros]

FDR kicked Churchhill in the nads and stole his...



... true story

[Thunderhawk]

The desire to have a large and powerful navy, money to create it, politicians and various educated people to develop and manage its growth, and commitment to do so over the decades of political/social/economic change.

[MB.]

How it become so poweful and strong?

The USN has a long history. A word on seapower. The United States today commands seapower, but it is not itself a seapower. Throughout its entire history the navy has existed to enable two functions: the projection of military force and the protection of America's trade from interruption by aggressors. A true seapower relies on the sea as a way of life as well as it commands force upon the sea- thus states such as Venice or Britain could not have achieved political hegemony vastly disproportionate to their respective populations and geographical size, without a cultural connection to the ocean. The US is principally a landpower that uses the sea to facilitate the expansion of its empire (cf. Rome, Persia, China, Russia, France etc etc).

Before the Revolutionary War, the 13 colonies possessed a large merchant marine. Trade flourished around a network of major trading ports along the Atlantic seaboard, on the Great Lakes, and across the ocean-sea to Europe and of course, Africa. In the Caribbean, where trade continued during the blockade (eventually prompting Britain to declare war on the Netherlands), and South America various goods traveled to the production centers of the continental United States in colonial ships.

During the American Revolutionary War it became necessary to appoint naval officers to command the warships of the colonies and the newly created Congressional Navy conducted numerous operations and expanded rapidly. The USN, notably, was responsible for providing frigates to carry dispatches for the Alliance, for blockade running and privateering. Battles fought on the Great Lakes involved intelligent logistics and deployment, including war galleys. American manufactured frigates were superior for their time, being larger and faster and mounting heavier broadsides than their Allied or Royal Navy counterparts. Orders were made for many large warships, although politics often stalled productions.

Between the wars, Jefferson promoted a coastal defense navy in keeping with his anti-Federalist policies. In consequence many floating barges and gunships were built by the various States' navies. In the War of 1812, the USN found itself utterly unprepared for a contest with the Royal Navy (in that year nearing the zenith of its seapower), and despite several heroic frigate actions, was reduced and hounded to harbour by RN blockade. Mahan treats this very thoroughly and boringly but feel free to consult him on the matter further. Suffice it to say the USN was in dire straights and as a result of America's inability to protect its sea-borne trade, or command the sea for operational reasons, the prestige of naval enthusiasts suffered as much as the American economy.

The election of Andrew Jackson, another pronounced anti-federalist, further stymied naval expansion. Culturally and economically the nation was turning towards the western frontier, voyages were made around the Southern American continent and California was explored. However, there were some profound naval enthusiasts in the United States, among them Able P. Upshur, secretary of the navy for president Tyler, who expanded the navy. The ability to expand the navy nearing the middle of the 19th century was due to the dramatic technical changes that were transforming combat at sea. It was believed by many theorists and commanders in America that a few powerful steam-powered shell-firing hybrid battleships could topple the naval hegemony imposed by the European powers with their vast fleets of obsolete warships, or at least be used in the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy- hinged on the expansion of the United States westward. The truth of this assertion was convincingly proven to the Americans when their steam-powered frigates and cruisers captured California, made possible the invasion of Mexico, and opened trade with the Japanese (other developments abroad further indicated the transformative developments in naval steam power, ordinance and armoring).

During the Civil War this new highly technical USN proved a game winning trump. The blockade, as predicted, destroyed the Confederate economy and enabled unhindered and powerful riverine operations, ultimately responsible for dividing the Confederacy and strangling it's logistics and trade. Although attempts earlier in the war were unsuccessful, it seems clear to me that the issue of command was the decisive factor, and not any fault on the part of the navy. The USN (and CSN, lord), were however shown to be greatly deficient in armoring and battleships, as a few fast confederate raiders and ironclads were able to punch holes in the USN blockade. On the otherhand, the Americans and the CSA were leaders in amphibious and submarine warfare, building many mines, uboats and landing craft throughout the war.

The navy continued to expand and develop after the war. Warship and merchant ship production has always been a lucrative business and only more so when the vessels in question are highly complicated machines involving great concentrations and commitments of manpower and industrial strength to manufacture and service. As the industrial capacity of the United States and its arms and weapons industries grew to rival and ultimately surpass that of the European powers, the reality of unfettered naval dominance became a real possibility. The American navy in the 1880s was largely a cruiser force, and it was theorists like Mahan who now pushed for a 'big navy' of blue-water battleships. The closing of the Western frontier at the end of the 19th century, combined with the brilliant success of the Spanish-American war at sea, seemed to confirm Mahan's thesis with regard to naval power: to ensure American power it was necessary for America not only to trade on the seas but to dictate all naval affairs from a position of strength (seapower). As a result, the USN grew into a spectacularly enormous force, showcased by the tour of the White Fleet during the Roosevelt administration. By the conclusion of the First World War, the USN was although not the most technically or socially advanced navy; was in stream to become certainly the largest navy in the world.

After Versailles the monumentally significant Washington Naval Conference convened at president Harding's request confirmed that America would posses relatively the most powerful navy in the world- although allocated tonnage remained equal to that of Great Britain. However, America needed defend two coasts only, with the Japanese Empire- strictly limited in tonnage by the conference- presenting the most likely potential aggressor. Britain, on the other hand, faced potential threats from basically every power in the world, it's empire stretched frailly thin, and the commitment to parity with America clearly acknowledged that British seapower was facing its demise.

Eventually the US develops a fleet air arm and and independent air force and an enormous submarine and SSBN contingent and so on and it goes on to win WWII, and the Korean War basically entirely with seapower. The American empire by this (1955) point was so massive that it required a permanent commitment to naval production and development, technology and power surpassing that of any country or combination of countries in history...

The desire to have a large and powerful navy, money to create it, politicians and various educated people to develop and manage its growth, and commitment to do so over the decades of political/social/economic change.

Yes, but with regard to commitment I think it is clearly a case of the tail-wagging the dog here. The USN needs to be massive and technologically exotic because it's the USN. Today this is really going beyond the point of madness- the transition from sail to steam and cannon to rifles was handled far more rationally than the transition to robotics, nuclear power and weaponry, lasers, drones and so forth. A large conventional explosive or crude thermonuclear device of sub-kiloton yield would be enough to obliterate a fleet in harbor before the beginning of a war, or as a random act of terrorism. In this era, the 50,000 button scenario illustrated by Khan is coming into reality, or indeed, already has, rather.

[Thunderhawk]

My comment on commitment was not just for the sake of technological growth and development, but also of a culture and professionalism within the navy. If support of the navy was sinusoidal then I can see the USN having a generation of mediocre officers promoted to command during an expansion phase, and poor morale during a contraction phase especially for the mid level officers who then lost most prospects.

I believe a level of consistancy from the government is required for the navy and its members to believe that the nation/government supports them, which is important in the military for its members to want to do their duty rather then then just enough to scrape by.

Im not talking esprit de corps, but I lack the words (and sleep) to explain this further.

[MB.]

My comment on commitment was not just for the sake of technological growth and development, but also of a culture and professionalism within the navy. If support of the navy was sinusoidal then I can see the USN having a generation of mediocre officers promoted to command during an expansion phase, and poor morale during a contraction phase especially for the mid level officers who then lost most prospects.

The sinusoidal oscillation is caused by public interest in great naval battles, and is absolutely cultural in that regard, I agree. Morale is a tricky thing- but you said you're not talking about morale precisely? Anyway, I think public and professional interest in naval affairs in landpowers is usually spurred by 1) heroic naval victories or ties 2) new technical or material developments 3) the bemoaning of specialists. If these factors are not present the landpower will usually just build a navy large enough to keep its neighbors from contesting any strategic or economic strongpoints. Whereas, if furnished with great victories and public interest the landpower may go on to cultivate its seapower out of proportion with its necessity.

I believe a level of consistancy from the government is required for the navy and its members to believe that the nation/government supports them, which is important in the military for its members to want to do their duty rather then then just enough to scrape by.

Oh I agree, but aren't we basically discussing funding?

[Cartertonian]

I'm still looking for that airpower stuff, btw, MB.

Who gives a toss about bloody matelots anyway? (sez the crab!)

[Thunderhawk]

Im thinking about respectability in the eyes of the civilian population, which can be largely influenced by how the government acts socially towards the navy. If a government blaimed military failures on its navy time and time again, rather then just accepting the failures and moving on, it would set up a negative image of the navy. 5-10 years later, even if funding hasnt been changed, what kind of people would join the navy? what kind of public support (including benefit of the doubt) would the navy get when they do fuck up? Would the navy become a region of "fat" that could be cut when politicians need to save money?

[Figlio di Moros]

Between the wars, Jefferson promoted a coastal defense navy in keeping with his anti-Federalist policies. In consequence many floating barges and gunships were built by the various States' navies. In the War of 1812, the USN found itself utterly unprepared for a contest with the Royal Navy (in that year nearing the zenith of its seapower), and despite several heroic frigate actions, was reduced and hounded to harbour by RN blockade. Mahan treats this very thoroughly and boringly but feel free to consult him on the matter further. Suffice it to say the USN was in dire straights and as a result of America's inability to protect its sea-borne trade, or command the sea for operational reasons, the prestige of naval enthusiasts suffered as much as the American economy.

You seem to have forgotten about the Barbary Wars, particularly Commodore Edward Preble and his officers(including Decatur and Bainbridge as the more famous officers under his tutelage), as well as the legacy of the war of 1812 being British support of the Monroe Doctrine and the US ending the power of the Barbary pirates.

[MB.]

Certainly the minor success of the Barbary operations served to further interest in naval expansion heading into the middle of the 19th century. Other operations were also conducted against Sumatra and Java.

Thank you for reminding me, Figlio di Moros!

[Zagadka]

2 things: Lots of money and lots resources and of ocean. We didn't have to import like Germany or Japan or even Britain.

It helped that people like Reeves and Halsey and others who helped drum up support for carrier development, upon which our naval operations are based (aside from subs).

[Igor Antunov]

The desire to build many carriers plus the support ships they require = the navy you have now.

I'm interested to know what component of your armed forces takes up the biggest share of defense spending? I would imagine it's the army? Am I correct?

[MB.]

I'm still looking for that airpower stuff, btw, MB.

Thank you, Cartertonian, no rush...

Im thinking about respectability in the eyes of the civilian population, which can be largely influenced by how the government acts socially towards the navy. If a government blaimed military failures on its navy time and time again, rather then just accepting the failures and moving on, it would set up a negative image of the navy. 5-10 years later, even if funding hasnt been changed, what kind of people would join the navy? what kind of public support (including benefit of the doubt) would the navy get when they do fuck up? Would the navy become a region of "fat" that could be cut when politicians need to save money?

With regard to the question of recruiting, the most important aspect is a professional NCO corps which can inspire, teach, and lead the junior officers and enlisted men. By building or gaining a trained body of NCO's the ratings should not be a problem. They can always be impressed if the situation becomes dire ^_^ Of course naval leadership and command is another issue...

As for public & government support, I think it clear that in landpowers the navy is always a measure of fat. Seapower is a luxury, not a necessity for the continental United States. The people will believe in the navy so long as it has big warships and great battles and lots of theory behind it, if you follow my meaning.

It helped that people like Reeves and Halsey and others who helped drum up support for carrier development, upon which our naval operations are based (aside from subs).

What do you think about Reeve's recovery and launch tactics? I think Reeves in particular was really a big-ship enthusiast more than a 'carrier' enthusiast, necessarily. His methods essentially transmuted battlefleet gunnery tactics into aircraft attack. Anyway, I have a major pet-peeve with the notion that American sea-power is made of out carriers or whatever.

I am also curious, what are your thoughts on Halsey's command decisions at Leyte Gulf?

[Figlio di Moros]

As for public & government support, I think it clear that in landpowers the navy is always a measure of fat. Seapower is a luxury, not a necessity for the continental United States. The people will believe in the navy so long as it has big warships and great battles and lots of theory behind it, if you follow my meaning.

I disagree; being the large state we are, and therefore involved in international trade, which takes place largely over maritime traffic, I would argue it makes as much sense for the US to be a Maritime power as GB.

[MB.]

The problem is with semantics. Both Great Britain of the 19th century and the modern United States had/have seapower, but only the former was a seapower.Being a seapower is about being totally reliant on the ocean, culturally economically, militarily, and this is reflected politically. The United States is not a seapower (even with external trade completely eliminated in a hypothetical war a resolution with the continental United States would remain a matter for landpower to decide) although; it is however a spacepower.

Can I ask for your definition of 'maritime power'?

[Zagadka]

I am also curious, what are your thoughts on Halsey's command decisions at Leyte Gulf?

Total fuckup, but it was a... unique position.

Anyway, my point was that there was a group of Navy leaders who pushed development of carriers, and that is what saved our asses back then and gives us overwhelming firepower today.

[Figlio di Moros]

The problem is with semantics.

Basically, we're not an Island or a tiny peninsula, therefore we could never technically be a seapower?

Can I ask for your definition of 'maritime power'?

Eh, I was a bit tired when I wrote that, I suppose "Naval power" would be a more apt term.

[MB.]

I suppose "Naval power" would be a more apt term.

How do you think the naval power you describe differs from the concept of seapower?

Basically, we're not an Island or a tiny peninsula, therefore we could never technically be a seapower?

In short, yes. Being a seapower is a position of weakness for the aforementioned reasons. Seapower is great to have but not something you want to rely on for your defense, especially in the modern era.

Anyway, my point was that there was a group of Navy leaders who pushed development of carriers, and that is what saved our asses back then and gives us overwhelming firepower today.

Absolutely. Airpower enthusiasm and development of carrier doctrine and production history is something I plan on studying further.

Total fuckup, but it was a... unique position.

I think I was alluding to the failure of intelligence with regard to the decoy carriers- is Halsey to be blamed or held responsible?

[Zagadka]

As a general rule, a leader can designate authority, not responsibility, so on that theoretical note, yes.

On a realistic note, increased island hopping and hope for a decisive blow probably made him far too bold. I do think he should be held responsible. He almost cost another tremendous defeat, possibly war changing, by ignoring the intelligence. That's his ball.

[Figlio di Moros]

How do you think the naval power you describe differs from the concept of seapower?

I'm not one for semantics... The idea I was hoping to project was of being a seapower without being dependent on the sea, sort of the US being a Naval power but not reliant solely on our Navy.