fuser wrote:The point remains you are yet to show how an European Russia effectively in German control was in British interest and not opposite of that, irrespective of my ideology. (that was just one big cop out from your part basically.)
A National-Socialist Germany in control of northwestern Eurasia would have been in British interests in several ways, and let us pretend for the moment that in this scenario Britain and France have either remained neutral or else even actively aided Germany, but in any event, the USSR is defeated:
a. It would have removed the fulcrum of world Communism, which was seated in a multinational empire and that had declared as its aim the economic ruin of the major European powers.
b. In its place would be a power under the government of an individual that, as I have argued very strongly, admired the British Empire, and wanted it conserved on racial-cultural grounds.
c. Apart from a. and b., which are already significant, it would have opened up extensive economic vistas to Britain, France and America. While Hitler would have pursued a policy of Germanic colonization, I suspect he would have welcomed British economic investment in the area while colonization proceeded.
The continued existence of the Soviet Union constituted a major ideological and geopolitical threat to the European empires, because of not only its constant anti-colonialist agitation but also because of any issue it could exploit, like World War II, to advance itself territorially at the expense of Europeans.
The only real beneficiaries of the postwar Soviet Union were the leaders of indigenous anti-colonialist movements in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Am I not right on this point,
El Fuser? It certainly has not been to the benefit of the people subjected to those movements, as Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and of all places, China and Cambodia, historically attest. Hitler was motivated by a desire for living space, but removing the threat of the USSR would have reaped great benefits to colonialist Europe and the world.
pugsville wrote:A large factor in the initial success of Barbarossa was the ludicrous positioning and readiness of the Red Army. Without a war in the west the Red Army would have been in a defensive posture. A lot of the Problems would not have been fixed, as there were a myriad of problems with Command control within the Red Army. But the Red Army is a reasonable defensive posture would have been a much tougher proposition than it was in june 1941. The German benefits from the conquest of France and the Nazi-Soviet pact in resources was not insignificant.
Just to address your point and also a similar one made by fuser, it appears to me that my points about the Soviet Union's fluctuating military strength are being ignored.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_ ... eparationsThe source of the statistics on Soviet military strength in 1939 and in 1941:
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/11.htmlRun it through a translator, if need be.
Soviet military strength as of January 1, 1939: 131 divisions, 2,485,000 personnel, 55,800 guns and mortars, 7,700 aircraft.
Soviet military strength as of June 22, 1941: 316 divisions, 5,774,000 personnel, 117,600 guns and mortars, 18,700 aircraft.
I have also argued in this thread that the principle foreign policy aim of Germany was confrontation with and destruction of the political and military basis of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the war in the West distracted Hitler from his real goal, and while it is not necessarily positive Germany would have undertaken her campaign in early 1940, if there had a) been no war with the West and b) either an alliance with Poland (in the absence of a British war guarantee) or a campaign in Poland, anyway, in August 1939 (again in the absence of a British war guarantee) would have entailed that there would have been no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, because this in fact was designed to guard Germany's rear while it dealt with the war imposed on it by the West. In this scenario, a confrontation with the Soviet Union appears to be more likely to occur, earlier on.
Now, factor in what I have argued should have been the case: British friendliness and support for Germany. This would have ameliorated, assuming it was relevant, benefits of what you have called "booty" from the West, in terms of economic support. Low-interest loans, investment, and asymmetrical aid to Germany would have considerably strengthened her position. Now, given the facts I have pointed out about the state of the Soviet military, we are talking about a situation in early 1940 that for the Soviet Union was far less enviable than the situation she was to be in well over a year later. In actual history, Stalin had used those two years from Sept. 1939 to June 1941 to literally double the size of the Red Army. Ignore it if you like, but a Germany, especially an Anglo-British alliance, confronting the USSR in early 1940 is in a far better position.
Also, in real history, America became involved in the European war only because Britain had. In my scenario, assume a British determination to see through a European campaign against the USSR. In addition to British assistance, it is possible that France, in the face of British diplomacy, might aid the campaign, and, just as happened historically, over time American sympathies, resting with the British, might have crystallized in the form of US assistance to Britain and her allies. In any event, British friendless would have been decisive.
fuser wrote:Yeah, of course. by the way, it would also be an ideologically motivated post, right?
You ignored my original use of Soviet military figures. Any position that does not seem to accept the inevitability of Soviet victory appears to be a "fantasy", to you, so you figure it out.