[Dave]

It was still winnable in 1943. After Stalingrad the Germans called up an additional 800,000 men and had more men in service than ever. Furthermore, Germany didn't even begin total war production until 1944. Had Germany not squandered its offensive power at Kursk they likely would've defeated a Soviet offensive and regained the initiative for a new general offensive in 1944.

[guzzipat]

You can call, Hitler as much as you want, but his achievements in war you cant deny.

What "achievements";
The stupid and disasterous decision to attack Russia and face war on two fronts?
The idiotic decision to declare war on America?
The destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad?
Sending reinforcements to N. Africa just in time to surrender?
The "stand and fight" order issued in 1944, that resulted in the total destruction of army group centre as an effective force?
Or perhaps the issueing of stupid orders to non existant forces during the battle of Berlin showed his genius?
The battle of the Bulge which led to the destruction or capture of reserves of good troops and top class tanks. The very troops needed to have any chance of holding the Red Army, was entirely his idea too.
The order that left Army group North surrounded and isolated?

Hitler was a total disaster as a strategist, his early successes were the result of incompetance of the military leadership he faced, and a large slice of luck.
The crossing of the Meuse in 1940 was accomlished by Rommel mostly by bluff. The long narrow thrust into France was only successful because of the stupidity of the French general staff. A determined thrust across that column would have cut them off. Even a feeble attempt at that tactic caused panic and an order for the Armoured thrust to halt.
Hitlers orders to keep panzer divisions on reserve instead of sending them to Normandy ensured the success of the allied landings.

Only a cretin totally ingorant of military matters could call Hilters war time leadership an "achievement". To judge the extent of Hitlers "genius" as a strategist, I would suggest;

"Hitlers Greatest Defeat" The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944, By Paul Adair.

Or if you want a German view. "Panzer Leader" by General Heinz Guderian, who virtually invented "Blitzkreig".

[RonPaulalways]

It was still winnable in 1943. After Stalingrad the Germans called up an additional 800,000 men and had more men in service than ever. Furthermore, Germany didn't even begin total war production until 1944. Had Germany not squandered its offensive power at Kursk they likely would've defeated a Soviet offensive and regained the initiative for a new general offensive in 1944.

I would have thought that US involvement spelt the end.

[guzzipat]

It was still winnable in 1943. After Stalingrad the Germans called up an additional 800,000 men and had more men in service than ever. Furthermore, Germany didn't even begin total war production until 1944. Had Germany not squandered its offensive power at Kursk they likely would've defeated a Soviet offensive and regained the initiative for a new general offensive in 1944.

Wrong, the conclusion can't be supported by the military and production realities.

Soviet production far surpassed German and was increasing. Germany had decisively lost air superiority, their entire offensive training was a based on aircaft as mobile artillery. They could never regain air superiority, they were loosing too many planes to the long range American fighters and the new Soviet types. For instance the Stuka, main stay of army cooperation, had been proved too vulnerable in combat in 1941 against the RAF. Taking such a slow vulnerable aircraft anywhere near modern opposition fighters was a death sentence.

The tanks Germany were producing, although technically excellent, were poorly made, unreliable and difficult to mass produce. They were also difficult to repair on the battlefield, a far higher percentage had to go back to workshops. By comparison the T34 and Sherman, although technically inferior, were easy to produce in large numbers, comparatively reliable and far easier to repair on the battlefield. There was no prospect whatsoever of Germany reaching anything like parity in tanks on the Eastern or Western fronts, or even a level of numbers capable of winning battles. They could perhaps have coped with 1-2, but the odds were far greater and insummountable.
Any postponement of Kursk could only have increased Germany's inferiority in planes and tanks and worsened their situation in relative strength.

It is difficult to get a true figure for axis losses at Stalingrad, the total axis losses were certainly above 600,000, including the 91,000 captured and some estimates put the losses at between 600-800,000. To that you have to add the 275,000 toops captured in N. Africa in May 1943.
So the extra call up you describe did little more than replace losses. That however isn't the main cost, the losses were more decisive in quality and experience. The German Army of 1944 was a pale shadow of that of 1941, the officers who had led the conquest of Western Europe and then to the gates of Moscow were mostly dead. Frozen to death in the winter of 41-42, killed in Stalingrad, or wasted in a stupid reinforcement of N. Africa.
Calling up 800,000 inexperienced people to replace the enormous losses of elite and tactically aware troops could not possibly mean that the German Army would regain it's former efficiency. In particular the loss of experienced panzer troops and officers was acute.

So in terms of aircaft, tanks, artillery and men, the German Army could never match the power of the Allies after Stalingrad. There never was a prospect of victory in 1944. I think your idea that it was possible is based on a perception of the German army and it's offensive capabilities, that was by 1943 already a year out of date and no longer existed.

[Dave]

Soviet production far surpassed German and was increasing. Germany had decisively lost air superiority, their entire offensive training was a based on aircaft as mobile artillery. They could never regain air superiority, they were loosing too many planes to the long range American fighters and the new Soviet types.

Air superiority was not decisively lost until the air battle over Berlin in 1944. In 1943 the first American raids into Germany produced disaster. Airpower was never as important on the Eastern Front either, and even deep into 1944 German armor could usually operate in the open. Doing likewise on the Western Front resulted in rapid annhilation by P-47s or Typhoons.

For instance the Stuka, main stay of army cooperation, had been proved too vulnerable in combat in 1941 against the RAF. Taking such a slow vulnerable aircraft anywhere near modern opposition fighters was a death sentence.

The Stuka continued to be excellent in service on the Eastern Front as a tank buster, and the Il-2, though better armored, was also slow and vulnerable. Furthermore, new tank buster designs, such as the excellent Hs-29 existed, but the RLM was dominated by tactical bomber boosters, even though at least 7 Stukas could be produced for 1 medium bomber, had higher sortie rates, were more likely to survive any given mission (smaller target, more maneuverable), and were much more effective in the close air support role. I can provide you with some material showing the excellent performance and survivability of the Stuka on the Easter Front if you'd like. The VVS was far smarter than the Luftwaffe here and mass produced the Il-2 and Il-10, relegating medium bombers to the back burner.

The tanks Germany were producing, although technically excellent, were poorly made, unreliable and difficult to mass produce. They were also difficult to repair on the battlefield, a far higher percentage had to go back to workshops. By comparison the T34 and Sherman, although technically inferior, were easy to produce in large numbers, comparatively reliable and far easier to repair on the battlefield.

No disagreement here, and this is why Guderian fought to keep the PzKw IV in production. It was easier to produce, more reliable, and easier to repair. The Panther II would've combined (and improved upon) the excellent fighting qualities of the Panther with greater ease of production and maintenance, but it never made it beyond the prototype stage.

There was no prospect whatsoever of Germany reaching anything like parity in tanks on the Eastern or Western fronts, or even a level of numbers capable of winning battles. They could perhaps have coped with 1-2, but the odds were far greater and insummountable.
Any postponement of Kursk could only have increased Germany's inferiority in planes and tanks and worsened their situation in relative strength.

In 1943 the USSR produced 24,041 AFVs, compared to 13,657 in Germany. At Kursk, where the Germans were attacking, both sides recorded a German kill ratio of between 3.6-3.8 Soviet tanks destroyed for every German tank lost. Kursk was also heavily mined and German armor was suffering technical problems. A Soviet offensive against defensive works produced by Model would've resulted in a far more outlandish casualty ratio, along with numerous disabled Soviet tanks for the Germans to press into their own service. It is therefore completely conceivable that a Soviet offensive in 1943 ending in German victory would've returned the intiative to the Germans.

It is difficult to get a true figure for axis losses at Stalingrad, the total axis losses were certainly above 600,000, including the 91,000 captured and some estimates put the losses at between 600-800,000. To that you have to add the 275,000 toops captured in N. Africa in May 1943.
So the extra call up you describe did little more than replace losses. That however isn't the main cost, the losses were more decisive in quality and experience. The German Army of 1944 was a pale shadow of that of 1941, the officers who had led the conquest of Western Europe and then to the gates of Moscow were mostly dead. Frozen to death in the winter of 41-42, killed in Stalingrad, or wasted in a stupid reinforcement of N. Africa.
Calling up 800,000 inexperienced people to replace the enormous losses of elite and tactically aware troops could not possibly mean that the German Army would regain it's former efficiency. In particular the loss of experienced panzer troops and officers was acute.

The poor state of German forces you describe was not really the case until after Operation Bagration, which resulted in the collapse of Army Group Center and the entire Eastern Front. Even after Bagration the German Army retained extensive operational proficiency, as the Battle of the Bulge and the defense of the Seelow Heights both show. And the Panzerwaffe in particular was not heavily affected by Stalingrad. The Soviets suffered heavier losses but none the less continued to increase their operational proficiency.

[guzzipat]

Air superiority was not decisively lost until the air battle over Berlin in 1944. In 1943 the first American raids into Germany produced disaster. Airpower was never as important on the Eastern Front either, and even deep into 1944 German armor could usually operate in the open. Doing likewise on the Western Front resulted in rapid annhilation by P-47s or Typhoons.

The number of aircaft available for front line duty began to decrease significantly from August 1943. The Soviets estabished air superiority after Kursk. The operational efficiency of the Luftwaffe was further degraded by shortening the training period for new pilots and an inceasingly severe fual shortage.
From Sept. to Dec. 1943 Germany had concentrated it's day fighter strength in the West, more than 3.5 times the fighters in the East. Total losses in that short period were 3059 fighters.

The Stuka continued to be excellent in service on the Eastern Front as a tank buster, and the Il-2, though better armored, was also slow and vulnerable. Furthermore, new tank buster designs, such as the excellent Hs-29 existed, but the RLM was dominated by tactical bomber boosters, even though at least 7 Stukas could be produced for 1 medium bomber, had higher sortie rates, were more likely to survive any given mission (smaller target, more maneuverable), and were much more effective in the close air support role.

The Hs 29 is irrelevant, total wartime production was only 841, with 411 built in 1943.
On the 26th October 1943, General Ernst Kupler, completed a report saying the JU87 could no longer survive operations. The report was accepted and production run down with 1012 (down 600) in 1944 and none in 1945.

In 1943 the USSR produced 24,041 AFVs, compared to 13,657 in Germany. At Kursk, where the Germans were attacking, both sides recorded a German kill ratio of between 3.6-3.8 Soviet tanks destroyed for every German tank lost. Kursk was also heavily mined and German armor was suffering technical problems

Your figures are misleading and also disputed.
The figures seem to include German Light tanks, such as the panzer 38(t) and Panzer 11 & 111's totalling 8594 units in 1943, but exclude Soviet light tanks. Soviet production including light tanks has been put at 27,300. Some sources have put German tank production that year at 10,747. Panzer 1V, V's and Tigers were less than half total production.
You also seem to be saying that all the German tanks went to the Eastern Front, when clearly a proportion must have gone to the West, Jugolavia, Greece and Italy.

In terms of the replacement of losses the situation is clear in 1943 the Soviets replaced losses and increased their tank force by another 2000 tanks. Germany replaced losses but only managed an increase of 500. The implication that by the summer of 1944, the inbalance in tanks would be so great as to prevent a German victory is inescapable. Even if we disregard the allied tanks in the West.
Taking into account the entire AFV production of the Allies the German position was hopeless.

The poor state of German forces you describe was not really the case until after Operation Bagration, which resulted in the collapse of Army Group centre and the entire Eastern Front. Even after Bagration the German Army retained extensive operational proficiency, as the Battle of the Bulge and the defense of the Seelow Heights both show. And the Panzerwaffe in particular was not heavily affected by Stalingrad. The Soviets suffered heavier losses but none the less continued to increase their operational proficiency.

The deteriation in the the efficiency of the German Army was marked from Stalingrad on. The Panzerwaffe was not untouched by Stalingrad and was certainly badly effected by defeat in N. Africa and the loss of 250,000 prisoners.

What you claim as proof of their "operational proficiency" at the Battle of the Bulge was in fact an example of incompetant tactics that wouldn't have happened in 1941.
Without in any way belittling the the Airbourne troops who defended Bastogne, who were top class and fought brilliantly, under an excellent commander. The defence was aided by some pretty silly tactics. Bastogne was the key with most roads in the Ardennes running through it, I have visited the area and know the ground. The German piecemeal attacks played into the defenders hands, allowing a mobile defence particularly with the artillery. The defenders made full use of the German mistakes, but a competant leadership, given the local superiority would have taken Bastogne.


To get back to the original claim you made before it disapears into the detailed examination. Your claim was;

It was still winnable in 1943. After Stalingrad the Germans called up an additional 800,000 men and had more men in service than ever. Furthermore, Germany didn't even begin total war production until 1944. Had Germany not squandered its offensive power at Kursk they likely would've defeated a Soviet offensive and regained the initiative for a new general offensive in 1944.

If by that you mean that Germany was capable of winning the war in 1944, you are totaly wrong, Victory for Germany was impossible from !943 on.

If you mean that Germany could have mounted an offensive in the East alone in 1944, without Kursk, that is possible, but anything other than a short phyric victory was extemely unlikely and complete victory over the Soviets impossible.

Certainly the statement "it was still winnable in 1943" is wrong. A battle might have been winnable, the war certainly wasn't. Which are you claiming?

[Doomhammer]

Hey. It's the 2nd of February (well, 3rd here). The Battle of Stalingrad ended on this day. Heh. Interesting coincidence.


Would there have been any chance of a German victory (even in 1943) if they had began the production of turbojet aircraft earlier on (say, 1942 or 1943)? Just curious.

[Smilin' Dave]

After Stalingrad the Germans called up an additional 800,000 men and had more men in service than ever.

At Stalingrad the Axis lost a lot of experienced troops, while the Soviets gained a great deal. Numbers won't always compensate for experience.

Furthermore, Germany didn't even begin total war production until 1944.

Germany had been in a state of pseudo-total war production prior to WWII in an attempt to have full rearmament by the projected start date of WWII, in effect the German war economy war already running on overtime. And while it's all well and good to guess what might have been, the reality is that the Germans even at full production couldn't surpass the allies, in addition to increasing problems with getting new generation weapons onto the front line.

Had Germany not squandered its offensive power at Kursk they likely would've defeated a Soviet offensive and regained the initiative for a new general offensive in 1944.

The German Eastern front was too long to effectively defend. In 1944 the Germans still had quite powerful reserves to call on, but the Soviet use of sequential attacks along the entire central front (a result of Soviet doctrine and superiority in numbers) made it impossible to employ the reserves effectively and resulted in a total German collapse. Defence is also an issue if you are hoping for a decisive result. Simply winning on the defence would not have given the Germans an advantage when they decided to move onto the attack again, an annihilation such as took place prior to the attack in 1942 would be necessary. The afore mentioned Soviet fondness for fighting along broad fronts is also illustrated at Kursk, where the German offensive wasn't decisively defeated by the defences, but by the Soviet counter attacks in Orel.

With the benefit of hindsight, an extended war would also have resulted in Berlin being nuked in 1945.

[Thunderhawk]

A tidbit most dont know..

In 1943 the first American raids into Germany produced disaster.

Due to operation tactics.
American fighters were ordered to protect their bombers and thus forbidden to chase down enemy fighters, allowing the Germans to strafe and run. Even if the Germans didnt kill the bomber or an escort fighter, they had little to worry about outside 5-10 minutes of action. Once that policy was changed -American fighters allowed to chase down enemy fighters- the Germans started taking large casualties in the air as the American fighters could then actually continue fighting rather then give up a retreating target. It was that operational change in tactics that resulted in improved allied performace in the air. P-51s came in soon after and the credit unjustly goes strait to them, rather then the new strategy.

[Siberian Fox]

I really believe that from the moment Germany invaded Poland, Germany was doomed to lose the second World War. Germany just did not have the necessary resources with which to knock the British Empire out of the war in a quick and decisive way like Poland and France. It wasn't even so much a mistake on Hitler's part, since when the war began Neville Chamberlain was still Prime Minister, and so it is understandable that the German leadership would expect Britain to begin peace negotiations after allied forces were defeated in France. That instead Winston Churchill became the new British Prime Minister, a man as stubborn as Hitler himself in his resolution not to be defeated made it inevitable the Germany would eventually lose one way or another. Churchill was so ruthless he destroyed the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir just because they did not surrender their ships after a six-hour ultimatum, on the off-chance that they might fall into Axis hands (which their French commanders had had no intention of allowing), and ordered that if Germany launched an amphibious attack on the South coast of England that the Royal Air Force was the drop mustard gas on the beaches.

• Geography: The English Channel meant Germany possessed no ability to win the war - no heavy bombers (unlike Britain) and a weak navy (unlike Britain).
• Germany did not have (or have access to) the resources the British Empire had which would be more important for a long war (both mineral and man-power).
• If Germany had not invaded the U.S.S.R., the U.S.S.R. would have spent it's time arming itself in preparation for an invasion of Europe at an opportune time, and Germany did not have the manpower to defeat the Soviet Union.
• The USA's preferred victor was Britain, and so Britain would still be supplied American equipment, and the USA would almost certainly have eventually joined the war on Britain's side after Pear Harbour.

I'm not saying Britain could have taken Berlin on it's own (because it couldn't), but it's long term position was more resilient than Germany's and it had time on it's side in a way Germany did not.

[Oxymoron]

My humble opinion:

Germany should not have helped Italy by invading Yugoslavia and Greece thus delaying Operation Barbarosa. I think that if they launched the invasion of the USSR on time, the winter wouldnt have been such a factor. The Germans would take Moscow and cut the vital railroad hub as well as perhaps fragmanting the Soviet Leadership. LeninGrad would then fall, as would StalingGrad and the Caucuses forcing Stalin to negotiate for Peace or be replaced via Coup.

[Siberian Fox]

Germany should not have helped Italy by invading Yugoslavia and Greece thus delaying Operation Barbarosa.

That would have left Greece in the war as a British ally, potentially providing a staging post for British forces to enter Europe and threaten Germany's oil supply in Romania. Germany would have been forced to deal with it anyway, but with increased disruption.

I think that if they launched the invasion of the USSR on time, the winter wouldnt have been such a factor.

True, but could those four weeks have really been decisive? The hardening of Russian defence around Moscow and the determinedness of the defenders of Leningrad was not all because of winter.

The Germans would take Moscow and cut the vital railroad hub as well as perhaps fragmanting the Soviet Leadership.

The German's failure to capture (or at least surround) Moscow had more too do with Hitler changing his mind about which army-group was more important than anything else.

LeninGrad would then fall

Hitler could have taken Leningrad if he had wanted to. He could have just left it as his priority target instead of changing his mind to Moscow (too late). However Hitler preferred that Leningrad be made to suffer (or be pounded into dust).

as would StalingGrad and the Caucuses forcing Stalin to negotiate for Peace or be replaced via Coup.

Stalingrad was much too far East to be taken in 1941 unless Leningrad and Moscow be abandoned as primary targets and more resources be given to Army group South.

Let us say that Hitler took the advice of his staff and made Moscow number one target. Let us say that they successfully surrounded it even.

1. It would not be captured in 1941 and fighting there would turn into a bloody Stalingrad type battle.
2. Even if it was captured and Stalin was killed the U.S.S.R. was such a vast country that they would have kept fighting from the East. With Germany's supply lines becoming increasingly longer.

If the German attack had come earlier the war might have lasted longer, but the best result would be that the Western allies get to Berlin first, or worst case Berlin gets Atom-bombed.

[Oxymoron]

That would have left Greece in the war as a British ally, potentially providing a staging post for British forces to enter Europe and threaten Germany's oil supply in Romania. Germany would have been forced to deal with it anyway, but with increased disruption.

I dont think the British were capable of threatening Romania, as they were busy in Africa. By the time they had an opportunity to do anything German troops would hold the Caucuses and would have defeated or dealt a huge blow to the Red Army.

True, but could those four weeks have really been decisive? The hardening of Russian defence around Moscow and the determinedness of the defenders of Leningrad was not all because of winter.

The ferocity and bravery of the Russian soldier cannot be overlooked, but I think the severe winter was the desicive blow to the Germans without which I think Moscow would have fallen, and without the Railhub Leningrad and Stalingrad would be lost.

The German's failure to capture (or at least surround) Moscow had more too do with Hitler changing his mind about which army-group was more important than anything else.

There were multiple reasons for Germanies failure but perhaps chaning one of them would have been enough of a difference.

Hitler could have taken Leningrad if he had wanted to. He could have just left it as his priority target instead of changing his mind to Moscow (too late). However Hitler preferred that Leningrad be made to suffer (or be pounded into dust).

Very true.

Stalingrad was much too far East to be taken in 1941 unless Leningrad and Moscow be abandoned as primary targets and more resources be given to Army group South.It would not be captured in 1941 and fighting there would turn into a bloody Stalingrad type battle.
Even if it was captured and Stalin was killed the U.S.S.R. was such a vast country that they would have kept fighting from the East. With Germany's supply lines becoming increasingly longer.

I didnt mean to say it would have been taken right away but the Soviets wouldnt be able hold the city, with Moscow out of the picture and the Soviet Leadership disorganized, and the troops moral being very low. I suspect a mutiny would have taken place by Stavka forcing a cease fire.

If the German attack had come earlier the war might have lasted longer, but the best result would be that the Western allies get to Berlin first, or worst case Berlin gets Atom-bombed.

Perhaps, its hard to say but if Russia was knocked out of the war I think Britain would have no choice but to secure a peace treaty with Germany.

[Smilin' Dave]

Germany should not have helped Italy by invading Yugoslavia and Greece thus delaying Operation Barbarosa.

Operation Barbarossa had already been delayed at the point, due to failure to stockpile sufficient supplies and some late rain turning the ground into slush (which would have made building momentum for the initial invasion difficult). As Fox noted, Greece was on its way to becoming part of the Allies, which was also an issue.

I think that if they launched the invasion of the USSR on time, the winter wouldnt have been such a factor.

Autumn was probably more decisive season-wise, frost hardened roads are relatively easy to drive on. The Axis would still have had to contend with logistics problems, as well as the high level of attrition experienced prior to the push on Moscow.

I dont think the British were capable of threatening Romania, as they were busy in Africa.

An air attack early in the war would have been quite viable, especially if German air defense assets were bogged down in the invasion of the Soviet Union. If anything Greek airbases would have given the British strategic bomber command something useful to do.

By the time they had an opportunity to do anything German troops would hold the Caucuses and would have defeated or dealt a huge blow to the Red Army.

In the short term the Germans were still dependent of Romanian oil, even if they could have secured the Caucasus, since the Soviets destroyed the wells and refineries as they retreated (not to mention the issue of shipping the oil back to Germany). Thus the loss of Romanian oil would have been fairly serious.

The ferocity and bravery of the Russian soldier cannot be overlooked, but I think the severe winter was the desicive blow to the Germans without which I think Moscow would have fallen

The German attack on Moscow had already been delayed prior to winter by difficulties on the southern front, first with Army Group South running behind, then with significant pockets of Soviet troops having to be reduced around Smolensk etc. I also question why the Soviets were able to launch a winter offensive, but not the Germans. The Soviet army wasn't actually well equipped to fight in winter (see for example the attacks on Finland) and probably lost more men than the Germans from the cold. On the other hand, maybe the Germans had already shot their bolt when the Siberian reserves came onto the line?

There were multiple reasons for Germanies failure but perhaps chaning one of them would have been enough of a difference.

Not if the base causes of those failures eg. enemy resistance, a poor general staff and the Nazi party, had not been resolved.

if Russia was knocked out of the war I think Britain would have no choice but to secure a peace treaty with Germany.

Why? By late 1941 the US had entered the war, giving the British another big ally to rely upon. German victor in the east would not have allowed Germany to attack Britain in the short term, given the British time to build up, attack the periphery etc.

[guzzipat]

Perhaps, its hard to say but if Russia was knocked out of the war I think Britain would have no choice but to secure a peace treaty with Germany.

Logic had very little to do with Britain deciding to fight on in 1940. I see no reason for that to change.
Churchills perspective was clear, if jingoistic and and unsubtle, he said that a country that went down fighting would rise again, one that surrendered was doomed.
The rights or wrongs of that are immaterial, it would have taken the overerthrow of the Churchill Government to make peace.

[Erebus]

The stupid and disasterous decision to attack Russia and face war on two fronts?

So stupid that people agreed with it and no one stopped it?

[guzzipat]

Quote:
The stupid and disasterous decision to attack Russia and face war on two fronts?


So stupid that people agreed with it and no one stopped it?

I was refering to Hitler's decision.

Here is what Gerneral Heinz Gudarian, one of the orgiinators of blitzkreig and a superb commander of armour, said about it. in his book "Panzer Leader"
On seeing a map of Russia displayed and being told for the first time of Operation Barbarossa.
"I could scarcely beleive my eyes. Was something which I held to be utterly imposible now to become a fact? Hitler had criticised the leaders of German policy in 1914 in the strongest possible words for ttheir faillure to avoid a war on 2 fronts. Was he now on his own initiative and before the war with England had been decided, to open his second-front war against the Russians?
Many other Generals were of similar opions.
Who specifically were you refering to when you said "people agreed with it" do you have what they said?

As for no one stopping it, Hitler was a dictator, he wasn't known for tolerating dissent, it would have been impossible to stop him short of assasination.
What did you mean by that?

Are you saying that starting a war on 2 fronts was a sensible strategy? I would be interested in hearing a justification for that.