Smilin' dave wrote:In terms of battle experience however, I think it fair to say the replacements were of lesser quality.
Certainly, but the opponents of the Germans suffered similar problems, usually to a greater degree due the Germans inflicting casualties at a higher rate they received. Tactically critical forces like armor, artillery, etc. were also usually preserved to a higher degree.
Smilin' dave wrote:Yes and no. The German manpower issue in the midwar period was resolved at the cost of removing Germans from key areas of the economy, which had an impact on the quantity and quality of weapons being produced. The Luftwaffe Field Divisions were another example of manpower shortages not being as simple as boots on the ground.
Is there any evidence of skilled machinists and such being removed from their jobs? Luftwaffe field divisions were an example of diverting non-essential manpower, as these men simply weren't needed in the Luftwaffe at all. Pity for the Germans that in the first war no one had the idea of coming up with Kaiserliche Marine field divisions.
Smilin' dave wrote:Why would totally industrial mobilisation offset the shortage of petroleum? Synthetic production never came near realistically suplementing the German war machine.
Total industrial mobilization would necessarily include the construction of necessary synthetic fuel complexes, as well as effectively centralizing management. Much in the same way, the total industrial mobilization of the United States during the war involved the construction of massive synthetic rubber plants--a technology we didn't even have at the outset of the war, unlike the Germans. The only major synthetic fuel plant plans prior to Speer taking control were either initiatives pushed by profit-minded industrialists or the SS and their buna werke at Auschwitz, which was a clusterfuck of a project due to the SS's strong desire to kill the workers rather than finish the project. Following Speer taking control, new plans were drawn up and synthetic fuel plants were going up all over the Reich in 1944.
Smilin' dave wrote:It was a partial error, but its is really only apparent in hindsight. The advance of Moscow had already stalled by that stage of the invasion due to logistics issues and the fear of Soviet counter attacks against the German flanks (which had proven problematic in the invasion of France, and to a lesser extent in earlier Soviet counter attacks). Von Bock's troops might have been allocated on the basis it would wrap up the Kiev pocket faster, after all earlier battles in the pockets had caused long delays, like the taking of Brest. That Kiev fell so quickly seems to have come as a surprise, and hence why von Bock was wrong footed.
It only becomes obvious in hindsight, yet von Bock, Guderian, List, von Leeb, and a host of Hitler's other top commanders saw it as an error at the time itself. It was Hitler's insistence that the kessel at Kiev be destroyed, based on a faulty conception of the tactical capabilities of the Wehrmacht, that forced the decision.
Smilin' dave wrote:Inspired? The Soviets were simply using a tactic used against previous invaders... I not even sure it could be considered quintessentially Russian, since most nations try to do this given the opportunity.
As far as I know, the first recorded instance of such a strategy is during the Second Punic War, under the direction of Fabius Maximus. And the strategy is almost certainly older than that.
pugsville wrote:The sheer lack of reasonable strategic planning was the germans major problem. They didnt really have any definite objectives set after the initial crushing of the border armies, this lead to poor logistics planning. Without serious planning occupation of the oilfields would have been an hollow victory. they also had poor intellegence of the size of soviet army.
Their plan with bliztkreig and the russians fold like cheap cardboard, and thats it. If they had definite plans to take leningrad and moscow as strategic objectives in 1941, planned to support armies that far into russian they may have done better.
They did have very clear objectives for 1941. The plan was to seize Leningrad, the Donetsk Basin, and Moscow in addition to destroying the main body of the Red Army. After that, likely for 1942, the plan was to advance to the Archangel-Astrakhan line.
Poor intelligence was certainly a problem, as the Soviets had twice as many tanks as the Wehrmacht thought, including the nasty surprise that was the T-34.
guzzipat wrote:There is a lot of nonsense spoken about countries "replacing manpower" in armies after a reverse, as if this means it restores that army to it's former efficiency.
It doesn't, not by a damnsite, any army that suffers heavy losses will inevitably lose a high percentage of their best troops, you don't put sub-standard units in the front line, if you can avoid it. Replacing the best and bravest with raw replacements with no battle experience, can never bring that army up to it's former efficiency.
The two most important factors in any military unit are moral and logistics. It is impossible for an army to suffer a reverse and the massive losses of the 1941 winter, without a huge drop in moral, especially as the army had known nothing but victory before. Follow that with another heavy defeat and massive losses at Stalingrad and moral would have plumetted. Replacements in any army are treated with contempt till they prove themselves, the fact that the manpower is replaced doesn't increase moral by much. It certainly will not return any army to it's former efficiency.
There can be no doubt that the losses of 1941 were serious and effected the efficency of the army. Compound that with the massive losses at Stalingrad and you have a terminal decline. The ridiculous decision to attack at Kursk, was the act that finally meant the German army faced no possibility other than defeat.
The problem with this is the Soviets continually suffered heavier losses, including nearly their entire 1941 force. This simply did not happen to the Germans. The 1941 winter inflicted 300-450 thousand casualties, compared to another one million for the Soviets. The loss of the 6th army was a disaster to be sure, but again their losses in 1942 were lower than those of the Soviets. The Soviets also continually suffered far higher losses in the tactically critical armored forces, so I don't buy that the quality depreciation caused by losses doomed the Wehrmacht.
Supply lines are a different matter entirely, and the opening of the Railroad War in 1943 was a disaster for the Wehrmacht.