[Potemkin]

After December 1941 there was no way Russia would have lost the war(I don't think they ever would of)

Utterly false. The German Wehrmacht reached the outskirts of Moscow, where Stalin intended to make his last stand. Only the intervention of fresh troops from the East prevented the Germans from capturing Moscow and killing Stalin. Even after they were driven back, Hitler still had a better than 50% chance of ultimately winning the war. If he had captured Stalingrad and the oilfields of the south, he would have been sitting pretty.

Of course, you're right about the French though. The British would be the last people to underestimate the French as a martial nation; we've fought them often enough to know how tough they are.

[albionfagan]

Utterly false. The German Wehrmacht reached the outskirts of Moscow, where Stalin intended to make his last stand. Only the intervention of fresh troops from the East prevented the Germans from capturing Moscow and killing Stalin. Even after they were driven back, Hitler still had a better than 50% chance of ultimately winning the war. If he had captured Stalingrad and the oilfields of the south, he would have been sitting pretty.

Of course, you're right about the French though. The British would be the last people to underestimate the French as a martial nation; we've fought them often enough to know how tough they are.

How an earth do you quantify something like that ?

I disagree, I agree that the battle for Stalingrad was pivotal and turned the war. However I don't believe it ultimately decided, the war was decided by the end of 1941. This was shortly before the end of the battle of Moscow, which ended officially in January 1942 but it had been decided before the end of 1941, this was the end of Germany. They were forced to wait out the winter, suffering incorrigble losses and allowing the Russians to regroup. The German aim was to knock Russia out within 6 weeks at most and at least by the end of 1941, they failed. After this it was a war of attrition, which the Germans did surpisingly well with to begin with, but was never likely to win, Russia was simply inexhaustable in terms of manpower. If Italy had not been so apallingly amatuerish in Greece, resulting in German involment, then the Russian offensive would have begun earlier(I think around mid May), maybe then Germany could have defeated Russia.

[Potemkin]

How an earth do you quantify something like that ?

You don't; of course, I pulled the number out of my ass, as our trans-Atlantic friends would say.

I disagree, I agree that the battle for Stalingrad was pivotal and turned the war. However I don't believe it ultimately decided, the war was decided by the end of 1941. This was shortly before the end of the battle of Moscow, which ended officially in January 1942 but it had been decided before the end of 1941, this was the end of Germany.

I disagree. The failure of Operation Barbarossa was no more the end of Germany than the failure of the Schlieffen Plan was in the First World War. Germany could still have won.

They were forced to wait out the winter, suffering incorrigble losses and allowing the Russians to regroup. The German aim was to knock Russia out within 6 weeks at most and at least by the end of 1941, they failed. After this it was a war of attrition, which the Germans did surpisingly well with to begin with, but was never likely to win, Russia was simply inexhaustable in terms of manpower.

Russia was very exhaustible in terms of manpower. And it wasn't just manpower which won the war; it was the production of tanks, rifles, explosives, uniforms, equipment, etc etc etc....

If Italy had not been so apallingly amatuerish in Greece, resulting in German involment, then the Russian offensive would have begun earlier(I think around mid May), maybe then Germany could have defeated Russia.

Who knows? Certainly, Germany would have been better off if Italy had remained neutral, like Spain.

[albionfagan]

Yes I can only agree there the man that Hitler once admired was only a burden once it came to warfare.

[Dave]

I disagree, I agree that the battle for Stalingrad was pivotal and turned the war.

I don't even agree with this consensus view, as the Germans replaced all of their losses from Stalingrad by May of 1943.

However I don't believe it ultimately decided, the war was decided by the end of 1941. This was shortly before the end of the battle of Moscow, which ended officially in January 1942 but it had been decided before the end of 1941, this was the end of Germany.

Please justify this assertion.

They were forced to wait out the winter, suffering incorrigble losses and allowing the Russians to regroup.

The Russians actually attacked, suffering defeat and heavier losses (on the order of 3:1 from January-March).

The German aim was to knock Russia out within 6 weeks at most and at least by the end of 1941, they failed.

The aim was actually to defeat the USSR in 20 weeks. 6 weeks is a preposterously short time to defeat such a large and powerful adversary.

After this it was a war of attrition, which the Germans did surpisingly well with to begin with, but was never likely to win, Russia was simply inexhaustable in terms of manpower.

The Germans had no problems with manpower until after D-Day and Operation Bagration, and never suffered the kind of manpower problems they had in the First World War. Soviet manpower advantages were somewhat offset by enormous casualties in 1941 (6 million), the loss of the Western USSR, and large-scale desertion The war of attrition you refer to was a matter of industrial resources and raw materials. The Germans were ahead of the USSR in industrial resources, but failed to mobilize them properly until 1944 due to Hitler's belief that the Kaiser had lost the first war by forcing the German people to make too many sacrifices. On the other hand, the Germans were desperately short of raw materials throughout the war, particularly refined petroleum products (something which also could've been alleviated had they engaged in total industrial mobilization earlier).

If Italy had not been so apallingly amatuerish in Greece, resulting in German involment, then the Russian offensive would have begun earlier(I think around mid May), maybe then Germany could have defeated Russia.

Unusually heavy spring rains in 1941 meant that Operation Barbarossa could not have begun in April (as originally scheduled) or May either. If you're looking for a timing problem, diverting von Bock's armored forces to the Battle of Kiev, where they were not required, instead of advancing directly to Moscow was a serious error. Failing to capture the bridges over the Neva River early enough also prevented the Germans from taking Leningrad. Barring the use of fallschirmjaegers after Crete contributed to the latter and many other missed opportunities, giving the poor state of Soviet communications in 1941 (later rectified by Lend-Lease radio equipment).

[albionfagan]

I don't even agree with this consensus view, as the Germans replaced all of their losses from Stalingrad by May of 1943.

Replaced but for how long, they did not have anywhere near the reserves that Russia could call upon with them. Couple with this the invasion of Italy drew extra troops away.

Justify this assertion

Once Operation Typhoon failed the Germans were indefinitely stuck

The Russians actually attacked, suffering defeat and heavier losses (on the order of 3:1 from January-March).

Whilst the German army didn't suffer complete defeat it still sustained heavy losses during these battles, something it could ill afford, considering the lenght of supply lines and Russia's significant advantage in man power.

The aim was actually to defeat the USSR in 20 weeks. 6 weeks is a preposterously short time to defeat such a large and powerful adversary

.

Not exactly, using the blitzkrieg tactics so pivotal to success across the rest of Europe, Germany though they could break the back of Russia within 6 weeks. This included the capture of Leningrad, donetsk basin and then Moscow. Leningrad was the primary objective of Hitler's

The Germans had no problems with manpower until after D-Day and Operation Bagration, and never suffered the kind of manpower problems they had in the First World War. Soviet manpower advantages were somewhat offset by enormous casualties in 1941 (6 million), the loss of the Western USSR, and large-scale desertion The war of attrition you refer to was a matter of industrial resources and raw materials. The Germans were ahead of the USSR in industrial resources, but failed to mobilize them properly until 1944 due to Hitler's belief that the Kaiser had lost the first war by forcing the German people to make too many sacrifices. On the other hand, the Germans were desperately short of raw materials throughout the war, particularly refined petroleum products (something which also could've been alleviated had they engaged in total industrial mobilization earlier).

This doesn't refute what I was saying really, it doesn't matter when it became a problem, it did and it was always going to. Of course the war economy was too late to be applied in Germany. Russian scorched earth policy was also decidedly inspired, meaning the Germans could make use of Russian natural resources.

Unusually heavy spring rains in 1941 meant that Operation Barbarossa could not have begun in April (as originally scheduled) or May either. If you're looking for a timing problem, diverting von Bock's armored forces to the Battle of Kiev, where they were not required, instead of advancing directly to Moscow was a serious error. Failing to capture the bridges over the Neva River early enough also prevented the Germans from taking Leningrad. Barring the use of fallschirmjaegers after Crete contributed to the latter and many other missed opportunities, giving the poor state of Soviet communications in 1941 (later rectified by Lend-Lease radio equipment).

This is true but doesn't completely negate what I said, only serves to further compound it.

[albionfagan]

I really do need to sort out my quoting

SD - Fixed. For reference you need a new set of quote tags for each bite of text you are quoting.

[Oxymoron]

I don't even agree with this consensus view, as the Germans replaced all of their losses from Stalingrad by May of 1943.

But they lost vital initiative, and the Soviets forces where growing expenationaly.

The Russians actually attacked, suffering defeat and heavier losses (on the order of 3:1 from January-March).

Russians could replenish forces much quicker, and they didnt have to deal with long supply lines.

[Smilin' Dave]

@Dave

I don't even agree with this consensus view, as the Germans replaced all of their losses from Stalingrad by May of 1943.

In terms of battle experience however, I think it fair to say the replacements were of lesser quality.

The Germans had no problems with manpower until after D-Day and Operation Bagration, and never suffered the kind of manpower problems they had in the First World War.

Yes and no. The German manpower issue in the midwar period was resolved at the cost of removing Germans from key areas of the economy, which had an impact on the quantity and quality of weapons being produced. The Luftwaffe Field Divisions were another example of manpower shortages not being as simple as boots on the ground.

On the other hand, the Germans were desperately short of raw materials throughout the war, particularly refined petroleum products (something which also could've been alleviated had they engaged in total industrial mobilization earlier).

Why would totally industrial mobilisation offset the shortage of petroleum? Synthetic production never came near realistically suplementing the German war machine.

If you're looking for a timing problem, diverting von Bock's armored forces to the Battle of Kiev, where they were not required, instead of advancing directly to Moscow was a serious error.

It was a partial error, but its is really only apparent in hindsight. The advance of Moscow had already stalled by that stage of the invasion due to logistics issues and the fear of Soviet counter attacks against the German flanks (which had proven problematic in the invasion of France, and to a lesser extent in earlier Soviet counter attacks). Von Bock's troops might have been allocated on the basis it would wrap up the Kiev pocket faster, after all earlier battles in the pockets had caused long delays, like the taking of Brest. That Kiev fell so quickly seems to have come as a surprise, and hence why von Bock was wrong footed.

@Oxymoron

But they lost vital initiative, and the Soviets forces where growing expenationaly.

The Germans still had the initiative by and large, hence why they had the option to select the (ill fated) Kursk salient as the next major offensive target. Perhaps it would be more accurate to same the initiative wasn't as clearly with one side after Stalingrad, or that Germany had less options.

@albionfagan

Russian scorched earth policy was also decidedly inspired,

Inspired? The Soviets were simply using a tactic used against previous invaders... I not even sure it could be considered quintessentially Russian, since most nations try to do this given the opportunity.

[pugsville]

The sheer lack of reasonable strategic planning was the germans major problem. They didnt really have any definite objectives set after the initial crushing of the border armies, this lead to poor logistics planning. Without serious planning occupation of the oilfields would have been an hollow victory. they also had poor intellegence of the size of soviet army.

Their plan with bliztkreig and the russians fold like cheap cardboard, and thats it. If they had definite plans to take leningrad and moscow as strategic objectives in 1941, planned to support armies that far into russian they may have done better.

[guzzipat]

There is a lot of nonsense spoken about countries "replacing manpower" in armies after a reverse, as if this means it restores that army to it's former efficiency.

It doesn't, not by a damnsite, any army that suffers heavy losses will inevitably lose a high percentage of their best troops, you don't put sub-standard units in the front line, if you can avoid it. Replacing the best and bravest with raw replacements with no battle experience, can never bring that army up to it's former efficiency.

The two most important factors in any military unit are moral and logistics. It is impossible for an army to suffer a reverse and the massive losses of the 1941 winter, without a huge drop in moral, especially as the army had known nothing but victory before. Follow that with another heavy defeat and massive losses at Stalingrad and moral would have plumetted. Replacements in any army are treated with contempt till they prove themselves, the fact that the manpower is replaced doesn't increase moral by much. It certainly will not return any army to it's former efficiency.

There can be no doubt that the losses of 1941 were serious and effected the efficency of the army. Compound that with the massive losses at Stalingrad and you have a terminal decline. The ridiculous decision to attack at Kursk, was the act that finally meant the German army faced no possibility other than defeat.

[Dave]

In terms of battle experience however, I think it fair to say the replacements were of lesser quality.

Certainly, but the opponents of the Germans suffered similar problems, usually to a greater degree due the Germans inflicting casualties at a higher rate they received. Tactically critical forces like armor, artillery, etc. were also usually preserved to a higher degree.

Yes and no. The German manpower issue in the midwar period was resolved at the cost of removing Germans from key areas of the economy, which had an impact on the quantity and quality of weapons being produced. The Luftwaffe Field Divisions were another example of manpower shortages not being as simple as boots on the ground.

Is there any evidence of skilled machinists and such being removed from their jobs? Luftwaffe field divisions were an example of diverting non-essential manpower, as these men simply weren't needed in the Luftwaffe at all. Pity for the Germans that in the first war no one had the idea of coming up with Kaiserliche Marine field divisions.

Why would totally industrial mobilisation offset the shortage of petroleum? Synthetic production never came near realistically suplementing the German war machine.

Total industrial mobilization would necessarily include the construction of necessary synthetic fuel complexes, as well as effectively centralizing management. Much in the same way, the total industrial mobilization of the United States during the war involved the construction of massive synthetic rubber plants--a technology we didn't even have at the outset of the war, unlike the Germans. The only major synthetic fuel plant plans prior to Speer taking control were either initiatives pushed by profit-minded industrialists or the SS and their buna werke at Auschwitz, which was a clusterfuck of a project due to the SS's strong desire to kill the workers rather than finish the project. Following Speer taking control, new plans were drawn up and synthetic fuel plants were going up all over the Reich in 1944.

It was a partial error, but its is really only apparent in hindsight. The advance of Moscow had already stalled by that stage of the invasion due to logistics issues and the fear of Soviet counter attacks against the German flanks (which had proven problematic in the invasion of France, and to a lesser extent in earlier Soviet counter attacks). Von Bock's troops might have been allocated on the basis it would wrap up the Kiev pocket faster, after all earlier battles in the pockets had caused long delays, like the taking of Brest. That Kiev fell so quickly seems to have come as a surprise, and hence why von Bock was wrong footed.

It only becomes obvious in hindsight, yet von Bock, Guderian, List, von Leeb, and a host of Hitler's other top commanders saw it as an error at the time itself. It was Hitler's insistence that the kessel at Kiev be destroyed, based on a faulty conception of the tactical capabilities of the Wehrmacht, that forced the decision.

Inspired? The Soviets were simply using a tactic used against previous invaders... I not even sure it could be considered quintessentially Russian, since most nations try to do this given the opportunity.

As far as I know, the first recorded instance of such a strategy is during the Second Punic War, under the direction of Fabius Maximus. And the strategy is almost certainly older than that.

The sheer lack of reasonable strategic planning was the germans major problem. They didnt really have any definite objectives set after the initial crushing of the border armies, this lead to poor logistics planning. Without serious planning occupation of the oilfields would have been an hollow victory. they also had poor intellegence of the size of soviet army.

Their plan with bliztkreig and the russians fold like cheap cardboard, and thats it. If they had definite plans to take leningrad and moscow as strategic objectives in 1941, planned to support armies that far into russian they may have done better.

They did have very clear objectives for 1941. The plan was to seize Leningrad, the Donetsk Basin, and Moscow in addition to destroying the main body of the Red Army. After that, likely for 1942, the plan was to advance to the Archangel-Astrakhan line.

Poor intelligence was certainly a problem, as the Soviets had twice as many tanks as the Wehrmacht thought, including the nasty surprise that was the T-34.

There is a lot of nonsense spoken about countries "replacing manpower" in armies after a reverse, as if this means it restores that army to it's former efficiency.

It doesn't, not by a damnsite, any army that suffers heavy losses will inevitably lose a high percentage of their best troops, you don't put sub-standard units in the front line, if you can avoid it. Replacing the best and bravest with raw replacements with no battle experience, can never bring that army up to it's former efficiency.

The two most important factors in any military unit are moral and logistics. It is impossible for an army to suffer a reverse and the massive losses of the 1941 winter, without a huge drop in moral, especially as the army had known nothing but victory before. Follow that with another heavy defeat and massive losses at Stalingrad and moral would have plumetted. Replacements in any army are treated with contempt till they prove themselves, the fact that the manpower is replaced doesn't increase moral by much. It certainly will not return any army to it's former efficiency.

There can be no doubt that the losses of 1941 were serious and effected the efficency of the army. Compound that with the massive losses at Stalingrad and you have a terminal decline. The ridiculous decision to attack at Kursk, was the act that finally meant the German army faced no possibility other than defeat.

The problem with this is the Soviets continually suffered heavier losses, including nearly their entire 1941 force. This simply did not happen to the Germans. The 1941 winter inflicted 300-450 thousand casualties, compared to another one million for the Soviets. The loss of the 6th army was a disaster to be sure, but again their losses in 1942 were lower than those of the Soviets. The Soviets also continually suffered far higher losses in the tactically critical armored forces, so I don't buy that the quality depreciation caused by losses doomed the Wehrmacht.

Supply lines are a different matter entirely, and the opening of the Railroad War in 1943 was a disaster for the Wehrmacht.

[Smilin' Dave]

Certainly, but the opponents of the Germans suffered similar problems, usually to a greater degree due the Germans inflicting casualties at a higher rate they received.

So one side lost an advantage they had, while the other side was in the same boat it had always been. This sounsd like a net loss to me. Germany's ability to exact such high kill:loss ratios was after all related to its tactical edge, which traces to its experienced troops.

Is there any evidence of skilled machinists and such being removed from their jobs?

I thought this was fairly well covered in the existing literature on the Nazi shift to a total war economy, along with the attempts to supplement production with slave labour.

Luftwaffe field divisions were an example of diverting non-essential manpower, as these men simply weren't needed in the Luftwaffe at all.

It was also indicative of an urgent need to deploy manpower, even if it meant taking it from organisations perceived as critical (unless industrial workers however, the luftwaffe probably didn't need the troops anyhow). The poor performance of the field divisions is also relevant to the discussion on the defecit of experienced troops.

Total industrial mobilization would necessarily include the construction of necessary synthetic fuel complexes, as well as effectively centralizing management.

The resources needed to expand the synthetic oil infrastructure sufficiently to have a decisive effect didn't exist, or would have to come out of another element of the war effort. For example it might have impeded the dispersal of industrial facilities in the face of Allied strategic bombing.

It only becomes obvious in hindsight, yet von Bock, Guderian, List, von Leeb, and a host of Hitler's other top commanders saw it as an error at the time itself. It was Hitler's insistence that the kessel at Kiev be destroyed, based on a faulty conception of the tactical capabilities of the Wehrmacht, that forced the decision.

As noted in the text you quoted, there was sufficient reason to believe at the time that the Kiev pocket would not be easily cleared and its strategic importance was clear. Thus extra resources were allocated. Only in hindsight was this proven to be an error. I'm sure plenty of German officers got it wrong about Brest after all.

The Soviets also continually suffered far higher losses in the tactically critical armored forces, so I don't buy that the quality depreciation caused by losses doomed the Wehrmacht.

No one is saying this element alone accounted for the doom of the Wehrmacht, they are simply noting that the losses at Stalingrad etc. did have an effect, even if they were partially offset by the release of manpower from other areas.

[Dave]

So one side lost an advantage they had, while the other side was in the same boat it had always been. This sounsd like a net loss to me. Germany's ability to exact such high kill:loss ratios was after all related to its tactical edge, which traces to its experienced troops.

It wasn't just experienced troops, but superior doctrine and especially a superior staff system. Inexperienced German units also did well in both World Wars. It was Bavarian Landswehr in the first war which dislodged elite French forces from the Woevre plain, not crack Prussian guard units.

The German tactical edge in operationally critical units like armor would also only have increased throughout the war, due to much of the Soviet tanker force regularly being killed and replaced.

I thought this was fairly well covered in the existing literature on the Nazi shift to a total war economy, along with the attempts to supplement production with slave labour.

If you could recommend some of the literature I would appreciate it. Are you professionally/academically involved in historical study? This is speculation on my part, but wouldn't the Germans replace unskilled labor and perhaps semi-skilled labor with foreign slaves, rather than skilled industrial workers who had draft exemptions? And it's not as if they could just quit and sign up easily either--it was illegal in Nazi Germany for an employee to quit his job without permission from his employer.

It was also indicative of an urgent need to deploy manpower, even if it meant taking it from organisations perceived as critical (unless industrial workers however, the luftwaffe probably didn't need the troops anyhow). The poor performance of the field divisions is also relevant to the discussion on the defecit of experienced troops.

Naturally when fighting the USSR, the United States, and the Britsh Empire manpower was going to be a shortcoming, but the Germans always managed to have enough troops to man their lines, at least until the twin disasters of Falaise and Bagration.

The Luftwaffe field divisions performed poorly due to the infighting typical to the Third Reich. The army was unwilling to see Luftwaffe units get more glory than they already had (fallschirmjaeger, herman goering division) and refused to supply trained officers, even though there were more than enough staff officers to do so. Thus the divisions had to make do with converted Luftwaffe officers or worse.

Other rapidly formed units which had good officers performed better, for instance post-1942 Waffen SS units.

The resources needed to expand the synthetic oil infrastructure sufficiently to have a decisive effect didn't exist, or would have to come out of another element of the war effort.

The main necessary resources were structural steel, which the Germans had a surplus of, brick or cement, which the Germans also have a surplus of, and unskilled workers (no shortage due to slavery). A big issue would be keeping the SS away from worksite management of course.

For example it might have impeded the dispersal of industrial facilities in the face of Allied strategic bombing.

A serious dispersal effort was not made until the latter part of 1944 anyway, and by that time the Allies had (correctly) switched their targeting to transportation infrastructure (mainly via the efforts of Pete Quesada's tactical air force) and oil refining (oops!).

As noted in the text you quoted, there was sufficient reason to believe at the time that the Kiev pocket would not be easily cleared and its strategic importance was clear. Thus extra resources were allocated. Only in hindsight was this proven to be an error. I'm sure plenty of German officers got it wrong about Brest after all.

Fair enough, but if we're talking about missed opportunities this is certainly one, even if it wasn't obvious given the information available at that time.

No one is saying this element alone accounted for the doom of the Wehrmacht, they are simply noting that the losses at Stalingrad etc. did have an effect, even if they were partially offset by the release of manpower from other areas.

I don't think anyone would disagree with that.

[Smilin' Dave]

It wasn't just experienced troops, but superior doctrine and especially a superior staff system.

Good doctrine is harder to implement without experienced troops, and without that tactical edge it is harder to achieve the strategic advantages of staff work without the casualties experienced by the Soviets.

The German tactical edge in operationally critical units like armor would also only have increased throughout the war, due to much of the Soviet tanker force regularly being killed and replaced.

Actually I would say the Soviet armour consistently improved throughout the war, although never reaching the level of the Germans. On the other hand while the German armour didn't suffer the same level of attrition as the infantry, it did experience a gradual decline from late 1943.

If you could recommend some of the literature I would appreciate it.

I'll have a dig through my notes, it's been a while since I looked at the economics of Nazi Germany.

Are you professionally/academically involved in historical study?

Not currently.

This is speculation on my part, but wouldn't the Germans replace unskilled labor and perhaps semi-skilled labor with foreign slaves, rather than skilled industrial workers who had draft exemptions?

The loss of even semi-skilled labour would still have been fairly critical if the replacements was less skilled and perhaps more importantly, less committed to certain standards of production and quality.

Naturally when fighting the USSR, the United States, and the Britsh Empire manpower was going to be a shortcoming, but the Germans always managed to have enough troops to man their lines, at least until the twin disasters of Falaise and Bagration.

The line was perhaps a little thing along the flanks just before Stalingrad was encircled, no? And that was before US troops had entered the war in a big way.

The Luftwaffe field divisions performed poorly due to the infighting typical to the Third Reich. The army was unwilling to see Luftwaffe units get more glory than they already had (fallschirmjaeger, herman goering division) and refused to supply trained officers, even though there were more than enough staff officers to do so. Thus the divisions had to make do with converted Luftwaffe officers or worse.

Morale and poor equipment levels were probably more decisive than officers in the performance of Luftwaffe field divisions. The impression I get (I don't have figures of relative casualty levels) is that Luftwaffe units tended to cave in rather than get annihilated.

The main necessary resources were structural steel, which the Germans had a surplus of, brick or cement, which the Germans also have a surplus of, and unskilled workers (no shortage due to slavery). A big issue would be keeping the SS away from worksite management of course.

Nazi mismanagement was such that even if surplus existed, the shifted emphasis might still have deprived other sectors of material. This also still doesn't prove that an expanded synthetic oil industry would have replaced other oil suppliers.

Wasn't slave labour tied to the SS from day one? It would have made it impossible to divorce the two in anything but a fantastic hypothetical.