[peter_co]

On the other hand keep in mind that in 1939 the British and French did not use that power to save Poland. There was a lack of will and a limited capacity to project power into Eastern Europe in a meaningful way. In this hypothetical they don't even have the indirect option of attacking Germany from the West as in actual 1939.

About the will, I just assumed that was one of the givens of this hypothetical scenario. As for the "limited capacity to project power," I would disagree with that. Yes, the Anglo-French military strategy was essentially defensive in nature, but this was mostly due to the type of military thinking that pervaded the Allied military staff of the time (a direct consequence of the last war) and the great investment in fixed defenses (i.e. the Maginot line) and heavy artillery that had been made in the interwar period. However, the Allies did not lack the equipment necessary to undertake mobile offensive operations. This last point is well illustrated by the fact that at the outbreak of the war Germany and the United Kingdom combined had more numerous and superior armor and planes than the Germans did when they undertook their campaigns in Poland and later in Western Europe. The bigger problem is that they had not fully developed the tactics necessary for mobile warfare like Germany had, but cooperation with Germans could probably have ameliorated that deficit to a great extent.

Would Romania have been so keen to fight the USSR without them annexing Bessarabia and Bucovnia first? I'm not sure. Keep in mind in this scenario the Axis have no chance to build up, so the Romanians would be fighting alone to start with. I don't remember Hungary's diplomatic relations with Poland well, but I don't think they were that friendly.

The USSR had never hidden its pretensions towards Romanian lands, and as a result of this (and other factors) the Romanian attitude towards the USSR was always negative, only alternating from cold passivitiy to outright hostility. In fact, the situation was virtually the same in all other Eastern European countries (Russia has always had a certain way of getting on with its neighbors ). As a result of this, in spite of all their internecine squabbles, the Eastern European countries always shared the fear of their Eastern neighbor and frequently discussed forming a defensive military alliance with the Western Allies. Had the USSR invaded Poland, I am virtually certain that all these countries would have agreed to partake in an attack on the USSR as the only means of eliminating the imminent existential threat to their own states (since they would have had no reason to believe that the Russians would have stopped in Poland).

Something else to factor in is that lack of surprise. The Axis almost won in 1941 because the first few weeks of the invasion devastated the Red Army before it could properly deploy and was right in the middle of a strategic mobilisation/reorganisation.

Yes, I agree that the lack of surprise would have been a great disadvantage. However, I would argue that it is possible that this factor could have been offset by the unprepared state the Red Army found itself in '39. After all, what you call the "strategic reorganization" is a euphemism for what can be best characterized as a desperate attempt to patch up as much as possible after Stalin's disastrous purges, not only of the officer corps, but also of other sectors of the Soviet military-industrial complex, such as the engineers. The disaster of the Soviet campaign against Finland serves as a testament to the horrible state that the army was in at the time. And in that case surprise (or at least the initiative) was on the Soviet side, and their opponent was much less prepared and worse equipped than the Western Allies. Of course, it is difficult to extend this example to a possible Soviet-Allied confrontation, but the case is telling nonetheless.

Returning to my point on a planned war, if the Soviet leadership had been planning to invade Poland in 1939, they might have approached the purges of the military differently. They might at least have started releasing officers sooner than they actually did.

Yes of course. I was just kind of assuming that the Soviets would not have done anything different than what they had done in reality by the beginning of 1939. In any case, even had the Soviets acted earlier to amend the situation, as the example of Finland shows, I don't believe a few months would have sufficed.

[Smilin' Dave]

@Captain Sam

I'm sure Finland would of been very accommodating to the allies.

Finland's foreign policy didn't involve needlessly provoking war with it's neighbours.

@peter_co

About the will, I just assumed that was one of the givens of this hypothetical scenario.

Willpower isn’t just an on-off switch. After all the western Allies had the will to go to war with Germany over Poland... they just lacked enough willpower to do anything risky (like expanding the limited offensive launched by the French in 1939) that might help Poland.

However, the Allies did not lack the equipment necessary to undertake mobile offensive operations. This last point is well illustrated by the fact that at the outbreak of the war Germany and the United Kingdom combined had more numerous and superior armor and planes than the Germans did when they undertook their campaigns in Poland and later in Western Europe.

All of which counted for something in a war in and around France. In a hypothetical situation where the war is to be fought in Poland (and can’t really be fought anywhere else), all those tanks etc. are only as useful as the Allied ability and will to redeploy them strategically (and potentially leaving themselves at a disadvantage against... Nazi Germany, who can just use their railroad).

The USSR had never hidden its pretensions towards Romanian lands, and as a result of this (and other factors) the Romanian attitude towards the USSR was always negative, only alternating from cold passivitiy to outright hostility.

Nothing says passivity like invading the Soviet Union... which is what you are proposing...

As a result of this, in spite of all their internecine squabbles, the Eastern European countries always shared the fear of their Eastern neighbor and frequently discussed forming a defensive military alliance with the Western Allies.

I think this is excluding Bulgaria, but anyhow.

Had the USSR invaded Poland, I am virtually certain that all these countries would have agreed to partake in an attack on the USSR as the only means of eliminating the imminent existential threat to their own states

Romania didn’t intervene against the Soviets in 1939 when they invaded Poland, or IIRC again when they had their provinces were annexed. Did any of the Eastern European states intervene in 1921 when the Soviets were at the gates of Warsaw?

since they would have had no reason to believe that the Russians would have stopped in Poland

Again, someone needs to actually outline the reason for a Soviet invasion of all Poland. For example, if the Soviets had invaded simply to take back parts of Poland they considered to be part of Ukraine and Belorussia (which wasn’t too far off their actual foreign policy goals) it changes everything.

Yes, I agree that the lack of surprise would have been a great disadvantage. However, I would argue that it is possible that this factor could have been offset by the unprepared state the Red Army found itself in '39.

Given the nature of the hypothetical I don’t think it would be exceptional to suggest the Politburo and Stalin would have been better prepared for a war in this scenario than in 1939.

After all, what you call the "strategic reorganization" is a euphemism for what can be best characterized as a desperate attempt to patch up as much as possible after Stalin's disastrous purges, not only of the officer corps, but also of other sectors of the Soviet military-industrial complex, such as the engineers.

It’s not a euphemism. The Soviet military was literally being re-organised, for example the Red army was expanded and tanks were being reallocated to specialised mechanised units. I generally don’t use euphemisms when discussing Soviet history, but I do know what I am talking about...

The disaster of the Soviet campaign against Finland serves as a testament to the horrible state that the army was in at the time.

I might point out that once Voroshilov was removed from command of the Finnish campaign the Soviets made significant inroads and the Finns had to make concessions. The Winter War was a screw up in part because of the purges, but other factors like how the army was structured and poor strategic planning were also at play.

And in that case surprise (or at least the initiative) was on the Soviet side, and their opponent was much less prepared and worse equipped than the Western Allies.

The Finns, unlike the Western Allies, were fighting for their homeland and hence had excellent morale. They were fighting on ground that they (or at least their commanders) knew quite well, giving them another edge. I think the comparison you make is flawed.

I was just kind of assuming that the Soviets would not have done anything different than what they had done in reality by the beginning of 1939.

So they are going to wait to see what the Wehrmacht does first before invading?;)

In any case, even had the Soviets acted earlier to amend the situation, as the example of Finland shows, I don't believe a few months would have sufficed.

How is the Finnish example an example of the Soviets ‘acting earlier’ on the problem? You just used it as an example of the supposed key problem in play!

[peter_co]

Nothing says passivity like invading the Soviet Union... which is what you are proposing...

I said that, even at the warmest, Soviet-Romanian relations could only be characterized by passive animosity, but at worst there was active hostility between them, which I believe could have readily evolved into a violent confrontation (and such a phase was indeed initiated by the USSR in 1940).

Romania didn’t intervene against the Soviets in 1939 when they invaded Poland, or IIRC again when they had their provinces were annexed.

The problem was that Poland was first attacked by Germany, and only later by the USSR. And the Allies did not even hold the USSR responsible of aggression to same level as Germany, as they still wished to subsequently use them as allies. In other words the Eastern European states could hardly have seen their involvement as being part of an Allied crusade against Soviet aggression. Furthermore, as you said, the Allies did not even choose to attack Germany to relieve Poland, but stayed on the defensive, so any type of concerted action between the Eastern "powers" and the Western Allies was out of the question. This would not have been the case under this hypothetical scenario.

but I do know what I am talking about...

I never said you didn't, or are you saying that I don't?

The Winter War was a screw up in part because of the purges, but other factors like how the army was structured and poor strategic planning were also at play.

And wouldn't the same factors have applied to this fictional invasion of Poland?

How is the Finnish example an example of the Soviets ‘acting earlier’ on the problem? You just used it as an example of the supposed key problem in play!

I had just assumed that this fictional war would have happened a few months earlier than the actual Finnish war, but now that I look at the OP, I guess that's not a given.

[Smilin' Dave]

I said that, even at the warmest, Soviet-Romanian relations could only be characterized by passive animosity, but at worst there was active hostility between them, which I believe could have readily evolved into a violent confrontation (and such a phase was indeed initiated by the USSR in 1940).

My point is that the Romanians didn't intervene directly until they were directly threatened themselves. I'm sure the Romanians didn't like the Soviet Union, but I doubt they would start a war with them without direct support from some other country. That doesn't take place in this scenario.

I never said you didn't, or are you saying that I don't?

It was directed at you. Saying I'm using euphemisms for the purges when in fact I was referring to a different phenomena is mildly irritating and foolish on your part.

And wouldn't the same factors have applied to this fictional invasion of Poland?

Well since no one will put forward a scenario for this war (answering the question of whether it was a planned war), who knows? Given that the Soviets had been wargaming conflicts between themselves and Poland/Germany for some time prior to the war, and that troops needed would already be available (troops sent into Finland were often from the southern USSR), some problems might have been mitigated.