[Monopoly]

Many people I know in both Russia and the West believe that had it not been for Stalins exceptional disregard for human life and suffering the USSR would have lost the war. They believe that due to the post war industrialization that claimed nearly 20 million lives the USSR would have been defenceles against the Germans and that during the war and that during the war Stalin inspired confidence and du to his willingness to sacrifice anything to achieve victory the USSR eventualy won.

Well I completely disagree! During the war Stalin made loads of Strategic Tactical errors even more than Hitler its because of Stalins orders that 600 thousand soldiers got encircled in Kiev and more in Vitebsk and Orel Stalin is responsible for issuing the order no. 270 and no. 227 which basicaly meant to shoot all those who retreat and all that not a step back b.s.

What about before the war? Stalin ignored intelligence reports that Germany was going to attack some even gave the exact date of the attack but he was convinced that Hitler wont fight on two fronts so he just dismissed them! And why purge the army 1937!? The decision to purge nearly all of the top officers including 3 of 5 Marshalls and 8 of 9 admirals is crazy. Among them was Tukhachevsky who was in favour of Reforming the Red Army and aparantly the basis for this was forged Nazi documents that incriminated him of being a spy or something.

So my question is do you believe that the Soviets managed to beat the Germans due to or inspite of Stalins decisions before and during the war?

[redcarpet]

In spite of Stalin. He was no more a 'good' military commander than Hitler was.

[Smilin' Dave]

Stalin's decisions up to and including 1941 were indeed poor. As noted the 1937 purge of the Red Army made little sense(1), the 1939 Winter War was a fiasco (and based on Soviet success in 1940, avoidable) and the continued ignoring of the warning signs in 1941 nearly crippled the Soviets. About the only highlight of this early period was the Stalinist investment in heavy industry and military development. I think the effect of the 'Not One Step Back' order is exaggerated, for example in the early weeks of the war retreat didn't save soldiers at all, never mind the civilians left behind for the Einsatzgruppen. On the other hand, removing generals like Pavlov didn't help at all.

Later in the war however Stalin proved to be a fairly adept war leader. He understood the importance of pooling resources and holding reserves, which started to play a role outside Moscow. I believe the formation of STAVKA was Stalin's initiative, and this proved useful in terms of organising party-state resources. He deferred to his generals, even when they disagreed with him. Stalin played an important role on the diplomatic front in negotiations with the Western Allies. In a general sense he was a reasonably good political war leader. Much of this can't be said of Hitler, so I would reject the claim that Hitler and Stalin were equal in this field.

So I wouldn't say the Soviets won inspite of Stalin's efforts. On the other hand I would question whether they won because of him.

(1) Just a note on the role of Nazi documents in undermining Tukhachevsky, it should be noted that Stalin had tried to destroy Tukhachevsky prior to their creation and had been stopped. It also appears the Nazi forged evidence was never presented. So there was no shortage of incentive and the material made no difference.

[pugsville]

Really hard to Judge without stalin the Soviet Union MAY have been radically different, maybe factions and civil dis-order may have happened (and the soviet union might not have lasted till 1939), without him the soviet army may have been stronger in leadership (no purge) doctorine (more mobile warfare) posture (not so unprepared and disbelieving of the German preperations) and adopted more sucessful tactics )withdraw and delay?.

There could be many many possible arguements over a a vast number of points. How much does an individual influence history. With Germany between the wars some sort of Right wing coup was entirely predictable if there was any sort of economic shock, but without Hitler would such an insane mob get controls of the levers of power. (I am constantly struck by my reading acbout the nazis that how could such a rabble of stupidly flawed and seriously dysfunctional near non-entities had such an effect of world history? why werent they just turfed out for sheer mad incompendence, but then again I look at our political leaders and amazed people take them as seriously part of any sort of solution rather than the problem)

[redcarpet]

Putting General Zukov in charge of the defense of Moscow and the Kursk tank battle(biggest in history) were his best.

[Smilin' Dave]

"Kursk tank battle" wasn't Zhukov's command (he was in charge of the whole theatre, not the tanks committed), and the battle you are thinking of is Prokhorovka. Nor was that even Zhukov's greatest achievement. I think his defence of Leningrad, where he basically had no notable resources to work with, or his Stalingrad counter offensive, were far more impressive.

Saying the only good thing Stalin did was appoint Zhukov isn't correct. After all, it was from strategic reserves that STAVKA marshalled that Zhukov drew his forces from. It also sells short a number of other Soviet commanders, like Konev or Vasilevsky.

[chaostrivia]

Stalin is portrayed today as a moron in the west and this is not true: Speaking of his personality, he was a lunatic and a genius at the same time.
Unfortunately he was not a military genius. He was a terribly bad military commander and leader. So the USSR won despite Stalin and not because of Stalin. Or maybe I should say, because of my grandfather

[pugsville]

I dont know about the purge not making any sense. Was there ever even rumblings of some sort of militrary plot to get rid of stalin. It might have been a massive diastater for the country and insane stupidity from a national perspective, but if the aim was just get every last guy in the army who might be tempted to not put up with stalin even if it meant getting many many guys who wouldnt have, it may well be describe as sucessfull. Without the purge whats the chances someone shots stalin? Surley they would have to be significantly greater, personally I dont understand why so many soldiers went so god dam quietly.

[peter_co]

Much of this can't be said of Hitler, so I would reject the claim that Hitler and Stalin were equal in this field.

I don't know if I agree with that. Of course Hitler made serious blunders later in the war, and of course the decision to start the war in the first place was not exactly the stuff of genius, but I would argue that Hitler was instrumental in the German success at the beginning of the war. The leadership of Germany's high command was still quite conservative when Hitler assumed power, and in spite of brilliant innovations by the likes of Guderian, the overall doctrine of the Wehrmacht was in many ways only a modernization of Germany's Kesselschlacht approach. In fact, even as late as a a couple of years before the outbreak of the war with the Western Allies, the main German battle plan for the West was essentially a variation of the Schlieffen Plan. This would almost certainly have resulted in German defeat, since not only did this strategy require a numerical and technical superiority that the Germans did not possess, but the strong French defenses on the envisioned axis of attack would have paralyzed the attacking German armies. It is therefore no wonder that German generals were almost despairingly pessimistic regarding the prospect of victory.

Mannstein of course had an alternative plan that eventually proved to be astoundingly successful, however even shortly before the outbreak of the war he was marginalized by the military hierarchy as his ideas were seen as unrealistic. However, Mannstein, bypassing the chain of command was able to convince Hitler of the need to adopt this alternative approach to the Western Front, and the rest is as they say history. Were it not for this, it is very probable that Germany would have lost the war in 1940.

So to sum it up, both Hitler and Stalin made costly mistakes throughout the war, but when it comes to their successes, Hitler made an invaluable contribution that has absolutely no counterpart in the case of Stalin.

[Kman]

Then again you could say that if Stalin hadnt murdered most of the russian army's officer core then the russian army would have been a much better fighting force, and able to repel the germans without losing so many of their soldiers.

In the years before WW2 the russian army was in a state of paralysis because of the terror that Stalin induced, nobody would start any initiatives to renew tactics and strategy because of fear of standing out and getting killed.

[Smilin' Dave]

@peter_co
The passage you quoted relates to the use of politics and diplomacy during a war, so I’m not sure what this discussion about military matters has to do with it. In any event your interpretation is somewhat off the mark.

The leadership of Germany's high command was still quite conservative when Hitler assumed power, and in spite of brilliant innovations by the likes of Guderian, the overall doctrine of the Wehrmacht was in many ways only a modernization of Germany's Kesselschlacht approach.

Which remains apparent during the Nazi invasion of Poland, despite Hitler being well and truly in power by this stage. While mechanised forced played a role in the attack on Poland, their method of employment was far from revolutionary. I would argue that blitzkrieg while conceived in texts like Achtung Panzer etc., it didn’t develop as a doctrine without combat experience.

In fact, even as late as a a couple of years before the outbreak of the war with the Western Allies, the main German battle plan for the West was essentially a variation of the Schlieffen Plan.

Actually a variation of the Schlieffen Plan was retained right up until 1940, when the loss of the invasion plans in a plane accident tipped off the Allies. Without this chance occurrence Manstein’s sickle stroke would never have been implemented.

Hitler made an invaluable contribution that has absolutely no counterpart in the case of Stalin.

Your narrative of Hitler’s acceptance of Manstein’s plan actually closely mirrors the narrative of how Zhukov’s plan for Operation Uranus (Stalingrad counter offensive) was sold to Stalin. So there is a picture perfect counterpart on Stalin’s side of the ledger. That the Soviets were not being forced to revise their plan in the face of circumstances probably gives a bit of a bump too.

@Kman

Then again you could say that if Stalin hadnt murdered most of the russian army's officer core then the russian army would have been a much better fighting force, and able to repel the germans without losing so many of their soldiers.

This is basically correct. There is an argument that claims that the purges cleared out ‘old fashioned’ type generals and cleared the way for the leaders who ended up winning the war, but I don’t buy it. After all the purges left Voroshilov safely in charge along with killing off more competent and dynamic leaders.

In the years before WW2 the russian army was in a state of paralysis because of the terror that Stalin induced, nobody would start any initiatives to renew tactics and strategy because of fear of standing out and getting killed.

Yes and no. The basic concepts laid out by Tukhachevsky, Trianafilov etc. were actually retained in the Red Army field manuals, and were subsequently employed later in the war to great success. So while the purges discouraged independent action and slowed the full implementation of effective doctrine, there wasn’t necessarily a need to renew doctrine. The retention of these teachings also suggests that the leadership wasn’t completely hell bent on discarding everything of value in the name of politics.

[peter_co]

While mechanised forced played a role in the attack on Poland, their method of employment was far from revolutionary. I would argue that blitzkrieg while conceived in texts like Achtung Panzer etc., it didn’t develop as a doctrine without combat experience.

I would point out that even without actual combat experience, blitzkrieg tactics became progressively more accepted by the German high command before the war not only as a result of theoretical work, but also as a result of the success with which such tactics met in war games. The German staff took these games quite seriously and the breakthroughs proven to be possible by dynamic mechanized forces greatly enhanced Guderian's status. Furthermore, as you well know there is more to blitzkrieg than mechanized warfare, and other tactics, for instance tactical close air-power support was practiced by the Germans as early as the Spanish Civil War and was applied with excellent results in Poland.
In any case though, I agree that in spite of these advances the German high command had not fully embraced the new spirit espoused by Guderian and Mannstein (and Fuller for that matter on the English side), which resulted in Germany's tactics against Poland being far more coservative then those that would be employed the following year. It is against this very background that I emphasized Hitler's decisive intervention in 1940 in favor of Mannstein's approach.

Actually a variation of the Schlieffen Plan was retained right up until 1940, when the loss of the invasion plans in a plane accident tipped off the Allies. Without this chance occurrence Manstein’s sickle stroke would never have been implemented.

I don't deny this, however note that not even then was Mannstein's Plan preferred by the German staff, and Hitler's backing of Mannstein's alternative plan was met with great reluctance (if not outright opposition) on the part of the German high command. In other words, if it weren't for Hitler, not even after the old plan was compromised would something as revolutionary as the plan proposed by Mannstein have been accepted.

Your narrative of Hitler’s acceptance of Manstein’s plan actually closely mirrors the narrative of how Zhukov’s plan for Operation Uranus (Stalingrad counter offensive) was sold to Stalin.

I would argue that the two situations are completely different. In the case of Hitler, the majority of the high command was opposed to Mannstein's Plan and in effect Hitler had to go against the "common wisdom" of the general staff to implement the new policy, which was a radical change from the previous conservative approach. On the other hand, in the case of Stalin, the two most important generals of the general staff that worked on the Stalingrad plans: Zhukov and Vassilevsky vigorously promoted operation Uranus, and in fact there was no concerted support by other high-ranking generals for one alternative plan. In other words, Stalin's acceptance of Uranus can rather be described as the course of least resistance, while in the case of Hitler the exact opposite was the case.

[Smilin' Dave]

Furthermore, as you well know there is more to blitzkrieg than mechanized warfare, and other tactics, for instance tactical close air-power support was practiced by the Germans as early as the Spanish Civil War and was applied with excellent results in Poland.

True, but close air support was also one of the lessons the German General Staff carried away from WWI. It didn't originate with the theorists alone, and was in fact already being taken into account.

In other words, Stalin's acceptance of Uranus can rather be described as the course of least resistance, while in the case of Hitler the exact opposite was the case.

Like Stalin, I would question just how much Hitler had to fear disapproval from the general staff. Both Hitler and Stalin had gutted the high command in their own way prior to the war. Where Stalin had his purges, Hitler removed two (maybe one only?) high ranking generals on largely trumped up accusations and eventually duplicated the efforts of the general staff between the OKW and OKH. Stalin was actually opposed to the Uranus plan, and was instead favouring a more limited offensive (and Saturn was competely out of the question). I don't know if this was off Stalin's own bat or put forward by other generals. However despite repeated rejection, Zhukov and co. managed to win over Stalin.

Now, compare this to Hitler refusing to consider alternative options, including that put forward by Manstein, in the lead up to Operation Citadelle.