- 03 Jul 2010 00:33
#13434633
Montgomery barely beat the Germans at El Alamein, and the outcome of the battle was hardly “decisive” since the German forces in North Africa were not destroyed. Monty also did not beat an Axis force that was anywhere near the peak of its strength. Rommel was critically weakened by his failed end-around the Alamein position, where he impaled his force on the British at Alam Halfa (incidentally, the British defenses were laid out according to Auchinleck's plans). Practically out of fuel, Rommel was forced to accept positional warfare, on the defensive. Despite the weakness of the Germans, Monty's attack went badly and was a close-run thing. Only with the early committment of his armor was Monty able to punch through the German lines. The fact that he nearly bagged the German forces was due more to Rommel obeying (briefly) Hitler's ill-advised "stand fast" order.
The subsequent "pursuit" of Rommel's forces was badly handled and lacked vigor. It was a faiulre, not a victory, particularly since in North Africa more than anywhere else it was the destruction of the enemy that mattered, not taking territory. At this time, Monty enjoyed total sea, air, land, and logistic superiority. With ULTRA, he also knew that he had such superiority. This means his short hooks were excessively timid, his failure to try very hard to cut off the Germans by sending stronger forces across Cyrenaica via Mchili-Msus-Agedabia is extremely disappointing (he only sent a thin screen of armored cars), and his pause in front of Al Agheila to prepare for a set-piece battle reveals a distinct lack of vigor.
http://www.uni.edu/~licari/monty.htm
A growing number of authors have demonstrated that the British army in World War II was not that good. It started out badly and hardly, if at all, improved during the course of the war (see Heginbotham's MIT security studies paper, and subsequently in the May/June 2000 edition of Military Review; Hart in Clash of Arms; French in Raising Churchill's Army, Place in Military Training in the British Army).
His plans at El Alamein, the Mareth Line, Sicily, Normandy, Market-Garden, and Veritable all were complex or flawed, and the British army performed badly in each.
The subsequent "pursuit" of Rommel's forces was badly handled and lacked vigor. It was a faiulre, not a victory, particularly since in North Africa more than anywhere else it was the destruction of the enemy that mattered, not taking territory. At this time, Monty enjoyed total sea, air, land, and logistic superiority. With ULTRA, he also knew that he had such superiority. This means his short hooks were excessively timid, his failure to try very hard to cut off the Germans by sending stronger forces across Cyrenaica via Mchili-Msus-Agedabia is extremely disappointing (he only sent a thin screen of armored cars), and his pause in front of Al Agheila to prepare for a set-piece battle reveals a distinct lack of vigor.
http://www.uni.edu/~licari/monty.htm
A growing number of authors have demonstrated that the British army in World War II was not that good. It started out badly and hardly, if at all, improved during the course of the war (see Heginbotham's MIT security studies paper, and subsequently in the May/June 2000 edition of Military Review; Hart in Clash of Arms; French in Raising Churchill's Army, Place in Military Training in the British Army).
His plans at El Alamein, the Mareth Line, Sicily, Normandy, Market-Garden, and Veritable all were complex or flawed, and the British army performed badly in each.