[cicero91]

In my opinion, this is a quite important historical step.
The British conducting an appeasement policy to protect Europe by preventing a war who would have begun in 1938 if the British government hadn't politically correctly reacted to concede territorial expansion to Germany just for not triggering a war.

[Smilin' Dave]

the British conducting an appeasement policy

It is wrong to ascribe appeasement strictly to British government policy. First, while the French government tended to talk tougher on Germany, they tended to take the non-war route just as readily has he British. Second it should be remembered that what is now called appeasement was highly popular. Daladier, who wasn't happy with the outcome at Munich but unable to see any other way, was surprised to be greated by cheering crowds on his return. Thus policy wasn't imposed, it was driven by popular feeling.

The trauma of WWI is easy to forget now, it was pretty fresh in the 1930s.

politically correctly reacted to concede territorial expansion to Germany just for not triggering a war

Political correctness had nothing to do with the Czech crisis... I'm unclear as to whether you've just used the wrong words, or have made a pretty silly political statement.

[SF note: I think he means "... if the British government's political reaction hadn't been correct; to concede ..."]

[pugsville]

I'd not agree with "to protect europe", the british policy was fundamentally about British,(often Imperial) interests. Britian didnt want a war, it was fundamentally concearned with domestic policies. There was a feeling that some of the german greivances were based on reasonable claims. The British public opinion changed markedly between 1938 and 1939. Hitler fundementally misunderstood the British (and vica versa) Chamberlain was not really well aquainted with foriegn relations or the world in general. War would be expensive and well disruptive teh Bristsh wanted primraly to get on with their own business. Appeasement was the attempt to deal with Germany in good faith and hopefully satisfy there demands hopefully only at expense of some unimportnt minorities in europe (well from the British perspcective).

[William_H_Dougherty]

I think Smilin' Dave's comment is that "appeasement" was larger than a British Policy. It was a French, Italian, and pretty much all-of-the former entente policy. Why?

First. Well, the Entente Powers quite frankly felt they no longer had the industrial strength to mount a full scale war against Germany with a reasonable prospect of winning.

Second. Much of democratic Europe had signficant internal domestic problems. For instance, the Spanish Civil War was feared by the establishment classes across the Entente as a precursor to a civil war in their own country. That is the main reason countries like Portugal, England and France decided on a neutral course, not simply to avoid a confrontation with a foreign power, but to avoid an internal confrontation with a sizeable number of dissidents. In many ways they were right; one could argue that Italy and France did fight such a civil war during WW2 (The French State vs. The French Republic, The Italian Social Republic vs. The Kingdom of Italy).

Third. Russia and Italy. The winning "team" of the Great War was France, England, Italy and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Skip forward to 1930s Europe, and Russia is now the Soviet Union, which the conservative classes viewed as equally (if not more) dangerous than Nazi Germany. Italy is also barely in the Entente, trying to start confrontations with various countries and leaning towards an alliance with Germany.

And the US, of course they can be counted on to enter "eventually", but as far as France and England were concerned, the outcome of the war would be decided rather early on. They needed help up-front when they were being invaded, less-as-much at the end of the war.

1 + 2 + 3 = rapproachment with Germany if what they are asking is reasonable. Up until Germany dissolved Czechoslovakia, one could argue they were being reasonable.

- WHD

[pugsville]

It's not the prospect of winning. I think the British & French sought of assumed they were much better chance than events would show (the quick fall of France). It wasnt that they didnt think they didnt have the industrial might to beat Germany, it was the COST of such an effort, they thought a war would bring a massive cost in lives, suffering, social stress and money. I think generally they thought France + Britain should a pretty reasonable chance against Germany + Italy. France being blown out of the war pretty quick wanst really thought of. The economic costs of WW1 were huge.

[Thunderhawk]

If there was a real fear of the potential industrial capacity of Germany, then the Rhineland would not have been ceded back without confrontation.

[Smilin' Dave]

It's not the prospect of winning. I think the British & French sought of assumed they were much better chance than events would show (the quick fall of France). It wasnt that they didnt think they didnt have the industrial might to beat Germany, it was the COST of such an effort, they thought a war would bring a massive cost in lives, suffering, social stress and money. I think generally they thought France + Britain should a pretty reasonable chance against Germany + Italy. France being blown out of the war pretty quick wanst really thought of. The economic costs of WW1 were huge.

It wasn't until the period marked by appeasement that Britain and France really started to ramp up re-armament/production though. So it seems:
- They probably didn't perceive themselves as strong enough at the time
- They weren't avoiding costs with the policy (or perhaps the policy was offset by a seperate policy?)

If there was a real fear of the potential industrial capacity of Germany, then the Rhineland would not have been ceded back without confrontation.

Unless I'm mistaken the Rhineland wasn't de-industrialised, but only de-militarised. The Germans were still getting 'value' out of the Rhineland, it just wasn't well defended. Apparently the French (most effected by this move) were concerned about the costs involved in opposing its re-militarisation... which actually supports pugsville's point
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remilitari ... and#France
The earlier occupation of the Ruhr, motivated in part by economics, was unsuccessful in that Germany ultimately got a better deal. Perhaps we should be thinking of appeasement as a series of phases, rather than a single continuity?

[Thunderhawk]

Unless I'm mistaken the Rhineland wasn't de-industrialised, but only de-militarised. The Germans were still getting 'value' out of the Rhineland, it just wasn't well defended. Apparently the French (most effected by this move) were concerned about the costs involved in opposing its re-militarisation... which actually supports pugsville's point

If I remember right, that region had (and still has) a lot of highly productive coal and iron mines. A demilitarized Rhineland occupied by France and a belligerent re-arming Germany would make it easier for France to physically stop the flow of resources that were a large part of the German economy and MIC.

After the French (and Brits) left there was still a large risk that if war broke out then much of the Rhineland industry could be reoccupied before the opposing armies even met and much of that could be ruined even if the Germans had a successful campaign. As the French/Allied leadership didnt expect a blitzkrieg then the potential to destroy a large part of the German war industry would have been rather useful for the French from a long term military view.

[pikachu]

I think I agree with WHD's points above, they sound reasonable.
I'd also probably add that the status quo in the 1930s was very favorable to the Anglo-French alliance, but they knew that their position was vulnerable and any outbreak of major war in Europe could easily throw them off the pedestal. Even if Germany was to be defeated in the end, a protracted war in Europe would mean the end of the Anglo-French ruling entente. And that is in fact what happened, as the war lead directly to the rapid collapse of the Western European colonial empires, their economic destruction, indebtedness, and military occupation by outside powers. Despite their tactical victory, the French and British were only nominally on the winning side of the war. In reality, victory for them would have been if the war never happened.
But of course, Hitler could also see this vulnerability of their position and therefore kept pressing them for concessions hoping that they would peacefully give way to a German supremacy in Europe. But doing so would be too humiliating for the Entente powers who have defeated Germany at an enormous cost just 20 years ago, plus it would arguably place them in an even worse strategic position, so they chose resistance in the end.

[William_H_Dougherty]

As the French/Allied leadership didnt expect a blitzkrieg then the potential to destroy a large part of the German war industry would have been rather useful for the French from a long term military view.

What? Then why didn't they invade during the Polish campaign? The French expected an onslaught, and were aware that their forces, much like the italians, looked better on paper than they were in reality (although not up to the same point as the italians).

Their plan was to hold on to their defenses and to fight the fight of their lives as the UK and Commonwealth mobilized sufficient troops to make a successful offensive into Germany plausible.

There was also a hope that the German recognition of Belgium's neutralty and the Maginot line meant that the war would take place, at least on the ground, by proxy in the Scandinavia, Africa, and especially Yugoslavia where the French Army had detailed plans for an intervention should Germany invade to get access to the med.

As in the Great War, they also thought the Naval Blockaide of Germany would compromise the Germany War Industry, which was a mistake belief considering Germany's Industrial and Financial Pacts with the Soviet Union and Italy's Neutrality.

Even if Germany was to be defeated in the end, a protracted war in Europe would mean the end of the Anglo-French ruling entente. And that is in fact what happened, as the war lead directly to the rapid collapse of the Western European colonial empires, their economic destruction, indebtedness, and military occupation by outside powers.

+1. Really, the Brits knew what the French had come to accept even before the Great War, that #1. their populations were losing the "temperment" to maintain an empire (i.e. the population increasingly had sympathies for the national yearnings of their colonies), #2. that their industrial strength was being increasingly outstripped by that of the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union and they would not be able maintain a military that could go "one-to-one" with any of these powers, and #3. that the biggest threats to the "status quo" were internal, rather than external factors.

Despite their tactical victory, the French and British were only nominally on the winning side of the war. In reality, victory for them would have been if the war never happened.

But what a way for the British Empire to go out. At the dusk of their Empire, they didn't just disappear into nothingness like the Romans and Soviets, they fought the biggest war in the history of humankind and came out on the winning side, one last time, all against the odds. For one flash of a moment, you could be a subject of the crown and sing Rule Britannia without irony!

But of course, Hitler could also see this vulnerability of their position and therefore kept pressing them for concessions hoping that they would peacefully give way to a German supremacy in Europe.

Yes, it is clear to me that Hitler never believed #1. that the allies would declare war on him in the first place and #2. that once they did, a negotiated peace was a month around the corner. This last point he held onto until his final days.

But doing so would be too humiliating for the Entente powers who have defeated Germany at an enormous cost just 20 years ago, plus it would arguably place them in an even worse strategic position, so they chose resistance in the end.

Yes, but not entirely. I think come the setting up of Slovakia, the establishment in England realized what hitler's real aims were and that his word was meaningless. This was Hitler invading a country that did not have a sizeable german population, against his written word of just a few months prior.

Collectively the response of the british establishment was akin to: oohhhhhh $$$$$hhhh!!!tttt!

- WHD