[Oxymoron]

I always wondered, what could have the Soviets done in the months prior to operation barbarossa, and during to have had better success stopping the Germans.

For instance what if the Soviets had not extended their defensive lines.

or What if Stalin used intelligence of the attack, and launched a pre-emtive strike.
?
What could have been done differently

[fuser]

For instance what if the Soviets had not extended their defensive lines.

What you mean by that? Moving from Stalin line to Molotov line?

or What if Stalin used intelligence of the attack, and launched a pre-emtive strike.
?

USSR was in no position for a pre-emptive strike in 1941?

They had seen it coming.

There wouldn't had been much difference but Soviets could have suffered less casualities and German gains would had been less impressive if 2-3 things had went differently for USSR.

For example a timely withdrawal from kiev could had saved half a million soldier, not having bulk of air force parked at newly and half build airstrips too close to the border.

But in the end the general situation would had been almost same, with a little more advantage to USSR than historically.

[Siberian Fox]

Having a more effective airforce from the beggining certainly wouldn't have hurt. It's not like the Russians were desperately short of aircraft in 1941.

not having bulk of air force parked at newly and half build airstrips too close to the border.

The apparent failure of the Soviet airforce to learn anything from Germany's attacks on Poland and France seems inexcusable. But then one needs to consider that in mid-1941 over 91% of all those commanding larger VVS units had held their posts for less than six months* and a large number of airforce commanders and aviators had been dismissed for political reasons in the preceeding years.

*Lennart Andersson 1994, Soviet Aircraft and Aviation 1917-1941, Putnam.

[Smilin' Dave]

I think a pre-emptive strike would have been a mistake with the benefit of hindsight. I believe the Soviet logistical tail would get tangled up generally the Red Army wouldn't be able to make significant enough gains in the initial offensive to make it worth it. And it might then expose the spearheads to counterattacks that would be as bad, if not worse, than the troops getting trapped in pockets at the start of Barbarossa.

Simply adopting a more effective defensive footing in the few months leading up to the invasion would have done wonders. Imagine if the defense of Brest was the rule rather than the exception? Now lets go a bit further and assume that a good defense had depth to it - now not only would the Wehrmacht have to contend with resistance against their lines of advance (or in their rear areas, which will disrupt supply and combined arms operations) but also be threatened with counter attack. In that scenario the German forces probably wouldn't have gotten so far into the Soviet interior, which means their industrial and resource base would have been secure and there isn't the drop in production seen in 1941/1942.

[ThirdTerm]

Hitler urged Japan to take part in the invasion of Russia to force Stalin to fight a two-front war but Japan made the decision to strike south to avoid challenging the Soviets. The Soviet Union could swiftly transfer Far Eastern forces westward after a Russian spy in Tokyo informed Moscow about the Japanese decision and these powerful reinforcements turned the tide in the Battle of Moscow, thus making it impossible for Nazi Germany to defeat the Soviet Union. Imperial Japan could have played a small part in distracting Stalin's attention from the Western Front by invading Siberia simultaneously in 1941 but the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 cost Japan around 45,000 casualties and the humiliating defeat was the main reason why Japan refused to get dragged into Hitler's war against Russia and the IJA was clearly under-equipped to challenge the modern Russian army.

[Rich]

Stalin should have gone to war on May 20th 1940, or as soon as it was clear that the Germans had reached the sea in the West. Germany was totally committed in the West. France was in serious trouble and British forces were heavily committed. There was now no chance of Germany and the West doing a deal and turning on the Soviet union together or the West allowing the Soviet union and Nazi Germany to mutually exhaust themselves in a war of attrition, before attacking the Soviet Union. Just because of geography Germany was a far more dangerous enemy than the Western nations. The Soviets should have hit Germany at their weakest and in May 1940, they were very vulnerable. The Germans used up huge quantities of equipment, ammunition and stores. They would be in a totally calamitous position to resist in the East. France might even have fought on if they knew the Soviets were in the war. just the loss of Soviet raw material imports would have been a huge blow to the German war economy.

No doubt in any such offensive competence by the Soviets would be low and the initial advances potentially limited. But the best way for the Soviets to learn was to go to war and learn in a strategic offensive which can be paused, rather under the pressure of calamitous advances of the Wehrmacht. Caution is not always the same thing as prudence. Particularly in this case.

[Oxymoron]

I do not think the Soviets anticipated the collapse of france. I think the Soviets were expecting WW1 type stalemate, and thus had years to act.

[Rich]

I'm sure they did predict a WWI style stalemate, but with the rapid fall of Poland, Denmark and Norway they should have been preparing to respond at short notice to a rapid change in the situation. Even so I can only find 18 German infantry divisions on the Eastern Front in May 1940. I'm not quote sure if that includes forces on the Norwegian Eastern border. The Soviets could easily have attacked from a standing start into Poland, East Prussia and Northern Norway. The German defence of Poland and Eastern Prussia would have been pitiful. I can't imagine that Hungary, Romania, Finland or the Baltic states would have been eager to come in to the war on Germany's side. They would have been in strong position to bring pressure to bear on Romania, Hungary and Sweden to cut off supplies of oil and other raw materials. Its even possible given their very strong position that in May 1940 the Russians could have got the Polish government in exile to accept the movement of the border Eastward. Quite possibly Lithuania could have been pressured into declaring war on Germany and reclaiming lands. Germany's position would have catastrophic.

If at all possible the Soviets should have attempted to bomb Berlin Danzig and Konigsberg at the earliest opportunity, not for immediate military or economic advantage, but to encourage general panic within Germany but even more importantly also to encourage Germany to rush as many forces as possible back east and hence disable themselves from delivering the killer blow in the West.

The idea that the Soviets should have waited after late May 1940 for a more favourable balance of forces was cretinism pure and simple.

[fuser]

The Soviet Union could swiftly transfer Far Eastern forces westward after a Russian spy in Tokyo informed Moscow about the Japanese decision and these powerful reinforcements turned the tide in the Battle of Moscow,

That is just a myth. See : http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Busters/Mythbusters3.html

Japan could had never defeated USSR in far east, USSR maintained a garrison of about 1 million men in east for the entire duration of war with more AFVs and Planes than the Japanese army in Manchuria. Coupled with the logistical problems, any invasion by Japan in all probability would had been a self inflicting disaster as previous engagement also showed.

I do not think the Soviets anticipated the collapse of france. I think the Soviets were expecting WW1 type stalemate, and thus had years to act.

Yes that is correct. USSR expected France to hold out for 2 years at least. Hell the original German plan (first draft) expected that war with France would be over in 1943.

The Soviets could easily have attacked from a standing start into Poland, East Prussia and Northern Norway. The German defence of Poland and Eastern Prussia would have been pitiful.

1. A large scale invasion needs time and preparation.
2. USSR could had never known when Germany would attack France stripping her defences in east.
3. USSR could had never known when the war in west would end, sending large German army in east.
4. As like most of the world expected that war in west would take years, giving ample time to prepare.

An invasion in1940 was not an option.

[starman2003]

IMO the best soviet approach would've been to move the bulk of their forces away from the frontiers, to avoid rapid envelopment. Only a few thousand or so troops should've been left close to the frontier, hidden in forests or marshes. Their mission would've been to wait until the German combat units passed then pounce on their logistical tether and rip it up. The Soviet air force should likewise have been moved beyond the initial reach of the Luftwaffe and concentrated on the German supply columns (and mobile units) as the enemy advanced. The Soviet army should've tried to wear the Germans down in defensive battles before Leningrad, Moscow etc. With luck German combat strength would've ben degraded sufficiently to enable a massive winter counterattack to crush them completely.

[fuser]

IMO the best soviet approach would've been to move the bulk of their forces away from the frontiers, to avoid rapid envelopment. Only a few thousand or so troops should've been left close to the frontier, hidden in forests or marshes.

^ That is accepting defeat before war commences, not possible in real life. Why give up large areas before fighting, that makes no sense. Who would had guaranteed without any hindsight that Germany wouldn't had encircled large part of Red Army even then.

[Potemkin]

That is accepting defeat before war commences, not possible in real life. Why give up large areas before fighting, that makes no sense.

Not to mention that it would have outraged the populations in those regions, who would have justifiably felt that the Soviet government was abandoning them to their fate. War isn't just an abstract game of chess; it's played in the real world, in real countries, with real populations.

[starman2003]

Not to mention that it would have outraged the populations in those regions, who would have justifiably felt that the Soviet government was abandoning them to their fate. War isn't just an abstract game of chess; it's played in the real world, in real countries, with real populations.

Yeah it would've been politically problematic. For some time NATO forces were positioned too close to the frontier; the political demand that the soviets be kept out everywhere if at all possible overode the more realistic military view. Evidently the best military course can be too tough even in a dictatorship (Egyptian forces in '67 and Saddam's forces in '90 were suicidally placed too close to the frontline). Still I think the political damage might've been offset by an early decisive victory and liberation. In any case from a purely military point of view it made the most sense. By 1941 it should've been obvious that the Germans were capable of very rapid movement, and it was exceedingly dangerous for inexperienced forces especially to invite encirclement. It was pretty irresponsible to sacrifice enormous numbers of troops, jeopardizing the survival of the whole state, just to make a political point.

[fuser]

Yeah it would've been politically problematic.

It was militarily problematic too. You want a war as far away from your capital/industrial region as you can.
Even a two day resistance means less German soldiers and more time for USSR to protect her more vital region.

There is nothing at all guaranteeing that no encirclement would had taken place with Red Army positioned further inside their border.

There was nothing at all guaranteeing that a large encirclement would had absolutely taken place with troops at the actual border.

This is all only from hindsight.

Why the fuck any nation would give her enemy hundreds of kilometres without any attrition to that enemy, without any time delay and without any combat experience to her troops? All because of an assumption i.e. we will certainly get encircled at the border and certainly won't get encircled further inside the border. This is just absurd.

[Rich]

1. A large scale invasion needs time and preparation.

Not when you've got may be 100 hundred divisions facing 18, with no armour, no motorised, very little air force, no elite divisions and no paratroopers. The Soviets could easily have deployed another 100 divisions by the end of August. Plus Soviet defence doctrine was to attack. The Soviet union was supposed to be permanently ready to go on the offensive because that was their defence strategy. Part of the catastrophe of June 41 was that the Soviets were deployed to attack.

2. USSR could had never known when Germany would attack France stripping her defences in east.

They must have intelligence that Germany had redeployed its forces westwards. Deploying from East to West or vice versa took a lot of time. Germany failed to be ready even for May 41. Stalin should have attacked as soon as it appeared that France might be in trouble. That's what leadership is called. Leadership consists of more than shooting unarmed "Kulaks".

3. USSR could had never known when the war in west would end, sending large German army in east.
4. As like most of the world expected that war in west would take years, giving ample time to prepare.

An invasion in1940 was not an option.

Of course it was an option. Of course another option was rather than attacking 18 probably second line infantry divisions they could wait until Germany had amassed a combined army of four million men, 3000 tanks and over 4000 aircraft. In particular giving time for Germany to absorb its new acquisitions, get them producing for the German war economy and add Yugoslavia and Greece to their empire. Yes that was an option too. A bloody stupid one!

[fuser]

Not when you've got may be 100 hundred divisions facing 18, with no armour, no motorised, very little air force, no elite divisions and no paratroopers.

Yes, you do.

The Soviets could easily have deployed another 100 divisions by the end of August.

No, they couldn't. Beside, Germany wasn't in France in August. Any large scale deployment will result in German reaction too.

Plus Soviet defence doctrine was to attack. The Soviet union was supposed to be permanently ready to go on the offensive because that was their defence strategy. Part of the catastrophe of June 41 was that the Soviets were deployed to attack.

This post is confusing, you are arguing for an attack or not.

They must have intelligence that Germany had redeployed its forces westwards. Deploying from East to West or vice versa took a lot of time. Germany failed to be ready even for May 41. Stalin should have attacked as soon as it appeared that France might be in trouble.

The point was a large scale offensive needs time, you don't invade Germany at a very short notice. Germany also was pretty much outmatched in east in ww1 and yet Russia suffered humiliating defeat at Tannenberg. Numbers aren't everything.

Of course it was an option. Of course another option was rather than attacking 18 probably second line infantry divisions they could wait until Germany had amassed a combined army of four million men, 3000 tanks and over 4000 aircraft. In particular giving time for Germany to absorb its new acquisitions, get them producing for the German war economy and add Yugoslavia and Greece to their empire. Yes that was an option too. A bloody stupid one!

You know, what hindsight is, rich?




EDIT : Also, from where are you getting this 100 div vs german 18 division number.

In may 1940 Germany had 15 division in East and 29 Division in Germany i.e. 44 Division to act without interfering with French operation. USSR managed to have around 50 divisions for Poland in September 1939 and considering that Red Army more than doubled from September 1939 to June 1941, I doubt they had amassed 100 divisions let alone 200 divisions without abandoning all of their defences in all other fronts other than Germany. A scenario which is not possible in real life.

My sources are :
1. David Glantz "When Titans Clashed"
2. David Porter "Order of Battle The Red Army in WWII"
3. Number of German divisions by front in World War II

Note : the decrease in German manpower for east in June is precisely because there was no intelligence suggesting any attack from East. If there had been those 44 Divisions would had been there.

[starman2003]

It was militarily problematic too. You want a war as far away from your capital/industrial region as you can.

Not necessarily. Shorter lines of communication can be advantageous.

There is nothing at all guaranteeing that no encirclement would had taken place with Red Army positioned further inside their border.

In addition to longer supply lines, a key difference would've been that a defense farther east would've faced less enemy strength since the infantry took quite some time to catch up to the panzers. Furthermore if the soviet air force had also been kept farther east, out of range of initial luftwaffe strikes, its planes could've plastered enemy mobile forces--especially their softer skinned vehicles--and logistical units.

Why the fuck any nation would give her enemy hundreds of kilometres without any attrition to that enemy, without any time delay and without any combat experience to her troops?

As I posted above, my plan called for leaving behind some units, initially hidden, to pounce on enemy supply columns after their combat forces had passed. That would've caused significant disruption and delay e.g. forcing some combat units to go back. And it would've been a very economical approach compared to sacrificing whole armies as in real life.

[fuser]

Not necessarily. Shorter lines of communication can be advantageous.

So, for shorter line of communication a country should place her strategic regions at risk? Well, this is absurd.

In addition to longer supply lines, a key difference would've been that a defense farther east would've faced less enemy strength since the infantry took quite some time to catch up to the panzers.

While fighting, not when you leave your region undefended for enemy to just cross. Beside it makes no sense, its not like that it would had taken so much time for German infantry to catch up panzer divisions that Red Army in that entire period could had completed an entire offensive operation.

or German Panzer would had kept on rolling and would not had prepared staging area (for both panzers and infantry) for major offensive operation further east based on intelligence report.

Furthermore if the soviet air force had also been kept farther east, out of range of initial luftwaffe strikes, its planes could've plastered enemy mobile forces--especially their softer skinned vehicles--and logistical units.

This is the only valid point and I have also made this point already.

As I posted above, my plan called for leaving behind some units, initially hidden, to pounce on enemy supply columns after their combat forces had passed. That would've caused significant disruption and delay e.g. forcing some combat units to go back.

No, it could had never been comparable to fight by conventional forces not even remotely close.

You are just making too far fetched assumptions to justify your theory.

[jessupjonesjnr87]

A little more co-ordination with the west would have been about the only thing he could have done differently. Also a more intensive scorched earth policy would have helped. The Germans actually done the Russians the biggest defensive favour when they levelled Stalingrad creating an almost impenetrable maze of rubble.

[layman]

The Soviets were overated.

5.7 million taken prisoner and they call the French cowards

But yeah lots of tanks, lots of cannon fodder and lots of supplies from the filthy capitalists.