[MB.]

Who is at fault?

The British?
The French?
The Germans?
The Russians?
The Serbians?
The Italains?

Or is it something else... say the aristocracy?

[Adrien]

Well it's everybody's fault. It was like everybody wanted it, was ready to open the door, and just waited for the other to do a bad move in order not to look like the bad guy.

But in the end the Germans may have pushed it a little more than others, wanting to take care of France once and for all: see the two Marrocco crisis for instance.

On the other hand France would have find a way to go and take back the two stolen provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from the Kaiser's hands; it was an open wound which could not be healed with time.

[MB.]

But in the end the Germans may have pushed it a little more than others, wanting to take care of France once and for all: see the two Marrocco crisis for instance.

What do you mean by 'take care of france once and for all'?

Absorb it into the 'empire'?

I highly doubt that this was actaully Germanies motivation for starting 9at least in terms of their involvement) the war.

[bach]

Everyone wanted to become a dominant power and so this was the chance for anyone to take over, it could be argued that the germans were more interested on it, and in the other hand the British the less interested on seing anyone challenge them.

Thats why England made such a big deal out of Belgium and the germans using it to transport troops, I mean once it started no one cared anymore about the cservs and the austrians, all the attention was on Western Front.

[CasX]

The simple answer is that everyone was at fault - Germany (and Austria-Hungary) probably more than the others. There's all sorts of causes...the alliance system, the arms race, nationalism and the imperialist colonial disputes. The one factor which seems to blanket all the madness was miscalculation. All the statesmen of the Europe at the time seemed pretty useless.

[GandalfTheGrey]

You sure opened a can of worms here Mr Bill.

You need to view the situation on two different layers. On the surface layer, you had Gavrillo Princip, a terrorist (and not representing Serbia), who assasinated the heir to the Austo/Hungarian throne Franz Ferdinand. Austria responded by demanding submission from Serbia. Serbia hesitated, and Austria declared war on Serbia. Germany's role was to advise Austria to take whatever measures they felt neccessary against Serbia. Russia, an ethnic ally of Serbia mobilised its army to prepare to help defend Serbia. Germany and Austria in turn declared war on Russia. Fearing a war on two fronts, Germany declared war on France and invaded the low countries. Britain wavered, but declared war on Germany when Germany invaded Belgium, who Britain had promised to protect.

The next layer that needs to be viewed digs much deeper, and puts all of this into context.

Austria
The Austro/Hungarian was imploding within as more and more of its multicultural subjects revolted. The actions of Princip was just the end of a long line of attacks on Austria from within. Serbia had in fact recently gained independence from Austria, and Austria was itching for an excuse to reign her back into the empire. This explains Austria's impossible ultimatum to Serbia - since she wanted to attack Serbia anyway.

Germany
Germany became a nation in 1871 when it defeated France and annexed the territories of Alsace and Loraine. To ensure France had no possibility of regaining these territories, the great statesman Bismark worked to isolate France diplomatically. He secured alliances and assurances from all the major powers. When Kaiser Wilhelm II came to power, he did not have the patience for Bismark's diplomatic tip toeing around. He wanted to make Germany into a colonial power that rivalled Britain and France. This is what caused the arms race and the build up of two seperate power blocks. So in a sense it was Germany who initiated the tension, but from another perspective it was the imperialism of Britain and France which created this situation in the first place (read AJP Taylor for more on this theory). The Kaiser succeeded in undoing the work of Bismark in isolating France, and by the eve of the war there emerged two power blocks: the triple entente: Britain France and Russia and the axis powers, or central alliance: Germany Austria and Italy.

France
France was humiliatingly defeated by Germany in 1871, and their two territories Alsace and Lorraine were annexed by Germany. From that moment on, France had a burning desire to declare war on Germany and reclaim its territory. France succeeded in establishing an alliance with Russia, thereby surrounding Germany. Eventually she was able to establish an alliance with Britain. France had a large colonial empire, mostly in Africa, but was weak militarily.

Britain
Britain was the undisputed world power, and had the largest empire the world has ever seen. Its navy was the most superior and by far the largest. During its time at the top, Britain saw its role as a balancing act: to maintain stability in Europe and not allow one country to establish any sort of hegemony. Thus we can then understand Britains reaction to Germany's arms build up - especially its build up of its navy.

Russia
Russia was stuck in a feudal system that had been abandoned by most of Europe for hundreds of years. The last tzar to rule Russia, Nicholas II, was probably the most reactionary of all the tzars. Nicholas's policies were deeply influenced by religion: he was appointed by God to keep Russia great and Russian people needed him to rule them. Nicholas also felt a religious duty to protect ethnic allies of Russia, including Serbia. Nicholas's decision to protect Serbia was consistent with his loyalty to his people, as well as his determination to keep Russia secure, and not let it be known that she can be bullied. Its probable that Nicholas didn't believe Germany would react to Russia's mobilization, it was an issue between Russia and Austria. And besides, the tzar and the Kaiser were cousins, Nicholas believed they had an understanding.

The Schlieffen Plan
From very early on, many Germans predicted that a war with Germany would eventuate. It was also obvious that Germany would have enemies both from the east (Russia) and west (France). To prevent a war on two fronts, Mr Schlieffen came up with a sophisticated plan. Germany would act defensively against the Russians, and mount a quick and decisive attack on France through the low countries. This was the quickest path to Paris, and it was assumed that once Paris fell, the rest of France would fall. After France's fall, Germany would transfer its troops to the eastern front to defeat the eastern threat. Therefore, the critical point about this is that in the event of war, regardless of who starts it, or where it starts, Germany was committed to attacking France first This explains Germany's seemingly unrelated declaration of war against France when war started between Russia and Germany.

[Lt. Spoonman]

I don't think it was so much that everyone wanted the war, the only ones who seemed to have a real, strong desire to shake of the status quo and expand their influence and territory were Germany and Italy.

Also i think that it is interesting to consider the fact that all of the nations involved thought the gargantuan sizes of the military and revolutionary new technologies used in the art of war would make for a more explosive type of war. No one expected the quagmire that insued. When Germany invaded France via Belgium to start the primary groung combat, the plan that was accepted as realistic by those in Berlin called for Paris to be in German hands in a matter of a few months. If anyone could have forseen the changes in tactics logistics that would accompany such a new and massive war, and result in such a disaster for all involved, it seems unlikely that the major powers would have went to war in the first place.

Ah well, 20/20 hindsight makes it look much more simple than it was...

[GandalfTheGrey]

When Germany invaded France via Belgium to start the primary groung combat, the plan that was accepted as realistic by those in Berlin called for Paris to be in German hands in a matter of a few months.

I don't think its unrealistic to say that this would have happened if it wasn't for the hesitation of the German high command. The technology inflicted appalling casualties on the Germans, but it didn't really slow them down. Not even the fabled Battle of Mons had much of an impact on the German advance.

Had Germany stuck to the original Schlieffen doctrine, I strongly believe they would have been in Paris right on schedule. The original plan stressed the need for the German attack to maintain its strength on the right flank. I've heard it said that Schlieffen's dying words were "don't weaken the right flank". Yet, that is exactly what happened, and Schlieffen's worst fears, a decisive counter-offensive on the exposed flank, was precisely what eventuated. While the German High Command stuck to the Schlieffen plan on the whole, they weakened it because of the perceived threat against the left flank. Schlieffen always planned for the left flank to be weak, focusing instead on the strength of the right flank. However, German commanders became paranoid about the threat of a French counter-attack on the exposed left flank. So they strengthened the left flank at the expense of the all crucial right flank. Schlieffen's doctrine proved to be sound, because the French counter attack that occured on the left flank was a disaster. Sure, the Germans had strengthened this front, but as Schlieffen predicted, the Germans needn't have worried much at all about the French attack.

[MB.]

On the topic of the arms race thing- there's something there that really annoys me: Germany was NEVER a match for Britian's Grand Fleet. I highly doubt that the British were cowering in fear of the Grand German navy- of which there really wa none (of any great scale I mean).

I think we can write off the naval race as a issue.

[GandalfTheGrey]

I think we can write off the naval race as a issue.

I disagree.

The British took the German naval build up very seriously. Whether or not Britain needed to build an even bigger fleet than they already had is irrelevant. The fact is, they tool the German naval build up very serously, and it was just one of the factors that built up tensions between the two nations.

I will point out that the German's scored a tactical victory over Britain in the only naval battle of the war.

But more importantly, Germany's fleet of u-boats at one point threatened to knock Britain out of the war.

[MB.]

I will point out that the German's scored a tactical victory over Britain in the only naval battle of the war.

As I recall, after Jutland the German fleet NEVER came out of port again. Infact, at Jutland the Germans were trying to ESCAPE not actaully inflict damage on the British (of course, I'm reffering to the events, not the objective of the origninal battle plan).

But more importantly, Germany's fleet of u-boats at one point threatened to knock Britain out of the war.

Yes and no. The u-boats were only effective up unto the introduction of the Convoy system, of which bassically ruled them ineffective. Also, it can be aurgued that the Germans shot themselves in the foot by introducing unrestricted submarine warefare in 1917 (as the Americans were then quick to the join the war).

[Rokossovsky]

I've always seen it as six of one and half a dozen of the other. The major participants were all waiting for a spark to give them an excuse to attack. That spark was Gavrilo Princips.

The fact that the schileffen plan existed shows that the Germans were actively anticipating war in which they would take the offensive.

They overestimated the scale and length of the war as much of it was to do with pride (the kaiser wanting a grand fleet which he didnt really need).

[Din]

Serbia's fault they were obsessed with killing franz ferdinand so i'd say that pretty much sums it up, but of course the countries had been buildng up armamments for quite some time

[bach]

It has to be mentioned that the "original Schlieffen doctrine" was never fully achieved mainly because, the general staff decided to break down in two the german army, which was not the plan, even thought it was 90-10.

Schlieffen always thought of the plan as the whole army against the french and british, and five weeks later the whole army against the russians.

[MB.]

An interesting question would be: What *would* have happened to France, Britian and Russia had the Germans won at the first battle of the Marne?

[Arthur2sheds_Jackson]

Thats why England made such a big deal out of Belgium and the germans using it to transport troops, I mean once it started no one cared anymore about the cservs and the austrians, all the attention was on Western Front.

British/English foreign policy for roughly 700 years has been to oppose the power who controls modern day Belgium

For that reason we've had wars with France, Spain, Holland and Germany.

In that context the invasion of Belgium in 1914 was a continuation of this

[Adrien]

Yes, England always had views on Belgium; even back in 1830 they did all they could to prevent Louis-Philippe from taking part in the revolution and take Belgium closer to France.

Another question, in case we have experts here, how could this kind of positions war been avoided? And once the armies were stuck in the tranchees, was there a way to make the "real" war start again?

[MB.]

The way I see it Adrien:

War can never be avoided in hindsight. All the factors resonsible point to the war's inevitablity.

However, a certain Niell Ferguson (a nutty British conterfactual historian) firmly belives that had the British not involved themselves in the war, that the war would have ended in 1914 in a German victory.

As for getting back to the 'real war'... well... only the Tank of 1916-18 made that possible.

However, it has also been argued that breaking the trench deadlock would have been easy- if only the generals were competent in the slightest. For example: a heavy artillery attack, coupled with the dropping of smoke rounds followed by a tightly packed infantry advance would have broken just about any trench line on the Western Front (of course, barbwire would have to have been cut the night before). Once the trench had been broken, the sucsesful forces would sweep around behind the enemy's lines and breakdown the trenches from behind, while reserves are pushed through the narrow openning. Through this process, assuming the enemy is slow to bring up his own reserves, a breakthrough could have been achieved.

[GandalfTheGrey]

a heavy artillery attack, coupled with the dropping of smoke rounds followed by a tightly packed infantry advance would have broken just about any trench line on the Western Front

Well thats pretty much what they did

Actually, most offensives succeeded in breaking trench lines to a certain extent. The trouble was that it was "won" at such a high cost that the new ground couldn't be held from enemy counterattack. The flaw with both sides tactics was their "decisive victory" mentality. Each offensive was to be the offensive that won the war; thats why they persisted with each offensive for so long, even after suffering appaling casualties. The attitude was yeah we're suffering, but the enemy must suffering more.

The first succesful change from this strategy actually came from the Germans during the Ludendorff offensive. Rather than win everything at once, they took a much more conservative approach; just win control of one small objective, consolidate, bring up reserves, and move on to the next objective. On the allied side, it took the brilliant Australian commander Sir John Monash to implement this strategy with devastating effect. The crucial difference this time was the use of tanks in this offensive.

[MB.]

I agree with your perception on Monash, as an early tank tactician he was quite exceptional.

However, youe should recal that almost NO attack took the form of description I've provided in the above post:

ie, artillery bombardments lasted far too long, with no gain. Smoke was not used at most attacks, and often or not the wire was never cut (it was assumed that the heavy shelling would destory the wire- through the use of purpose built HE shrapenel shells), and the attack NEVER took place on a small front, but rather over massive distances both in terms of trench spanning and distance required to walk.