[Ombrageux]

I am reading more and more about Mikhail Gorbachev and the last years of the Soviet Union. I am finding it fascinating. It is such a complex topic, I can't decide on the importance of his role and how positive it was. Just to list a few of the achievements and caveats:
* 1985-87: failed 'acceleration' campaign for the economy, failed anti-alcohol campaign, other minor reforms
* 1987: negotiation of INF treaty with Reagan (removes a whole class of weapons, intermediary-range nuclear weapons, from Europe)
* June-July 1988: party conference sets date for unprecedentedly competitive elections for March 1989
* Dec 1988: big speech to UN 'de-ideologizing' Soviet foreign policy, cut of Soviet army by 500,000 men, removal of half of all Soviet tanks from Europe, reassertion of 'right to choose' of political system for all nations
* March 1989: partially democratic elections, this, more than anything else, led to the collapse of the USSR and Gorbachev's loss of control. It (over time) led to other Republican-level elections and power centers, delegitimized and paralyzed the Communist Party, precipitating economic anarchy and political collapse.
* June 1989: surprise victory of Solidarity in Polish elections, Gorbachev continues non-interference
* August 1989: East Germans flock to West through Hungary, which had opened up the Iron Curtain with Gorbachev's consent, knowing it would increase pressure on the GDR to reform
* November 1989: Fall of Berlin wall, decision not to intervene violently, Eastern European radicals galvanized, German unification and Eastern emancipation inevitable by this point
* October 1990: German reunification
* August 1990-March 1991: Gulf Crisis/War, prosecuted by US-led coalition with Soviet backing
* December 1991: End of U.S.S.R.

To attempt to come up with a balance sheet, Gorbachev was critical to 1) Ending the Cold War 2) Emancipating Eastern Europe 3) Abolishing Leninist despotism (though not installing democracy) 4) Destroying the (post-)Soviet economy 5) Destroying the Soviet Union.

What does this make Gorbachev? Hero? Incompetent despot? Slave to circumstance (weak economy, Western pressure)? Flawed giant? Fraud? Naive fuzzy thinker? Where do you think the balance sheet stands?

[peter_co]

What does this make Gorbachev? Hero? Incompetent despot? Slave to circumstance (weak economy, Western pressure)? Flawed giant? Fraud? Naive fuzzy thinker? Where do you think the balance sheet stands?

I definitely see him if not quite as a hero, then certainly as one of the most (and probably the most) positively influential leaders of the twentieth century. The liberal reforms he instituted in the USSR are simply mind boggling in light of the sheer barbarity and oppression that dominated the history of the USSR. Although his economic reforms were ultimately unsuccessful, this is hardly surprising considering that the command economy had fatal flaws which made the system unsustainable by the time he came to power. As history has shown, economic recovery could not be achieved in a blink, regardless of what policies one instituted. As for the USSR breaking apart during his time, I certainly will not count that against him. I realize that dismantling the USSR was neither his goal, nor his desire, but the fact that he allowed this process to take place should only reflect positively on him. The USSR was an artificial creation that was only established and maintained through violence, and I certainly don't see how forcing the constituent nations to remain together against their wishes could have been consistent with what I regard as a "good leader". In conclusion, nobody is perfect and Gorbie was no exception, but few individuals have had and used the opportunity to change the course of human history for the better as he has.

[R_G]

Yeah I put a lot of research in my Cold War studies to the 1980s and what happened there.

Gorbachev basically wanted to transform a Communist Dictatorship into a Socialist Democracy.

That's the most basic answer I could give you.

The fact is, the Soviet Union was bankrupt after the Brezhnev era.

Gorbachev needed to make reforms to stimulate the economy and get away from large deficit spending.

There was really no way he could have succeeded in any reforms to keep the Communist faith in tact.

Only way the Soviet Union could have been preserved is what happened in China or North Korea.

Gorbachev personally opted to not take that route, and in many ways decided to embrace his moral views.

Of course there are personal benefits to look at as well, Gorbachev was not a holy man, but Yeltsin did do a lot of work behind him and ultimately it was Yeltsin that nailed the coffin.

[Igor Antunov]

He is an incompetent failure on every level. He let emotion and personal morals guide what should have been a more calculated and logical undertaking. A soft, weak unremarkable leader at a time when a country needed a strong, exceptional leader.

[Okonkwo]

A soft, weak unremarkable leader at a time when a country needed a strong, exceptional leader.

The Soviet Union didn't have such a leader since Stalin died in 1953. They have all been failures since then and an incompetent hard-liner would have been potentially much more disastrous than an incompetent weakling.

[peter_co]

He is an incompetent failure on every level. He let emotion and personal morals guide what should have been a more calculated and logical undertaking. A soft, weak unremarkable leader at a time when a country needed a strong, exceptional leader.

Pray tell, how exactly would such a strong and decisive leader have acted? By safeguarding the Soviet Union's interests by defending the authoritarian regimes in the West, for example by stopping the reunification of Germany? Would he have started a wave of harsh repressions in the Baltics in order to prevent the nascent movements for independence? Would he have retained the Communist Party's monopoly on political power to prevent the weakening influence of bourgeois politics? In other words, would you have preferred an authoritarian leader who put the interests of an artificial state created through military expansion and it's empire of satellites maintained through brute force, and most importantly a decrepit party with little veritable popular support at the expense of individual liberties? Frankly I don't and most people of the USSR at that time and probably now (with the probable exceptions of many Russians who have now fallen behind a light version of such a hero) would agree.

In fact, I find the whole premise that Gorbachev was weak and indecisive to be absurd. The reforms he was able to implement, were nothing short of miraculous in light of the entrenched opposition that sought to undermine him at every turn. The easy way out would have been to simply continue as in the past, it took a strong leader to break that pathogenic cycle.

[W01f]

Perhaps his legacy could be that of a mass murderer?

Here's a question. If Stalin can be blamed for all the deaths that resulted from the 30s famine and the 5 year plan, can Gorbachev be blamed for all the deaths that resulted from the economic reforms in the 90s? Both were doing what they felt was necessary to bring progress and prosperity to the Union while ignoring what negative effects their plans and reforms might have had, and in both cases this resulted in millions of preventable deaths as a direct result. The only difference is that Stalin actually did achieve his goals to an extent, as for Gorbachev, we'll have to wait and see.


A medical study on the health effects of the economic reforms

This study compares the effects of rapid mass privatisation, such as that done in Russia, to those of more gradual restructuring. Rapid mass privatisation was associated with an increase of 12.8% in mortality rates among men. Possible mechanisms? Rapid social change has been linked to psychological stress, decreased access to and quality of medical care, poverty, unemployment, social inequality, social disorganisation, corruption, and an erosion of social capital. Harmful consumption of alcohol may have been a major cause of increased disease.

Though I guess you could make the argument that this wouldn't be an easy thing to foresee, so maybe mass manslaughter?

[Oxymoron]

weak cowardly Traitor.

[peter_co]

can Gorbachev be blamed for all the deaths that resulted from the economic reforms in the 90s?

You do realize that he wasn't actually in power in the 90's? Maybe you are arguing that the economic reforms he instituted lead to the crisis in the 90's but I don't really see much strength in that argument either. If you really want to find someone to blame for how the transition to capitalism was handled, Yeltsin, and the "shock therapy" methods used by his economic team would probably be the prime targets. And of course, one cannot ignore the fact that the economy of the USSR was already suffering deep fissures when Gorbachev came to power, in fact it was that fatal economic crisis that not only allowed him to take power, but which gave him the opportunity to effect the liberalizing political reforms that he undertook. So to blame Gorbachev for Russia's difficult economic times in the 90's seems rather silly, in fact I haven't even really heard the argument from the chauvinist Russians who hate Gorbachev for taking away their empire, or the Communists who hate him for letting Communism end (and for losing the empire as well, they're Russian too after all ), both of these (along with the majority of society) blame Yeltsin for these problems. And besides, the level of mortality remains high even now, sine Putin who you apparently admire more has been in power, so I find it especially odd that you would single out Gorbachev for the problem (especially since even on your graph mortality under him was lower and in fact stopped growing as it did in the previous two decades, but I'm not sure if you actually know when he was in power).

[LAz]

I look at him as a traitor. Now, what is interesting is that everyone saw that there were some problems in the USSR in the mid 1980s. Everyone wanted some change, and this is what got him to change stuff. But shit, he went too far, insanely too far.

One aspect of perestroika was to make things competitive... in doing so firms started producing the more expensive goods because all goods were paid for by the state. Well shit, the small consumer goods were being produced less and less as there was less profit. That is what I think of when I think of gorbachev, a dude who created shortages by introducing the worst of capitalism. He could have done what belarus did, and that would have been good, but no, he did the worst things and screwed everything up.

[peter_co]

He could have done what belarus did, and that would have been good, but no, he did the worst things and screwed everything up.

Of course he could have continued on an authoritarian track a la Lukashenko, but I hardly view that as a positive. I certainly would not have wanted to live under such a regime, but had he chosen the route you propose, in all likelihood I would have been forced to do so.

[W01f]

You do realize that he wasn't actually in power in the 90's?

His economic and political reforms are what set up the Yeltsin era and paved the way for shock therapy and the end of communism, aka mass poverty and mafia wars. That's the only point I was making. Obviously he doesn't shoulder all the blame, but the troubles of the 90s can easily be traced back to him and his reforms. There's no denying that the economy and the Union were in hard times. Changes were inevitable, but the rapid collapse and switch to a broken form of democracy and a criminal form of capitalism definitely wasn't. Not until after he was finished with his reforms that is.

But if you really want to blame it entirely on the people who specifically introduced shock therapy as opposed to those who initially set the climate for those changes, blame should be given to those who were advising Yeltsin, such as the IMF and various western institutes, rather than Yeltsin himself. He was just a drunk old fool who happened to be there because no one else was, and if he wasn't, it would have been some other fool. He would have done whatever they told him to do. Shock therapy wasn't his idea. At best he can be charged with incompetence and neglect.

And besides, the level of mortality remains high even now, sine Putin who you apparently admire more has been in power, so I find it especially odd that you would single out Gorbachev for the problem

He's credited for cleaning up much of the mess of the 90s, but it didn't happen over night. You can see in the chart that the mortality rate spiked during the 1998 financial crisis, hit a peak a few years later and has been declining since. The 1998 crisis had nothing to do with Putin or his policies.

(especially since even on your graph mortality under him was lower and in fact stopped growing as it did in the previous two decades, but I'm not sure if you actually know when he was in power).

The decline during the Gorbachev era was a direct result of his anti-alcohol campaign, which failed and had a terrible effect on the already teetering economy. Even then mortality rates started rising again before he left office.

[peter_co]

His economic and political reforms are what set up the Yeltsin era and paved the way for shock therapy and the end of communism, aka mass poverty and mafia wars.

But that's the thing, I agree that he paved the way for the end of communism, and as corollary of the advent of Russian capitalism, but he mostly did this by making it possible for the Communist party to disappear, not by embracing the free market himself (remember, he wasn't actually much of an enthusiast of capitalism). Of course he did undertake certain limited economic reforms, but I believe that those mostly had no effect or were somewhat positive. For instance, the liberalization of small business greatly lessened the constant shortages that had plagued the USSR in the 80's. I guess what I'm trying to get at is that when he left office Russia still for the most part had a command economy, it was subsequent leaders who implemented its dismantling (which I believe was necessary after all), so it's difficult to make the argument that Gorbachev should be blamed for the negative effects of that process.

blame should be given to those who were advising Yeltsin, such as the IMF and various western institutes

Oh yes, I fully agree. By the way, I didn't want to sound like I was blaming Yeltsin, my point was that if you are going to blame Russia's economic problems in the 90's on politicians than Yeltsin would be a much better candidate than Gorbi. And of course, as you say shock therapy was strongly pushed by the IMF and the World Bank. That's not too say that this policy was completely flawed either, after all, it worked much better in other countries (Czechoslovakia is probably the best example of a success), but yes overall one would have to say that it had a mixed record in the long run, with frequently harsh conditions in the short run.

[Smilin' Dave]

In fact, I find the whole premise that Gorbachev was weak and indecisive to be absurd. The reforms he was able to implement, were nothing short of miraculous in light of the entrenched opposition that sought to undermine him at every turn. The easy way out would have been to simply continue as in the past, it took a strong leader to break that pathogenic cycle.

Gorbachev only appears strong in comparison to colourless and/or sickly General Secretaries who preceeded him. Uskoreniye was hardly a radical break with the past (by definition it is more of the same... but faster), yet it was the official line for the first two years of Gorbachev's rule. I think that the entrenched oppostion is also exaggerated. Some of Gorbachev's bitterest foes were promoted by himself, but lost faith with him (for example most of the coup ploters, or Ligachev). Similarly Gorbachev was swinging back towards the hardliners, ironically just before they tried to throw him out. Further Gorbachev appears to have been selected as General Secretary despite there being other readily available conservative candidates (like the unfortunately named Romanov), precisely because he was the reformist/dynamic candidate, suggesting he had a broad base of support.

I think Gorbachev lacked political savvy, and this might have ultimately ruined everything he attempted. He didn't do a good job of making his policies reality and I think he misread the situation. In some respects this was a product of the system become entrenched, Soviet leaders no longer forged their own path, they rode on other people's coat tails and never learnt valuable lessons as a result.

[Ombrageux]

I think many are being a little too hard on Gorbachev. Obviously his reforms ultimately led, directly or indirectly, to the disasters of the 1990s, but he is not solely or, in a sense, directly responsible.

The economic collapse of 1990-1 (and beyond) was not due to privatization per se but the way it was done. Gorbachev in all likelihood did not want the reforms. The problem was he lost control of events after the partially democratic March 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies led to a number of radical reformers assuming office (including Boris Yeltsin). While powerless in themselves, it was something of a vote of no confidence in the system, gave these reformers the possibility to air their views publicly, and led to a polarization of Soviet public life and demands for further democratic reforms.

This eventually led to the (more democratic) Republic-level elections in 1990. In July 1990, Yeltsin eventually became something very much like a Prime Minister (later President) of the Russian SFSR. He used that power to proclaim Russia's sovereignty and passing laws and economic reforms that contradicted those of the Union government. This encouraged other, more timid Republics to do likewise. The result was the 'war of laws' between the Union and the Republics, an economic system once based on centralized planning, was reduced to chaos.

From here the situation deteriorates rapidly, Gorbachev lacks the democratic mandate of his Republican rivals (read: Yeltsin), the economic situation is deteriorating rapidly, and the Republics are steadily stripping the Union government of its power (including things like taxation). Gorbachev becomes extremely defensive, and perhaps a bold, risky step (like holding a presidential election) would have been necessary.

So while Gorbachev clearly got the ball rolling, above all with the election of March 1989, other actors had key roles to play. If Yeltsin had not been so adamant about destroying Gorbachev and the Soviet Union (something most Russians in fact opposed), had Soviet public opinion been less radical, then it is unlikely we would have seen either the breakdown in Union authority (and the economic chaos that ensued) or the catastrophic speed of the later reforms.

I happen to think this is Gorbachev's greatest failing, and it is truly catastrophic. I am reminded of LBJ, half of whose legacy is that of a destroyer, the other of a great emancipator. Had Gorbachev succeeded in liberating the East and saving the Union, he would be remembered as a 20th Century Lincoln. He failed, but I still think the balance sheet is overall positive. He ultimately made life extremely difficult for the peoples of the Soviet Union. But he also, quite literally, ended the Cold War, assented to the liberation of Eastern Europe, exorcised the risk of nuclear annihilation of the world, ended bureaucratic tyranny and reintegrated Russia into the world. He made Yeltsin, was defeated by him, and that is his greatest failing. Yet Gorbachev is in fact greater than both Lenin and Stalin, because he undid both of them.

[peter_co]

I happen to think this is Gorbachev's greatest failing, and it is truly catastrophic. I am reminded of LBJ, half of whose legacy is that of a destroyer, the other of a great emancipator. Had Gorbachev succeeded in liberating the East and saving the Union, he would be remembered as a 20th Century Lincoln. He failed, but I still think the balance sheet is overall positive.

I am surprised that you believe that had Gorbachev been able to (as you put it) save the USSR, that this should have been greatly to his credit. I think you don't quite appreciate simply how unpopular Soviet rule was in many republics, in the West especially. The Baltics and Moldova for example, which were occupied as a result of naked Russian aggression during WWII would never have remained in the union voluntarily, since they considered their original inclusion on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty to lack any legality (and rightfully so). Ukraine and other various republics also to a large extent did not wish to remain in the union. If part of Gorbachev's legacy is that of a destroyer, than is that of a destroyer of a empire deeply resented by many of its members who had been forced to live in it through compulsion, so I honestly don't understand how you can regret this development.

[Ombrageux]

I do not see multinational states has inherently illegitimate, otherwise I'd have more enmity for Canada and Belgium, neither of whose federal governments are particularly popular with the Quebecois or the Flemish. It is not uncommon for a federal government to be more truly free, than local government in all its petty despotisms. The history of the American South is only the most striking example of that. One can think also of Austria-Hungary, in which the Hungarian half had a decidedly 'muscular' magyarization towards the end.

In the case of the Soviet Union, it is not clear to me that there was all that strong a public sentiment towards independence outside the Baltic States until Gorbachev and the Union government had been discredited. Former Soviet citizens have been freed of Leninist tyranny, but it is striking how absent genuine democracy is on the whole for the vast majority of them, in Belarus, in Moldova, in Russia or the Central Asian Republics. In practical terms, the division of a state which united the sprawling Russian diaspora, which forms almost half the population in many Republics, presents a huge danger. I heard it called 'Yugoslavia with nukes' and the risk is certainly there. The issue of Russian minorities could well prove the spark to some conflict, civil, international or atomic perhaps dragging in the West, in the Baltics, Ukraine or Kazakhstan. Fortunately the only instance this has really occurred is Transnistria, but the possibility is there. Finally, another practical matter, economically it has been a disaster and has led to economic dislocation as the Soviet system was not designed for these little states to have autonomous, viable economies. A century's worth of infrastructure is being at subpar levels. Ukraine's living standards today are around the same level as China's! (As measured by PPP GDP/capita.)

Putin was grossly hyperbolic when he said the end of the Soviet Union was 'the greatest catastrophe of the 20th Century', but he certainly had a point!

[peter_co]

Teen, considering how vocally you oppose the imperialism of Western European nations, it really surprises me to see that you take the polar opposite position in the case of Russian imperialism. Note, that I did not choose that word as mere hyperbole. The fact that the holdings of the Russian Empire and its successor were geographically contiguous to the "home state" does not change the fundamental fact that these states were essentially empires, with all that that entails, especially the privileged status of the main ethnic group and its culture. The problem is certainly not confined to the Soviet Union having been a multinational state. Rather, the problem was the Soviet Union was an imperial power that conquered some of its territories in the twentieth century through unmasked aggression, and which used brutal methods to not only keep the empire together but even to attempt to destroy local cultures in order to create a more or less homogeneous state based on the ideal of a "Soviet citizen" who spoke Russian and behaved like a Russian. On the latter point, I am not exaggerating either. Although there was some flirtation with embracing multiculturalism in the beginning of the USSR, by the 1930's that project was completely abandoned, and the state pursued a policy of covert Russification. In fact, when the USSR conquered the Baltic States and Bessarabia, the very first thing they did was to round up and either execute or deport the country's elites, in order to both prevent possible resistance.

Actually in addition to intellectuals, thousands of ordinary citizens were often deported and resettled in other parts of the union in a divide and conquer type of policy. This project was coupled to a massive influx of ethnic Russians, whether they were moved officially, or if they simply immigrated for work, etc. In fact, this was a continuation of tsarist policy of making the peripheries more "Russian." So, I find it especially odd that you cite this Russian presence, which in some cases was carried out with almost a colonizing purpose as an argument for why the USSR should have remained united.

Keep in mind, that these policies were not restricted to WWII or immediate post-war era and cannot be dismissed as Stalinist aberrations, such policies were at the core of Soviet social policy until its very end. These formal (whether overt or covert) policies were certainly not the end in terms of discrimination against minorities. Russian was predominantly used in universities, in public administration, in fact in virtually all spheres of public life, so that the local languages were virtually excluded. This was exacerbated by cultural attitudes that for instance induced some Russians to answer "govorite po chelovecheski" (or speak like a human) when addressed in a local language, even though the majority of the population of the republic was non-Russian.

Such discrimination was deeply resented, as I am sure you can understand. However, when you say that there were no massive movements for independence before the government was discredited, that's missing the point. Before the government was discredited, such movements were simply impossible! Any type of opposition, or dissent was brutally repressed. Even in 1991, when Lithuanians surrounded a TV station that the Soviets wanted to close down, Soviet tanks were sent straight into the crowd, crushing 14 people to death.

Warning: Graphic
http://irzikevicius.files.wordpress.com ... ankas2.jpg

When the government was starting to be discredited, spontaneous movements for independence arose, en masse, indicating the pent-up anger and frustration that was only kept in check by force. Even in Moldova, which was seen as one of the most "docile" republics, hundreds of thousands of people (that's out of a population of four million!) gathered to support the government's movement for sovereignty (a stepping stone to independence).


Sorry if I was a bit long-winded, this is just an issue on which I'm rather passionate. Many of my relatives were deported to Siberia when Bessarabia was occupied in 1940, one of my great-Grandfather was drafted into a penal regiment when the Red Army was passing West and essentially died as canon fodder somewhere in Poland in 1944, some of my parents' friends were arrested for "nationalism", others were put into mental asylums, etc. Furthermore, you mentioned the economic problems of post-Soviet states. I don't deny that the breakup had a disruptive effect on many economies (including Russia's), but that does not make me nostalgic for the USSR. Rather, it makes prompts me to think what Eastern Europe and the Western ex-USSR states could have looked like today had they not had to carry the yoke of Communism and Russian domination for half a century.

I realize that most Russians, and even many non-Russians regret the break-up of the USSR and look back upon the union with nostalgia. I certainly have no such regrets. 50 years of occupation was quite enough.

[Smilin' Dave]

@peter_co
I think you over simplify the Soviet nationalities issue. Russification seems to have ebbed and flowed, and depended in large part of which part of the Soviet Union was being studied. There is a good overview in Brezhnev Reconsidered on on the topic if you were interested in a post-Stalin look at the role of nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Russian was predominantly used in universities, in public administration, in fact in virtually all spheres of public life, so that the local languages were virtually excluded.

It was also Soviet policy that the national language be taught in local schools. Russian was treated as the official lingua franca, but on the other hand it was a large multi-ethnic state and Russian would seem the most logical choice.

This was exacerbated by cultural attitudes that for instance induced some Russians to answer "govorite po chelovecheski" (or speak like a human) when addressed in a local language, even though the majority of the population of the republic was non-Russian.

I think a line should be drawn between government and individual national chauvanism (or government sanctioned individual action for that matter).

Even in 1991, when Lithuanians surrounded a TV station that the Soviets wanted to close down, Soviet tanks were sent straight into the crowd, crushing 14 people to death.

Here on the other hand you have a point. You might also want to have a look at Gorbachev's involvement in Operation Ring, which was effectively the first chapter of the Armenian-Azeri war.

@Ombrageux

I think many are being a little too hard on Gorbachev. Obviously his reforms ultimately led, directly or indirectly, to the disasters of the 1990s, but he is not solely or, in a sense, directly responsible.

If you then didn't go on to give an example of Gorbachev under cutting himself by creating his own monster, you might have had a point. Instead you seem to reinforce Gorbachev's political failure, which in turn fed into the other crises. Gorbachev had more power than many of his predecessors to build his own power base, so it is a bit hard to blame others in the party or government for his failure. There was a greater general expectation that a General Secretary would 'clean house' on assuming power than for a similar political role.

[Ombrageux]

Peter_co - I am not defending Russian or Soviet empire-building. I understand that that was a bloody and often murderous undertaking which had in many times and places a colonialist character.

However, I think the Soviet Union because of the intermixing of Russians and because of the contiguous borders does have a character not quite the same as that of your average colonial empire. It is not to defend the fact that Russians conquered and were sent to settle in Kaliningrad or Bessarabia, but to say this was a fact of life by the 1980s. It was no more, no less legitimate than non-Native populations of the Americas, of Whites in South Africa, of Scotland's amalgamation to Britain, the presence of Jews in the Holy Land or the existence of Yugoslavia.

I do believe that democratic multinational states are impossible, though never easy. The notion of a democratic British or French Empire - with the parliament owing more seats to Africa and Asia! - was always absurd. However, where it is possible, why not? I do not think the fact that Guadeloupe and Martinique are departments of France - with the same right to vote for parliament, receive state funds or migrate to metropolitan France - is a bad thing. A democratic Russian Empire, I am not so sure was impossible.

What we do know is that the vast majority of former Soviet republics have proven basket-cases, suffering from varying degrees of corruption, instability, ethnic conflict and despotism. It has also reserved the possibility of a Yugoslav-type conflict in the former Soviet Union over the Russian diaspora. I do not think these are good things. There should have been no hurry to gain independence, it is not as though Moscow was suddenly becoming more tyrannical. Immediate independence, in my view, only became defensible when the Union government had effectively ceased to function (we can argue about the date) and organizing one's own economic and political life therefore became a necessity. This was due to increasing independence, effectively the defection, of the largest Republic in the whole Union, Russia.

This is not to say that I think independence should never have been possible. However, I am not a fan of Wilsonianism or a dogmatic or 'sacred' conception of self-determination. I just think a democratic Soviet Union could have been tried, and secessionists more than anything else, destroyed that possibility. It is astonishing the extent to which the Soviet military and all the bitter old Communists and Cold Warriors, tolerated so many of Gorbachev's concessions in Eastern Europe and reforms at home. It was only when territorial integrity itself became an issue, that they ditched perestroika. Once (if) things had stabilized. It could be time to consider rather more dispassionately secession in the more vigorously nationalist countries, that would not undermine the Union as a whole, namely the Baltic states. I do not think it follows, that the core, I am thinking mainly of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, should have to be split apart, with all the problems that emerged that are still with us today.

Smilin Dave - Well, Gorbachev had replaced (or forcibly retired) a huge amount of government and party officials upon taking power. The fact that this had not improved the economic situation frustrated him, and led him to attempt something more radical, the March 1989 elections. It turned out to be a mistake, that doesn't mean the decision necessarily had to lead to breakdown, if the actors it empowered, the reformers, Yeltsin, the public, acted differently. I think there is room for contingency. If I were to fault Gorbachev, it is for doing everything at once. He could have emancipated Eastern Europe, perhaps having the CMEA/Pact countries negotiating collectively for its aid and trade terms with the U.S.A./European Community. He certainly could have gotten a better deal for German reunification, if the fall of the wall had not coincided with the coming disintegration of Soviet power.

This would have allowed for more trade and a thorough demilitarization of the Soviet economy, while ensuring that the restoration of Eastern Europe's links with the West, would not be separated (as they have been) of those with the Soviet Union/Russia. Had he done that, the economic situation might not have seemed so dire, and reform could occur in a more ordered fashion.