The Taliban saw Al Qaeda as an asset to be used in their war. Under my scenario, they would become a net liability. The Taliban would be mad at America, but once America left, they could get back to their civil war
A civil war where they are right back where they started, with small footholds in the south. If anything the desire to regain their former possessions would encourage a more radical approach to shorten the campaign/s.
where strategy would suggest not getting into further pointless conflicts with the US.
Would it be pointless, if it appeared that:
- The US didn't win the first time (after all, Taliban survived, camps coming back).
- The US has come out as a specific opponent (now counter moves have to be considered).
- The US has already shown exactly how far it will go, which in light of the first point, isn't far enough.
plan could fail, but I'm not convinced that going back later would be more expensive than occupying the country in the meantime.
By logic, every time you start again, you have to redo everything, rather than just progress from the advanced position. In particular the release of heavy ordinance to cover the advance of the Northern Alliance (or second time around it might have to be US troops on the ground) would have to be done all over again, and those munitions arn't cheap. That there is no return on this investment (remember the threat of cyclical violence) only makes the proposition more expensive in relative terms. It might be cheaper in some respects for the Taliban a second time, as they gain a morale advantage and propaganda as well as the possiblity they learn some military lessons.
You're right, an endless cycle would be unacceptable and under that eventuality a new strategy would be required.
Having wasted the resources the first few times, how can you justify a change of course later on, or ensure that the resources will always be available. The second time around, Afghanistan might not be the primary theatre to start with.
But it's not like the strategy actually adopted has been all that successful.
Because the current strategy didn't follow through on its own point 4 for various reasons. That what is being done now isn't working isn't an endorsement for your approach.
Expelling the Taliban from the country is definitely not part of the plan though, so they would have no need to build bases in Pakistan.
The Taliban and other sympathetic groups have always had bases along the border with Pakistan. Attacks in Afghanistan leads to the logically result of placing infrastructure someplace else, especially if bombing and limited local offensives are your only apparent tool.
I am aware of the recent terrorist trends in Pakistan. As America conducts more operations in the Tribal Areas, we will no doubt see even more attacks in the rest of the country.
Instability has been fairly constant in Pakistani politics since the 1980s, the current conflict has only accelerated it. It is entirely possible had there been no invasion of Afghanistan, that the Pakistani army would still have had to deal with militants in the frontier zone, triggering the same chain of events.