[Donna]

I work with an Afghan guy who believes the country should be ran as an Islamic theocracy under the control of Uzbeks. I'm assuming he's Uzbek-Afghan.

[unbalanced zealot]

Just a short few points coz we are going out to dinner soon ...

Does anyone know what Pakistan's nuclear structure is like?

Well, Pakistani's do and probably only those in a select group within the military and the ISI, much like the
Revolutionary Guards in Iran probably have more clear inside info on their nuclear program than the clerics do.
It was interesting that the U.S. couldn't get access to A Q Khan no matter what.

Shah highlights a good point about the Taliban essentially being aligned to a Pashtun agenda which extends into
Pakistan and beyond ... this whole thing including Jamaat-e-Islami and the disp[osition of the Zia ul-Haq regime back in the day
has been discussed in other threads.

But really, we are also talking about a philosophical focal point for Islamic radicalism has become tangible in the form of
a crap kind of political Islam put in practice, one that nobody wants. Zawahiri is out of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad scene and
the Qutb school of political Islam. And just like it was best to totally purge the likes of the Khmer Rouge with it's (distorted) association
with communist political reasoning ... it's also best to completely purge the Taliban from any influence upon Islamic political reasoning.
If people know much about the dyanmics of ancient Islam around the time of the Prophet and immediately after they may know of
the Kharijites who were the Taliban of their day. Islam was sensible enough to reject these people and move on down
a constructive and progressive path. So basically - fuck the Taliban (not literally of course). The conflict with them has
really just turned into an exercise in attrition and like the KR in Cambodia, they are going to incrementally recede to the
point where they end up having internal bickering and further self implode before relegated to history.

Getting out and leaving them to make a comeback to what-ever extent sucks. Killing them off (along with Hekmatyar and others
guilty by association at least) is righteous and best to be done now while a historical window of opportunity to do it is open.

IMO anyway. Sorry for any typo's in this ... typed quickly.

[filerba]

The US didn't win the first time (after all, Taliban survived, camps coming back).

It is not really not winning if the goal was never to overthrow the Taliban. You are assuming that leaving Afghanistan is a sign of weakness. If the announced objective is a proportional military retaliation, then doing that quickly and then leaving shows strength. Failing to catch Bin Ladin, and then occupying the country and failing to suppress resistance is the true display of American impotence.

Instability has been fairly constant in Pakistani politics since the 1980s, the current conflict has only accelerated it.

I would say exacerbated rather than accelerated. There is no way to know if it would have gotten worse or better without US involvement. But surely less worse than it has. I cannot say too much on that issue; I do not have a good understanding of the exact working of the intesection of Islamic fundamentalism, Pashtun tribalism, and the Indian-Pakistani confict that goes into their Taliban policy.

The crux of my position is that America trying to solve these countries' problems by force is foolish and doomed to failure. Wiser by far when attacked to respond in such a way that the cause of the retaliation and the way to avoid it in the future is obvious to all.

[ingliz]

Clinton had the right idea, bomb a few camels, make a fuss and pretend you've done something, and then 'up' the covert CIA, intelligence led, dirty war on the ground. Cheaper and more effective, next to no collateral damage and any there is can be blamed on local factional infighting, cooperation from fragile but sympathetic third party governments etc etc etc.

[Siberian Fox]

Which forum was this originally posted in? The topic as it has developed is not really GP material. It could live in the PC, Asia-central, IRDC or post-war history forums quite happily.

[Smilin' Dave]

Was in IRDC.

It is not really not winning if the goal was never to overthrow the Taliban.

The Taliban don't define their victory conditions based on what the US intended...

You are assuming that leaving Afghanistan is a sign of weakness.

Since you propose this because you don't think the US can hack a full occupation, then yes, it is a sign of weakness. It's a tacit admission that you can't do something.

If the announced objective is a proportional military retaliation, then doing that quickly and then leaving shows strength.

Only for the period in which you are inflicting the retaliation.

Failing to catch Bin Ladin, and then occupying the country and failing to suppress resistance is the true display of American impotence.

Again, failure on the current path isn't prove your alternative is viable or even desirable.

There is no way to know if it would have gotten worse or better without US involvement.

Well prior to the Afghan issue the Pakistanis had issues with the Baluchis and Kashmir. The madrassahs developed during and immediately after the Soviet-Afghan war were likely to reach critical mass eventually. Let's not forget the political tension from military then democratic rule. There isn't a shortage of problems in Pakistan.

The crux of my position is that America trying to solve these countries' problems by force is foolish and doomed to failure.

So using force and not solving anything long term is preferable? Come on.

Wiser by far when attacked to respond in such a way that the cause of the retaliation and the way to avoid it in the future is obvious to all.

Fear of punsihment isn't the biggest barrier to people commiting crimes, I suspect it's more a social thing. Given that groups like the Taliban have already gone to the extreme end of things and base some of their ideology on martyrdom, threat of force isn't effective on its own.

[unbalanced zealot]

Well prior to the Afghan issue the Pakistanis had issues with the Baluchis and Kashmir.

If people examine the links the ISI have it's likely they'll find that that the Kashmir issue is intertwined
both from a operatative point of view and an philosophical/ideological POV. I wrote a whole stack of stuff
in a thread about Jamaat-e-Islami and Maududi related to this dynamic. It's somewhere on this site and
if I can locate it will link to it rather than reiterate it all again.

In Australia the domestic intelligence services have found that many of the 'trouble makers' had infact
been training with Lashkar-e-Taiba (anti-Hindu etc.) (in Pakistan) with Afghan Taliban types and AQ types.
For many in the ISI the anti-Hindu agenda is probably their main game and if they draw on Taliban/AQ
networks/people and (in the past) also siphon off some Arab Wahabist/Salafist funds for the cause ... so be it.

[Siberian Fox]

Well if this topic was originally in IRDC and was moved from there (presumably because the OP was phrased in past tense) I'll move this thread to post-war history.