How America planned for an attack on BRITAIN in 1930 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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Inter-war period (1919-1938), Russian civil war (1917–1921) and other non World War topics (1914-1945).
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#13800104
The Daily Mail wrote:Details of an amazing American military plan for an attack to wipe out a major part of the British Army are today revealed for the first time.

In 1930, a mere nine years before the outbreak of World War Two, America drew up proposals specifically aimed at eliminating all British land forces in Canada and the North Atlantic, thus destroying Britain's trading ability and bringing the country to its knees.

Previously unparalleled troop movements were launched as an overture to an invasion of Canada, which was to include massive bombing raids on key industrial targets and the use of chemical weapons, the latter signed off at the highest level by none other than the legendary General Douglas MacArthur.

The plans, revealed in a Channel 5 documentary, were one of a number of military contingency plans drawn up against a number of potential enemies, including the Caribbean islands and China. There was even one to combat an internal uprising within the United States.

In the end there was no question of President Franklin D. Roosevelt subscribing to what was known as War Plan Red. Instead the two countries became the firmest of allies during WW2, an occasionally strained alliance that continues to this day.

Still, it is fascinating that there were enough people inside the American political and military establishment who thought that such a war was feasible.

While outside of America, both Churchill and Hitler also thought it a possibility during the 30s - a time of deep economic and political uncertainty.
In 1931, the U.S. government even authorised record-breaking transatlantic flying hero and known Nazi sympathiser Charles A. Lindbergh to be sent covertly as a spy to the west shore of Hudson Bay to investigate the possibility of using sea-planes for warfare and seek out points of low resistance as potential bridgeheads.

Four years later, the U.S. Congress authorised $57million to be allocated for the building of three secret airfields on the U.S. side of the Canadian border, with grassed-over landing strips to hide their real purpose.

All governments make 'worst case scenario' contingency plans which are kept under wraps from the public. These documents were unearthed buried deep within the American National Archives in Washington, D.C. - a top-secret document once regarded as the most sensitive on earth.

It was in 1930, that America first wrote a plan for war with 'The Red Empire' - its most dangerous empire.

But America's foe in this war was not Russia or Japan or even the burgeoning Nazi Germany.

Plan Red was code for an apocalyptic war with Britain and all her dominions.

After the 1918 Armistice and throughout the 1920s, America's historic anti-British feelings handed down from the 19th century were running dangerously high due to our owing the U.S. £9billion for their intervention in The Great War.

British feeling against America was known to be reciprocal.

By the 1930s, America saw the disturbing sight of homegrown Nazi sympathisers marching down New York's Park Avenue to converge on a pro-Hitler rally in Madison Square Garden.

Across the Atlantic, Britain had the largest empire in the world, not to mention the most powerful navy.

Against this backdrop, some Americans saw their nation emerging as a potential world leader and knew only too well how Britain had dealt with such upstarts in the past - it went to war and quashed them.

Now, America saw itself as the underdog in a similar scenario.

In 1935, America staged its largest-ever military manoeuvres, moving troops to and installing munitions dumps at Fort Drum, half an hour away from the eastern Canadian border.

It was from here the initial attack on British citizens would be launched, with Halifax, Nova Scotia, its first target.

'This would have meant six million troops fighting on America's eastern seaboard,' says Peter Carlson, editor of American History magazine.

'It would have been like Verdun,' alluding to the brutal conflict between German and French troops in 1916 which resulted in a death toll of 306,000.

Even Winston Churchill said while people regarded a war with the U.S. as inconceivable, it was not.

'America felt Britain had thrown it under the bus in order to stay top dog,' says Professor Mike Vlahos, of the U.S. Naval War College.

'The U.S. was forced to contemplate any measure to keep Britain at bay.'

Even Hitler thought such a war was inevitable, but astonishingly wanted Britain to win, believing that to be the best outcome for Germany, since the UK could then join his forces to attack the U.S.

'You have to remember the U.S. was born out of a revolutionary struggle against Britain in 1776,' says Dr. John H. Maurer, of the U.S. Naval War College.

Using available blueprints for this war, modern-day military and naval experts now believe the most likely outcome of such a conflict would have been a massive naval battle in the North Atlantic with very few actual deaths, but ending with Britain handing Canada over to the U.S. in order to preserve our vital trade routes.

However, on June 15, 1939, the same year as the German invasion of Poland, an internal U.S. memo states these plans for an invasion were 'wholly inapplicable', but nevertheless 'should be retained' for the future.

This is now seen as the dawn of and prime reason behind the 'special relationship' between our two countries.



Interesting for a few reasons:

1. Just interesting.

2. It underlines the fact that the US and UK were traditional and hated rivals for most of their history - the "special relationship" was a manufactured relationship that still runs today.

3. It doesn't say so in the article, but I know from archival material that the British were terrified that the Canadians would defect to the Americans - even the Canadian leaders were sure that in the right circumstances the Canadians would revolt and join the US. Thus the successful invasion of Canada probably wouldn't have been too difficult back then.
#13800453
I think that they were deadly serious, there actually was a real chance that the UK could've pursued a different path and ended up firing from the same side as Axis would eventually be firing from. It was a real enough possibility that Trotsky watched various events unfold and wrote of what he saw as a real possibility of a war between the UK and the USA.

It was resolved in the end not as a war between the two powers, but as the financial powers running the UK decided to hitch themselves onto coat tails of the American form of capitalism and ride them into World War II as an 'Ally', rather than expend the effort fighting against the USA. And so came a whole cavalcade of British concessions.

Nationalism and Economic Life (1934), Leon Trotsky wrote:That highest form which the Yankees gave to the law of the productivity of labour is called conveyor, standard, or mass production. It would seem that the spot from which the lever of Archimedes was to turn the world over had been found. But the old planet refuses to be turned over. Everyone defends himself against everybody else, protecting himself by a customs wall and a hedge of bayonets. Europe buys no goods, pays no debts, and in addition arms itself. With five miserable divisions starved Japan seizes a whole country. The most advanced technique in the world suddenly seems impotent before obstacles basing themselves on a much lower technique. The law of the productivity of labour seems to lose its force.

But it only seems so. The basic law of human history must inevitably take revenge on derivative and secondary phenomena. Sooner or later American capitalism must open up ways for itself throughout the length and breadth of our entire planet. By what methods? By ALL methods. A high coefficient of productivity denotes also a high coefficient of destructive force.


Perspectives of World Development (July 1924), Leon Trotsky wrote:In defending the program limiting the construction of battleships, the American naval journals wrote: "If you so much as dare to balk at an agreement, we shall turn out warships like so many pancakes." The reply of the leading English naval periodical was approximately as follows: "We are ourselves in favour of pacifist agreements. Why do you keep threatening us?"

This already expresses the new psychology of ruling England. It is growing accustomed to the fact that it is necessary to submit to America, and that the most important thing is to demand ... polite treatment. This is the most that the European bourgeoisie can expect from America on the morrow.

In the competition between England and the United States, only retreats are possible for England.


Anglo-American Rivalry and the Growth of Militarism (16th February 1926), Leon Trotsky wrote:Only the other day, Britain renounced the previously adopted plan of reinforcing Singapore. It is too bad we have no map here. Singapore and Hong Kong mark the most important high-ways of imperialism. Singapore is the key between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It represents one of the most important bases of British policy in the Far East. But in the Pacific, Britain can conduct her policy either with Japan against America, or with America against Japan. Huge sums were appropriated for the fortification of Singapore. And MacDonald had to decide: with America against Japan or with Japan against America? And so, he renounced the fortification of Singapore.

This is not, of course, the last word of British imperialist policy. The question can come up again for a new decision. But at the given moment it is the beginning of Britain's renunciation of an independent policy – or an alliance with Japan – in the Pacific. And who ordered Britain (yes, ordered!) to break the alliance with Japan? America. A formal ultimatum was issued: break the alliance with Japan. And Britain broke. Meanwhile, Britain is conceding and retreating.

But does this mean that this is how matters will proceed to the very end, and that war between them [UK and USA] is excluded? In no case. On the contrary, at the cost of concessions today Britain is buying only redoubled difficulties on the morrow. Under the cover of collaboration, contradictions of unprecedented explosive power are accumulating.


And then the choices were made.

Which led eventually to sorrows and lamentations, which were best voiced by Enoch Powell:

Speech on the British evacuation of the Suez Canal, 1953 (Hansard, 520:347-8.), from Simon Heffer, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell (Phoenix, 1999), p. 188. wrote:I believe a second factor which has weighed heavily in this matter is the attitude, or supposed attitude, of the United States. I confess that I am not greatly moved by this. Whatever may be the attitude of the American Government and public to the United Kingdom as such, my view of American policy over the last decade has been that it has been steadily and relentlessly directed towards the weakening and the destruction of the links which bind the British Empire together. [Cyril Osborne: "No!"] We can watch the events as they unfold and place our own interpretation on them. My interpretation is that the United States has for this country, considered separately, a very considerable economic and strategic use but that she sees little or no strategic use or economic value in the British Empire or the British Commonwealth as it has existed and as it still exists. Against the background I ask the House to consider the evidence of advancing American imperialism in this area from which they are helping to eliminate us.


The Sunday Express (4 February, 1982), from Simon Heffer, Like the Roman. The Life of Enoch Powell (Phoenix, 1999), p. 853. wrote:Yet we slink about like whipped curs ... our self-abasement principally takes the form of subservience to the United States ... we are under no necessity to participate in the American nightmare of a Soviet monster barely held at bay in all quarters of the globe by an inconceivable nuclear armament and by political intervention everywhere from Poland to Cambodia. It is the Americans who need us in order to act out their crazy scenario... We simply do not need to go chasing up and down after the vagaries of the next ignoramus to become President of the United States.


And then just pure painful poetry:
Contemporary British History, Volume 7, Issue 3 Winter 1993 , pages 704 - 724 wrote:I [also] know that, on my deathbed, I shall still be believing with one part of my brain that somewhere on every ocean of the world there is a grey, grey ship with three funnels and sixteen-inch guns which can blow out of the water any other navy which is likely to face it. I know it is not so. Indeed, I realised at a relatively early age that it is not so. But that factor – that emotional factor... will not die until I, the carrier of it, am dead.


[Soundtrack] :(
#13800455
It should be remembered that the US Army at the time was tiny, the conscripts in the Second World War had to train with dummy guns because there weren't enough Springfields or Garands to go around. The US was only able to arm to the extent it did because of Lend Lease. I expect that if such a war had broken out between Britain and America we would have probably won.
#13800481
Talk about revisionism Section Leader. The reason there was a shortage of guns when America first entered WW2 is that we were sending surplus arms to Britain. So really you guys were the ones in need of our extra weaponry.

I think America could have beaten the British, or at least come to a stalemate and left them fairly vulnerable to other powers.
#13800485
Takkon wrote:Talk about revisionism Section Leader. The reason there was a shortage of guns when America first entered WW2 is that we were sending surplus arms to Britain. So really you guys were the ones in need of our extra weaponry.

I think America could have beaten the British, or at least come to a stalemate and left them fairly vulnerable to other powers.

:roll: :roll: :roll:

You've got the cheek to call me a revisionist? The US Armed forces were very weak throughout the 1930s and up to the Second World War. There was no way the US could have defeated us in the 1930s, the miniscule US Navy would have been eliminated very quickly and the US economy, still in the depths of the depression, would never have been able to manufacture enough rifles or ammunition
#13800674
I just watched the documentary on which this article is based. Both are more than a bit sensationalist but interesting nonetheless.

The American plan was based on some false assumptions. It was centred around the concept of a rapid advance to seize Canada before the British could mobilise. However the Canadians had their own plans for war with the US, which envisaged lightning raids into the US itself, destroying vital infrastructure, followed by a scorched earth retreat. The idea was to significantly slow down the American advance. Considering the nature of warfare at the time, the infrastructure in the region and the distances involved, it is entirely plausible that they could have done that.

The Americans thought they had to take Canada quickly as the Empire would mobilise its vast manpower and send it across the Atlantic, potentially resulting in mass WW1-style slaughter in Canada. The British had no intention of this though. London assumed that Canada would fight valiantly but be overrun. The response would be to fight the Yanks at sea and cut them off from the world.

The conclusion of the documentary and the military experts in it was that whilst Canada would fall to the Americans, they could not defeat the Royal Navy and would ultimately fail in their war aims and be forced to sue for peace.

The Immortal Goon wrote:It underlines the fact that the US and UK were traditional and hated rivals for most of their history - the "special relationship" was a manufactured relationship that still runs today.


Far from being manufactured, today's special relationship is a much more natural state of affairs than the animosity of the past. The UK and US share a common history, culture, language and set of values and have extremely close economic, military and political ties. The same kind of links the UK has with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The special relationship is basically America coming back to it's natural home in the Anglosphere.

We aren't going to go back to the conflict of that past. That was merely the ripples of the American revolution, something which both sides got over long ago. I'm afraid that your rampant anti-British prejudice often leads you into wishful thinking.

The Immortal Goon wrote:It doesn't say so in the article, but I know from archival material that the British were terrified that the Canadians would defect to the Americans - even the Canadian leaders were sure that in the right circumstances the Canadians would revolt and join the US. Thus the successful invasion of Canada probably wouldn't have been too difficult back then.


You honestly think that had the US launched an invasion of Canada, the Canadians would have come onto the streets and cheered the armed annexation of their country like a gang of Sudeten Germans? That's laughable.

Takkon wrote:The reason there was a shortage of guns when America first entered WW2 is that we were sending surplus arms to Britain. So really you guys were the ones in need of our extra weaponry.


Without drifting too far off-topic. you'd been selling us arms and making a bloody good profit from it, so don't expect gratitude on that front. You wouldn't even extend us credit at first, making us pay cash for every bullet. Why were we short on weaponry? Perhaps because we'd been fighting the most powerful war machine on the planet alone, with them poised twenty miles from our coast.
#13800787
SL wrote:You've got the cheek to call me a revisionist? The US Armed forces were very weak throughout the 1930s and up to the Second World War. There was no way the US could have defeated us in the 1930s, the miniscule US Navy would have been eliminated very quickly and the US economy, still in the depths of the depression, would never have been able to manufacture enough rifles or ammunition

Yes, I am calling you a revisionist, especially since you're still at the same wrongheaded point even after I pointed out how you were wrong. There was only a shortage of weaponry because we were exporting our surplus guns to you, and we definitely did not have a shortage a bit after we entered the actual war.

As for the rest, I'm not a military historian (just like you), so I won't pretend to know if the UK Navy could have defeated the US Navy, especially since I'm not interested in entering a pissing contest. Maybe revisionist isn't the right word. Inconvenient fact ignorer? Would that be a better expression?

Also, don't use the roll eye smilie against me, it's rude and makes you look petulant.

Otebo wrote:Without drifting too far off-topic. you'd been selling us arms and making a bloody good profit from it, so don't expect gratitude on that front. You wouldn't even extend us credit at first, making us pay cash for every bullet. Why were we short on weaponry? Perhaps because we'd been fighting the most powerful war machine on the planet alone, with them poised twenty miles from our coast.

That's all well and good, but I think you missed the point. I don't want gratitude, and I'm glad that we made you pay for weaponry before we were in an alliance with you. I'm not one of those people that think America single-handedly won the war, so I'm not trying to denigrate whatever battles the British fought. I'm saying that the line of reasoning that because America had an artificial shortage that's a sign of weakness is wrong.
#13800805
Takkon wrote:Yes, I am calling you a revisionist, especially since you're still at the same wrongheaded point even after I pointed out how you were wrong. There was only a shortage of weaponry because we were exporting our surplus guns to you, and we definitely did not have a shortage a bit after we entered the actual war.

The US Army numbered 174,000 men in 1939, naturally there was a small number of surplus weapons for a small force, the conscription of millions more men is what caused the shortages. There were no "surplus guns" to speak of, the British government directly contracted various US arms producers to produce weapons (mainly Thompson and Savage), the US Army was not the source. The guns the US Army was in urgent need of, Springfields and M1 Garands, were never used by the British Army.
#13800988
Again: This is one of the plans that sit idly in military drawers and are never serious.

Just look at the situation in 1930:
- The world was in a really serious economic crisis. Nobody had money to waste for useless wars and the people of democratic nations like the US and the UK had other things on their mind than a war between those countries
- The US and the western allies had just fought a war as Allies against Germany 12 years earlier
- The US had organized and signed the Washington Conference of 1921/1922 resulting in:
-- The Four-Power-Treaty between US, UK, F and JP to respect the status quo in the Pacific
-- The Washington Naval Treaty between US, UK, F, JP, IT regarding a limitation of naval armament
-- The Nine-Power-Treaty between US, UK, JP, China, F, IT, Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal regarding the Open-Door-Policy in China
- The plans to reorganize the German reparations were mostly brokered by Americans (Dawes-Plan, Young-Plan) which shows their interest in a peaceful resolution of political conflicts in Europe

But the strongest argument: Anyone who knows a shred of stuff about the US in the inter-war-period knows that the US was deeply isolationist. They didn't join the "League of Nations" and Franklin D. Roosevelt had a hell of time to persuade the isolationist bloc in the US to enter the war in Europe and the Pacific after it broke out.

There are many plans that are in the drawers of the military that never entered reality, but were there just for planning and testing:
- There's "Operation Unthinkable", a british plan to attack the Soviet Union in 1945 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable)
- The "Forward Strategy" for West Germany in the early 1950s (a plan to counterattack a Soviet invasion immediately with nuclear weapons and seize the Oder-Neisse-line)
- More or less any plan for central european nuclear war by the NATO and the WP
- Any plan China has for attacking and seizing Taiwan (plus the defense plan of the US)
- US plans to seize Pakistani weapons in case of Taliban uprising (and corresponding plans of India)
- Indian/Pakistani plans for nuclear war against each other
- ...

All these plans exist and are "in theory" capable of implementation, but that doesn't mean that the political leadership pursues or desires those plans to be executed.
#13801392
Otebo wrote:Far from being manufactured, today's special relationship is a much more natural state of affairs than the animosity of the past. The UK and US share a common history, culture, language and set of values and have extremely close economic, military and political ties. The same kind of links the UK has with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The special relationship is basically America coming back to it's natural home in the Anglosphere.

We aren't going to go back to the conflict of that past. That was merely the ripples of the American revolution, something which both sides got over long ago. I'm afraid that your rampant anti-British prejudice often leads you into wishful thinking.


But this is looking back at history through the lens of today and assuming that everything that has happened, had to have happened. The US has gone to war with the UK more than any other power, and even at the outbreak of WWI had masses of people attempting to support the Germans - to whom far more Americans are related and (especially at the time) felt connected to than the British. Further, the second largest nationality in the US (then and today) behind Germany are the Irish - who especially at the time had no love lost for the British. From the strictly American side of things, American history was largely a series of battles in kicking the British out of the Americas. From East to West. The last big memory Americans had of a major war (before WWI) was the Civil War, in which the British spent time and gold against the United States. And after that, it was fighting over Venezuela.

I'm not saying that we need to assume that they would be enemies - but dismissing 200 years of antagonism as something that would inevitably end simply because it did end is...poor history I think.

Otebo wrote:You honestly think that had the US launched an invasion of Canada, the Canadians would have come onto the streets and cheered the armed annexation of their country like a gang of Sudeten Germans? That's laughable.


I never said that. However, the Canadian elites and London were worried about Canadian people in general defecting to the US en masse. It was actually such a concern that it flavoured the Home Rule movement - which is why I know anything about it.
#13801451
It really isn't as crazy as it sounds. One of the main concerns for the Americans, for example was Edward VII's pro-Nazi tendencies. Had he remained on the throne it's highly likely that he would have precipitated the UK joining the Axis powers. In the event of course he abdicated, but even after that he still passed secrets to the Germans anyway. Furthermore even until the end of 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, Congress was undecided as to whether the United States should side with Hitler or the Allies, based on their desire to see the Soviet Union destroyed if possible, and not really caring how it was done. Luckily Japan removed any doubts they may have been having.
#13801632
Section Leader wrote: The US was only able to arm to the extent it did because of Lend Lease.

Why do you think Lend Lease resulted in the US being able to arm itself, when it was a policy aimed at arming other nations in addition to the US army? Lend Lease was a two way street, but it in terms of supplying armaments it was the US in the lead.

Takkon wrote:The reason there was a shortage of guns when America first entered WW2 is that we were sending surplus arms to Britain.

Yes and no. The US continued to send surplus to the other nations throughout the war, but didn't have a shortage of arms through out the same period.

US arms shortage in this period didn't have anything to do with Lend Lease, it was because the US government didn't assign the budget to the armed services. This also goes some way towards explaining the limitations of 'early' US armaments, for example their early medium tanks, there hadn't been a lot of demand/incentive for R&D prior to the decision to enter the war. Lend Lease demonstrated US industry could churn out plenty of arms if the incentive was there.
#13801663
For a better understanding of how the US thought and ticked in the inter-war years, I recommend the reading of "Fateful choices" by Ian Kershaw. In the three (of ten) chapters regarding the United States and how it entered the war, he covers a lot of what happened in the US in the inter-war period.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/ju ... ianreview4
#13801679
The Immortal Goon wrote:I never said that. However, the Canadian elites and London were worried about Canadian people in general defecting to the US en masse. It was actually such a concern that it flavoured the Home Rule movement - which is why I know anything about it.

Sources please, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
#13801923
Section Leader wrote:Sources please, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.


Resolutions Favouring Home Rule for Ireland, Passed by the Canadian House of Commons. Journals of House of Commons of Canada. Vol. 16, page 308; April 21st, 1882 and Vol. 20; Page 237. May 7th, 1886 (2); Vol 21, page 61. April 27; see also Debates, House of Commons; Dominion of Canada 1887. Volume 1, page 10 – Paril 1887; Debates, House of Commons; Dominion of Canada 1887. Volume 1, page 10 – Paril 1887

Redmond, January 1, 1895 letter to A. Maguire National Library of Ireland, Dublin. MS 15,238/7

Davitt, July 11, 1902; January 14, 1906 letter on a tour of Canada to Redmond; National Library of Ireland, Dublin. MS 15, 179

--

The problem in Canada, as per my research into something else entirely, is laid out by John Costigan:

Costigan, John, June 18, 1883 letter to Lord Lorne. wrote:I am thoroughly convinced that Home Rule is the measure that Irishmen at home and abroad expect. I am also of opinion that no other measure which will not place the control of Local Legislation and Administration in the hands of the Irish people will be satisfactory to them, or productive of that harmony which is so essential to the well-being of the Empire.

...

But there could be a still greater safeguard. These difficulties could be finally settled before Home Rule were granted at al. The Land Question could be settled now. In fact I believe no system of Home Rule would succeed in Ireland unless that question were first settled. No matter how that question is disposed of at present, the ultimate solution ofmit [sic] must be a radical one. Ireland must have a peasant preparatory sooner or later, and it should be far more satisfactory to the landlords and better for the Empire to have the difficulty ended by an Imperial enactment than risk the success of Home Rule by leaving so difficult a problem to be solved by the first Local Legislature (3).

There is another serious aspect of the Irish question which a careful student of the English press cannot fail to notice…Imagine, Mr Lord, a Democratic Government with a Democratic President in power at Washington, the strength of the Irish element in the United States would acquire. The Irish are the backbone of that political party in the United States. They would bound into power on the success of the Democratic party, and would use their influence to embroil England with the Republic. They would see to it that the American Minister at London was a far different kind of man from Mr. Lowell, and that he should pursue a far different line of policy to that pursued by the present holder of that office, and it is not difficult to imagine a state of affairs that would force him into strained relations with the Imperial Government. This alone would give to the people of Canada cause for serious anxiety. Nor is it difficult to imagine a state of affairs in this Country that might increase that anxiety.

There is in Canada, as there always has been, a great number of men who favor [sic] annexation. They are not openly know [sic] as such, nor do they form a party in the Dominion, but they are to be met everywhere. A few hard years, some internal commotion, the triumph of the Democratic party south of us (5), and these annexationists might be bold enough to take the aggressive, and, in a constitutional way, seek to persuade Canada that her interests would be promoted by a closer relationship with the United States. Under such circumstances the Irish in the United States would likely throw in their aid in money with the Annexationists in Canada, and should the present unfortunate state of Ireland still continue, a particular effort would no doubt be made to secure the co-operation of the Irishmen in Canada (6).”


This, incidentally, also leads to the British and the Canadians allegedly helping to prop up the Republican Party of all things.

The public forms of these are mostly allusions to the problem. For instance:

My notes in regard to 1882 – Journals of House of Commons of Canada. Vol. 16, page 308. April 21st, 1882. wrote:3 – The Irish in Canada prefer, “foreign homes, to their feelings of estrangement towards the Imperial Government.”
4 – The King, and Canada shouldn’t be deprived of Irishmen (1)
5 – “…Canada and its inhabitants have prospered exceedingly under a Federal system, allowing to each Province of the Dominion considerable powers of self-government” and it also kept the Empire together.6 – “We would further express a hope that the time has come when Your Majesty’s clemency may, without injury to the interests of the United Kingdom, be extended to those persons who are now imprisoned in Ireland charged with political offences only, and the inestimable blessing of personal liberty restored to them.”
“This Resolution was also concurred in by the Senate of Canada.”


Which is what drove me to these papers in the first place - as Redmond was the topic of my research and had under Parnell been the international representative of Irish nationalists. The Canadians here are asking the British to put Ireland in order to allow for their own stability. Incidentally, the response from Britain helps inflame the situation in Canada:

[quoteJournals of House of Commons of Canada. Vol. 20, Page 237. May 7th, 1886, quoting the English response,"]‘Her Majesty will always gladly receive the advice of the parliament of Canada in all matters relating to the Dominion and the administration of its affairs; but with respect to the questions referred to in the Address, Her Majesty will, in accordance with the Constitution of this country, have regard to the advice of the Imperial parliament and Ministers, to whom all matters relating to the affairs of the United Kingdom exclusively appertain.’[/quote]

The Canadian House of Commons resolves in light of the above, wrote:That this House, having reference to the tenor of the said answer, does not deem it expedient again to address Her Majesty on the subject, but earnestly hopes that such a measure or such measures may be adopted by the Imperial Parliament as will, while preserving the integrity and well-being of the Empire and the rights and status of the minority, be satisfactory of the people of Ireland’


The Canadian House of Commons then feels the need to contact the Irish nationalists (amongst others) in an attempt to even things out as times go on:

1887 – Journals of House of Commons of Canada. Vol 21, page 61. April 27th (3). wrote:That the granting of Home Rule to Ireland will fittingly crown the already glorious reign of Her Most Gracious majesty as a constitutional/sovereign, will come with special appropriateness in this Her Jubilee year, and, if possible, render Her Majesty more dear to the hearts of Her already devoted and loyal subjects.

That the present Resolution be forwarded to the Right Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Prime Minister, the Right Honourable WE Gladstone, MP, and Charles Stuart Parnell, MP (4).


No real surprise, as the private correspondence reveals increased fears that the Canadians will begin to want to become American:

Edward Blake, in a letter amongst the Redmond papers at the National Library of Ireland, Dublin 15237 /2 wrote:But sir, I would wish to remind him and all of us, that independent altogether of the difficulty which is created by the local feeling and the special personal interests of the fishermen of the United States, and independent altogether of that general feeling of a disposition to assert a supposed national dignity, sometimes unnecessarily, on the part of a great power like the United States, there is always before us this, that the sore with reference to Ireland creates a body of public feeling in both countries hostile not to Canada because it is Canada, but to Canada because it may be a means of humiliating and interfering with England.


By 1895, Canada is being referred to as "a disaffected portion of the Empire" that has needed, and will need, to be culled.

MS 15,238/7

Redmond, January 1, 1895 letter to A. Maguire

This is exploited:

Davitt was a longstanding Irish nationalist. For a while, he was the envoy of John Redmond (Parnell's successor). In these letters he deliberately cultivates strategies designed to exploit the fact that the Canadians are at odds with the leaders about Canadian connection to the Empire. For instance:

Davitt, July 11, 1902 letter to Redmond wrote:I think that some consideration is due to the Premiers of Canada and Australia...They are likely to have quite enough to answer for to London Society and to Jingo statesmen for dining with yourself and colleagues; but what would be said against the unfortunate men if they could be accused of having dined in the company with so hopelessly disloyal a person as myself?
#13802113
Tensions between the Dominions and imperial centre were nothing new but don't you think that you're overplaying them a little TIG? Some individuals may have had concerns over the loyalties of a number Canadians at points in history, but I see no evidence for your original statement that 'the British were terrified that the Canadians would defect to the Americans'. We're discussing 1930 here remember.

to whom far more Americans are related and (especially at the time) felt connected to than the British. Further, the second largest nationality in the US (then and today) behind Germany are the Irish


We may be going slightly off-topic here, but this isn't technically correct, as I'm sure you're aware. Americans of German and Irish descent are the largest self-reported ethnic groups. For various reasons Americans of British descent often don't describe themselves as such, using simply 'American' or identifying with another ethnic group from which they trace ancestry (including German or Irish). As such 'British-Americans' are under represented in the modern census figures. However using past census data one can extrapolate that Americans of British descent would likely form the largest ethnic group in the US today by far.

I take your point though that they might not feel as connected to that ancestry as to others, but to some extent that is a modern phenomenon.
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Otebo wrote:Tensions between the Dominions and imperial centre were nothing new but don't you think that you're overplaying them a little TIG? Some individuals may have had concerns over the loyalties of a number Canadians at points in history, but I see no evidence for your original statement that 'the British were terrified that the Canadians would defect to the Americans'. We're discussing 1930 here remember.


1930 is stretching the date a bit - I'll admit - but the fact that imperial policy was even taking into account the fear of Canadians defecting to the US is pretty telling, is it not? But you are right, I haven't stumbled into any sources about Canada after 1914 or so.
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The US had warplans like this for dealing with all the great powers in the interwar period, they were known as the Rainbow War Plans. Britain was War Plan Red, France was War Plan Blue, Germany was War Plan Black, and Japan was War Plan Orange.

Canada's war plan of using flying columns as a spoiling attack was interesting, but its success would've depended on its speed and communication. How motorized were Canadian forces at the time, and how good was their radio gear? The US Army was small and poorly equipped at the time, but once US industry geared up that would've changed.

The big problem for the British is that the primary theater of war would be very far from the their center of mass (long supply lines), concentrating the RN to fight the very large USN would've exposed them to threats from other powers, and Britain was dependent on massive imports of raw materials. The RN would need to keep Britain's sea lines of communication open, supply a large army in Canada, maintain Britain's other imperial links, and fight the US Navy all over the globe.

Meanwhile, the longer the war lasts the worse the position from Britain. Aside from rubber, the US was largely self-sufficient in raw materials at the time and its heavy industry was located close to its raw materials. Its industrial base was also larger and more modern, and the American population was larger than that of Britain and the white dominions. Only Eastern Canada was plausibly defensible against American forces, as the Canadian West was sparsely settled and consisted of wide-open, flat plains on either side of the Rockies. US forces might not have been able to advance into the Golden Horseshoe or the Maritimes, but they would be able to seize the Pacific Coast and the Canadian prairie. This would cut Canada in two, and US forces in the Great Lakes area could pin down Canadian forces while columns advanced into Ontario from the west.

The best hope for British victory would be similar to Japan's own plan for the Pacific War. Use the element of surprise and speed to strike a major blow against the US Navy, then rapidly seize key objectives before the US could respond. If Britain could win two Pearl Harbor like victories and rapidly mobilize its army, then its plausible that the US might have sued for peace. This didn't work for Japan, but the RN was larger than the IJN and British forces could perhaps have advanced down the Eastern Seaboard. Aggression was always a hallmark of the Royal Navy, the Great War being the lone exception.
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If Britain could win two Pearl Harbor like victories and rapidly mobilize its army, then its plausible that the US might have sued for peace.
Let's also recall that if there was to be any confrontation between the UK and US in 1930s, Japan would inevitably be on the British side. Which is why there was specifically a plan Red-Orange, for war against the UK and Japan at the same time. Keeping in mind the Naval treaty proportions (5-5-3 for US-UK-Japan), the USN would be at a disadvantage in size, especially if the UK manages to bring France on its side which I think is very plausible because the British and French interests during this period mostly overlapped. So if the UK found a reason to confront the Americans, the French would probably find one too. Would the US be able to make allies in this? Idk, perhaps Weimar Germany. But either way, the states which signed the Five-Power Treaty were the only ones with any navy to speak of. I would expect the USN to be able to defend the coastline from invasions, but not be a significant factor in disrupting the British shipping... at least for a while.

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