[Maxim Litvinov]

Appeasement - "the policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly dangerous." (Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy)

Appeasement in use -
* Detente with the USSR
* Most favoured nation status with China
* Negotiations with Iran and North Korea
* Talks with Libya
* Negotiations over Northern Ireland
* The Velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe
* Treaty over Aceh
* Peace of Westphalia

Other options -
* Nuclear war with USSR
* War with China
* Bombing campaign of Iran and North Korea
* Destruction of Libya
* Civil War in Ireland
* Huge deaths after popular uprisings in Eastern Europe
* Ongoing violence and volatility in Aceh
* An unstable Europe.

Like the title says.

[ianulus]

I would contest the definition.

"the policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict [...]"

... is only appeasement if one of the parties is an agressor and/or a totalitarian state. If neither of the parties is an agressor, it this is called diplomacy and it works very well.

Further more, there are other options than outright violence like economic sanctions and contesting the agressor's domestic totalitarian authority.

ianulus

[Bri]

I would define appeasement as the dictionary does.

"The policy of granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace"

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=appeasement

Rational negotiation and compromise is the heart of good diplomacy.

Why diplomacy works.

Cuban missile crisis, enough said.

[ThoughtProvoking]

Why diplomacy doesn't work German re-armament, WW2 Hitler in Austira, Chezhoslovakia and Alsace-Lorraine.

[Adrien]

That does not discredit "diplomacy" as a whole but corrupt diplomacy: the leaders of Western Europe didn't want the "red plague" to reach their countries, and corporate interests led them to make the choice of "rather Hitler than Stalin".

In an ideological context similar to that of 1913/1914, if Germany had threatened an ally of France and Britain, especially an ally such as Czechoslovakia, it would have seen an immediate and crystal clear answer..

[Jim G]

Why diplomacy doesn't work German re-armament, WW2 Hitler in Austira, Chezhoslovakia and Alsace-Lorraine.

An oft-repeated myth. Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to see that Hitler had to be stopped early, but was that even possible?

It's important to ask what other options the "allies" had in the years building up to the invasion of Poland. Surely, before 1939 the german war machine would have decimated the underprepared British and French armies. To put it in perspective, between 1933 and 1937, France produced one-tenth of the military aircraft that Germany did. Because of lasting resentment towards WW1, French soldiers were only trained to defend, not wage an offensive war. Moreover, without adequate time to prepare defenses and rearm, surely London would have ceased to exist if it was bombed in 1938. Waiting a year allowed Britain to develop adequate air defenses and radar. What would be the use/effectiveness of confronting Hitler early when britain and france knew it would end in their defeat? From their perspective, the more time they had to rearm the better.

What's more, it was hard not to be somewhat sympathetic to Germany's claims to land. Austrians were primarily of German origin; shouldn't germans be able to unite with germans? The same can be said of czechoslovakia, which had many germans, who Hitler said were discriminated against.

Besides, it wasn't simply appeasment with no backbone. Chamberlain drew the line, and warned Hitler that invading Poland would provoke Britain to respond with all of its power. Nevertheless, Hitler attacked, and Britain and France honored their promises to fight. This is not appeasement.

In the pacific, a policy directly contrasting with appeasment ended in the same way, with Japan at war against the US. As Japan built up its war empire in the 1930s, the US imposed sanctions and threatened Japan with military action. Yet this policy of engagement also failed, as Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. How can you indict appeasment without also recognizing the failings of the policy you advocate.

Perhaps, in reality, little could have been done on either side to prevent the global conflict in WW2. It is dangerous, though, to indict with the benefit of hindsight an event from which one is so far removed.

[Fernando]

I do not think anyone thinks appeasement (but I think Litvinov want to say simply, peaceful means) is better than war.

The problem arises when one of the parties wants to take it all and perceives the counterparty is never going to go to a war. The logic consequence is to pull the rope on and on.

I mean, I think there are 'serious' international agents and 'not-serious' international countries.

With the first ones war is out of the questions. The typical example is quarrelling in the EU on economic issues. They can say whatever their peoples like to hear but everybody knows that an agreement is to be reached, without casualties.

In the examples provided by Litvinov, I would say that negotiations with USSR, Lybia and the velvet revolutions will be / were the best solutions, while I think that a firm stand is necessary with China, NK and IRA. In the case of NK the threat of war should not be discarded. I must remember that current situation in NI is a consequence of 'militar' IRA defeat.

About Westphalia treaty and Aceh I have no opinion cause I have almost no basis to give an opinion.

[Maxim Litvinov]

Fernando - you think that the world would have been better off if there had been increased tensions and/or war with DPRK and China?

I also agree with Jim G on this one - for the UK, for instance, to go to war over (a) German remilitarisation of its own territory (b) the Anschluss, which seemed to be popularly supported by the Austrian people (c) negotiations to slightly increase German territory and sovereignty over German-speaking peoples in Czechoslovakia ... well, that's simply reckless.

'Appeasement' seems to only be used these days as a dirty word in relation to WWII. Even in WWII, its least successful airing, appeasing Hitler had little cost but delaying war for a few years. At the same time it was maximising the opportunity for a bloodless solution to tensions (a bloodless solution, incidentally, that any rational leader of Germany would have taken up - and not invaded France, for example).

And ianalus - there is nothing much about aggressors and especially not 'totalitarian states' in appeasement. The general idea is that you are giving a compromise that eases tensions and therefore there is an outraged party, but you are simply redefining the terms.

[Ombrageux]

'Appeasement' seems to only be used these days as a dirty word in relation to WWII. Even in WWII, its least successful airing, appeasing Hitler had little cost but delaying war for a few years.

I think that's an understatement. If France had chosen to chase the Germans out of the Rhineland when Hitler remilitarized it, she could have. It would have been a huge embarassment for Hitler, his prestige and position would have been irrevocably damaged instead of enshrining him as a national hero.

If France had chosen to fight when Hitler threatened Czechoslovakia (and there is good evidence to show that Hitler would have attacked had there been no surrender at Munich) things would have been very different. The Germany of 1938 was much weaker than the Germany of 1939. It would have meant fighting with as yet poorly integrated Austrian units, not having Czechoslovak military equipment freely and having to go against the not negligeable mountain fortress defences of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia also had close ties to the Soviet Union, had war been fought then, then the Soviet Union would likely be on the Allies' side from the beginning.

Appeasement was a disasterous policy, it wasn't a mere delay, it was an unmitigated disaster. Diplomacy is not inherently bad, but giving away power to undemocratic regimes for paper promises is folly.

That said, today is not WW2, and we should not treat every banana dictatorship like Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany because it was both inherently contemptful of other nations and capable of the domination of Europe (and by extension, much of the world) demanded extraordinary measures. No regimes today, except perhaps the United States, has any potentiality of being a comparable menace to balance and thereby justifying such extraordinary measures.

[Maxim Litvinov]

The thing is, Dumbteen ... if France had assassinated Hitler in 1933 then there also would have been no Third Reich... if Britain had declared war following the Anschluss everything would have been 'A-OK' (apart from a massive war)...

We cannot expect these things to be done with hindsight, however. The idea of France *invading* Germany to stop Germany putting her own troops back in her own territory in a move that was simply seen as watering down the unnecessarily harsh restrictions of Versailles - well, it's unthinkable. Similarly, the idea of the United Kingdom seeing Hitler welcomed with rapturous applause on the streets of the Austrian capital and deciding on this basis to declare war... well, that's unthinkable. Similarly, the idea of declaring war over a fairly peacable annexation of a small German-speaking section of Czechoslovakia... as for the Soviet Union - well, all the Allies had to do is actually *try* to make a treaty with it - that they didn't is no result of 'appeasement'.

The alternative, of course, is for the Allies in the late 1930s to have plunged Europe into war on the basis of some small infraction of Versailles or similar - which would have us bemoaning ever after why they were so stupid not to just let Hitler remilitarise the Rhineland.

[ianulus]

This is another discussion, but I'll say it anyway:

The parallel case to the Versailles treaties is how the rest of europe dealt with France in 1814/15. The congress of Vienna aimed not at France never being an agressor again but at reintegrating her into the 'european concert'. It ensured peace for almost half a century, and limited peace for nearly a century. I'm not a fan of 19th century politics, but it served its purpose in this regard. Versailles was a major step back, especially considering that Germany became a democracy in 1919 and may have remainded one had the peace treaties been more like those of Vienna.

ianulus

[Jim G]

I think that's an understatement. If France had chosen to chase the Germans out of the Rhineland when Hitler remilitarized it, she could have.

I have substantial doubts that France would have had the ability to drive the Germans out of the Rhineland at the time. It's army was inferior to that of the Germans, with a focus on defense, not offense; moreover, its air force was no match for the technologically superior German air force.

It would have been a huge embarassment for Hitler, his prestige and position would have been irrevocably damaged instead of enshrining him as a national hero.

Maybe. But Hitler's statements from the time reflect a man with a deep-seeded iron will to fight. After persistently criticizing the Germans during WW1 for surrendering so early in the fight, it would be doubtful that Hitler would not expend every resource he had, fighting to the bone to win. This was the face of the new Nazi Germany.

The Germany of 1938 was much weaker than the Germany of 1939

Which is not to say that it was in any way incapable. What's more, the allied nations were substantially weaker during this same interval.

Czechoslovakia also had close ties to the Soviet Union, had war been fought then, then the Soviet Union would likely be on the Allies' side from the beginning.

But the allies had understandable concerns over Stalin's territorrial ambitions; under the circumstances, he could have been seen as a liability. More importantly, although the USSR was willing to protect Czechoslovakia, Poland would not let soviet troops cross over it borders to get there, because of the reasonable fear that they would stay.

Appeasement was a disasterous policy, it wasn't a mere delay, it was an unmitigated disaster.

We should be careful about casting such judgements. As historians, our job is not to assess "right" or "wrong", but rather to try to understand the way by which certain events came to be. Given the situation of Europe in the late 1930s, it is perfectly reasonable that this policy was pursued, and there was little other rational choice.

[Adrien]

Invading Germany was not an intelligent option for France: firstly our government was working with Weimar's to adapt the Versailles Treaty and most importantly the entire population had been (rightly) litterally traumatized by the slaughter that was WWI.

[Fernando]

Just to clear up a Litvinov's remark: Of course I do not think that going to war now against China or NK is the better solution. The only thing I say it is, when dealing with some countries, you must be ready to go to war (and to show him so).

About WWII, Maxim say

"Even in WWII, its least successful airing, appeasing Hitler had little cost but delaying war for a few years. At the same time it was maximising the opportunity for a bloodless solution to tensions (a bloodless solution, incidentally, that any rational leader of Germany would have taken up - and not invaded France, for example). "

Of course, "IF". The problem is that Germany had not a rational leader at the time. It had a leader that only understood force.

France had no possibility to invade Germany in 1938 (he had no international support and Germany had a good army) but it had it when Rhineland re-militarisation. Hitler was frightened because of a possible military reaction of France and Britain.

[Smilin' Dave]

Of course, "IF". The problem is that Germany had not a rational leader at the time. It had a leader that only understood force.

It is very easy to say Hitler was a nutjob with the benefit of hindsight, it was far from clear at the time. Keep in mind that in the 1930s Hitler was credited with getting the country back on its feet etc., which supposedly made him a good politician.

but it had it when Rhineland re-militarisation. Hitler was frightened because of a possible military reaction of France and Britain.

Which would have been 1936 IIRC. At that stage Germany wasn't perceived to be doing anything that would warrant international attention. The de-militarised zone was officially German territory to boot, reoccupying it wasn't entirely illegitimate.

[Fernando]

You are fully right. The perception of Hitler in Europe at the moment is what you describe. The problem is that, retrospectively, we can see that perception was wrong. Our problem is to know how many Hitlers we are dealing with and how many Krushevs (assuming he did not attack W Europe because of persuasive diplomacy and not because of US war threats).

[Maxim Litvinov]

Hitlers are few and far between. The vast majority of people respond to stimuli in a fairly predictable and arguably rational way. In a cost/benefit analysis, negotiation and compromise will win out time and time again.

The wager is fairly straightforward - the choice is either to back conflict now, on the basis that conflict later will be bloodier and on the highly unlikely basis that the person you are negotiating with won't act according to her best interests, or to assume they will respond like most people and not bring about thousands of deaths that could be avoided.

The wager is indeed so straightforward that while, like all probabilities, you could lose out every so often, it would be criminal to back an unnecessary war every time.

[Ombrageux]

We cannot expect these things to be done with hindsight, however. The idea of France *invading* Germany to stop Germany putting her own troops back in her own territory in a move that was simply seen as watering down the unnecessarily harsh restrictions of Versailles - well, it's unthinkable.

Hitler himself was extremely stressed by the situation and later said that had the French intervened he would have been forced to retreat. What's more, this is Germany's international treaty obligations we are talking about: the Germans had had their Western border guaranteed by France, why therefore should they feel the need to break the treaty regarding the militarization of that border?

It's comparable to say, a nation creating nuclear weapons after signing a non-proliferation treaty.

Similarly, the idea of the United Kingdom seeing Hitler welcomed with rapturous applause on the streets of the Austrian capital and deciding on this basis to declare war... well, that's unthinkable.

I made no reference to the Anschluss as I don't think there was necessarily any realistic prospect to war over Austria. That said, Germany had promised to not annex Austria if Austria declared herself a "German state" which she did, so while I don't think there could be war over Anschluss I don't think it was rightly done.

Similarly, the idea of declaring war over a fairly peacable annexation of a small German-speaking section of Czechoslovakia... as for the Soviet Union - well, all the Allies had to do is actually *try* to make a treaty with it - that they didn't is no result of 'appeasement'.

Peaceable? You don't know what your talking about. The Czechs and Soviet Union would never have allowed there to any annexation, peaceful or otherwise, that is until the British, rightly traumatized by WW1, decided to not guarantee Czechoslovakia's borders. After all, Czechoslovakia was a vibrant democracy, Germans were not oppressed, the same cannot be said for when the Czechs would find themselves part of the Third Reich.

Had there been no surrender at Munich, there would have been no peaceable annexation, Hitler would have declared war on Czechoslovakia and France, Britain and the Soviet Union would have come to her defence.

The alternative, of course, is for the Allies in the late 1930s to have plunged Europe into war on the basis of some small infraction of Versailles or similar - which would have us bemoaning ever after why they were so stupid not to just let Hitler remilitarise the Rhineland.

You misunderstand, appeasement didn't just delay war. It strengthened Hitler. A war for a demilitarized Rhineland or a war for Czechoslovakia would have been much much more tame than the war of 1939. The only reason WW2 in Europe was dramatic was the fall of France. That was the key issue, if there were to be war in 38, and even more certainly 36, France would not have fallen and it would have been a very limited and self-contained war for central Europe.

You gloss over the fact that appeasement boosted Hitler's prestige (making him internally unassailable), his armed forces (through extra time, Austrian divisions and Czech military equipment and strategic position (by letting him simply grab Czech fortresses).

[Maxim Litvinov]

A war for a demilitarized Rhineland or a war for Czechoslovakia would have been much much more tame than the war of 1939.

It also would have been utterly unjustifiable and would have been condemned by history as such. Declaring war on Germany because she chose to put troops in her own territory would have been like invading Iraq, Vietnam, North Korea and Afghanistan all into one, except probably with less public support and less of a legitimate case for war.

the Germans had had their Western border guaranteed by France, why therefore should they feel the need to break the treaty regarding the militarization of that border?

Isn't the answer to this question obvious? Apart from the 'French guarantee of Germany's border' hardly being reassuring, the notion that a country didn't have full sovereignty over its *own land* was humiliating. The German people felt humiliated that 20 years on they were still forced to pay obeisance to the loser's agreement at Versailles, and this is one reason why there was a lot of sympathy even outside Germany for German troops taking control of the Rhineland again.

It's comparable to say, a nation creating nuclear weapons after signing a non-proliferation treaty.

It's nothing like that. If you want a comparison, you can compare it to the Japanese sending troops to Iraq - ie. breaking the spirit of their WWII surrender but with the sympathy of much of the international community to do so.

[Fernando]

To choose appeasement or not is not a blak/white business. Should France have invaded (or seriously threaten with doing so) Germany in 1933? No. In 1934? No. In 1936? Probably yes. In 1938? No doubt. Appeasement (better diplomacy) works, but up to a limit. Sometimes only works in front of the direct or indirect threat of war.

Is this 'medieval thinking' desirable? Certainly not. But there are many people who (sadly) only understand force argument.

A country is nothing better or wiser than an individual (I would say worse and dumber) and you do not appease criminals: you send him to jail. You do not do this in inter-state relations for the following reasons, either:

- you can not
- you think the cost (both in terms of your soldiers, your civilians and, even other's soldiers and civilians) is too high.