[Thoss]

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a Captain in the United States Navy, gained international notoriety with his theses on sea power and national greatness. His most famous treatise, The Importance of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890, stressed the national elements of sea power as the precursor to national greatness. Moreover, the concentration of great fleets, control of oceanic highways and straights, translated, Mahan argued, through sea commerce, to economic and military hegemony.

In the 1890s, for some leaders, the Mahan Doctrine was an obvious, albeit reductionist, but a never before enunciated truth. It can be argued that his doctrine had a direct influence on policy makers and helped spur the nautical militarization of the late 1800s and early 1900s. If the British secret to success wasn't written on the wall then, Mahan certainly made it plainly clear to the rest of the great powers.

With the rise of air planes, land and carrier based, the increasing effectiveness of submarine warfare, and the general phasing out of the battleship, how relevant is Mahan's doctrine? Does the change in technology negate his thesis on concentrations of traditional naval power securing national success? Or has his thesis merely flowed with technology?

Does the Mahan Doctrine apply to the 21st Century?

[Nattering Nabob]

how relevant is Mahan's doctrine? Does the change in technology negate his thesis on concentrations of traditional naval power securing national success? Or has his thesis merely flowed with technology?

Does the Mahan Doctrine apply to the 21st Century?

Air power, missiles, and satellites (reconnisance, communication, and navigation) have replaced naval projection of power. A ship is now only a platform for these technologies.

[Sniperwolfe]

Air power, missiles, and satellites (reconnisance, communication, and navigation) have replaced naval projection of power. A ship is now only a platform for these technologies.

I agree, battleships aren't what they used to be. A battleship could not stand up against a long range missile, just plain and simple. I think though, that sea power is still immensely powerful in longe range warfare, especially with the AEGIS system. The point of the Doctrine however, that sea power is the most important factor in a strong military, is simply not true at this point in time.

[Thoss]

The point of the Doctrine however, that sea power is the most important factor in a strong military, is simply not true at this point in time.

I agree. But I think an emphasis on sea power - namely power projection of the other services, upkeep of commerce, and destruction of enemy commerce - is still quite imperative.

[Piano Red]

Does the Mahan Doctrine apply to the 21st Century?

Yes. Even though the doctrine mainly dealt with Naval Power from the form of the battleship it still applies through today in terms of power projection. When you factor in the amount of global trade that is found purely in the maritime realm, or the amount of strategic locations, population centers, and global chokepoints that are within easy reach of modern naval systems the fact becomes even more apparent.

[Alfsigr]

Yes. No ammount of air power will allow you to completely defeat an enemy, ground forces are still essential. And fleets are the only sensible way to transport such a force.

[Sniperwolfe]

Yes. No ammount of air power will allow you to completely defeat an enemy, ground forces are still essential. And fleets are the only sensible way to transport such a force.

The amount of ground required with strong air power is ridiculous low. The complete control of the sky and the essentials necessarry for the air power to work at 100% efficiency could have an army win at a ratio of 100 to 1.

Of course thats for a defensive army, if playing a offensive war, that ratio would have to be higher, but the rate of casualties and defence efficiency of the opposing army would be both drastically reduced.

[soron]

While it's true it's also the greatest Achilles heel of air power. Tanks used to dominate the battlefield and became heavier and heavier - but in the end they met a natural growth barrier and anti-tank weapons still became more and more sophisticated so that now the development goes towards lighter tanks.
I believe the same is true for air power and aircraft are far more restricted as far as armor and weight is concerned. I think we'll sooner or later see some sort of personal AT/AA weapon, which will make "complete control of the skies" a lot more difficult than today.
Which will lead to the situation that boots on the ground are still the only thing to maintain power in an area - and a naval force the only way that can provide a nearby base in order to get those boots on the ground.
Ships are a mobile military base as far as their abilities are concerned, something that neither air power nor ground units can provide.

[Sniperwolfe]

I agree with the sense that they are a mobile base, and that's probably the biggest thing keeping them highly important in 21st century warfare. Especially, the use of a aircraft carriers, which is a necessity in modern warfare. To be able to wage wars halfway across the globe with a base for your airpower can not be underrated...
However, as for a AT/AA gun that could "control the skies", as well as the battlefield, there are plenty of things that do that such as mobile SSM/SAMs. SSM/SAMs have long been a part of modern militaries, however air power is by far the hardest part of a military to destroy. SAMs usually can not even hit a plane when it targets it, wether due to the design of the plane, laser technology, or its altitude. As for SSMs, or even AT crew weaponry, the tactics that are used against them, prove them to be not as effective as the could, such when theres a large force of SSMs with infantry, then we're not going to attack it, we're going to use air power and just make it a crater.

[MB.]

Does the Mahan Doctrine apply to the 21st Century?

Only for a world-wide Imperial Power, as Mahan suggested. Thus, only for the United States. No other nation comes even close enough to claim overwhelming naval force projection to meet the demands of a Mahanian doctrine.

Moreover, the concentration of great fleets, control of oceanic highways and straights, translated, Mahan argued, through sea commerce, to economic and military hegemony.

Of course, he was wrong. British trade with the United States during the 19th C reached an astounding height without the employment of force projection between the two countries.

It can be argued that his doctrine had a direct influence on policy makers and helped spur the nautical militarization of the late 1800s and early 1900

Come again? What exactly do you mean by "nautical militarization"?

relevant is Mahan's doctrine

Mahan was more interested in battle fleet power projection then battleship power projection.

[Thoss]

Come again? What exactly do you mean by "nautical militarization"?

A nautical arms race. Mahan had some influence on the naval arms races in the late 19th early 20th centuries.

Mahan was more interested in battle fleet power projection then battleship power projection.

In the 19th century, when Mahan was writing, were they not one in the same?

[MB.]

were they not one in the same?

The battlefleet is the fleet one expects to employ to secure command of the sea in the event of conflict. It need not be composed of Battleships.

For example, the IJN at the Yalu secured command by totally annihilating the Bieying fleet without the use of battleships at all (the IJN at this period (1895) was composed entirely of cruisers, while the Bieying sported a pair of German built turretships- the Ching Ying and Ching somethingorother off the top of my head).

EDIT: Sorry, the Chen Yuan and Ting Yuan.

[Thunderhawk]

In our time of relative peace, especially between the powers, I would say the Mahan doctrine is to extreme.


If general conflict breaks out the world over with parity (or near parity) amoung many of those fighting each other and technology exists to deal with airpower, then I can see Mahon's doctrine applying again.

I look at the Carribean when it was in turmoil after WW2, and I see Mahon's doctrine being of relevence.



However, thats all looking at his doctrine as something static and exclusively linked with gunships and the navy.

If you are to view the Mahon doctrine (or any philosophy of war/state/politics/etc) as an idea, then you should look at it completely. If you are going to analyze an idea from a specific era, the you must look at it in that era's light. If you are looking at it from today's world, then you must apply the idea to today's world first.


Today we do in the air what was done in the water centuries past. Apply it to today's world, with air speed and reach, and it applies.

.. and you may even see a similarity between it and the air abilities and situation of the USA.

battleship

Do you mean what is currently considered batteships ?
- yee naval vessels phased out the world over.


Or do you mean the older definition of a naval vessel meant for naval combat ?
(British line ships)

[MB.]

batteships

Battleship, for the sake of clarity, thunderhawk, is any ship fit to stand in the line of battle. That being, from the evolution of man-o-wars to modern battleships. The concept, given that the concept of the line itself no longer exists as a tactical naval combat system is therefore mute in the 21st century.

[Thunderhawk]

I should have been more clear.
I was refering to this:

Mahan was more interested in battle fleet power projection then battleship power projection.

In the 19th century, when Mahan was writing, were they not one in the same?

When I looked at it, I viewed "battleship" as the biggest war ship, be it 1st line, man-o-war or galliass.

Fleet power was primarily from the big war ships.. or atleast based around them, while the ability to project that power and secure a region required the fleet as a whole.

[MB.]

Fleet power was primarily from the big war ships

Again, this depends on the time period and isn't true anyway. The French Juene Ecole and the IJN of the Sino-Japanese war both disprove the theory that only the "big ship" mounting "big guns" was the deciding factor in naval combat.

The advent of the submarine is the nail in the coffin of that argument.

[Thunderhawk]

Again, this depends on the time period and isn't true anyway. The French Juene Ecole and the IJN of the Sino-Japanese war both disprove the theory that only the "big ship" mounting "big guns" was the deciding factor in naval combat.

Juene Ecole strikes me as a school of thought to counter an opponants naval dominance. It does not strike me as an effetive method to establish or maintain naval dominance, nor as a dirrect means for economic profit.

[MB.]

It does not strike me as an effetive method to establish or maintain naval dominance

This wholly depends on your notion of dominance. Dominance, as far as I'm concerned refers to the ability, at any point, to cripple an opponent with overwhelming force while suffering little or no loss to oneself.

The use of Cruisers and Torpedo boats, coupled with night attacks as advocated by the adherents of the Juene Ecole to distrupt the and destroy the battlefleet fits those characteristics as far as I'm concerned. And, again, as much was proven by the Sino-Japanese war.

[Thunderhawk]

This wholly depends on your notion of dominance. Dominance, as far as I'm concerned refers to the ability, at any point, to cripple an opponent with overwhelming force while suffering little or no loss to oneself.

Generally I would agree with your definition, but not here.

Your definition of dominance is not conductive to mercantilism or gunboat diplomacy, which is needed to extort economic gain by might.


I view Juene ecole as something like naval guerilla warfare.
Its effective at hampering/defeating the enemy, but not good at exploiting economic resources or forcing foreign markets open.

[MB.]

exploiting economic resources or forcing foreign markets open.

Generaly, all fleets are massive holes into which one pours money. Mahan's notion of economic gain was incorrect- as I've suggested above.

As for forcing open a market, any armed ship can handle that function so long as it is clear that the fleet backing it is superior.