- 07 Aug 2003 10:54
#21092
The Errors of the Neo-Cons
By William S. Lind
The architect Andres Duany recently sent me a copy of a new and influential
neo-con tract, Robert Kagan's "Of Paradise and Power". As one would expect
from a neo-con scholar (I refuse to call them "neo-conservatives" for the
simple reason that there is nothing conservative about them; the neo-cons
are really post-Marxist Trotskyites), it is a well-written, well-argued
essay. Its thesis is that America and Europe are now on fundamentally
divergent courses, America seeking to become the dominant world power while
Europe seeks a Kantian paradise of perpetual peace. That is largely true.
Not true at all are Kagan's portrayals of America's imperial past or future.
Like all good neo-cons, he argues that America has always been on a course
toward world dominion, which is a vast misreading of American history. More
dangerous is his assumption that America's current quest to rule the world -
a quest mandated by the neo-cons, who now rule Washington - will succeed.
Behind that assumption lie two others, two central errors that "Of Paradise
and Power" illustrates well.
The first is that the American armed forces cannot be defeated. Kagan does
not so much argue this point as presume it:
The sizable American military arsenal, once barely
sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a
single formidable adversary... With the check of Soviet power removed, the
United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it
chose...
This military dominance, so complete that America can use armed forces
almost casually, is in turn a product of the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA), the domination of war by advanced technologies owned solely by the
United States.
In fact, war is going in a very different direction, one the neo-cons are
apparently incapable of comprehending. Hi-tech state armed forces are
capable of fighting only other hi-tech state armed forces, in what have
effectively become not wars but jousting contests. Real war is waged by
amorphous "fighters," indistinguishable from civilians, using low-tech
weapons such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), sniper rifles and suicide
bombs, often fighting not for a state but for a larger cause such as
religion or tribe. This kind of war, Fourth Generation War, simply bypasses
the RMA and renders it an expensive joke. It is not intimidated by the
American armed forces, and it can defeat them, as we will see in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Kagan's other error, and one of the neo-cons' central points of pride, is
American exceptionalism. This assumption is implicit in "Of Paradise and
Power," but without it the book falls apart. What it means, put simply, is
that what happened to other countries that attempted to establish world
dominion cannot happen to the United States.
Kagan acknowledges the role history, at least the history of the twentieth
century, played in Europe's present aversion to the game of Great Power. In
the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War, German and
Russian ambitions to rule the world brought disaster to both countries. The
eastern third of Germany now seems lost forever, and Russia has fallen back
to her boundaries at the time Peter the Great came to the throne. Nor did
other Europeans states prosper from Germany's and Russia's defeats; on the
contrary, all Europe was devastated.
But Kagan does not go back far enough. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
centuries, both Spain and France made their bids to establish the "universal
monarchy," and they too suffered disaster. Spain ended up a backwater and a
joke, and France inflicted the French Revolution on herself and the world.
The law is universal: Any country that attempts to establish itself as
ruler of the world, through the Great Power's tools of diplomacy and
military force, overextends, crashes and falls.
But somehow America won't. Why? Kagan doesn't say, beyond mumbling about
American power being "benevolent," which is just how everyone else saw their
power too.
During the Bosnian Crisis of the Clinton years, I asked one of the CINCs,
and old friend, whether the people making American policy knew the history
of the Balkans. He replied, "They know the history. They just don't think
it applies to them." It seems to matter little what Party is in power in
Washington; at least in foreign affairs, hubris rules. So it did earlier in
Madrid, Paris and Berlin.
William S. Lind
i agree with him!!!
elusio
By William S. Lind
The architect Andres Duany recently sent me a copy of a new and influential
neo-con tract, Robert Kagan's "Of Paradise and Power". As one would expect
from a neo-con scholar (I refuse to call them "neo-conservatives" for the
simple reason that there is nothing conservative about them; the neo-cons
are really post-Marxist Trotskyites), it is a well-written, well-argued
essay. Its thesis is that America and Europe are now on fundamentally
divergent courses, America seeking to become the dominant world power while
Europe seeks a Kantian paradise of perpetual peace. That is largely true.
Not true at all are Kagan's portrayals of America's imperial past or future.
Like all good neo-cons, he argues that America has always been on a course
toward world dominion, which is a vast misreading of American history. More
dangerous is his assumption that America's current quest to rule the world -
a quest mandated by the neo-cons, who now rule Washington - will succeed.
Behind that assumption lie two others, two central errors that "Of Paradise
and Power" illustrates well.
The first is that the American armed forces cannot be defeated. Kagan does
not so much argue this point as presume it:
The sizable American military arsenal, once barely
sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a
single formidable adversary... With the check of Soviet power removed, the
United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it
chose...
This military dominance, so complete that America can use armed forces
almost casually, is in turn a product of the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA), the domination of war by advanced technologies owned solely by the
United States.
In fact, war is going in a very different direction, one the neo-cons are
apparently incapable of comprehending. Hi-tech state armed forces are
capable of fighting only other hi-tech state armed forces, in what have
effectively become not wars but jousting contests. Real war is waged by
amorphous "fighters," indistinguishable from civilians, using low-tech
weapons such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), sniper rifles and suicide
bombs, often fighting not for a state but for a larger cause such as
religion or tribe. This kind of war, Fourth Generation War, simply bypasses
the RMA and renders it an expensive joke. It is not intimidated by the
American armed forces, and it can defeat them, as we will see in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Kagan's other error, and one of the neo-cons' central points of pride, is
American exceptionalism. This assumption is implicit in "Of Paradise and
Power," but without it the book falls apart. What it means, put simply, is
that what happened to other countries that attempted to establish world
dominion cannot happen to the United States.
Kagan acknowledges the role history, at least the history of the twentieth
century, played in Europe's present aversion to the game of Great Power. In
the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War, German and
Russian ambitions to rule the world brought disaster to both countries. The
eastern third of Germany now seems lost forever, and Russia has fallen back
to her boundaries at the time Peter the Great came to the throne. Nor did
other Europeans states prosper from Germany's and Russia's defeats; on the
contrary, all Europe was devastated.
But Kagan does not go back far enough. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
centuries, both Spain and France made their bids to establish the "universal
monarchy," and they too suffered disaster. Spain ended up a backwater and a
joke, and France inflicted the French Revolution on herself and the world.
The law is universal: Any country that attempts to establish itself as
ruler of the world, through the Great Power's tools of diplomacy and
military force, overextends, crashes and falls.
But somehow America won't. Why? Kagan doesn't say, beyond mumbling about
American power being "benevolent," which is just how everyone else saw their
power too.
During the Bosnian Crisis of the Clinton years, I asked one of the CINCs,
and old friend, whether the people making American policy knew the history
of the Balkans. He replied, "They know the history. They just don't think
it applies to them." It seems to matter little what Party is in power in
Washington; at least in foreign affairs, hubris rules. So it did earlier in
Madrid, Paris and Berlin.
William S. Lind
i agree with him!!!
elusio
i am primary.