The basis is that without God being a fact, then there are no facts.
A professor shows you why your (Leibniz’s) argument is false.
The argument.
Gottfried Leibnitz, Monadology, 32. wrote:the principle of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise.
1. Any contingent fact about the world must have an explanation.
2. It is a contingent fact that there are contingent things.
3. The fact that there are contingent things must have an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent things can’t be explained by any contingent things.
5. The fact that there are contingent things must be explained by something whose existence is not contingent. (3,4)
Conclusion: There is a necessary being. (5)
A rebuttal.
Let us suppose that the fact that there are contingent beings is explained by some necessary being, whom we can call N. Then it seems as though if the cosmological argument is to be convincing, the following must be true: N creates contingent things. So far, so good, you might think. On closer examination, though, this claim leads to a dilemma. If we are supposing that this claim is true, then it must be either a necessary truth or a contingent truth.
contingent <- N creates contingent things -> necessary
The first horn of the dilemma first - absurdity:
1. Suppose that the claim that N explains the existence of contingent things is itself contingent. Then by the principle of sufficient reason there must be some explanation for the fact that N explains the existence of contingent things.
But this sounds absurd.
What could explain this? N itself can’t explain the fact that N explains the existence of contingent things, since this is circular. And what else could.
The second horn of the dilemma - a contradiction:
2. Suppose that this claim about N is necessary. Then we avoid having to find an explanation for this claim, which is good - no?
No, we end up with a worse problem, if it is a necessary truth that N explains the existence of contingent things, then it is a necessary truth that there are contingent things. Which contradicts a premise of your original argument.
Therefore
If the claim that N explains the existence of contingent things is neither contingent nor necessary, it
must be false. But if it is false, then (5)
must be false, and the argument collapses.
"All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia" Orwell
E l/r -10 : L/A -7.64