- 18 Jan 2007 02:37
#1097975
You cannot really sum up the entire attitudes of millions in a campaign of such magnitude. Judging an army by individual accounts and beliefs is always secondary. Individual actions usually have opposite, unintended consequences from the original plans. You are partially right summing up the attitudes of conscripts, but only partially. It must be taken into account the average German was brainwashed to believe in the merits of expansionism and extermination of the Slavic peoples. The actions of a unit towards the civilian population were determined by the character of the officers.
Collaboration was most fervent among Ukrainian Catholics and minority of Muslims. The prominence and power of the church was the vehicle for mass recruitment among Ukrainian collaborators.
The Germans made key withdrawals around Smolensk in August of 1941, saving many troops from encirclement. In the case of Stalingrad, the Germans believed the Soviet army was beaten and allowed arrogance to dominate over competent decision making.
I believe you are describing the nature of operational actions of the Wehrmacht, not the grand plans for the campaign. The main debate was marching straight towards Moscow or supporting thrusts towards Leningrad and Ukraine, then attacking Moscow from all sides.
True, the problem was the logistical network for the Germans.
Yes, the critical actions around Smolensk were paramount for the success of relocating industry and manpower to the Urals. The German advance was stalled for seven weeks in the centre.
Hehe, calling Soviet soldiers “Mongolians†is probably more about ignorance and a lack of knowledge about Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. The human wave tactic is nonsense.
Shade2
Okay.
Also the Nazi concept of a racial war was totally flawed, in some parts of Russia the Germans were welcomed by the villagers. Having read some of the accounts of the campaign from the Germans it is interesting to read that front line soldiers and officers were often better behaved than the rear area troops that came behind them - which included the SS Death Squads. This is not to say all Wehrmacht troops on the front lines were on their best behavior, but the attitude of the Conquering German seems to have been largely a product of the Rear Area troops who would take over an area after the front line troops have moved on.
You cannot really sum up the entire attitudes of millions in a campaign of such magnitude. Judging an army by individual accounts and beliefs is always secondary. Individual actions usually have opposite, unintended consequences from the original plans. You are partially right summing up the attitudes of conscripts, but only partially. It must be taken into account the average German was brainwashed to believe in the merits of expansionism and extermination of the Slavic peoples. The actions of a unit towards the civilian population were determined by the character of the officers.
Collaboration was most fervent among Ukrainian Catholics and minority of Muslims. The prominence and power of the church was the vehicle for mass recruitment among Ukrainian collaborators.
But there was one key word in the plan that Hitler didn't like, withdrawal. To Hitler the German soldier ether fight where he stood, or died where he stood.
The Germans made key withdrawals around Smolensk in August of 1941, saving many troops from encirclement. In the case of Stalingrad, the Germans believed the Soviet army was beaten and allowed arrogance to dominate over competent decision making.
I think one of the initial plans raised by one of the General Staff officers had the best plan to succeed, it called for rapid thrusts to capture key locations, followed by a period of withdrawal and consolidation. Which would then be followed by another period of rapid thrusts and withdrawal and consolidation - in effect to slowly take bites out of the USSR. This plan showed promise as it recognized the problems of bringing up supples over long distances and the problems out a rapid thrust outrunning its supply lines (a problem Patton faced many times).
I believe you are describing the nature of operational actions of the Wehrmacht, not the grand plans for the campaign. The main debate was marching straight towards Moscow or supporting thrusts towards Leningrad and Ukraine, then attacking Moscow from all sides.
The German war industry didn't go onto a war footing until late in the war, even in the finial days it was still outputting material although it had been bombed to dust. I've even seen photos of an open air factory in a forest to make the jet powered ME262.
True, the problem was the logistical network for the Germans.
The USSR simply packed up the plants and shiped them by train away from the Germans, the factory workers walking along the sides of the railways were even getting strafed by German fighters.
Yes, the critical actions around Smolensk were paramount for the success of relocating industry and manpower to the Urals. The German advance was stalled for seven weeks in the centre.
As for manpower, the Russians pulled in everyone it could get its hands on. Hans von Luck wrote in his book, Panzer Commander, about how he was surprised to see Mongolians in the Soviet army. Siegfried Knappe wrote in his book, Soldat, that he was astounded by the wave attacks of Russian infantry that just kept coming on, getting larger and larger with each wave. And when German troops counter attacked, there was so much Russian artillery that individual artillery guns were fireing at individual German soldiers!
Hehe, calling Soviet soldiers “Mongolians†is probably more about ignorance and a lack of knowledge about Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. The human wave tactic is nonsense.
Shade2
1-People don't join Nazis, just because they are under occupation. Slave workers were notorious for sabotage and lousy work, not to mention obvious lack of motivation. Likewise the industry and transport in occupied areas was continously sabotaged, which hindered German exploitation. It doesn't equal to German industry.
2-Military of allied nations was of varied quality and motivation, it also cannot be seen as the same of core nation. For example Romanians were known for their lack of motivation after reaching their goals against USSR while Hungarian soldiers sold weapons to Home Army in Poland and supplied it with tactical information.
Okay.
Last edited by Maksym on 18 Jan 2007 02:39, edited 1 time in total.