How? The Germans didn't have the capacity to support a larger force in North Africa. There were not enough ports, not enough ships, and even if you can get material and men to North Africa, getting it all up one road is a nightmare. Any delay to negate British advantages in the region (naval bases, airbases etc.) just gives them more time to dig in and build up their land forces in North Africa.
The British could have built up their forces until the cows came home, but the reality is that German forces only lost the initiative in North Africa because millions and millions in men and materiale was now tied to the Eastern Front. Axis forces were still delivering crippling defeats on land in Tunisia as late as '43, even after the disaster at Stalingrad. Without this theatre, there is no way no how that the British would have maintained control of Egypt with German forces pouring in, millions more in numbers, from Italian Libya.
This fantasy is also incompatible with Kirby's. Super-peaceful Hitler still has an amazing war machine for some reason? Please.
I never once stated I suscribed to any such scenario; you so arrogantly assigned it to me, and it's a very puerile method of debate.
The infrastructure for a push into the Middle East via Egypt is even worse than in North Africa, especially if you assume the British were willing to destroy infrastructure rather than let Germany have it, which was pretty much the plan anyway.
With German control over Suez and Egypt proper, the time required to repair, rebuild, and create alternate infrastructure would be an inconvenience, not a sign of defeat. The British could have shoved as many Indian conscripts as they could find into Iraq and Palestine, but this was not even practical considering the superior British position in our own timeline.
Also making a dash for the oil fields pretty well guarantees US intervention. They've got an interest in the oil fields of the Middle East already, and their only previous barrier had been the British. As much as they might have disliked the British Empire, a Nazi Empire bent on autarky (again, see the Hossbach Memorandum) wasn't going to be a better partner in the Middle East.
And once Axis forces were moving freely throughout Egypt, with the time constraints and logisics of mobilization and expedition, the U.S. would have been hard pressed to make a quick and decisive impact in the Middle East. As I highlighted earlier, considering the U.S. performance in the Battle of the Kasserine Pass and the undoubtably inferior German position at the time, that scenario doesn't make much logical sense.
A lack of troops was never the issue that prevented an occupation of Spain and Portugal
I'm aware of this, but lack of troops among other things was what prevented a far more extensive and comprehensive anti-British effort on the continent and in the Mediterranean between '40 and '43.
it was strictly political (well that and occupied Spain probably would have been a weeping sore of insurgency but anyway...).
An insurgency of ex-Republican soldiers, anarchist ideologues, etc. that posed no serious challenge to the legitimacy or effective qualities of Franco's government. Why would they be a serious challenge for a joint German and Italian occupation force? And if you are assuming that an Axis presence, whether hostile or upon invitation, would have reignited Spanish political tensions, it would be nothing worse than what was being dealt with in Yugoslavia with Tito's Partisans or the Polish Underground Army in the General Government.
Knocking out Gibraltar would have been a good strategic move, but any other gain of occupying Spain etc. would have been negligble.
How so? Physical control of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, all of Latin Europe, in addition to a far more likely successful siege and conquest of Malta in that scenario seems to put German forces on a much better footing with respect to Mediterranean operations.
Oh, and it would have alienated the other Axis powers and potentially friendly neutrals, which would probably be an issue further down the line.
I fail to see how it would have alienated allies such as the Romanians, the Hungarians, or the Slovaks, for example, and these continental allies (and the Slovak Republic was essentially a client) would be even less important without the need for men, far more extensive resources, and broad cooperation that the Eastern Front demanded of its participants.
As for neutrals, there would be very few left. Switzerland would have done nothing and were the Swedish to take a hostile tone, they wouldn't have a military position to negotiate from.
And again, incompatible with Kirby's peaceful Hitler.
Entirely irrelevant.
And 'but I'm talking about something else' isn't an excuse, you posted in this thread, you can stick with the OP.
What are you talking about?
My first post here was in response to some of Gandalf's comments. You are creating a position for me which doesn't exist and never existed. Quite bizarre indeed.
"I am never guided by a possible assessment of my work" - President Vladimir Putin
"Nations whose nationalism is destroyed are subject to ruin." - Muammar Qaddafi