I'm just not going to engage your crazy conspiracy theory at all.
I'll just give the thread this, and the commentary which I have written before:
Asia Times, 'Korea through the Russian looking glass', 04 Mar 2004 (emphasis added) wrote:Russia's interests are rooted in its history, geography and policy, and understanding the hierarchy of objectives governing Russia's position on the Koreas may help make sense of the apparent contradictions inherent in its policy.
First of all, Moscow, like the other four partners outside of the DPRK, and perhaps Pyongyang too, is most worried about war and the need to prevent the onset of conflict. That shared anxiety is what creates a common negotiating space for the five states seeking to roll back the North's nuclear program. But beyond that important commonality, there are divergences among the parties, creating situations in which it becomes harder for all to agree and reach consensus; instead, one or two states agree with each.
Historically Russia has fought four wars in the 20th century to prevent Northern Korea, with whom it shares a territorial boundary near the Pacific Ocean, from falling prey to hostile powers. Those wars were the Russo-Japanese war from 1904-05; the undeclared war with Japan in 1938-39 that took place mainly in Manchuria; Russia's invasion of Manchuria and Korea, the culminating offensive of World War II in Asia in August,1945; and Russian pilots' participation in the air war during the Korean War of 1950-53.
In all cases, the point was, and is, not the unification of the Korean peninsula as such. Rather it is the conditions under which the peninsula might be united that concerned - and still do concern Moscow.
Most important is that Moscow, in approaching the two Koreas and the issue of terminating the unfinished Korean war between them, is the weakest of all the outside powers and one that is acutely aware of how little it brings to the table. Moreover, what haunts the minds of policymakers from Putin down is that Russia, due to its current economic and military weakness, could easily be marginalized and excluded from any process bringing an end to hostilities on the peninsula, reunification and denuclearization.
[...]
Despite it's seat at the table, Russia continues to fear its potential marginalization in Asia generally, and Korea in particular, fears which are traced to two primary concerns:
- First, that the US penchant for unilateral action may bring about a war - hence Losyukov's warnings about the dangers of unilateral US military action. A war would bring about a situation inherently dangerous and unpredictable, especially if the DPRK has nuclear weapons.
- And second, that rising Chinese economic power will marginalize Moscow's ability to play a major role in Korea.
Russia is anxious over China's rising power because Moscow has major economic interests tied to its geopolitical objectives of maintaining North and South Korea in balance, integrating the North with the rest of the world, and using the two Koreas to help Russia's own stricken Eastern and Asian provinces recover economically. Thus it is seeking debt repayment from the North, even if its has to sell arms to Pyongyang. Moscow also encourages the North to reform, seeks either to pay off or have its debts forgiven by South Korea, and take advantage of its proximity to the Korean peninsula to construct its so-called Iron Silk Road, a railroad linking the two Koreas to the Trans-Siberian railroad and thus to Moscow and Europe.
The Iron Silk Road is of major geostrategic and economic significance to Russia. It would rival the European Union's Silk Road project from Europe to the Pacific Ocean, through the Caucasus and Central Asia - bypassing Russia in its course. And the Russian project, if undertaken, would also rival China's efforts to build a pan-Asian railway and advance its transport infrastructure.
Furthermore, a war on the Korean peninsula and/or any monopolization of aid to North Korea by Washington or Beijing would exclude Moscow from economic and political consideration, leaving its rundown and underdeveloped eastern provinces acutely vulnerable, mainly to Chinese economic pressure. Either or both of these contingencies - conflict or exclusion of Moscow from aiding North Korea - also makes it impossible to realize Russia's economic and political objectives regarding its Asiatic trade or the development of North Korea.
Thus, beyond being accepted as a legitimate part of any Korean "peace process", it is also essential for Moscow to be deeply involved, to whatever extent possible, in the economic dimensions of a solution to the Korean dilemma. Moreover, it does not want to have to choose among Beijing, Seoul and Washington, realizing that doing so makes it vulnerable to pressure from China or the US.
As was 1904, as is 2015. Toward the Russophile left and their groupies, we should have a bomb in our hands, a knife between our teeth, and an infinite scorn in our hearts. We need to understand that Russian throats have seasoned and have become ripe for cutting. When the time comes for harvesting those necks, we should do it and regret nothing.
When the Russians come and say, "What about the Second World War, don't you feel bad about 16 million deaths? Won't you please feel guilty and immobilised, Japan?", say "
No. We regret nothing."
Russian propaganda is getting more and more ludicrous by the day. I mean, that one is just amazingly crazy.
- By Unthinking Majority
- By Fasces
- By Pants-of-dog
- By paeng