A Defense of Immaterialism: The Debate - Page 11 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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#14941051
ingliz wrote:By whom?


Dr. Suess of course.

:lol:

Who do you think?

Obviously I deny that anything can be uttered about God unless it is necessarily inferred or has been communicated to us by Him.

we've already discussed this as well.
#14941056
Victoribus Spolia wrote:necessarily inferred

'Necessarily', my arse!

Yes, you can 'prove' or 'disprove' a statement depending on the set of axioms you select (I have done as much myself in this thread) because all propositions in a system of logic which includes the and operator but not the * operator or their propositional equivalents are decidable.

But this in truth proves nothing, and is nothing more than a mental exercise, as you can 'fix' the semantic system to give you your desired outcome.

by Him

Unverifiable.


:)

Addendum

A Problem with Causality:

The absurdity that an effect can be caused by hypothetical or non-existent entities. Our conception of the world is such that it makes sense to talk about unobserved events causing other events. According to the phenomenalist though, unobserved events are reducible to sets of possible sensory events. But a mere set of possibilities cannot be a cause. It makes no sense to say ‘Such-and-such a set of possibilities made it the case that X happened’.

For example, it is commonly accepted that the sound that an observer hears emanating from a radio's speaker is caused by electromagnetic radio waves impinging on the radio's antenna and streams of electrons modified and amplified within the radio's internal electronic circuitry. These radio waves and electrons are not visible to the observer and so, on a phenomenalist rendering, exist as possibilities of sensation only. Hence, for a phenomenalist, mere possibilities can have actual effects. (Dicker 1980)
#14941238
ingliz wrote:Yes, you can 'prove' or 'disprove' a statement depending on the set of axioms you select


You act like anything can be an axiom, that is simply not the case. You are confusing the idea of arbitrary first principles and those things which cannot be denied without assuming their validity. The axioms I have presented are in that latter category demonstrably.

ingliz wrote:I have done as much myself in this thread)


:lol:

Hardly, I don't even recall you presenting any specific axioms at all.

ingliz wrote:But this in truth proves nothing, and is nothing more than a mental exercise, as you can 'fix' the semantic system to give you your desired outcome.


A necessary inference is what it is, you can complain about logic all you want, but my conclusions follow from my premises which are likewise based upon axioms that cannot be denied without the assumption of their validity.

Hence, I have necessarily inferred the existence of God from undeniable axioms. Thus, in this capacity, I can speak of God.

ingliz wrote:Unverifiable.


"Verified" according to whom and what criteria?

If you mean by plain reason, no further verification is needed beyond my proof.

ingliz wrote:The absurdity that an effect can be caused by hypothetical or non-existent entities.


Good thing God is neither hypothetical or non-existent huh. :lol:

ingliz wrote:Our conception of the world is such that it makes sense to talk about unobserved events causing other events. According to the phenomenalist though, unobserved events are reducible to sets of possible sensory events. But a mere set of possibilities cannot be a cause. It makes no sense to say ‘Such-and-such a set of possibilities made it the case that X happened’.


No Phenomenal Idealist holds to this strange epistemology of causation you present here ^

In point of fact, Phenomenal Idealists deny any causation that is not a necessary condition. Which is why we are such sticklers on cum hoc and post hoc fallacies.

ingliz wrote:For example, it is commonly accepted that the sound that an observer hears emanating from a radio's speaker is caused by electromagnetic radio waves impinging on the radio's antenna and streams of electrons modified and amplified within the radio's internal electronic circuitry. These radio waves and electrons are not visible to the observer and so, on a phenomenalist rendering, exist as possibilities of sensation only. Hence, for a phenomenalist, mere possibilities can have actual effects. (Dicker 1980)


This is simply not true. Phenomenal Idealists deny that anything sensible is the cause of any other sensible thing. There is nothing observed in nature that is the cause of what you hear. Phenomena are causally inert. Full-Stop.
#14941298
Victoribus Spolia wrote:Good thing God is neither hypothetical or non-existent huh.

That God exists is not just an unproven hypothetical, it is unprovable.

A belief in the existence of God is not amenable to demonstration or refutation, but rests on faith alone.

No Phenomenal Idealist holds to this strange epistemology of causation you present here

Mill?

Now, of what nature is this fixed order among our sensations? It is a constancy of antecedence and sequence. But the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another. Very few such sequences are presented to us by experience. In almost all the constant sequences which occur in Nature, the antecedence and consequence do not obtain between sensations, but between the groups we have been speaking about, of which a very small portion is actual sensation, the greater part being permanent possibilities of sensation, evidenced to us by a small and variable number of sensations actually present. (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy)

My emphasis.


:)
#14941301
ingliz wrote:That God exists is not just an unproven hypothetical, it is unprovable.


Except I did, so Boom.

ingliz wrote:A belief in the existence of God is not amenable to demonstration or refutation, but rests on faith alone.


^ This is therefore false.

ingliz wrote:Mill?


There is a reason that Mill is not listed with the likes of A.A. Luce, Samuel Johnson, John Foster, Jonathan Edwards, Arthur Collier etc., as being of the immaterialist tradition, in spite of his claims.

This is because he is undoubtedly heterodox. You cannot be a phenomenal idealist without being a theist. Mill was an atheist and this is why his doctrine of causation is so fucked up.
#14941326
Victoribus Spolia wrote:Except I did, so Boom.

Not to my satisfaction.

This is therefore false.

Since you have proved nothing, it is true.

You cannot be a phenomenal idealist without being a theist

Mill being a phenomenal idealist, heterodox or not, shows you are wrong.


:)
#14941330
ingliz wrote:Mill being a phenomenal idealist, heterodox or not, shows you are wrong.


Since his position is of a different school than mine, than your critique of his position is still inapplicable of mine.

You Lose.

ingliz wrote:Not to my satisfaction.


Why should I give a damn about your "satisfaction."

The argument is plain, its posted, and it has been left unchallenged by you.

You haven't even attempted a critique of it.

ingliz wrote:Since you have proved nothing, it is true.


My proof remains unchallenged. Feel free to challenge it.
#14941331
Victoribus Spolia wrote:Since his position is of a different school than mine, than your critique of his position is still inapplicable of mine.

You Lose.

Since your position is of a different school than mine, then your critique of my position is still inapplicable of mine.


You Lose.


:)
#14941333
ingliz wrote:Since your position is different to mine, your critique of my position is inapplicable.

You Lose.


If I was presuming your position to be the same as mine when making my critique, you would be right, but i'm not, so you are wrong.

Again.

You Lose.
#14941338
Victoribus Spolia wrote:If I was presuming
.
I was not.

permanent possibilities of sensation

How does the phenomenalist arrive at his subjunctive conditionals? How does he, for example, work out the particular subjunctive conditionals that go to make up the meaning of the statement, 'Venus orbits the Sun'? Precisely by taking the laws of planetary motion, the laws of optics, the laws governing the reflective and refractive properties of the earth's atmosphere, the laws governing the operation of the human retina, the laws governing the neural processing of visual information and the psycho-physical linking laws (this list is not meant to be exhaustive), and then, by suitable permutations and combinations of the various constants corresponding to the various (infinite number of) initial conditions, finally deducing the expected perceptual experience under each initial condition.

Notice, firstly, that to work out the semantic content of 'Venus orbits the Sun' in 'experience' terms, the phenomenalist is using a realist conceptual scheme consisting of observer-independent physical processes. The experience of the observer is calculated to be the end result of a long chain of causal processes described in terms of physical theories that make no mention of the observer or experiences.

Secondly, it seems clear that for the phenomenalist to work out the semantic content of 'Venus orbits the Sun' in 'experience' terms, he must already know the meaning of 'Venus' and 'Sun' and 'orbit' in order for him to select correctly the relevant laws and be able to manipulate them, in conjunction with other laws, to achieve the desired 'translation'. Obviously, the phenomenalist selects primarily that set of laws (the laws of planetary motion) which contain as constants the terms 'Sun' and 'Venus', and which describe in mathematical form their spatial co-ordinates with respect to a time co-ordinate. It seems to me that 'Sun', 'Venus' and the other special terms of the theory gain their interpretation through the postulates of the theoretical system in which they are embedded, and this is how the phenomenalist knows their meaning.

The phenomenalist may admit that he had knowledge of the meanings of 'Venus', 'Sun' and 'orbit' prior to his phenomenalist translation, but that it was only partial knowledge. It is true, he will say, that the full meaning of these terms is given by the postulates of the laws of planetary motion, but, he will object, the meaning of these laws is exhausted by statements about possible experiences. However, the problem for the phenomenalist, once again, is that in working out the semantic content of the laws of planetary motion in 'experience' terms, he must use other physical and psycho-physical laws, which in turn must be interpreted in 'experience' terms by other laws, and so on.

In general, a phenomenalist interpretation of a natural law in 'experience' terms will need to specify particular observation conditions, measuring instruments, and so on, which will in turn require further interpretation, and so on ad infinitum. Not only will this translation procedure lead to an infinite regress, it will also lead to a vicious circle. Consider for a moment a phenomenalist interpretation of the laws of planetary motion. This translation will require the use of the laws of optics (in order to determine the positions of images of planetary bodies on the lenses of telescopes, for one). But conversely, a phenomenalist interpretation of the laws of optics requires the use of the laws of planetary motion (in order to determine the amount of bending of a light ray in the presence of a gravitational field, for one).

To avoid an infinite regress and a vicious circle, we must allow that the meanings of 'physical object' terms and physical theories are not defined primarily in 'experience' terms. 'Physical object' terms and the theories in which they are embedded only have observational import when conjoined with a whole host of other physical theories and psycho-physical linking laws. My point here then is this: the extent to which a phenomenalist uses a physical theory or theories to work out the meaning of a 'physical object' term or another physical theory in 'experience' terms, without first giving a full phenomenalist interpretation of the physical theory that he is using (which I argue is, in principle, impossible), is the extent to which his phenomenalist interpretation is parasitic on an anti-phenomenalistic realist assumption.

The phenomenalist's acceptance of contingent subjunctive counterfactual conditionals thus presupposes an anti-phenomenalistic realist framework. However, because the realist can explain the truth of these counterfactual conditionals (which, for the phenomenalist, remain inexplicable at the physical level) in terms of the physical and psycho-physical theories from which they are derived, there is then no need to justify them in terms of Berkeley's God or an Absolute or some other 'ultimate reality' underlying the physical world.

The upshot is that phenomenalistic idealism is untenable because our 'physical object' language is irreducibly realist at its conceptual core. If it is not already clear, phenomenalism construed not as a descriptive thesis about our actual 'physical object' language, but as a proposal for linguistic reform, is similarly untenable because of the conceptual and heuristic sterility of such a proposed language. The conclusion, then, is that the realist's thesis, that physical objects do not depend for their existence on being perceived or conceived by a mind, is analytically true. (Allan 2016)


:)
#14941346
ingliz wrote:How does the phenomenalist arrive at his subjunctive conditionals? How does he, for example, work out the particular subjunctive conditionals that go to make up the meaning of the statement, 'Venus orbits the Sun'?


This question is falsely answered by the author with this:

ingliz wrote:Precisely by taking the laws of planetary motion, the laws of optics, the laws governing the reflective and refractive properties of the earth's atmosphere, the laws governing the operation of the human retina, the laws governing the neural processing of visual information and the psycho-physical linking laws (this list is not meant to be exhaustive), and then, by suitable permutations and combinations of the various constants corresponding to the various (infinite number of) initial conditions, finally deducing the expected perceptual experience under each initial condition.


That is precisely NOT how Phenomenal Idealists account for their perceptual experiences in linguistic terms.

Rather, I am perceiving an object which is perceptually in motion around another object which is not perceived to be in motion. Simple as that.

No complex naturalistic theories and presuppositions are necessary, anything which is presupposed as laws, would be natural laws and natural laws are nothing but tentative descriptions of what one typically observes. Nothing realist about any of this. Nothing at all.

ingliz wrote:Notice, firstly, that to work out the semantic content of 'Venus orbits the Sun' in 'experience' terms, the phenomenalist is using a realist conceptual scheme consisting of observer-independent physical processes.


Entirely false. There is no presupposition of observer-independent physical processes in the statement. IF there is a presupposition of anything in the semantics, its only the use of inaccurate language for the sake of communicating with others.

ingliz wrote:The experience of the observer is calculated to be the end result of a long chain of causal processes described in terms of physical theories that make no mention of the observer or experiences.


Except there is no causal chain. Indeed, the claim assumes only what has been observed, an object going around another object. Following Occam's razor, anything that cannot be directly perceived must be held in suspicion. If an Idealist claims the reality of phenomena that are not observed, without qualification, he is acting inconsistent with Phenomenal Idealism, this is not an argument against the position though.

I for one am not entirely convinced that Venus even exists, in point of fact.

ingliz wrote:Secondly, it seems clear that for the phenomenalist to work out the semantic content of 'Venus orbits the Sun' in 'experience' terms, he must already know the meaning of 'Venus' and 'Sun' and 'orbit' in order for him to select correctly the relevant laws and be able to manipulate them, in conjunction with other laws, to achieve the desired 'translation'. Obviously, the phenomenalist selects primarily that set of laws (the laws of planetary motion) which contain as constants the terms 'Sun' and 'Venus', and which describe in mathematical form their spatial co-ordinates with respect to a time co-ordinate. It seems to me that 'Sun', 'Venus' and the other special terms of the theory gain their interpretation through the postulates of the theoretical system in which they are embedded, and this is how the phenomenalist knows their meaning.


Nonsense.

Names are affixed to certain perceptual objects and their observed relations.

Nothing more. Nothing less.

The following paragraph after the one quoted is therefore also nonsense.

ingliz wrote:In general, a phenomenalist interpretation of a natural law in 'experience' terms will need to specify particular observation conditions, measuring instruments, and so on, which will in turn require further interpretation, and so on ad infinitum. Not only will this translation procedure lead to an infinite regress, it will also lead to a vicious circle.


Also nonsense, one does not need to assume any translations or interpretations of natural law, all that is needed is descriptions of what is observed and the necessary grounds for observation itself, which is not epistemic realism, but theism.

ingliz wrote:the extent to which a phenomenalist uses a physical theory or theories to work out the meaning of a 'physical object' term or another physical theory in 'experience' terms, without first giving a full phenomenalist interpretation of the physical theory that he is using (which I argue is, in principle, impossible), is the extent to which his phenomenalist interpretation is parasitic on an anti-phenomenalistic realist assumption.


I would agree with this in one sense, if the Phenomenal Idealist is presuming things beyond what his system allows in order to be "scientific" then yes, he may in fact be acting parasitic of realist notions; however, this is not an argument against phenomenal idealism, but against the behavior of certain idealists.

If physical theory does not comport to idealism, it must be removed. If dark matter does not comport to idealism, it must be rejected, it the theory of relativity does not comport to idealism, it must be rejected, if geological time does not comport to idealism it must be rejected. et al.

ingliz wrote:The phenomenalist's acceptance of contingent subjunctive counterfactual conditionals thus presupposes an anti-phenomenalistic realist framework


The presupposition of an objective reality is not the same as presupposing a realist framework, an objective unified reality exists in the mind of God, which is why the presupposition that the room I leave (stop perceiving) still exists is not a false presupposition as it always exists in its unified totality in the Mind of God.

ingliz wrote:There is then no need to justify them in terms of Berkeley's God or an Absolute or some other 'ultimate reality' underlying the physical world.


:lol:

Except that realism cannot develop a theory of causation without engaging in fallacious reasoning, the existence of God is necessary inference to justify our language regarding the objective and unified character of the perceptual world and does so without violation of the laws or reason. No realist schema can do this. NONE.

ingliz wrote:The upshot is that phenomenalistic idealism is untenable because our 'physical object' language is irreducibly realist at its conceptual core.


False. Nothing realist about our language at all except where it inaccurately describes reality in colloquial form or assumes metaphysical snipes.

ingliz wrote:The conclusion, then, is that the realist's thesis, that physical objects do not depend for their existence on being perceived or conceived by a mind, is analytically true.


Probably the sloppiest conclusions from the shittiest premises I can imagine.
#14941355
Victoribus Spolia wrote:Except that realism ...

The same argument can be made contra phenomenalism, there is a logical gap between 'objects in the world' statements and 'experience' statements. And this is because the form of experience that an observer has in a particular perceptual situation is a function not only of the properties of the object under observation, but also of the properties of the mediating substances, the neurophysiological state of the observer and the nomological link between the neurophysiological state and the experiential state.


:)
#14941356
ingliz wrote:....but also of the properties of the mediating substances, the neurophysiological state of the observer and the nomological link between the neurophysiological state and the experiential state.


There are no mediating substances, and there are no neurophysiological states that are relevant to perceiving and there is most certainly not a causal link between what is observed regarding a brain and the experience had by an individual.

Brains as phenomena are causally inert and have nothing to do with perceiving.
#14941357
Victoribus Spolia wrote:there are no neurophysiological states

Are you saying perceptual error is a form of demonic possession? God is not a deceiver.


:lol:
#14941358
ingliz wrote:Are you saying hallucinations are a form of demonic possession?


Hallucinations only describe a change of perception in correlation to other events, often times correlated to ingesting certain substances.

Dreams are similar, they are perceptual experiences, often times lacking clarity and constancy, correlated to the experience of going to sleep.

But to answer your question regarding demon possession, I have never been possessed by a demon so I can't say for sure what such perceptual states would obtain for the subject possessed.

:D

There are no perceptual errors, whatever one perceives is what they perceive. Perceptual error is a misnomer.
Last edited by Victoribus Spolia on 21 Aug 2018 22:53, edited 1 time in total.
#14941360
Victoribus Spolia wrote:regarding demon possession

But, according to you, God does not deceive.

So how do you account for perceptual error?
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