[Piano Red]

R edit: The following post makes extensive and frivolous use of third-party material, specifically from this article by Planeman.

I thought i'd post this mainly in an effort to show exactly just how much (or how little really) of a concentrated ADGE (Air Defense Ground Environment) Iran truly has.

I can't even begin to recall the many times it's been postulated/argued in numerous threads on PoFo of how the US or Israel would inevitably win, yet at the same time suffer "tremendous", "costly", and "significant" losses (or any other number of vague references), in any air campaign conducted against Iran (particularly one directed at destroying their clandestine weapons program & nuclear facilities).

From what i've seen, many of the proponents of these claims have primarily based their arguments on the presumption of the "Iran is no Iraq" thesis. Or that, because of current US commitments in Iraq the US is militarily incapable of prosecuting a campaign against Iran. This argument in particular has been especially vexing because many of them simply juxtapose the notion that any US-Iran conflict would automatically see a US invasion of Iran when there wouldn't be a necessity for one to take place to begin with.

Even worse are the claims that the Iranian military has the organization, expertise, equipment, and so forth that actually put it on par with the US militarily, and (as based off the "not Iraq" concept) the US is deterred from/wary of fighting Iran because the Iranians are capable of inflicting some form of large and meaningful casualties to US forces (or regional allies and assets) in return.

My main intention with this is to show just how rediculously "undifficult" it would be for the US (or Israel with a bit of jimmyrigging) to prosecute a relatively unconstrained air war against Iran's current (and even projected) air defense posture. One in which offensive air elements would be able to penetrate and strike at targets within the country punitively, and with virtually no losses.

Most of my source material comes from Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Jane's Land Based Missile Systems, Google Earth, my own understanding of their ADGE OOB, as well as a number of blogs and reports on the subject. Now to get started.

SAM Systems
The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 GUIDELINE (a Chinese-produced SA-2 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, and SA-5 GAMMON.

The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple:

*click me* - IMG tags for these pics aren't working for some reason.

See this page for pictures.

SA-5 Gammon (S-200)
Iran declared the SA-5 long range missile system operational in 1997 and apparently now produces the missiles which Iran calls the “Ghareh”. There are 6 fixed SA-5 sites which provide principal coverage of the nation. Iran recently showcased an ‘optimized’ SA-5 but quite what that optimalization involves is not clear – although one can surmise that the existing SA-5 infrastructure must be sub-optimal in the eyes of the Iranian military.
See this page for pictures.

National SA-5 Coverage
The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of six SA-5 GAMMON firing batteries throughout the nation. The three northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fourth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.

The northern three SA-5 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining five sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the SA-5 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.

I-Hawk SAM
In 1983 Iran was reported to have 23 Hawk/I-Hawk batteries, ironically receiving extra missiles from Israel and US during the Iran-Iraq war as a result of the Iran-Contra affair. Today it is estimated that only 10 Iranian Hawk sites remain active or operational.
See this page for pictures.

Four Hawk sites circle the south and west of the capitol city of Tehran, at about 20-30km from the city centre. Of these only the southern-most two appear active in Google Earth. A fifth active Hawk site is located at Mehrabad air base.

Hawk is a relatively mobile system and can be redeployed in times of threat. During the Iran-Iraq war Hawk was mostly employed close to the battle front in temporary emplacements. Similarly the 1990’s Iranian Hawk sites on the islands of Sirri and Abumusa are much more rough-and-ready than the older Western built Hawk sites in Tehran’s ring. What is significant however is that even though the system can be redeployed, the signature layout is maintained, although three launcher configurations are more common than the original six:

See this page for pictures.

Coming back to the Tehran batteries, the west-most battery, although empty, is clearly built with only three firing positions:

See this page for pictures.

Standard SAM
Iran has reverse engineered the SM-1 Standard naval SAM missile and employs variants as both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems, possibly with the local name “Fajr”. The success and extent of service of the system is open to question, and it is thought that the Iranian Navy, who had fitted a Kaman class missile boat with the system after the retirement of the sole Babr class destroyer (Allen M Summer class FRAMII) which had carried 4 twin boxed launchers, and also trialed an air-launched anti-ship version, has retired the system. The reverse-engineered missile is claimed to have several enhancements including digital components allowing it employ different radar frequencies. In the SAM role the Fajr is fired from twin launchers as per the SM-1 system on Babr, which are now mounted on an adapted I-Hawk SAM launcher. Performance is not known but is likely to be similar to the SM-1MR (RIM-66A Block-IV) naval missile, having a range of about 32km; significantly shorter than the I-Hawk.
See this page for pictures.

None of the identified I-Hawk sites on Google Earth appear to have Standard missiles and given the likely inferior performance compared to the I-Hawk it seems likely that the system has not been adopted in meaningful numbers if at all.

HQ-2B/ Sayyad-1/Sayyad-1a
Iran first received Chinese HQ-2 (Chinese version of SA-2) SAMs during the Iran-Iraq war, possibly also with some SA-2s from other countries during that time. The system is generally regarded as obsolete and appears many HQ-2 sites are now empty, suggesting a general reduction in strength, but since 1999 Iran has produced an enhanced version of this system as the “Sayyad-1” and “Sayyad-1a”, which has an increased effective range of 50km (as per later HQ-2s) and possibly an improved warhead and elements of Hawk and Standard missile technology. It is probable that the Sayyad-1 is employed as an improved missile for existing HQ-2 sites rather than a complete stand-alone system.
See this page for pictures.

There are four HQ-2/Sayyad-1 sites covering Tehran, forming a semi-circle around the on the South-west side of the city, positioned about 30km from the city centre. Only the western-most site appears active and it is possible that the southern three are remnants from the Iran-Iraq war. It is not possible to discern whether the missiles employed are Sayyad-1 or original HQ-2s.

Pic 1

The active site is protected by seven 23mm AAA positions:
Pic 2

The 23mm AAA is however insufficient to cover the whole of the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s dead ground, leaving a significant opening for attacking aircraft /missiles to fly in under the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s altitude limits and then pop up 7-5km from their target for a diving attack that the ZU-23-2 would be almost powerless to stop:

See this page for pictures.

The combination of a relatively poor missile potency, particularly at short ranges and low altitudes, combined with the inadequate point defense and static installations makes the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM sites easy prey to cruise missiles and modern stand-off weapons. At the same time the sites themselves are not sufficiently valuable to warrant deploying SA-15 (Tor) or SA-19 (Panstyr) systems to shoot down incoming missiles.

SA-6 Kub
The 1960’s SA-6 Kub mobile medium range SAM system was first introduced into Iranian service in 1990, and is (exclusively?) operated by the IRGC-AF. In concept the system is a fully mobile area-defense system for maneuvering army brigades, but can be employed to defend fixed sites with the advantage of being able to redeploy to fresh sites frequently. Although the system was incredibly successful in the 1970s in Egyptian hands against Israel during the Yom Kippur War, it was far less successful in subsequent conflicts and although still considered a relative threat is no longer cutting edge.
See this page for pictures.

S-300
Perhaps the longest running and most controversial rumor surrounding Iran’s air defenses is the supposed acquisition of advanced S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) SAMs from Russia. For years people have argued whether Iran has them but in recent months several fresh rumors and credible reports have rekindled the fire. On the one hand there has been a spate of credible reports that Iran is in negotiations with Russia for the comparatively advanced S-300PMU1 (SA-10D) system:
See this page for pictures.

Whilst this deal was being denied by some Russian Government sources, reputable defense news source Jane’s published an article claiming that Iran was in final negotiations to purchase two batteries of the older S-300PT (SA-10A) system from Belarus. The report was denied by Belarus, but accuracy remains unclear. The S-300PT is less capable than the S-300PMU1 and less mobile, using trailer launchers that require significant preparation to redeploy relative to the much more mobile S-300PMU1 which uses either a self-propelled Maz truck launcher (TEL, above) or a more mobile truck and trailer configuration. At first glance it seems that Iran is so desperate to upgrade its air defenses that it is willing to pay over-the-odds for surplus early-model S-300s, although it now seems probable that the ‘leak’ was a political ploy to spur the Russian government into finalizing the S-300PMU1 deal. Strangely China’s comparable HQ-9 and KS-1A SAM systems don’t seem to be in the picture. The satellite imagery below shows one of the Belarusian S-300PT batteries supposedly involved in the deal:
See this page for pictures.


The funny (if not brutally ironic) thing about all this is that (even if the Iranians do get their hands on a Russian S-300 system. The US would already have the means of circumventing it, primarily because of the fact that the US DoD currently has an advanced S-300 system in its possession at the Tolicha Peak ECR (Electronic Combat Range) near Nellis AFB in Nevada.

Pic 1

The mainstream belief is that the Tolicha Peak facility houses a number of different radar systems to support the USAF's numerous Red Flag aerial combat training operations & regimens, given its proximity to two mock airfields. A more detailed examination provides an alternative, that of foreign SAM system exploitation and testing. Elements of S-125 (SA-3 GOA), S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), and S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE) SAM systems can be found on the grounds of Tolicha Peak.

The following annotated image depicts the Tolicha Peak S-300PS/PM facility:
Pic 2

Close examination of the terrain in the vicinity of the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range would seem to display impact craters, providing further evidence that actual SAM firings may be taking place here. As the United States does not actively list any of the aforementioned SAM systems in its operational inventory, it is likely that some sort of test work does take place here. It is also possible that the associated radar systems are in fact also used against aircraft flying on the Nellis AFB Range to provide more realistic electronic combat training.

Iranian SHORAD missile systems (Short Range Air Defense):
See this page for pictures.

Lighter Air-Defense systems:
See this page for pictures.

Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
By far and away the most advanced and potent air defense system in the current Iranian inventory, the 29 Tor-M1 systems entering service provide a credible defense against cruise missiles, stand-off weapons and medium/low flying aircraft including fast jets. Their main weakness is that they are relatively short ranged and cannot reach the highest altitude bombers.
See this page for pictures.

Although the Tor was designed to provide organic air defense to maneuvering armored brigades, Iran’s greatest threat is perceived as pre-emptive air strikes on key installations, and it seems likely that at least some of the Tor systems are deployed around key strategic targets during times of tension.

The Tor system in Iranian service is not the most current Tor variant, but it remains a very credible adversary.

Pantsyr S-1E
In May 2007 Iran was reported to have purchased at least 10 Pantsyr S-1E combined gun/SAM systems from Russia via Syria, although subsequent delivery to Iran has yet to be confirmed. The Pantsyr system is extremely potent with similar anti-missile capability to the Tor-M1, but with more missiles (12 ready to fire vs and two 30mm auto-cannons. The only noteworthy weakness of the system is that it is truck based and requires deployment of stabilizing legs to operate, thus making it inherently static in operation and thus cannot move to escape anti-radiation missiles, although it could conceivably shoot down the incoming ARM providing a measure of self defense.
See this page for pictures.

FM-80/Shahab Thaqeb (Matra R440 Crotale)
Iran had attempted to purchase the Crotale (Rattlesnake) short range SAM system from the French in 1985 but appears to have been rebuffed. However, Iran subsequently purchased a number of FM-80 (HQ-7) Crotale short -range SAM systems from China and more recently succeeded in reverse engineering the system under the Ya-zahra project. There is speculation that Iran also captured French made Crotale units from the Iraqis, and it is possible that Libya, who also operate Crotale and where allied to Iran in the 1980s also supplied equipment and/or technology. The new system, which differs in use of the Oerlikon Sky Guard radar instead of the original French radar, is called Shahab Thaqeb. It is not clear what the operational status of either the Shahab Thaqeb or FM-80 systems s and they are rarely (if ever) paraded for the press or photographers in an operational state.
See this page for pictures.

Rapier SAM
Before the revolution Iran had planned to mass produce the Rapier system under license, but when the regime change put paid to that only a small number of British assembled launchers had been delivered. The planned technology transfer required for local production had not taken place. Unlike other systems it is not thought that any extra missiles were delivered during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iranian Rapier systems were the original “Mk 1” system but with added ‘Blindfire’ tracking radars (sometimes retrospectively described as FSA; Field Standard “A”). This is essentially the same system that Britain used with modest (often over-stated) success in the Falklands war. However, several design flaws were found and subsequent modifications made, in particularly to increase the range, the addition of a warhead with proximity fuse. Iranian Rapiers however still use the non-warhead “Mk 1” missile that has to hit its target to inflict any damage (a “hittle” not a “miss-ile”…). Iran has developed local production of missiles and possibly fire units, but it is likely that the Rapier is not very widely deployed, not least because it is becoming obsolete, although some degree of operational service remains, evidenced by the routine inclusion of the system in military parades. Relative to the Shahab Thaqeb (FM-80) program the Rapier is much shorter ranged and has less modern electronics.

Iran experimented with a fully mobile Rapier system employing an all-terrain 8 wheel drive truck, with a distinctive tandem stepped cockpit reminiscent of an attack helicopters on the left hand side of the vehicle. There were four reloads in protective boxes on the back of the truck. It’s not clear if there was an additional search radar. Although this variant improved mobility it reduced the arc of fire and for whatever reason does not appear to have made it into production.

See this page for pictures.

SkyGuard / 35mm AAA
Iran purchased 24 SkyGuard systems before the revolution and primarily deployed them as point defense for air bases and other strategic targets. The AAA used is the Oerlikon GDF-001 35mm twin mount. In 2008 Iran unveiled a reverse engineered version which appears virtually identical to the GDF-001 and does not appear to include any of the design changes included in the later GDF-002>005 types now in service. Over the years the serviceability of the SkyGuard radars probably deteriorated and other radar sets were substituted. More recently Iran has unveiled a new radar similar to the existing Feldermaus fire control radar for locally produced GDF-001s, and possibly receiving upgraded Super Feldermaus radars from India . Although the ballistic performance and rate of fire make it by far the most potent of Iranian AAA systems, it is still reliant on manual aiming and firing, and lacks AHEAD or similar advanced ammunition.
See this page for pictures.

The distribution of SkyGuard around the capital city of Tehran can be divided into four groups; A, B, C and D:
See this page for pictures.
Group A approximately encircles the city centre, but is primarily sited at air bases. Because of the city centre is highly built up it is difficult for the AAA to have a full field of fire and it is possible that additional AAA would be sited on the tops of tall buildings in times of conflict.
Group B defends the alleged missile development facilities and is co-located with a cluster of lighter 23mm AAA. Group C defends a large oil refinery. Group D, which again is co-located with a cluster of 23mm AAA positions, protects the Parchin facilities.

Additionally there are several ‘possible’ sites although none appear to be occupied.

ZU-23-2 Light AAA
Probably the main Iranian AAA weapon in terms of numbers employed, the Zu-23-2 is a reasonably effective weapon against low-flying targets at short range. It uses essentially the same gun as in the infamous ZU-23-2 Shilka but only two rather than four, thus having only half the rate of fire. The weapon is crewed and relies on the crew for alignment with the target, although the crew may be cued by radar. The strength of the system is its simplicity, but it is generally ineffective against fast moving targets such as missiles and provides little comfort against cruise missile attack. The system is usually deployed in single gun positions surrounding key installations.
See this page for pictures.



Point defense of other high-value sites
Iran has several locations that Iranian military consider sufficiently high value to warrant permanent air defenses. These are typically sites associated with Iran’s alleged WMD programs.
The main point air-defense of these sites is the ZU-23-2 23mm AAA, although several also have SkyGuard sites. Defenses would also include man-portable (MANPADS) SAMs.

Natanz, Alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
4 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
12 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
25 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements) (plus 2 more several km to the south east)
4 x Unidentified AD positions, possibly RBS-70 SAM
2 x I-Hawk batteries (One 7km North and one 17km West)
1 x HQ-2/Sayyad-1 battery (21km north west)

See this page for pictures.

The SkyGuard positions around Natanz are interesting because, if you look carefully, you can see that the radars being used at at least one of them appears to be the original SkyGuard-1 system supplied to Iran in the 1970s, with the surveillance radar mounted above a round fire control radar:
See this page for pictures.

A closer look at the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM site to the north west reveals that although there is clear evidence of operational activity with missiles on their launchers and radar/command set up, it is also deployed at half strength with only three of the normal 6 missile positions occupied. This is a theme in Iranian SAM sites – I-Hawk batteries with only three firing positions (normal = 6), SA-5 sites with only two firing positions (normal = 6) etc. Also, although this HQ-2/Sayyad-1 site has 8 positions for light AAA (Zu-23-2 etc), none are occupied at the time of the satellite over-flight.
See this page for pictures.

Esfahan, Alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
5 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
6 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
13 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
See this page for pictures.

Examples of Esfahan’s Skyguard sites:
See this page for pictures.

See this page for pictures.

Bushehr, Nuclear facility
Defenses:
1 x I-Hawk site adjoined to facility (empty)
3 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar (one only has one gun position occupied))
13 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
6 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
2+ empty AAA positions
See this page for pictures.

Qushm Island, Not-so-secret "secret" mini-sub base
Defenses:
4 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
4+ empty AAA positions
See this page for pictures.

Arak, Alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
2x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
7 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
23 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements) + 2 further north and one empty position
3 search radar positions
See this page for pictures.

Arak’s AAA positions are arranged in two concentric rings; the outer ring is more sparse and consists of 35mm AAA with the occasional SkyGuard and 23mm AAA sites. At least three well sited search radars are also positioned in this ring. The inner ring consists of 23mm AAA encircling the site itself.

A quick comparison between the facility’s two SkyGuard sites shows a stark contrast; the site on the left has a more permanent feel to it whereas the site on the right hasn’t even got the guns on raised platforms etc.

See this page for pictures.

Isfahan, Alleged weapons facility
Defenses:
8 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
See this page for pictures.

All of the SkyGuard positions appear empty but are otherwise in perfect condition:
See this page for pictures.

Conclusions
The problem with Iran's SAM network is the apparent over-reliance on the SA-5 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The SA-5 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the SA-5 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan SA-5 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian SA-5s would certainly fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.

The remainder of the air defense network is primarily situated to provide point defense and as such does not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to exploit the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the network provided the SA-5s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack.

This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on it's fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the SA-5 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains the reports regarding Iranian attempts to purchase relatively more advanced SAM systems from Russia.

On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the six SA-5 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals a network which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian SAM network is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form or defense against a modern aggressor.

[Typhoon]

Fair gathering of whats on the net about Irans SAM/AAA equipment, Sean O'Connor would be proud .

The most important omission for the article is the lack of any mention on the MANPAD threat, an important factor for any planner. It would also have benifitted from a look at Irans early warning and air-traffic control network, command and control systems as well as the role and relationship of Iranian air defence forces within the rest of the military. A bit of history would have been nice, since there are articles out there from the Iran-Iraq war.

As a note the Pantsir system is fully mobile, able to fire when on the move in its tracked or wheeled varients.

[Piano Red]

The most important omission for the article is the lack of any mention on the MANPAD threat, an important factor for any planner.

I omitted them because the MANPADS Iran has it's disposable would be pretty irrelevant in terms of posing a threat to US strike aircraft and bombers. They still have a few Stingers, some Chinese QW 1/2s, and their own domestically produced Misagh 1s & 2s which are usually mounted on pickup trucks within their mechanized infantry formations.

In general MANPADS are least threatening to fast/high flying missiles and jets, and anything flying above about 5km relative to the terrain. Something which, given Iran's terrain, wouldn't really be all that advantageous. They can certainly be a problem for helicopters and such, but none of the MANPADS the Iranians have would be all that effective at trying to shoot down aircraft.

It would also have benifitted from a look at Irans early warning and air-traffic control network, command and control systems as well as the role and relationship of Iranian air defence forces within the rest of the military.

M'eh, I did the best that I could in rather short amount of time. Iran's AEW and EW defense assets, as well as C&C capabilities, are even less extensive than their ADGE. Not to mention less coordinated in some crucial departments b/c of the segregation of some units between the regular forces and the IRGC.

A bit of history would have been nice, since there are articles out there from the Iran-Iraq war.

I did include history, at least as much was relevent to the development and current posture of their air defense network. What do you think is missing from that?

As a note the Pantsir system is fully mobile, able to fire when on the move in its tracked or wheeled varients.

Got a source on that? All i've ever seen on it was that it had to be stationary when in operation.

[Typhoon]

I think it would have been nice to mention prior performance when it comes to history, Iranian Hawk units were quite dire in the face of Iraqi SEAD.

On the MANPADS they are probably far more worth a mention than the AAA when it comes to performance and because the possibility of a Isreali strike is high. Isreal would likly penetrate Iranian airspace at low altitute and avoid exposing themselves to top cover like the SA-5 or any surveilance radar, this would bring them into range of the MANPADS.

(Pantsir) is a development of the Tunguska, this could fire missiles on the move and guns on short halts, it would be suprising if Pantsir was less capable than its predecessor.

[stalker]

@Piano Red,

Great job!

I can't contribute to this, since I have only a superficial understanding of air defence systems, but I'm reading the thread with interest.[/b]

[Piano Red]

I think it would have been nice to mention prior performance when it comes to history, Iranian Hawk units were quite dire in the face of Iraqi SEAD.

Iraqi SEAD never once approached the level of sophistication that American SEAD has. Why allude to the problems the Iraqis had when they would be non-existent for the US?

On the MANPADS they are probably far more worth a mention than the AAA when it comes to performance and because the possibility of a Isreali strike is high.

The AAA have been actively deployed in far greater numbers than any of Iran's MANPADS systems. The truth is that the Iranians (like the Iraqis, N. Koreans, and other sub-par militaries worldwide) still rely more heavily on AAA systems moreso than the comparatively limited number of MANPADS assets they have.

That was the principal reason I listed the ones the Iranians have.

Besides that, their MANPADS would still be equally ineffective against an Israeli strike for exactly all the reasons i've outlined, if not more so. The F-15Is the IAF has are state-of-the-art, pound for pound the Israelis actually get better performance out of them in the strike fighter role than the USAF does with the F-15Es.

Isreal would likly penetrate Iranian airspace at low altitute and avoid exposing themselves to top cover like the SA-5 or any surveilance radar, this would bring them into range of the MANPADS.

On the contrary the IAF would likely follow the same tried and tested SEAD strategy they used to blindfold and beat the Syrian air defenses last year. An ADGE that is actually better coordinated, equipped, and "compressed" than the Iranian one is.

Kudos to you if you know what they did.

(Pantsir) is a development of the Tunguska, this could fire missiles on the move and guns on short halts, it would be suprising if Pantsir was less capable than its predecessor.

I'll take your word on it then.

[Typhoon]

Iraqi SEAD never once approached the level of sophistication that American SEAD has. Why allude to the problems the Iraqis had when they would be non-existent for the US?

You misunderstand, I said that the Iranian air defence was poor in the face of Iraqi SEAD, not the other way around.

The AAA have been actively deployed in far greater numbers than any of Iran's MANPADS systems.

I would have included them, they pose far more of a risk than AAA, being cheap, easy to deploy and relatively simple they are pretty easy to mass produce with Misagh-2 entering mass production last year. MANPADS pose a huge risk to aircraft whose only real defence (if your an F-15) is the flare and your superior performance in altitude and speed.

On the contrary the IAF would likely follow the same tried and tested SEAD strategy they used to blindfold and beat the Syrian air defenses last year.

Basically by minimising their exposure to the air defence systems, a low and high speed entry and exit over the shortest avaliable distance and least defended area.

I'll take your word on it then.

The YouTube clip worked ok?

[Piano Red]

You misunderstand, I said that the Iranian air defence was poor in the face of Iraqi SEAD, not the other way around.

Ah ok.

I would have included them, they pose far more of a risk than AAA, being cheap, easy to deploy and relatively simple they are pretty easy to mass produce with Misagh-2 entering mass production last year. MANPADS pose a huge risk to aircraft whose only real defence (if your an F-15) is the flare and your superior performance in altitude and speed.

That's the only real defense they'd need to be honest.

The probability of low altitude airstrikes being sortied at any point where aircraft would enter the Iranian MANPADS' range envelope is virtually nil. Aside from the fact i'vde already mentioned on how the Iranians put more emphasis on old air defense methods using AAA batteries rather than MANPADS.

Basically by minimising their exposure to the air defence systems, a low and high speed entry and exit over the shortest avaliable distance and least defended area.

You forgot their principal use of electronic warfare applications to essentially blind and disorganize the Syrian air defenses at the operational and command levels. Good enough though.

The YouTube clip worked ok?

Yep. I drop my charge.

[Onion Poptarts]

First of all i give you a for putting this whole thing together. Iran probably paid a former French col good money to do what you just did.

Let me start off with this. Iran's "fleet" of F14A if you could call it that is falling apart. They have a few F14A that we sold them way back in the day. Now days because Iran is on our shit bag list we no longer sell them the parts to said aircraft. The effect this has, is that every time a part breaks they have to take it from another plane to fix it. Year by year the "fleet" grows smaller. Leaving them with soviet aircraft which we have text book after text book on how to combat, thanks to the cold war.

The serious SAMs Iran does posses one could expect to be knocked out right before the bombings start by a join operation of special forces from the US and abroad. Just as the scuds were in desert storm.

Modern radar jamming ability's of the US military are over powering in comparison to the radar of the early 90s, 80s and 70s. Thanks to the advancement of computers since then. This in its self would disable a good chunk of Iran's SAM's and AA's and put them directly on the chopping block.

In the initial attack, communications between the Iranian higher ups and ground forces would have to be chopped. As the Iranian army depends largely on the orders of very high ranking officers and leaves little in the hands of lower ranking officers. This could be accomplished by bombing key government buildings or having specail forces units seize them.

In conclusion i believe Iran's SAM's and AA's are more or less designed to fight Iraq or Egypt but not any western nation. You can see them trying to adapt with the purchase of there newer equipment, but that is slow to come and far from finished.

[stalker]

Let me start off with this. Iran's "fleet" of F14A if you could call it that is falling apart. They have a few F14A that we sold them way back in the day. Now days because Iran is on our shit bag list we no longer sell them the parts to said aircraft. The effect this has, is that every time a part breaks they have to take it from another plane to fix it.

Haven't they managed to create (uniquely for the ME region) an indigenous military-industrial complex (albeit a somewhat antiquated one)?

[Typhoon]

Haven't they managed to create (uniquely for the ME region) an indigenous military-industrial complex (albeit a somewhat antiquated one)?

Iran has put a lot of effort into indiginous designes but are very reliant on external assistance. The F-14 fleet of Iran is limited to around 20 or so working aircraft (from 79 delivered!), surplus Tomcat spares are now banned from sale to limit Irans supply. Keeping the engines and avionics in good condition would be a real stuggle, to be honest not one I would bother with. The cost of trying to build up domestic support for antiques like the F-14 as compared with other brand new aircraft that are fully supported does not play in their favour.

The probability of low altitude airstrikes being sortied at any point where aircraft would enter the Iranian MANPADS' range envelope is virtually nil. Aside from the fact i'vde already mentioned on how the Iranians put more emphasis on old air defense methods using AAA batteries rather than MANPADS.

En route your right the low concentration of defences would mean the jets could travel to and from the target unmolested. The problem is around the targets, which are well known and unlike the supposed Syrian target, defended. Its difficult with IMINT to tell if MANPADS have been deployed, side with caution would probably be best. The combination (if well deployed) of MANPADS and SA-2,SA-6,Hawk top cover could pose a challenge to the attacker.

You forgot their principal use of electronic warfare applications to essentially blind and disorganize the Syrian air defenses at the operational and command levels.

I think the main factor in this regard was the knock-out of a surveilance radar in northern Syria before/during the strike. Theres been a lot of sensational reporting around "Sutor" and the like but after a close look at the information avaliable im calling BS on those reports, Aviation Week .

[soron]

Pretty good summary but the anaylsis seems to be somewhat "patriotically biased".
Some systems are dismissed as "no threat" because they are 60's or 70's vintage, without considering that the abilities of the modernized versions are as far apart as e.g. those of other '70s systems still in use today. Example:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enterprise_(CVN-65)
Just compare the armament and equipment right after comissioning and now.

Ultimately there's only one way to find out just how effective they are.
My guess would be that they are effective enough to make a limited strike into Iran impossible - the Bushies would certainly have done it if there would have been an acceptable chance of success.
Since they didn't their analysis probably predicts some losses along the way, especially since Iran had a couple of years now for ELINT and there's no telling just what modifications their SAMs received based on that data, modifications that didn't make the headlines.

[Piano Red]

stalker

Haven't they managed to create (uniquely for the ME region) an indigenous military-industrial complex (albeit a somewhat antiquated one)?

Yep. Typhoon pretty much covered it.

Typhoon

Its difficult with IMINT to tell if MANPADS have been deployed, side with caution would probably be best. The combination (if well deployed) of MANPADS and SA-2,SA-6,Hawk top cover could pose a challenge to the attacker.

That's the problem though. The deployment of Iranian MANPADS around the likely targets of a US or Israeli strike isn't very extensive. Operational deployment of such systems is very top heavy within the Iranian chain of command, not to mention that most of them are typically assigned to provide AA support for their military's organic and mechanized unit formations. There still isn't a lot of emphasis put on MANPADS being deployed to cover fixed locations.

I'd also point out that (depending on initial assessments made of each target site), a simple alteration in SEAD tactics would either see the suppression or penetration of the Iranian ADGE's top cover assets so that strike aircraft would still be able to fly well outside MANPADS ranges and still make their sorties. It's been done before.

soron

Pretty good summary but the anaylsis seems to be somewhat "patriotically biased".

Because of...what? Back up your statements with facts, not supposition.

ome systems are dismissed as "no threat" because they are 60's or 70's vintage, without considering that the abilities of the modernized versions are as far apart as e.g. those of other '70s systems still in use today. Example:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enterprise_(CVN-65)
Just compare the armament and equipment right after comissioning and now.

What a horrible argument.

You do realize that trying to compare the Iranian Military to the US' is an exercise in futility right?

The Iranians don't have the benefit of the world's largest military budget (to say the least of the amounts the US spent during the Cold War!) ensuring that older equipment received constant overhauls and updates.

Besides that, many of the systems the Iranians use never have been updated, alot of them are the same today as they were when the Iran-Iraq War was at fullswing.

Ultimately there's only one way to find out just how effective they are.

That's also wrong, on a variety of different levels.

My guess would be that they are effective enough to make a limited strike into Iran impossible - the Bushies would certainly have done it if there would have been an acceptable chance of success.

Your "guess" has no bearing and non-relevant without facts to back it up. I spent a great deal of time digging up alot of that information, the least you can do is indulge me on the reasons for why even a "limited strike" on Iran by the US would be "impossible".

As for the reasons for why the US hasn't launched an attack already, the answer to that is fairly simple: It has no intention to, at least not for the remainder of Bush's term.

Iran is geo-politically isolated, contained, and deterred. There's no reason for the US to exaserbate tensions with Iran further then they already are, especially since US policy in reaction to their nuclear ambitions and other objectives has been sufficient enough to check their plans. Historical American modus operandi at work and at its best.

Since they didn't their analysis probably predicts some losses along the way, especially since Iran had a couple of years now for ELINT and there's no telling just what modifications their SAMs received based on that data, modifications that didn't make the headlines.

Source all of this or i'm dismissing it at more false assumptions and speculation. Which Iranian SAMs have received modifications? How many? Where are they set up? What type of ELINT measures do you refer to? What systems are employed?

I can go on if you want.

[soron]

Because of...what? Back up your statements with facts, not supposition.

Because they are ? Because I experienced first hand when the iron curtain came down and the Bundeswehr suddenly had Western as well as Russian weapons how far off NATO's estimates on the combat efficiency of Soviet weapons was in some cases ? And I'm not talking about overrating them but underestimating them.

What a horrible argument.

You do realize that trying to compare the Iranian Military to the US' is an exercise in futility right?

Very well, I do acknowledge you find my argument horrible. Now how about some facts from your side why it's in fact horrible, not just in your opinion?
My argument is right to the point. The self defense weapons on the Enterprise are way more sophisticated that what she came with when she was built. The aircraft she carries are next generation compared to what she carried.
You would be the first to praise it, but when it comes to an evolution of other country's systems the whole thing suddenly follows different rules ?
I think you'll have to explain a little more than just hinting towards the US military budget. When I was in the airforce a stainless steel screw for a fighter jet from the OEM supplier could amount to several hundred dollars "system price" while the same screw in equal or better quality from the world's largest manufacturer Wuerth in Germany would cost only $5 - so no "too obvious to prove" arguments please.

many of the systems the Iranians use never have been updated,

In your opinion. Unless the Iranians tell you exactly what they do. And there is a pretty good indicator here:
Just read about their own military industry - you'll see they have a couple of projects running, like their own domestic fighter. And before you start another round of chestbeating how this aircraft doesn't compare to the F-22, that's not my point.
The point is we do have proof there how they take what they have and modify it.
And you think they will NOT do that in the one area which is most important of them all in defending themselves against an attack ? I find that proposal very unlikely indeed. A SAM is most likely the first weapon system of them all which is engaged in combat in case of war, long before the pilots are in their cockpits and the airplanes scramble to intercept.
And you suggest they are just sitting on their unmodified systems when they obviously are capable of building missiles and MANPACS, and despite the history of US air raids in other countries like Lybia, or Operation Eagle Claw ?
Mind you I do not claim that Iranian missiles will swat B2s like flies. What I'm saying is that your estimate on their efficiency seems to be at least to some part based on a mere "GO USA!" attitude.

Oh and btw - my guesses are at least as relevant as your "facts" based on patriotic fervent, especially when you're claiming obviously false information as "facts", like the international isolation of Iran when their relations with China or Russia are in fact good ebough to prevent the US from achieving anything substantial in the UN security council.
At least I am willing to admitt when I am making a guess instead of just claiming something as a fact which is nothing but wishful thinking.

[Oxymoron]

Iran might shoot down a few planes here and there, but the results will be the same. Utter destruction of Irans Air defences, destruction of command and control sites, destruction of Nuclear development sites, destruction of Military bases. a Full scale US Air attack would leave Iran paralyzed. Although a Israeli attack would lead to a more level playing field, and I am not sure as to how much succes the Israelis would have.

[Typhoon]

The deployment of Iranian MANPADS around the likely targets of a US or Israeli strike isn't very extensive. Operational deployment of such systems is very top heavy within the Iranian chain of command, not to mention that most of them are typically assigned to provide AA support for their military's organic and mechanized unit formations. There still isn't a lot of emphasis put on MANPADS being deployed to cover fixed locations.

The actual deployment of MANPADS is almost impossible to assess, being so easy to transport/store and requiring no obvious infrastructure for use. Taking into account Irans proliferation of MANPADS to surrounding regions, their potency, avaliability and the level of effort Iran has expended in defence of these sensitive installations, I would rate the risk of encountering MANPADS at these targets as high and as such a worthy inclusion in the analysis.

My guess would be that they are effective enough to make a limited strike into Iran impossible

I wouldnt say impossible but certainly difficult, and I think thats an important point. I dont think anyone could argue that the defences would survive a sustained and determined attack by the US, but a limited strike such as what Isreal has fielded in the past could definately be repelled.

[Oxymoron]

but a limited strike such as what Isreal has fielded in the past could definately be repelled.

Perhaps but they wouldnt repell a Israeli Joint S.Arabia strike.

[Typhoon]

Perhaps but they wouldnt repell a Israeli Joint S.Arabia strike.

Why would SA get involved?

[Oxymoron]

Why would SA get involved?

Im sure a Nuclear armed Islamist Shite Nation on S Arabia's door step is not a welcome event. I am sure that 20 billion arms deal was not by accident.

[Typhoon]

Probably wouldnt but theres no damning evidence to suggest Iran is or is attempting to become an operator of nuclear weapons, its even less likely that they would conduct a joint strike with Isreal.