[mikema63]

Fasces invited Eran to start this thread buti will instead.

Eran

First, what mechanism do you envisage to ensure (or, at least, make it likely) that the central authority is going to be motivated to act in a rational manner on behalf of the interests if the citizens?

Second, what tools does the central authority have to identify and properly weigh the disparate interests of its citizens?

Fasces

The corporatist model of governance under a central autocratic bureaucracy, though this is off topic. By all means, create a thread in the Paternalism & Corporatism subforum to continue this discussion.

How Is the corporatist model set up generally?

How does this model insure that a rational economic calculation occurs? (an interesting side to this may be how an Austrian take may be able to improve operations)

How is this model insure that the citizens are represented?

How is efficiency in the bureaucracy assured and how do you correct for the actual personal desires of the beurocrats?

Could smaller parallel beurocracies exist to allow local variation according to conditions?

[quetzalcoatl]

So I'm guessing 'corporatism' as used in this sub-forum is something quite different from the usage I am familiar with: crony capitalism operating as a shadow government within the liberal state.

[J Oswald]

So I'm guessing 'corporatism' as used in this sub-forum is something quite different from the usage I am familiar with: crony capitalism operating as a shadow government within the liberal state.

You are guessing correctly. Corporatism is the underlying economic model of fascism (although corporatism is not universally linked with fascism - modern Germany and Singapore both maintain corporatist aspects within their economy). The meaning of corporatism most Americans are familiar with is Newspeak.

[Eran]

Thanks mike, you beat me to it.

I'll re-iterate my questions, as I don't think Fasces' brief response addressed them.

Whenever we face the prospect of a benevolent government (of whatever breed), those two questions arise:
1. How can we be reasonably confident that the government will actually be benevolent, rather than opportunistic? The democratic model has an answer (which I think is weak), namely that the voters will throw out a government which worked against their interests. (The answer is weak because of voter rational ignorance, and very limited choice, amongst other reasons).

2. Even assuming the best-meaning governors, a central authority might lack the knowledge required to rule benevolently. In particular, how can a central authority balance the diverse interests and priorities of its citizens if it lacks the required knowledge about those interests and priorities? A representative example is a decision whether to widen a given road. Widening the road will cost money, temporary disturbance and, perhaps, the confiscation (through eminent domain) of some neighbouring houses (not to mention increased pollution and noise to the road's neighbours). On the up-side, the wider road will lower congestion and decrease average travel time. Is it worth it? Imagine a simplified problem in which only cost and reduced travel times have to be weighed. How can a central decision-maker know whether the reduced travel time is worth the cost?

[Fasces]

The corporatist model is a system of social organization that recognizes the existence of interest groups within a state, and awards political representation on the basis of those groups rather than geographic location. These groups are traditionally industrial, but do not have to be limited to that end - you could allow for representatives on the basis of faith, ethnicity, or political persuasion as well. The effect is that the legislature, rather than being composed of individuals representing districts with a diverse coalition of interests, will be composed of individuals representing a single interest group.

This has two benefits - first, it prevents corruption. In the geographic model, a representative from New York, to give an example, will be beset by lobbyists that hold interests in the region. When special interest groups are directly represented in the legislature, it is harder for opposing interests to use material means to gain leverage over individuals or buy votes.

It would still be possible for interest groups to petition other representatives for support (A representative from the oil organization asking the dentist represenative for his vote on an issue) this is stymied by allowing only those groups with a direct stake in a political question to participate in legislative action on that topic. For example, on the question of universal health care, only groups associated directly with the health industry would be given a voice - the representative for coal miners will not be invited to participate in that particular session. This has the added benefit of limiting participation to those individuals that would arguably be experts in the field. A gynecologist from Texas will not be voting on cybersecurity bills.

The actual makeup of each organization is a broad question that I could also write a lot about, but for the interest of brevity, assume they are anologs to trade organizations which exist already - such as the American Psychiatric Association, or American Association of Bankers. These organizations would be nationalized, made a direct part of government, and participation would be mandatory. These vertical trade unions are vital in ensuring a tripartite arrangement, whereby the conflicting interests of management and labor and brought into service of the state.

The legislature will formulate policy, which can then be passed off to the autocratic arm of government - which can then implement it or not based on the interests of the state. This bureaucratic office would be very similar to how the executive office of the presidency currently works in the United States, except wholly meritocratic and removed from the popular vote.

I have to go right now, but I'll add more about the way the institutions are made up to discourage corruption without depending on the popular vote (though the assumption that the popular vote is itself a working mechanism to preventing corruption within governing institutions is questionable).

[Social_Critic]

I considered the corporatist model when I lived in Russia as a possible option for them to consider but I blended it into a bicameral set up. And I added what I jokingly called "the House of Chance" where citizens picked by lottery after meeting certain requisites to be put in the drum would have the ability to veto a law.

This would leave the corporatist assembly and the geographic assembly to hash out laws to a mutually acceptable point where they could be submitted to the HoC to approve.

[quetzalcoatl]

...For example, on the question of universal health care, only groups associated directly with the health industry would be given a voice - the representative for coal miners will not be invited to participate in that particular session...

I'm slightly confused. Are saying that consumers of health care (like miners) would not have a voice, only the producers?

[Fasces]

Yes, and no. No, consumers would not have a direct voice in this legislature. However, this organization can only recommend policy - it must be implemented by the central authority, which serves the interests of the body politic. In addition, the discussion of policy would not be limited to producers of medical technologies or pharmaceutical companies, as I suspect is your fear, but also the representatives of physicians, hospitals, nurses, etc.

[mikema63]

Interesting, but how do you ensure that the consumers are represented? Doctors and nurses are still producers at the end of the day.

Also how are you rationing in this, do you still rely on a price system to measure supply and demand?

[Fasces]

Consumers do not need representation as consumers, because they are more than that. The executive office aims to protect the interests of the consumers, which is why it has the final say regarding the implementation of policy proposals made by the corporatist legislature. The legislature is a mechanism to manage competing social interests in society, but they are ultimately subservient to the interests of the state, which is the avatar of the body politic.

The economic system in place is a form of state capitalism, as seen in Korea, Singapore, or Japan, in which firms compete in a market system and private property is maintained, but in which the state plays an active role in the marketplace as both an owner/subsidizer of national firms, and an investor. See: Zaibatsu system or more modern METI system, Korean corporatism, German/Nordic social corporatism, or modern Chinese corporatism.

[quetzalcoatl]

How about other aspects of the state?

Actively interventionist or non-interventionist in diplomacy and military action?

How are existing national minorities, ethnicities, religions approached, as well as immigration? Is a particular racial makeup seen as integral to the state?

[Fasces]

That depends on the state. This is no universal approach - each nation is unique, has its unique characteristics, and with it, unique solutions to unique problems.

[mikema63]

Where and how does racialism play into all of this? Culture?

[Fasces]

It doesn't. Corporatism is a tool for organizing a society, not building it. Corporatism is part of platform, not the only plank.

[mikema63]

I see, does technocracy have those elements? What are the different breeds of fascism anyway beyond Italian and German?

[Fasces]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fascism_worldwide

[mikema63]

Anyway, so corporatism looks like it cuts out the middleman of elected officials and gives control over to something like a lobbyist. How does this work without creating the same problems that exist with lobbyists now? Why can't the autocratic arm or beuarocracy be corrupted?

[Fasces]

I'll get around to that tomorrow.

[Eran]

It sounds a lot like the way the City of London was organised for centuries.

In any event, I share the concern raised several times about having the interests of consumers not properly weighed. You tell us that the supreme organs of state will take consumer welfare into account before making final decisions, but I don't understand what mechanism will compel or even incentivise them to do so.

In fact, the whole structure is a recipe for stagnation and corruption. Those industry organs are, for all intents and purposes, cartels enjoying state-backed monopoly. They are highly likely to fix prices and prevent competition. They do so today, when their power is merely secondary (exerted through lobbying). How much more so when their power is direct?

And while I have little doubt that industry organisations will do a great job of representing the interests of the current members of the industry, it is more difficult to see how the interests of newcomers, challengers, new industries, etc. are taken into account. In a world making the transition from typewriters to word-processors, the existing typewriter-manufacturers organisations is much more powerful than the emergent (but not yet organised and established) word-processor manufacturer organisation.

The typing industry will be tightly regulated in ways that are beneficial to typewriters but not word processors. This will help established firms at the expense of both new ones and the consumers.

[Fasces]

The two main concerns are corruption and stagnation in the autocratic regime.

The first, I think, is a red herring. Corruption is best stymied by a strong independent judicial system and enforcement mechanisms, rather than regime types. I don't think one can find a correlation between democratic governance and less corruption in a system. Singapore is a one-party state, and is ranked fifth on the 2012 Corruption Perception Index, while democratic states like Iraq and Afghanistan which lack fundamental institutions which target corruption are ranked near the bottom. Hong Kong is under the control of communist autocracy, yet enjoys a higher ranking that the United States. Qatar and the UAE are ranked alongside Spain and Ireland.

This suggests to me that the system itself is not the issue - an autocratic regime is fully capable of protecting itself from corruption. The problem in many autocratic states today is that the judiciary has limited or not powers, enforcement mechanisms, or is not independent. In this system, there would be three organs of government - the executive beauracracy, the corporatist congress, and the independent judiciary.

Stagnation is avoid through the promotion of national goals. Georges Sorel wrote about this as the national myth. Examples include the Space Race, or the various government-led economic miracles of the late 20th century. By setting concrete goals that require national effort development is encouraged over stagnation, even if economic cartels form, and focuses development into a few key sectors. However, the purpose of this system is not to promote growth at all costs as in modern market systems, but to ensure that unemployment remains low and economic cycles are stabilized. The economy would be stagnant relative to this measure, but this is not necessarily bad.