Starman wrote:Shirer IIRC.
I don't remember any such statistic from his book but anyhow he is dead wrong. As I said France didnt had 100 divisions in may 1940 and that is when French army size increased from September 1939 and this is coming from like every single source on the conflict. You can easily check wiki or French oob online for the relevant time period.
Still had to have been a much bigger and stronger force than what Germany had available in the west at the time.
Of course in sheer numbers. Remember a large part of French army at this time was not even regular. It doesn't necessarily meant that they could had easily overcame Germany. Germany still maintained a large number of reserves even when under the command of Army Group North in east, which could had been easily deployed in west. And what if Germany defeats Poland and turns her full might towards west, what will France do then, outnumbered and outclassed in every way. Because a war plan must look for the long term, there was absolutely no chance that France could deliver a crippling blow in 2-3 months while there was a good possibility of a quick war in Poland, the rationale of France is perfectly understandable.
IIRC Shirer also wrote that an all-out bombing of the Ruhr might've proved disastrous to the Germans. IIRC he wrote: "This was the one great worry of the German generals in September as many of them admitted later."
Better said than done. Prior to war everyone exaggerated the effectiveness of bombers. Remember, "The bomber will always get through". How can allies successfully bomb Germany, the Luftwaffe was already very strong, the Brits would had needed time to transfer their assets and command in France. I find this speculation to be completely unworkable.