A lot of your post was what might be called "descriptive analysis" and not so much in the way of "critique," and I am seeing this a lot in many of your posts.
Are you simply uninclined towards debate and just prefer to assess, describe, and share your own musings?
In any event, I tried to pick out stuff that actually warrants a response, as most of your post was simply a complilation of you "thinking out loud" and referencing other perspectives. So here we go.....
Wellsy wrote:A concern I have with the axiom of human axiom is it’s a priori-ness, again the disregard for the empirical reality and purposeful neglect. Although you may think you yourself are personally concerned with the empirical, if you’re finding affinity with the Austrian school, it will hinder such a desire methodologically/philsophically.
Firstly, I would need a good reason to believe this was a problem. For instance, lets say that the Axiom of Human Argumentation is purely an apriori without any empirical basis......so what?
Secondly, I don't think the axiom lacks an empirical basis; after all, I described the axiom as a synthetic
apriori statement. That is, the axiom cannot be known apart from experience, but is likewise not dependent upon experience for its validty (which comes from its apriori character).
Wellsy wrote:Which I believe is a distinct approach from Marx who investigates the empirical and applies to it a particular logic adopted from Hegel’s method.
An area of concern I would suggest. Especially since any universal inferences made from empirical sets are nearly always fallacious; whether by the inductive fallacy, or by any one of the fallacies of causation (cum hoc/post hoc, et al.)
Wellsy wrote:Not that I should expect such detail in your want for a axiomatic system, but I think it is unconcerned with investigating human actions/activity at all and just wants to use it as part of a conceptual system where human action offers a universal human characteristic only to assert a performative contradiction.
Well, as the basis of praxeological analysis, it would end up being concerned immensely with human actions. In fact, it would be the only logically unassailable basis for making inferences about sociology that would likewise give us a non-fallacious foundation for predicting all of mankind's socio-economic and even political conduct.
Wellsy wrote:What is useful in it is that it is based on acknowledging others as moral equals which seems to be something situated in your axiomatic ethics.
I would say such are metaphysically equal, give the inferred anthropological conclusions of the axiom; thus, moral equality is understood only in the prior metaphysical sense regarding the nature and definition of man.
Wellsy wrote:But this self-ownership which is just an extension of modern private property and doesn’t go far enough due to how private property alienates humanity from its human side. Marx elaborates on what private property does to human sensibilities here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/w ... #44CC6That human senses get replaced by the immediacy of having things. And else where, in his comments on James Mill, expresses how private property and trade presuppose a relation between objects and so objects have value but not yet people.
Surely you are not speaking about self-ownership as it is inferred in my argument?
My argument does not presuppose any "modern conception." Indeed, any conception of property that does not align with my argument should be critiqued on that basis.
Wellsy wrote:Basically private property stunts the social and human relationship we might have one another as everything loses its practical existence as being for human beings as much as it ends up commodified. But this relates more to Marx’s sense of human nature and the value of its realization. So won’t dwell on it any more, just note the difference in approach as I see in the Austrian school more a focus on enshrining private property than deducing that it is what is best for people as private property has primacy. But this is debatable as seen with Marx’s critique of the political economy.
This of course, is untrue. What is best for people is what aligns with their rationally deducible nature, rights, and obligations. Hence, there is no higher criteria for either what man is, what he needs, or what he ought to do, then what my argument sets forth.
The commondization of man in our society and the subsequent alienation is not a result of the market or private property, its the result of the state.
Wellsy wrote:A concern I have due to this universalizing of that which is historically particular is that one doesn’t quantify the difference between private property as it originally existed with how it exists in the modern society. Originally private property used to the exclusion to others was merely mans appropriation of nature for himself and kin, but this isn’t synonymous with its forms through its development up to its epitome with wage-labour and capital.
Except no universalization of the particular has taken place in my argument; only an inference from that which is logically undeniable. It is typical for a marxist to assume that some form of "dialectic of history" is taking place in their opponent's conceptions, but not here. I am not particularizing any mere historic conception of private property and attemping to build a rational forticication around it; rather, I am inferring a concept directly from certain axioms and giving them a label; namely (in this case), private property.
Wellsy wrote:As noted in the communist manifesto, "private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths.”
One must wonder if its not Marx who is engaging in the universalization of a historical particularity. Especially since owning one's own home accounts for almost 7/10th's of the population in the U.S. alone.
Naturally, I am critical of the modern age, and it wouldn't bother me if 90% of the population with tenant farmers or peasants; however, the logic of the matter is what it is.
Wellsy wrote:And in terms of original appropriation, this sounds characteristic and unproblematic of tribal times but not in the modern day where the private property now owned by capitalist class came about through force, as coined by Marx as Primitive Accumulation. So the justness of someone being an owner because of their appropriation doesn’t seem to be based on being first but requires a standard that is derived from the mode of production that then informs the limit and nature social relations of a society
Obviously irrelevant, as the right of appropriation is not conditioned on any current historical context. That is, whether appropriation is practical, convenient, or even possible in this current time has no bearing on whether its a logically deducible right that underpins further inferences in the syllogism.
Appropriation is a natural right that underpins the inference that one owns what he claims (mixed with his action of appropriating); and if its not claimed in the sense of an "original appropriation," then it is claimed via appropriation which comes through the means of exchange without a direct act of aggression (which would violate the rights of others). Thus, though man rarely appropriates what is his via the act of original appropriation
; what he has is still his if he has appropriated in any sense whatsoever that was not explicitly an act of violent aggression.
Wellsy wrote:To which I do like the emphasis on the voluntary nature of interaction between people but within the capitalist mode of production this is an ideological illusion which ignores the structural conditions which create the two classes. In neoclassical economics and variations of marginalism, typically the real and essential characteristics of capitalist production are abstracted from their models. Where the voluntary association of property owners coming together of their own will to exchange things doesn’t reflect the actual existence of people under capitalism as a mode of production.
Ultimately irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of the syllogism.
Wellsy wrote:So I can’t stand by a principle that is primarily about the freedom of a ruling class which is necessarily presupposed by a certain mode of production.
Your feelings are quite irrelevant, you are rationally obligated to stand by this principle irrespective of whatever class you think it protects or does not protect because of the logic of the syllogism.
If you have a critique of the inferences made, i'd like to see them.
Further, as a point of note, the "ruling class" you critique would largely not exist if the conclusions of my syllogism were implemented or somehow came to pass (which I believe as a historical inevitability); after all, no monopolies and mega corporations can exist in ancapistan (without a state).
Wellsy wrote:Your objective morality is simply an attempt at n axiomatic system which defends private property as it exists today as rational and opposition to its dispossession as unethical.
My objective morality is logically binding on all mankind and enshrines only what it infers; which is quite contrary to our modern order.
Wellsy wrote:Added that I also doubt that capitalist private property can exist independent of a state to enforce against the working class for a capitalist class. Even if it was reduced to its most blatant and brutal character of military and police.
If you mean mega corporations and monopolies, then I agree completely as they are dependent on the state for their subsidies, loop-holes, exemptions, copyright laws, patent laws, etc.
HOWEVER, private property as it exists for the majority of Americans (70% of which are private property owners); does not require a state; nor has this historically been the case (the feudal era, the american frontier, etc).
Not to mention; irrespective of your historical speculation, the fact remains that a state as defined in my argument is irrational and therefore immoral. period.
Our thoughts about what would obtain in its absence being entirely irrelevant.
Wellsy wrote:Also I skipped the procreation deal as I got lazy and want to move onto other subjects that press my mind.
The reason i asked you in the Immaterialist thread to come and examine this argument was mainly because of how the procreation segment (as part of the broader syllogism) infers directly an essential human nature from logical axions; contra your claims in the immaterialist thread about us inferring a "concrete universal" from how we observe people in the "now."
Thus, you skipped what was largely the entire point for me having you come over here in the first place and thus remain ignorant of my entire theory of gender and the sexes.