[Fasces]

https://thechinaproject.com/2023/02/23/ ... -invasion/

An interesting podcast from US policy analysts on the Chinese-Russian relationship.

[Evan] in February, 2022, I said to you that Beijing’s basic problem was that it was trying to reconcile interests that were fundamentally irreconcilable. At the strategic level, they had a partnership with Russia that was focused heavily on the United States and on a shared interest in counterbalancing American power, antipathy to American foreign policy, and back footing American foreign policy where they could, both in international institutions and in various regions around the world.

But then second, China had these principles of supposed commitment to sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. Then third, and perhaps most importantly, China’s a major trading and investing power. And so, it had a very strong interest in assuring global market access. So, the problem they faced, and the reason I called them irreconcilable interests was that the more they leaned into their partnership with Russia, the more, quite intuitively, they would paint the sanctions target on their back. And conversely, the more they complied with sanctions, the more Mr. Putin would be dissatisfied with the nature, intensity, and velocity of his developing relationship with China. So, they performed what I predicted would be a kind of straddle, and I called it the Beijing straddle, where they would tack uncomfortably between these.

And that’s basically what’s happened.... So, I think they’ll continue in various ways, not just to straddle, but to lean a little harder into that relationship with Moscow. And it may surprise us over the next year in ways that probably defy what we think is moral or logical, but make certain sense in the calculus of Chinese foreign policy.

[Host] Sasha, 抱团取暖 (bàotuánqǔnuǎn) is one way I’ve heard Chinese colleagues and analysts describe China’s attitude toward Russia, that they huddle together to keep warm... Implicit in this is that there’s not a lot of love lost between China and Russia to begin with. They’re only doing it for the warmth. Does that description strike you as accurate?

[Sasha] I think it’s pretty accurate. There is not that much emotion in this relationship. There are no shared values unless you would call natural cynicism a shared value between Russia and China, and love for bunny corruption and nice life for senior officials. But this relationship is very pragmatic. It’s partly haunted by history. It’s very asymmetric and increasingly asymmetric, where China has so much more leverage. And as we speak, China’s leverage in this relationship grows. Russia knows that. There is indeed no love lost, but the relationship, despite being asymmetric and despite being more favorable to China than it is for Russia, it’s still mutually beneficial. They share a colossal continental border that used to be a waste in terms of resources and a major security challenge for both the Soviet Union and China during the Sino-Soviet Split.

The economies are mutually complementary. And then inside the UN Security Council permanent members group, these are only two authoritarian states that naturally have so many overlaps on the global agenda, be it storage of data, sovereignty on the internet, responsibility to protect, so many issues when Russia and China are naturally finding themselves in one bed.

Sasha: I hear the description from the Chinese colleagues that Russian foreign policy is a typhoon, it’s a natural disaster. You cannot control it. You can adapt to it and then use some of the fallouts to your advantage. Like put the wind farms at the edge of this typhoon and use them to generate electricity.

I think that the general view in Beijing that Russia acts irrationally, if Russia wanted to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, chopping off Crimea and moving two millions of pro-Russian voters into Russia was a stupid move. Alienating the West and inviting sanctions was a stupid move. I think it’s the way that China and Russia build out their equities and toolbox for being a great power. I think China understands that it’s really the economy and the technology is the key. The military capabilities matter, but you need to build a robust economic fundamentals like being very Marxist in that, and then move up the layers of technology, and really dominate the cutting-edge technology that would have military applications as well. Russia doesn’t do much to diversify its economy and became a kind… 21st-century economy. So, Russia punches above its weight using the tools that it has, which is military, and before the invasion, Russia believed that it has very strong conventional capabilities, some of the cyber, and just this ability to concentrate the resources and go after the goal that the Kremlin deems is important. And that’s definitely very different from what China does, in my view.

Evan: I think if you want to run that proposition that it’s Russia leading China by the nose, you have to put that to the test beyond just places like Ukraine... If you look at other parts of the world... where Russia has begun to return, in a sense, to playing a more global role, there is no synergy between the way Russia is pursuing its roles in those regions. And the play that China is extending to advance its own influence, I mean, I think about the Chinese play in Africa, it’s to be a trader, it’s to be a builder, it’s to be a lender, it’s to be an investor.

And because countries in those regions are focused disproportionately on their own interests, which, as you and I discussed last time, begin and end with growth, employment, upskilling, sustainability, innovation, and opportunity, China has advanced its influence in regions like Africa and the Middle East by pursuing and then putting forth an offering that tries, in China’s own way, to speak to that set of local agendas. That’s how China advances its influence. That is not at all how Russia has advanced its influence in Africa or the Middle East or anywhere else. Number one, because that’s not the Russian play. Number two, because Russia doesn’t have any offering, much less a complimentary offering. And so, it’s actually China pursuing its interest in a self-interested way that reflects the toolkit that I think Beijing has calculated can be most effective in advancing Chinese interests in these regions.

That has nothing to do with not only Russia “leading,” but it doesn’t even have China and Russia really in synergy, except at the most macro possible level... I just see China as a much more salient actor globally, and I just see the toolkit as being much more strategically attuned to what governments, firms, financial markets, and ultimately people in these regions are looking for. And so, I don’t see Russia and China on the same page, much less Russia leading China around.

Evan: generally speaking, my view has been that China’s a very self-interested power. And so, the alpha and omega of China’s approach to Russia is what’s good for China, not necessarily what’s good for Russia. In the first instance, China has no interest in being a Russian proxy. And so, if you begin with the presumption that support for Russia means carrying Russian water and being a proxy, then yeah, I guess China’s not supporting Russia. But that’s not the correct standard to apply. I think because China is self-interested, what they’ve tried to do is to be supportive of Russia at the strategic level while minimizing support to Russia at the tactical and operational level, except in areas where China has a self-interest and can, not to put too fine a point on it, get away with it within the ambit of the Transatlantic and broader sanctions coalition.

Essentially, China’s trying to have its cake and eat it too... if China were interested in showcasing its disapproval or of projecting opprobrium onto Russia’s actions, it would not be basically looking for every conceivable seam in here to basically have its cake and eat it.

Sasha: I would put it in a somewhat different way. I agree with what Evan just said. I think that the thinking in Beijing goes this way: “Okay, let’s imagine we can throw our dear friend, Vladimir, under the bus. We join the sanctions. We maybe introduce sanctions of our own. We abandon Russian oil, Russian gas, and support Western gold in choking off the Putin’s war machine.” Does it really lead to fundamental improvements in China-U.S. ties? Will the U.S. say, “Oh, we were so wrong about China”?

I think that their assessment is that yes, it might improve something, but we do not remove the deep sources of U.S.-China competition, which are entirely different.

Evan: Right. I want to circle back to... the role of the United States in this, because the reality is, at the beginning of the war in February, March, April, 2022, I had umpteen conversations with people in China where they said, “Oh, we know what your game is. You’re going to deal with this Ukraine thing. And once you clear that away, we know you’re just going to come back and focus on us.” To Sasha’s point, we’ve all heard from Chinese who’ve said, “We know what your number one priority is, and in fact, we’re not stupid. We read your national documents. China is the “pacing threat,” the pacing challenge. Basically securitizing every and all aspect of U.S.-China relations. That’s your game. We’re realist. We understand that. So, what’s in it for us, other than to play the defensive game of avoiding painting a sanctions target on our back, for us to be perceived as enabling the pressure that you’re putting on Russia?”

That’s point number one. Point number two, to Sasha’s point, there is nothing I think that many people, particularly the more hawkish people in Beijing, think that they will gain in terms of broad scope improvements in U.S.-China relations from providing that kind of support to the Western coalition on Russia.

Host: Kaiser: ...just under a year ago, I had Maria Repnikova on... and she went on to argue... that for China, it was never really about Russia and Ukraine, but ultimately about the United States... I want to turn to Sasha here. You had... This big piece looking at a potential Chinese foreign policy shift, and you laid out various pieces of evidence that Beijing clearly wanted to put out there to persuade Western observers that such a shift might be underway in the post Party Congress period.

We have off the record remarks reported by the FT. You have a key foreign ministry appointment and a surprising demotion actually, and so forth. So, one of the talking points coming out of these background and off the record remarks is that Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 did not know of Putin’s plans for an invasion. I had actually argued this right after February 24th. I got a lot of pushback on this, though I never quite changed my mind about it. Seeing as China had no plan in place for an evacuation, I thought that was a pretty strong piece of evidence. A lot of citizens in Ukraine and no plan. And because this had been confirmed to me by unnamed Chinese diplomats that I had spoken to, they were absolutely insistent that China had not been read in. So, you seem to agree with this claim — Putin simply never told him in their February 4th meeting in Beijing. And your thread from January notes that Putin didn’t even tell his own prime minister or the governor of Russia Central Bank either.

And what’s more, you suggest that we have tended, I think, here in the West, to read too much into this no-limit partnership that Russians and Chinese understand this as just words. Can you expand on this a little bit?

Sasha: I think that Xi Jinping, indeed, we don’t have any evidence to suggest that he knew beforehand the scope and the magnitude of Russian invasion. Based on what I know, there was a very polite discussion just dancing around the subject. And the key goal on the Chinese side was to get some form of assurances that nothing will happen during the Olympics. The Chinese intelligence officers, their experts, their diplomats were asking around, reaching to multiple sources in Russia, including myself. And then all the time, when I try to explain to my Chinese colleagues and friends that, “Hey, the invasion is very likely, and these are the building blocks,” the Chinese colleagues, even the Russia watchers were all the time very dismissive. “Because, they said, “it’s just so stupid.” The downsides, even if the guy is successful, even if he takes Ukraine, even if he captures Kyiv in four days.”

“But that galvanizes NATO, that involves sanctions, that invites terrorist attacks on Russia’s home turf, because there will be Ukrainian patriots who will blow up metro cars in downtown Moscow. There are so many downsides. Why would he do that? He’s a rational man.”... The other part is that China had this narrative initially that Evan mentioned. They supported the Russian talking points, the biolabs, the justified Russian security concerns.

I think that we see that around August, this discussion gradually evaporated from the briefings of the MFA, and then the tone of the official commentary became much more neutral, civilized, much more fact-based, and not that much pointing to the blame of the West. Then these diplomats who spoke to Western journalists, including the FT team, were trying to frame it that, “oh, we are not with the Russians.” But then, as you know, you need to 听其言而观其行 (tīngqíyán ér guānqíxíng), so you need to listen to the narrative, but also watch the actions.

And the actions, the trade figures that Evan just mentioned, and it’s not only that the Russian exports to China grew because of the volumes and because of the high commodity prices, but also Chinese exports to Russia have grown. For example, we have now only 14 brands of cars in Russia. Three are Russian brands and 11 are Chinese

Host: Sasha, you’ve argued that Beijing was dangling the possibility of a more distant relationship with Moscow as we’ve seen with Scholz. As you say, the words, the language that some Chinese officials used during that period,

Sasha: I think that China was aware that the No Limits partnership phrase created a big impression, particularly on the officials, decision makers, and experts who have never tracked China-Russia relationship. And I think that there is a reality where the expertise and depth of knowledge goes in pendulum. I remember... coming to The White House during Obama era, and then people on both China and Russia’s side of the NSC would tell me, “Ah, not much there. That is not of interest of the United States of America if Russia wants to enslave itself to China and wants to become China’s junior partner. Zero national security implications for us.” And then during Trump, you would sometimes hear that, “Oh, this is the axis of two authoritarian regimes that just lock hands to bring down the U.S. rules-based order.”

I think that this administration has a pretty good sense of what’s actually going on... But then in European capitals, this partnership with No Limits created a huge impression. And then China’s goal was to really correct this image. Because a lot of pompous statements that Putin and Xi Jinping pronounce are just hot air.

Sasha: Do Chinese believe that they have that much leverage to convince Mr. Putin not to use nuclear weapons? Is he feels compressed, like, I don’t know, Ukrainian army is entering Crimea, and he believes that his whole legacy and the security of him personally and his regime is based on idea to keep Crimea? We don’t know. Nobody knows. I know that Evan and my former boss, Bill Burns, who is now director of the CIA, is very worried about this. And he flew to Turkey to talk to the head of the Russian intelligence just about those risks. So, this is something very serious.

Sasha: I’m sure that the Chinese didn’t have a better insight in the Russian military than the Americans did. So, probably people overestimated. I heard that from a couple of Chinese colleagues who watched the Russian military, that they were also wrong and they were ascribing powers and efficiency to the Russian army, which were never there.

Evan: U.S. sanctions on Russia would’ve been ferocious even without the partners, but they are vastly more effective because the U.S. has a coalition. To go back to the discussion you just had with Sasha about China’s diplomacy with Europe, in the global south, around the world, China as part of a sanctions proofing, or at least campaign to make China less sanctions vulnerable, will be trying to drive wedges in the American effort to build a coalition for sanctions against China.

Sasha: I never heard any single U.S. official talking about carrots. I think that all of the conversation is really about the sticks.

[regarding carrots] I think that the root cause of problem is that there is a firm belief in China that the bipartisan consensus in the U.S. views China as the major competitor, as the most terrible evil country on the planet Earth, or not, but it’s definitely there. And there is not that much that China can do to change this.


Evan: I think where the Chinese are positioned now is that they think that the U.S.-China cake is increasingly baked. They’re not blind. They can see the direction of domestic politics in the United States around China. They can see the securitization of, even things that used to be easy bankable things in the U.S.-China relationship, flows of capital, of people, of technology, of data. These things increasingly are being sanctioned, yes, for reasons that have nothing to do with... Russia.

China’s strategy with the U.S. I think is largely defensive.... not trying to be in the crosshairs of sanctions [and] to focus instead on the rest of the world... I expect several European leaders to follow suit, potentially President Macron of France, Prime Minister Meloni of Italy. There’s a soft underbelly in Europe, the Hungarians. There’s plenty of other countries that don’t share the American view of China.

[Fasces]

Ukraine war: Zelensky wants Xi Jinping meeting following China's peace plan

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he plans to meet China's leader Xi Jinping to discuss Beijing's proposals on ending the war in Ukraine.

Speaking on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion, he said the proposal signalled that China was involved in the search for peace.

"I really want to believe that China will not supply weapons to Russia," he said.

China's plan calls for peace talks and respect for national sovereignty.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64762219

All you need to know about China’s plan for Russia-Ukraine talks

Released by the foreign ministry, the plan urges an end to Western sanctions against Russia, the establishment of humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians and steps to ensure the export of grain after disruptions caused global food prices to spike last year.

The proposal mainly elaborates on long-held Chinese positions, including that all countries’ “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity be effectively guaranteed”.

It said nuclear power plants must be kept safe and the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.

The plan also called for an end to the “Cold War mentality”, which is Beijing’s standard term for what it regards as global dominance by the United States and its interference in other countries’ affairs.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/2 ... kraine-war

[Patrickov]

The problem of China is the same as that of Russia. Neither deserve to be great but both try to coerce others into submission.

I usually say China "is" behind Russia but the more accurate term is China "has to be" behind Russia. As long as they do not accept the Anglo-American world order (and respect individual rights) this is where they are destined to.

Of course no one in their right mind would want China to join Western sanctions -- at least so long as CCP (or even something like KMT) remains in power. That would just be the West repeating the mistakes of 1941 and 1971.

The CCP, of course, will condemn the viewpoint above as "cold war mindset", but in reality what they are and why they stay what they are necessitates such thinking, instead of the other way round.

As for Ukraine, China cannot do much different from what they are doing (unlike litwin who naively believes China will leap on the opportunity to reclaim lost territories by stabbing Russia in the back), and I believe Zelensky knows it.

[Fasces]

@JohnRawls

[JohnRawls]

@Fasces

Yeah fair points, helping Ukraine won't solve the China-US relationship for sure.

I quickly skimmed through the bold parts since a little busy but the main point for me is not US-China relations but China-Europe relations which it would put straight. At the end of the day, Europe is Europe and we prefer trade as usual as long as that trade actually leads to more security and stability or closer relationships. So it was not unexpected but surprising that China would support Russia without a second thought on the matter. It is not like China is a super close ally to Russia. This definitely undermines the basis for our relationship to China.

Uhmm, I don't know but this is perhaps me so I don't think that China really thought this through. At the end of the day, having contest Vs US is what is inevitable but that is impossible if China has to have a contest with Europe and other allies which basically triple US GDP and military power.

There is no way right now for Europe to be allied with China due to the one party system and so on but we can be neutral which probably won't happen anymore. Or at least if China won't change its course and helps with Russia until the conflict ends which is unlikely.

[Rich]

So western liberals would love to see the whole of Eastern Russia taken away from the evil white oppressor Russians and given to a poor down trodden oppressed person of colour like Xi. That would be a fitting punishment for getting Trump elected in 2016 elected. The problem is the Chinese leadership don't live in the eternal sunshine of the spotless liberal mind.

The Chinese remember what happened to the Kurds in Syria, the liberals just spit you out and forget about you when they have no more use for you. The Chinese remember what happened to the western liberals' allies in Afghanistan. The Chinese remember what happened in Cyprus, or more to the point what didn't happen, the eviction of the Turkish Muslim oppressor occupiers. The Chinese remember all the empty promises given to the Palestinians over the years. The Chinese remember Somali. The Chinese probably don't even remember the Libyan affair as a sterling example of the assertion of western liberal power.

The one time the West did act effectively and decisively was in Iraq in 2003, but that was a Republican President not a Democract. OH and btw, the reason I supported that venture was I because I had faith in SCIRI, DAWA and the Kurdish opposition to hold power and deny the Baathist / Sunni Muslim gneociders a return. Not because I had faith in the staying power of Western Liberals or Cuckservatives.

So the bottom line is that the Chinese leadership almost certainly estimate that the chances of Joe Biden delivering on the destruction of Russia are about as close to zero that its a rounding error.

[JohnRawls]

@Fasces So any news about Xis visit to THE (Alleged but pretty much guilty) war criminal? Do you still consider the Chinese current stance "okay"ish?

[Fasces]

Yes - in what world can you negotiate a peace with Putin without... at some point, in some capacity, meeting and talking to Putin?

China’s Xi Plans to Speak With Zelensky for First Time Since Ukraine War Broke Out

SINGAPORE—Chinese leader Xi Jinping plans to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since the start of the Ukraine war, likely after he visits Moscow next week to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to people familiar with the matter.

The meetings with Messrs. Putin and Zelensky, the latter of which is expected to take place virtually, reflect Beijing’s effort to play a more active role in mediating an end to the war in Ukraine, some of the people said.

Mr. Xi is considering visiting other European countries as part of his trip to Russia, though his full itinerary has yet to be confirmed, according to the people.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi- ... n-f34be6be

China wants peace between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU.

1) Xi meets with Putin, talks to him.

2) Xi meets with Zelensky, talks to him.

3) Xi meets with other EU leaders, talks to them.

What, exactly, do you have the issue with?

[Fasces]

@JohnRawls To me, this is more problematic than Xi's meeting with Putin:

US 'firmly Opposed' To Ceasefire Between Russia, Ukraine; 'Peace Initiative Unacceptable'

Kirby insisted that any peace initiative for Ukraine that is endorsed by Russia's President Putin and his steadfast ally Xi Jinping will be rejected by the US.

US is "firmly opposed" to ceasefire between the warring nations Russia and Ukraine, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said in an interview with American broadcaster Fox news. According to Kirby, any peace initiative between Kyiv and Moscow whose military has been ensuing fierce battle on the eastern flank of Europe is “unacceptable." Kirby noted that brokering peace isn't possible due to the "current situation" as he pointed to the upcoming visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia next week.

If Xi can get Putin to come to the table, and Zelensky to agree on a ceasefire on terms acceptable to the Ukrainian people, the US should not be sabotaging that peace.

[Rancid]

I don't know but this is perhaps me so I don't think that China really thought this through.

It's well thought through is you assume Europe is just an extension of the long arm of the US.

[JohnRawls]

It's well thought through is you assume Europe is just an extension of the long arm of the US.

Not really, we were neutral and our "difference" point with the US was that we have our own seperate China policy where we continue trade to a large degree while US could duke it out with China.

But China kinda makes it impossible to have this policy anymore when it is directly supporting Russia, doesn't help EU with Ukraine. Total divergence of interest and ideas.

@Fasces Sure they oppose it because the offensive has been in the works for the last 5 moths which will start in late april, may, june. So what is the point to negotiate when we all know Russia is going to start loosing land again and Ukraine will be in a much better position.

[Fasces]

That's up to the Ukrainians to decide, not Washington.

[JohnRawls]

That's up to the Ukrainians to decide, not Washington.

It is, as said before, Ukraine is not interested in negotiations with Russia unless they withdraw to the february 24th borders and only then negotiations can start. US said 1 000 000 times that Ukraine decides the format and conditions by now and they are just repeating Ukraines position.

[Fasces]

John Kirby has outright stated that the US will reject a peace deal even if Ukraine accepts it. Xi will meet with Zelensky this week. If Zelensky has no interest in a ceasefire, that is his and the Ukrainians decision and right. If they do, the US has no right to reject it out of hand.

I have no problem with Xi trying to negotiate a peace deal that is agreeable to all parties, even if this is very unlikely to come to pass. If he wants to try, godspeed. I do have a problem with the US position that ignores the Ukrainian right of self determination, especially as that is ostensibly what they're there to protect.

[JohnRawls]

John Kirby has outright stated that the US will reject a peace deal even if Ukraine accepts it. Xi will meet with Zelensky this week. If Zelensky has no interest in a ceasefire, that is his and the Ukrainians decision and right. If they do, the US has no right to reject it out of hand.

I have no problem with Xi trying to negotiate a peace deal that is agreeable to all parties, even if this is very unlikely to come to pass. If he wants to try, godspeed. I do have a problem with the US position that ignores the Ukrainian right of self determination, especially as that is ostensibly what they're there to protect.

John Kibry is re-iterating Ukranian position unless there is something that changed that I don't know about. Ukraine is not interested in peace talks unless Russia withdraws to 24th borders and they are probably not interested in peace agreement at all without all the other parts being accepted. You are forgetting that hundreds of thousands of Ukranian military, civilians already died probably. Civilians much more. Ukraine doesn't want just Donbass and Crimea back but the reparations for all the damages and a war criminal court.

And if you are going to say that it is too much then you have not been paying attention. Ukranian resolve only increased since last year and it hasn't wavered. I said this before and I say this again, this is not something that EU or US can decide. If they have to fight alone with shovels to push Russia out then they will do so against all odds.

[Rich]

And if you are going to say that it is too much then you have not been paying attention. Ukranian resolve only increased since last year and it hasn't wavered. I said this before and I say this again, this is not something that EU or US can decide. If they have to fight alone with shovels to push Russia out then they will do so against all odds.

No they won't! The idea that Ukraine would fight on to regain all of their 2013 controlled territory without western support is a pathetic fantasy. I'm surprised, that someone of your intelligence would even try and push such patent nonsense.

Western Liberals hide behind Zelensky pretending that he makes the ultimate decisions. Zelensky's not stupid, he knows that repeatedly demanding Crimea at this stage only strengthens the Russians resolve. From a normal rational perspective you would take the Donbas and the land-bridge and only then start taking about Crimea. But Zelensky knows that It is Crimea that American military and western liberals are really interested in. And if Ukraine did get it, they wouldn't get to keep it, because the Liberals are dead set on turning it into a Tartar Muslim state.

All of this begs the question why are China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia not jumping into back the Western Liberals destruction of Russia. Obviously they like me are sceptical of what the Western Liberals will actually achieve.

[JohnRawls]

No they won't! The idea that Ukraine would fight on to regain all of their 2013 controlled territory without western support is a pathetic fantasy. I'm surprised, that someone of your intelligence would even try and push such patent nonsense.

Western Liberals hide behind Zelensky pretending that he makes the ultimate decisions. Zelensky's not stupid, he knows that repeatedly demanding Crimea at this stage only strengthens the Russians resolve. From a normal rational perspective you would take the Donbas and the land-bridge and only then start taking about Crimea. But Zelensky knows that It is Crimea that American military and western liberals are really interested in. And if Ukraine did get it, they wouldn't get to keep it, because the Liberals are dead set on turning it into a Tartar Muslim state.

All of this begs the question why are China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia not jumping into back the Western Liberals destruction of Russia. Obviously they like me are sceptical of what the Western Liberals will actually achieve.

Why? Did Vietnam not fight the French without large support? Did Vietnam not fight against the US? Did Taliban not fight the US or the USSR?

The problem with you Rich is that you think that "Liberal" countries decide everything for others. They don't. A war of independence is a much more complicated beast than some local proxy war that you perceive it to be. And this is a war of independence for Ukraine.

So unless you live under a rock for the last year, Ukraine will and decisions are not measured by what EU or US wants in this regard nor are we stupid enough to suggest that as mentioned before. I don't know if its cold hard calculation or respect for Ukranians willingness to fight but the sole decision on how to resolve this conflict is in their hands since like March of 2022 by any diplomatic measure that was announced.

[Rich]

Why? Did Vietnam not fight the French without large support? Did Vietnam not fight against the US? Did Taliban not fight the US or the USSR?

So first off Vietnam did not fight the French and Vietnam did not fight the Americans. These are just lies that the Liberals have repeated over and over again. The Vietnamese Communists collaborated with the French to destroy the non Communist nationalists. Then the Vietnamese Communists fought the French and later South Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists were backed by the Soviet Union and Communist China through out those wars. The Vietnam war were not wars of national independence but wars of international Communism to destroy the majority Buddhist Vietnamese Culture and the minority Catholic Vietnamese culture..

The Taliban had not been created while the Soviet Union existed, so unless they invented a time machine I didn't hear about, they did not fight the USSR. But during their whole war with the United States and local Afghan forces they were backed by Pakistan. But neither the regime or the terrain are similar. If Russia were attempt to occupy Western Ukraine, then yes I'm sure there could well be persistent resistance as there was after World War II, but that's not what we're talking about.

The problem with you Rich is that you think that "Liberal" countries decide everything for others. They don't. A war of independence is a much more complicated beast than some local proxy war that you perceive it to be.

I don't perceive it to be a proxy war but I'll respond to this at another point.

[Fasces]

Xi's visit to Russia is over - China's position is unchanged, no weapon supply for Russia, and no promises. Not the apocalypse.

[Szabo]

Putin was being obsequious. He’s trying to be Xi’s factotum.