[Arminius]

This problem becomes much more distinct if you consider that most negative rights are also positive rights because they force for example law enforcement bodies to act.
Most political philosophers for that reason consider freedom/rights to be a triadic relation

Then according to what criteria can it be determined what the state ought to provide its citizens?

[grassroots1]

The idea of the morality of negative rights rests on the idea of self-ownership. It is thought that negative rights are consistent with an ideology that guarantees each individual ownership over his body and the product of his efforts.

How could you own your body when your body isn't even solid, and recycles itself over time, and changes? Do you merely own the product of your body, your thoughts? If so, what value do they have, because they certainly have no material form.

My belief is that the freedom I would like to see cannot be achieved without relative material equity. The freedom I would like to see involves positive rights: the right to food, the right to shelter, the right to health care and education. This is a start. To answer your question about where to draw the line, that is something we will need to work out as a society. It probably isn't viable for each person to have a trip into space, so the ones who are best trained in that field may be designated to do so. This is all hypothetical. Of course I could imagine that people would want to have a trip into space, but my hope is that we are reasonable enough to understand that that may not be a possibility in the near future, when there is so much we need to worry about. Our sustenance, our education, our health, our environment. That doesn't seem too far-fetched to me, although it may to some of the cynics on this forum.

[RonPaulalways]

^ grassroots, self-ownership is the principle argument against violence, rape and slavery. If people don't have a moral right to protect and control their own body, what possible moral argument can you make against violence, rape and slavery?

RonPaulalways wrote:
A right to have land available to homestead is a positive right. Negative rights don't assume a right to have any land available, just a right to homestead any that are unclaimed.


Nor do positive rights try to redistribute anything if there is nothing available.

If there are no resources available, then it's impossible to redistribute them obviously. That doesn't change the fact the positive rights of two people can be mutually exclusive.

[grassroots1]

Why do you think that self-ownership is the primary argument against violence and rape and murder? I am against all of those things because my intuitive moral response is a negative one, not because I think other people own their bodies and therefore have a right to not be raped. That just seems unnecessary to me.

And you never answered my question.

[Order]

Then according to what criteria can it be determined what the state ought to provide its citizens?

Rawls original position? Moral intuitinism? Social contract theory? The options are endless.

If there are no resources available, then it's impossible to redistribute them obviously. That doesn't change the fact the positive rights of two people can be mutually exclusive.

So as I said, the rights can both exists but might not be able to be fully exercised. Still no difference. Negative rights can be mutually exclusive as well if an awkward situation arises. Think for example about the common example for the morality of torture with the bombs somewhere hidden in the big city and the bombmaker being in your hands.

[RonPaulalways]

RPA wrote:
If there are no resources available, then it's impossible to redistribute them obviously. That doesn't change the fact the positive rights of two people can be mutually exclusive.


So as I said, the rights can both exists but might not be able to be fully exercised. Still no difference.

The positive rights of two people can actually conflict with each other, if there is only enough resources for one of them. It's fundamentally different than negative rights, which only require the absence of coercion, and hence can be enjoyed by multiple people without conflict.

Negative rights can be mutually exclusive as well if an awkward situation arises. Think for example about the common example for the morality of torture with the bombs somewhere hidden in the big city and the bombmaker being in your hands.

That relates to ambiguity of guilt/innocence, not whether someone has a right to negative freedom.

[Order]

The positive rights of two people can actually conflict with each other, if there is only enough resources for one of them. It's fundamentally different than negative rights, which only require the absence of coercion, and hence can be enjoyed by multiple people without conflict.
[...]
That relates to ambiguity of guilt/innocence, not whether someone has a right to negative freedom.

Of course it relates to whether someone has the right to negative freedom. You are weighing two negative freedoms against each other and you have to choose a side. Let's say for example we dont have absolute certainty about the bombmakers responsibility. It is simply a fact that in this case not both freedoms can exist because the bombmakers freedom to not be tortured/die conflict with the victims freedom from harm. Similarly, positive rights can theoretically also be enjoyed without conflict if enough resources are available.

[RonPaulalways]

Of course it relates to whether someone has the right to negative freedom. You are weighing two negative freedoms against each other and you have to choose a side. Let's say for example we dont have absolute certainty about the bombmakers responsibility.

You don't weigh two negative freedoms against each other. The proper legal process is that you don't punish, let alone torture someone, if they're not found guilty by a court of law -that is, if you're not reasonably certain of their guilt.

[Order]

You don't weigh two negative freedoms against each other. The proper legal process is that you don't punish, let alone torture someone, if they're not found guilty by a court of law -that is, if you're not reasonably certain of their guilt.

Proper legal process is fair enough but you would say it is ok to sacrifice the millions?

[valishin]

Negative liberty is the only real liberty, but you are entirely right, it is not enough. Libertarians do not recognise this

First off lets get some definitions to the words here so that we all understand the issue. The term negative freedom used in the OP should be negative rights. However that is a poor use of language as it assumes that positive rights are also rights which they are not. So for the sake of accuracy negative rights/freedom = rights and positive rights/freedom = privilage. The defining difference between them is which can be accomplished without forcing participation of another.

And this leads us to the the problem isn't that Libertarians don't recognize there is a need or at least demand for privliages, the problem is that there is no way to provide those privliages without hindering the rights of others and without a method for doing so are obliged to limit government's role to protect rights and leave obtaining privlages to the individuals.

Why do you think that self-ownership is the primary argument against violence and rape and murder? I am against all of those things because my intuitive moral response is a negative one, not because I think other people own their bodies and therefore have a right to not be raped. That just seems unnecessary to me.

You are weighing two negative freedoms against each other and you have to choose a side.

There are no such conflicts, which ever one creates an infringement upon another is not a right. Your bomb maker example ignores the fact that bomb maker has infringed upon the rights of another to accomplish this task. As such he will be held accountable for his actions. Weither or not torture is a reprocusion of that action is another issue entirely.

Proper legal process is fair enough but you would say it is ok to sacrifice the millions?

As tragic as it sounds, that is correct as the government cannot be allowed to exceed its legal bounds regardless of how well intended the outcome is. The agency with the power of force cannot be allowed to assume the ends do not justify the means. With that said, I would not loose sleep over someone stepping up and taking the actions neccessary to get the information needed to save millions knowning that they will pay a price for infringing upon those rights, but none the less that individual still needs to be held accountable for their actions. Again, it is tragic but such is the price of liberty.

[Arminius]

Rawls original position? Moral intuitinism? Social contract theory? The options are endless.

Hmm maybe. But are there still no way of distinguishing how much rights that citizens are given?

Anyways, maybe this is a solution to my OP: Positive liberty is about equal opportunity, not equal outcome. Thus, every person regardless of the state of birth should, as far as possible, be given the same opportunities. I.e every person may aim for being able to afford space travelling, but not every person may succeed in trying.

Though maybe some sort of contractualism is better. But quite many contracts have been proposed.

Also, how do you view the accusation that Rawls used metaphysics to defend his original position?

[Order]

Hmm maybe. But are there still no way of distinguishing how much rights that citizens are given?

Rawls argues in the original position people would choose the highest possible amount of basic (!) liberties/rights that don't interfere with anybody's enjoyment of the same rights. I cannot remember his exact argument at the moment though. It definitely relies somewhat on Mill's harm principle.

Anyways, maybe this is a solution to my OP: Positive liberty is about equal opportunity, not equal outcome. Thus, every person regardless of the state of birth should, as far as possible, be given the same opportunities. I.e every person may aim for being able to afford space travelling, but not every person may succeed in trying.

In fact, Rawls is proposing exactly that. Part b of his second principle of justice is "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity". However, he recognises this position as inconsistent and adds the "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society".
I think that move makes sense because really, why do we think not having equality of opportunity is unfair? Obviously because it discriminates against people for reasons they have no influence on: Family they were born into etc. However, we are similarly not responsible for our genes and only to a limited extent responsible for the talents we have. Drawing a line would be completely arbitrary. Hence, in order to be consistent with the principle underlying equality of opportunity, a certain compensatory equalisation of income distribution follows.

Also, how do you view the accusation that Rawls used metaphysics to defend his original position?

I can't really give an answer to that as I have never dealt with anything but political philosophy in detail. What exactly are the illegitimate metaphysical arguments that Rawls used?

[Arminius]

Rawls argues in the original position people would choose the highest possible amount of basic (!) liberties/rights that don't interfere with anybody's enjoyment of the same rights. I cannot remember his exact argument at the moment though. It definitely relies somewhat on Mill's harm principle.

I meant primarily economic rights, such as welfare (i.e healthcare, education, etc).

Can the harm principle really be applied to that?

I think that move makes sense because really, why do we think not having equality of opportunity is unfair? Obviously because it discriminates against people for reasons they have no influence on: Family they were born into etc. However, we are similarly not responsible for our genes and only to a limited extent responsible for the talents we have. Drawing a line would be completely arbitrary. Hence, in order to be consistent with the principle underlying equality of opportunity, a certain compensatory equalisation of income distribution follows.

I think this is sensible, and I think most people would agree.

I can't really give an answer to that as I have never dealt with anything but political philosophy in detail. What exactly are the illegitimate metaphysical arguments that Rawls used?

Well, Ken Binmore thinks that Rawls was pretty much right, but for the wrong reasons (though he also takes into account at least one of the critics of Rawls, namely that of John Harsanyi who thought that the original position leads to utilitarianism). Binmore considers the idea of the original position to be written into our genes, and IIRC, considers the golden rule to be essentially a simplification of it. Whereas Rawls considered himself a Kantian and defended the original position as a form of Kant's categorical imperative, Binmore takes a naturalist approach, defending it as a part of our evolutionary heritage. Food sharing is common in nature, and hunter-gatherer societies who survived into modern times essentially shared a common deep structure. They are rather non-hierarchial and share food on an egalitarian basis.

But maybe Binmore falls on the is-ought fallacy? Though he is much influenced by Hume.

If human nature is that of egalitarianism, then how come people sometimes vest so much confidence into single, absolutist leaders, like Hitler or Stalin?

[Order]

I meant primarily economic rights, such as welfare (i.e healthcare, education, etc).

Can the harm principle really be applied to that?

Alright, I misunderstood you.

I think this is sensible, and I think most people would agree.

Do you disagree that the argument is inconsistent?

But maybe Binmore falls on the is-ought fallacy? Though he is much influenced by Hume.

It certainly seems like that. You can't really blame him for that though as pretty much any ethicists at some point ignores it. Otherwise they would be unemployed. No philosopher can avoid metaphysics in that sense.

If human nature is that of egalitarianism, then how come people sometimes vest so much confidence into single, absolutist leaders, like Hitler or Stalin?

That is a completely unrelated point I think. Stalin as well as Hitler were, at least in the purely ideological sense, proponents of some form of egalitarianism. I don't think that a belief in egalitarianism necessarily entails a belief in democracy as the outcomes of democracy can be pronouncedly anti-egalitarian.

[Arminius]

Do you disagree that the argument is inconsistent?

I don't know. Anyways, it makes sense. I think the world is too complicated to be reduced to maxims, like for instance that everything is about happiness and suffering, which the utilitarians think.

It certainly seems like that. You can't really blame him for that though as pretty much any ethicists at some point ignores it. Otherwise they would be unemployed. No philosopher can avoid metaphysics in that sense.

Is it even possible to avoid it if one at some time make a statement of ought based on how the world is? It seems rather pointless to think out oughts and completely ignoring how the world really is.

That is a completely unrelated point I think. Stalin as well as Hitler were, at least in the purely ideological sense, proponents of some form of egalitarianism. I don't think that a belief in egalitarianism necessarily entails a belief in democracy as the outcomes of democracy can be pronouncedly anti-egalitarian.

Ah, the argument was also (reportedly according to anthroplogists) that hunter-gatherers not only share food (at least meat) relatively egalitarian, they also tolerate no bosses. But Hitler and Stalin were extremely bossy. Maybe tolerance for bosses became necessary with agriculture.

[Order]

I don't know. Anyways, it makes sense. I think the world is too complicated to be reduced to maxims, like for instance that everything is about happiness and suffering, which the utilitarians think.

It is not really a maxim, I think it makes just logically sense. We have to use logical arguments at some point, otherwise we are just throwing unfounded statements at each other. I am very aware of the fact that that many proponents of equality of opportunity don't like it but it imo requires quite an excellent capability to suppress cognitive dissonance to overlook this fact after it has been revealed.

Is it even possible to avoid it if one at some time make a statement of ought based on how the world is? It seems rather pointless to think out oughts and completely ignoring how the world really is.

The argument is only that no moral claims flow directly from natural facts, not that we can't give natural facts meaning. Nothing can be concluded from the fact that we are all humans alone. But if we add the proviso that all humans should be treated equally, the natural fact acquires meaning. We just need to have reasons to imbue those facts with special status.

Ah, the argument was also (reportedly according to anthroplogists) that hunter-gatherers not only share food (at least meat) relatively egalitarian, they also tolerate no bosses. But Hitler and Stalin were extremely bossy. Maybe tolerance for bosses became necessary with agriculture.

Whatever the truth of it, it is similarly a fact of human life that as soon as the form of organisation acquired a certain complexity, authoritarian rule began. I don't really know how much truth for our current condition can be derived from these kinds of pseudo-evolutionary analysis. Human nature is endlessly malleable and diverse.

[Arminius]

It is not really a maxim, I think it makes just logically sense.

That everything is about happiness and suffering?

The argument is only that no moral claims flow directly from natural facts, not that we can't give natural facts meaning. Nothing can be concluded from the fact that we are all humans alone. But if we add the proviso that all humans should be treated equally, the natural fact acquires meaning. We just need to have reasons to imbue those facts with special status.

Hmm ok, seems I maybe have misunderstood it. According to Stanford, there are disputes about how this should be interpreted.

Whatever the truth of it, it is similarly a fact of human life that as soon as the form of organisation acquired a certain complexity, authoritarian rule began. I don't really know how much truth for our current condition can be derived from these kinds of pseudo-evolutionary analysis. Human nature is endlessly malleable and diverse.

I would myself give more weight to nurture than Binmore does. But at the same time, the idea of a blank slate is obviously false.

What argument did Rawls use for his original position principle?

Also, how dependent are Rawls' ideas on each other? For example, a survey showed that most people do not prefer the Difference principle over the alternatives (though from behind a veil of ignorance, it does make sense to me). How does this affect his other conclusions?

[Order]

That everything is about happiness and suffering?

I was referring to the "equality of opportunity" maxim. It is imo not just any maxim but a very plausible interpretation of the one fundamental principle of western if not human morality, treat like cases alike.

Hmm ok, seems I maybe have misunderstood it. According to Stanford, there are disputes about how this should be interpreted.

My knowledge about the is-ought problem is quite limited, I can't really challenge any sophisticated metaphysical arguments about it but I know for a fact that it hasn't been resolved for any ethical statement.

What argument did Rawls use for his original position principle?

Two different ones actually. Once the directly luck egalitarian one: All underserved differences should be avoided or compensated for, hence equality of opprtunity as far as possible and redistribution etc.
The second one is his more famous one, the OP and the reflective equilibrium. He argues that we should create an OP as we would consider fair and then look at the consequences of it. If the consequences are outrageous in our considered judgement we have to look at the OP again and decide if we made unwarranted assumption. If we didn't then we have to reconsider our judgement about what constitutes outrageous, otherwise we change the setup of the OP. This is supposed to be loop which ends when we have adjusted our moral judgement and the OP to a degree that we can agree with the initial setup as well as the outcomes, reaching the "reflective equilibrium".

Also, how dependent are Rawls' ideas on each other? For example, a survey showed that most people do not prefer the Difference principle over the alternatives (though from behind a veil of ignorance, it does make sense to me). How does this affect his other conclusions?

The first argument obviously is not dependent on how much people like his principles. They simply follow and you can't deny them as much as you can't deny that 1+1=2 if you share the basic assumptions.
The second case is trickier. Theoretically those people who can't agree with the difference principle would need to change the OP to achieve reflective equilibrium. However, if they do it they might suddenly introduce features they might as strongly disagree with as they disagree with the difference principle, or even stronger! Then they have to make a choice and I think in most cases people can't but accept Rawls basic assumption. There are similar surveys that show that people share Rawls' assumption about what constitutes fair equality of opportunity.
Rawls construction of the OP and the reflective equilibrium might appear awkward and cumbersome but it serves a clear purpose. It wants to present a unified theory of the state that can challenge utilitarianism and for this one thing is most important: consistency. It must get rid of contradictory intuitions and I think his reflective equilibrium is a good idea in that respect.

[Arminius]

I was referring to the "equality of opportunity" maxim. It is imo not just any maxim but a very plausible interpretation of the one fundamental principle of western if not human morality, treat like cases alike.

Yeah, I think it's hard to find others than fringe groups disagreeing with it, even though many of those agreeing may have different conceptions about how to put it into practice. And in the fringes, there are both minarchists as well as socialists.

Two different ones actually. Once the directly luck egalitarian one: All underserved differences should be avoided or compensated for, hence equality of opprtunity as far as possible and redistribution etc.
The second one is his more famous one, the OP and the reflective equilibrium. He argues that we should create an OP as we would consider fair and then look at the consequences of it. If the consequences are outrageous in our considered judgement we have to look at the OP again and decide if we made unwarranted assumption. If we didn't then we have to reconsider our judgement about what constitutes outrageous, otherwise we change the setup of the OP. This is supposed to be loop which ends when we have adjusted our moral judgement and the OP to a degree that we can agree with the initial setup as well as the outcomes, reaching the "reflective equilibrium".

Hmm. But the question is why this is viewed to be desirable. According to Swedish Wikipedia, John Rawls sought to formulate a theory in accordance with the "common sense morality". Is this correct?


I find this to be an interesting subject. I agree with the idea of liberalism as a framework in which multiple theories of "the good" may co-exist, rather than liberalism as a full-fledged system with views on ethics, metaphysics and epistemology etc (i.e the Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus). The harm principle is a given in such a system. I'm still trying to figure out what economic policies that are suitable to such a system - and the question of what the state ought to provide its citizens is relevant to this.

[Order]

Hmm. But the question is why this is viewed to be desirable. According to Swedish Wikipedia, John Rawls sought to formulate a theory in accordance with the "common sense morality". Is this correct?

Partly. He wanted to form common sense morality into a coherent entity. That obviously includes ditching some parts of it while preserving others. The OP was the way to determine which parts to get rid of and which ones to preserve.

But Rawls is not the only one trying to do that. All contemporary political philosophy tries to invent theories that can be grounded in common sense morality. It is the only way to ultimately justify any moral claims.

I find this to be an interesting subject. I agree with the idea of liberalism as a framework in which multiple theories of "the good" may co-exist, rather than liberalism as a full-fledged system with views on ethics, metaphysics and epistemology etc (i.e the Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus). The harm principle is a given in such a system. I'm still trying to figure out what economic policies that are suitable to such a system - and the question of what the state ought to provide its citizens is relevant to this.

So are you saying Rawls theory is one in which multiple theories of the good cannot co-exist?