Battlefleet operations & tactics during Pacific War, 1940 - 1944 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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The Second World War (1939-1945).
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#14828003
This is for Starman. I think the decisive battle of the pacific war as defined above was at the Philippine Sea, June 19-20 1944. The much larger battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 was however such a crushing defeat only as a result of the heavy losses sustained early that year, particularly in terms of experienced pilots and naval fighters, as well as vessels such as the striking force veteran carriers Hiyo, Shokaku, and the brand new Taiho, and merchant shipping losses from submarine interdiction, which meant depreciating fuel reserves. Most of the shipping losses appear to have taken place in 1942 and 1943 but losses continued for the rest of the war, I've seen figures ranging from 5 to 9 million tons of merchant shipping lost, but the figure of 5 millions tons, or 1,500 ships by submarine alone is representative of the overall problem for Japan, which never convoyed its merchant shipping, unlike its military transportation.

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This situation was caused by a triple score of reversals, first at the Coral Sea, then at Midway, and lastly at Guadalcanal, all in 1942, the same year von Paulus was being encircled at Stalingrad. It now became necessary to reduce the American surface force, which by 1943 was in the processes of developing battlegroup doctrine to support the amphibious landings campaign, which included the following operations, Gilberts, Marshall Islands (Tarawa, Makin), the Aleutians, and intercepted Japanese reinforcements for the ongoing New Guinea battle at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

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So by summer 1944 the Allies are invading Guam, Saipan and Tinian, and Nimitz has Spruance and Mitscher operating with the TF58 carriers when they are intercepted by Ozawa's mobile force. During the ensuing air attacks the IJN's air service loses hundreds of aircraft and three fleet carriers to minimal American losses, 123 aircraft but only 29 pilots KIA. This was the decisive battle of the war and it meant the Japanese were not going to be able to stop the second defence perimeter from falling and opening the tertiary and final perimeter, including the Phillipines, before invasion. When Shō-Gō 2 was ordered in October to interrupt the Leyte landings, the IJN was already so short on pilots and fuel that its operation was considered doomed by several senior commanders. Battle losses against over whelming American aircraft, torpedo, and battleship attacks meant that the best chance for the remaining surface vessels was to prepare for the final invasion of the inner islands and Ryukyus.

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#14828141
MB. wrote:This is for Starman. I think the decisive battle of the pacific war as defined above was at the Philippine Sea, June 19-20 1944. The much larger battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 was however such a crushing defeat only as a result of the heavy losses sustained early that year, particularly in terms of experienced pilots and naval fighters, as well as vessels such as the striking force veteran carriers Hiyo, Shokaku, and the brand new Taiho,


What if the Japanese had made a number of changes:
1. Destroy the fuel tanks at PH to help buy time.
2. Don't go to the Solomons (not even Rabaul) but build up army defenses in the Marianas while sending the bulk of the fleet including subs to the Indian Ocean, beginning after PH.
2. Without the attrition incurred at Midway and the Solomons, engage the US fleet in a big battle for the Marianas maybe late '43(?).

and merchant shipping losses from submarine interdiction, which meant depreciating fuel reserves. Most of the shipping losses appear to have taken place in 1942 and 1943


The farther the Japanese went from home bases the more exposed their shipping was to sub attack.

but losses continued for the rest of the war, I've seen figures ranging from 5 to 9 million tons of merchant shipping lost, but the figure of 5 millions tons, or 1,500 ships by submarine alone is representative of the overall problem for Japan, which never convoyed its merchant shipping, unlike its military transportation.


Japan tried convoying starting in late '43 when it was realized that "preservation of tonnage was more important than the efficiency of shipping circulation."

When Shō-Gō 2 was ordered in October to interrupt the Leyte landings, the IJN was already so short on pilots and fuel that its operation was considered doomed by several senior commanders.


But lack of trained pilots theoretically wasn't an issue; the carriers were just to draw the US fleet away from Leyte. Maybe Kurita shouldn't have sailed until there was clear evidence Halsey had been lured north. And the Japanese were stupid to mistake TF 3 for a fleet carrier group. If it was they'd be getting plastered since daybreak on the 25th just like on the previous day. Kurita should've gone straight to Leyte like he was supposed to.
#14828148
Do "forces" only count the mobile?
I dont know how much was destroyed by mines in the Pacific, but some quick googling gives looses by the British link and mines seems to be up there in causes. Were they ineffective in the Pacific?
I also notice no mention of coastal batteries.



Which, if you dont mind MB, makes we ponder: Mining straits/choke points/ideal landing zones is an obvious target, as is creating forts to fire upon such areas.. but how many ports/cities/areas have such a geography where attacking from a different direction and position is actually a bad or non-existent option ? Or have so much money and time that they can make an Atlantic wall to cover all options? When I think of Europe I do think of such geography and time, places for armies to crash against if reckless. When I think of the Pacific I dont see the geography or time (except around Japan and some traps), vast expanses of water for maneuver, head long pushes and surges. Actions that come to a head not because of clever use of the environment but because the opponent has shown up in force. This makes me think that Japanese success in the Pacific is actually much less impressive. More akin to Italy rather than Germany.

Thoughts?
#14828248
The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols, using some of the 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50, one of these, a Mitsubishi A6M Zero, found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, the Zero attacked a picket destroyer and was shot down.[citation needed]

Alerted, the Japanese began launching their aircraft on Guam for an attack. These were spotted on radar by U.S. ships. A group of thirty Grumman F6F Hellcats were dispatched from the Belleau Wood to deal with the threat. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field. Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A battle broke out in which 35 Japanese aircraft were shot down for the loss of a single Hellcat. It was a pattern that would be repeated throughout the day. At 09:57 large numbers of bogeys were picked up approaching the fleet. Mitscher said to Burke "Get those fighters back from Guam". The call "Hey, Rube!" was sent out.[27][N 3] The fleet held steady until 10:23, when Mitscher ordered TF 58 to turn into the wind on course east-southeast, and ordered all fighter aircraft aloft, deployed in several layers of (CAP) to await the Japanese.[29] He then sent his bomber aircraft aloft to orbit open waters to the east, so they wouldn't be in danger of a Japanese bomb going off in a hangar deck full of aircraft.[30]


The main problem for the Japanese Navy was the lack of the radar, which was available for the American Navy. The Japanese only relied on their search patrols to detect enemy ships, while the Americans could even see approaching Japanese aircraft on the radar, thus anticipating the enemy's next move. To make matters worse, there was no trained Japanese pilot left in 1944 and 35 Japanese aircraft were shot down for the loss of a single Hellcat in a battle.
#14828288
Well there's several interesting posts here we can address in sequence.

1) was the midway operation and Aluetians a mistake
2) was the failure of convoy protection decisive
3) could Japan have stopped the Leyte landings.

Firstly, I don't think midway was an error. I think it was the correct next logical step in building the defence perimeter. Yamamoto should probably have been a little more aggressive with the combined fleet but the final tactical victory for Spruance wasn't really the result of a planning failure but rather tactical events which were not predictable.

2) I think the failure to recognize how convoys would work is critical. As Starman points out convoys we're not ultimately pursued because the Japanese were unwilling to deliver up their fleet to protect the convoys, as they were still hoping for a decisive battle that not surprisingly neither side wanted on bad terms. Ultimately events like the Bismarck Sea in '43 show the Japanese didn't really understand convoy, of which the real purpose is to force the enemy to attack defended positions.

3) I addressed this in greater detail on hifo, but I disagree with Starman scenario. Kurita made the right decision since a frontal attack on the landing Armada would have been suicidal. Lack of pilots and planes is exactly why the carriers had to be bait rather than say elements of the main striking force.

As for mines, well, those and torpedoes were used extensively in the narrow seas between island chains. Submarines which can lay mines or stalk merchant and Naval traffic with torpedoes were especially deadly, destroying two Japanese carriers at the Philippines Sea in 1944.

Lack of radar only became significant by 1944 when improvements in US technology and doctrine began to overcome Japanese night fighting doctrine. Strategically it gave the allies a major advantage, as did their cryptography.

On reading this again, I do like Starman's Indian Ocean theory. I think this would have been more useful than the Solomons, BUT the British had already been badly defeated at Java sea, so we're they as significant a threat as the USN?
#14828373
MB. wrote:1) was the midway operation and Aluetians a mistake


Yes.

2) was the failure of convoy protection decisive


At the end of the war they said the most important cause of defeat was loss of shipping.

3) could Japan have stopped the Leyte landings.


I think it was possible. I think Kurita goofed badly in the Palawan passage. As soon as he heard sub transmissions he should've upped his speed to 20 knots to prevent them maneuvering ahead for attack and used searchlights to find them and force them down. Then, anticipating US recon flights, he should've first sailed past the entrance to the Sibuyan, (before doubling back later)so they'd think he was going around cape Engano (hence discovered the decoy force sooner and focused on that). It wouldn't have caused more of a delay than occurred historically and would've saved Musashi etc.

Firstly, I don't think midway was an error. I think it was the correct next logical step in building the defence perimeter. Yamamoto should probably have been a little more aggressive with the combined fleet but the final tactical victory for Spruance wasn't really the result of a planning failure but rather tactical events which were not predictable.


The Japanese should've just built a defense perimeter close to home, say in the Marianas, and focused on the Indian Ocean in '42.

2) I think the failure to recognize how convoys would work is critical. As Starman points out convoys we're not ultimately pursued because the Japanese were unwilling to deliver up their fleet to protect the convoys, as they were still hoping for a decisive battle that not surprisingly neither side wanted on bad terms.


It was pretty stupid IMO not to hand over the fleet destroyers to convoy defenses. By 1943 the IJN carriers were already critically short on trained pilots, which meant the combined fleet had to temporarily cease or at least minimize operations. Until it could fight again, they might as well have handed over the destroyers to the convoy escort groups. That could've saved over a million gross tons in '43.

I addressed this in greater detail on hifo, but I disagree with Starman scenario. Kurita made the right decision since a frontal attack on the landing Armada would have been suicidal. Lack of pilots and planes is exactly why the carriers had to be bait rather than say elements of the main striking force.


Sure but once Halsey was lured away, Kurita's fleet--assuming it reached Leyte without the serious attrition incurred historically--could've taken on Oldendorf's ships (if they hadn't also been diverted away, south) and crushed the landing operation.

On reading this again, I do like Starman's Indian Ocean theory. I think this would have been more useful than the Solomons, BUT the British had already been badly defeated at Java sea, so we're they as significant a threat as the USN?


The idea wasn't just to neutralize them but to wreck their empire, by taking India if possible and even maybe reaching the Persian gulf. The IJN broke off operations too soon in April '42. They should've found the fleet at Addu Atoll and tried to destroy the whole thing.

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