[The Clockwork Rat]

I was going to write a whole screed on this, but realised that this article said everything I was going to say, and better.

http://freespace.virgin.net/pep.talk/COLLAPSE..htm (This article is about equivalent to 16 sides of A4)

What are people's opinions on the theories discussed within?

[Maxim Litvinov]

The link seems to be all over the shop - most of the time it is talking pre-WWII and then it jumps from notions of bourgeois family to defence expenditure to GDP growth without sticking to the one clear line of reasoning.

Maybe that's just because I skim-read it. It does make some valid points.

I think the main thing to say is that the collapse of the USSR is not really down to "socialism" or "communism" but the idiosyncrasies of the Soviet state. There is nothing about those two ideologies that means the Soviet economy had to be structured as it was in the mid 1980s and nothing about them that demands a man like Gorbachev who let the reform agenda get away from him.

[The Clockwork Rat]

Maybe that's just because I skim-read it.

I think that's right.

I think the main thing to say is that the collapse of the USSR is not really down to "socialism" or "communism" but the idiosyncrasies of the Soviet state.

I agree again.

There is nothing about those two ideologies that means the Soviet economy had to be structured as it was in the mid 1980s

I feel like I have something to say about this, but can't quite get my head round it

[Maxim Litvinov]

Well, Gorbachev came in as a response to a lethargic economy (in terms of growth rates). The main problems in the economy were its lack of feedback mechanisms, corruption and the focus on quantity of goods over quality. None of these are either (a) issues peculiar to socialism or (b) matters that can't be dealt with in a much more successful way than Gorbachev managed.

[The Clockwork Rat]

Did these not all stem from the endemic apathy? To me it seems that many of the issues were spawned from the Bolsheviks trying to hold the revolution together through the civil war.

Sorry if that sounds disjointed.

[Maxim Litvinov]

I think a sort of siege mentality arose because of the Civil War that meant paranoia and purges were entrenched in post-revolutionary society, but that was not really that important by the 1980s. I'm not sure what "endemic apathy" refers to.

[The Clockwork Rat]

The loss of a conscious desire to keep up with the socialist project.

[Potemkin]

I'm not sure what "endemic apathy" refers to.

It refers to loss of belief in the ideology of the system, both by the masses and by the ruling elite itself. This is precisely the thesis of the author - the collapse of the Soviet system was not an economic collapse, but a political collapse, occasioned by the failure to transform the relations of production away from the capitalist model. There was an attempt at a 'cultural revolution' in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, which is not mentioned by the author, so Stalin at least was clearly aware of the need for such a transformation, but the author of the article does not mention this attempted cultural revolution, let alone analyse either it or the reasons for its apparent failure.

[Maxim Litvinov]

It refers to loss of belief in the ideology of the system

That's normally referred to as a "crisis of legitimation".

There was an attempt at a 'cultural revolution' in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, which is not mentioned by the author, so Stalin at least was clearly aware of the need for such a transformation

That doesn't follow. Collectivisation from the late 1920s and political death-purges from the mid 1930s were not really part of a long-term project of transformation but more direct 'pragmatic' responses to the circumstances. They don't reveal anything much about Stalin having a big picture conception of Soviet history.

[The Clockwork Rat]

There was an attempt at a 'cultural revolution' in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, which is not mentioned by the author, so Stalin at least was clearly aware of the need for such a transformation, but the author of the article does not mention this attempted cultural revolution, let alone analyse either it or the reasons for its apparent failure.

Are there any good texts on this, or would you just point me towards marxists.org?

[Potemkin]

That's normally referred to as a "crisis of legitimation".

Giving it a fancy name is not the same thing as analysing it, Maxim.

There was an attempt at a 'cultural revolution' in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, which is not mentioned by the author, so Stalin at least was clearly aware of the need for such a transformation

That doesn't follow. Collectivisation from the late 1920s and political death-purges from the mid 1930s were not really part of a long-term project of transformation but more direct 'pragmatic' responses to the circumstances. They don't reveal anything much about Stalin having a big picture conception of Soviet history.

I'm not talking about the collectivisation campaigns, nor about Stalin's purges of the late 1930s - I'm referring to the so-called 'cultural revolution' (and yes, it is called that in the scholarly literature) which Stalin launched between about 1929 and 1934, which culminated in the imposition of 'socialist realism' as the only permissible method of artistic creation at the Writers' Congress of 1934. The author of the article, like you, seems to be unaware of its existence and does not analyse it, whereas it is one of the major (implicit) theses of his article that that 'cultural revolution' must have failed in its aims, just as Mao's later Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s failed.

[U184]

I will read the paper, but whats to discuss, they ran out of money.

[Maxim Litvinov]

Giving it a fancy name is not the same thing as analysing it, Maxim.

What I'm saying is that "endemic apathy" just means that people can't generally give a toss. But if you search literature for "crisis of legitimation" or similar, you'll find the stuff you're looking for. I'm not giving it a fancy name, but it helps to know what it's called if you're interested in reading about it.

I'm well aware of the imposition of socialist realism, but I don't see its impact on the collapse of the USSR in the mid to late 1980s. You're going to have to explain the relevance.

I will read the paper, but whats to discuss, they ran out of money.

How is that a solution when it's not even true?

[Potemkin]

Are there any good texts on this, or would you just point me towards marxists.org?

I can recommend Herman Ermolaev's Soviet Literary Theories, 1917-1934: The Genesis of Socialist Realism for a good overview, though the book is biased towards the literary arts (as indeed was Soviet culture in general).

I will read the paper, but whats to discuss, they ran out of money.

No, they didn't.

[The Clockwork Rat]

Ah, I have to buy it.

[Potemkin]

What I'm saying is that "endemic apathy" just means that people can't generally give a toss. But if you search literature for "crisis of legitimation" or similar, you'll find the stuff you're looking for. I'm not giving it a fancy name, but it helps to know what it's called if you're interested in reading about it.

But from 1917 until the 1970s, the Soviet masses and the ruling elite did 'give a toss' about building socialism. There was tremendous enthusiasm for the Soviet system, as the author of the article makes clear. The question which has to be answered is, why did that enthusiasm evaporate? What went wrong? And before you say, 'Stalin's purges', that enthusiasm still existed into the 1960s, more than a decade after Stalin's death.

I'm well aware of the imposition of socialist realism, but I don't see its impact on the collapse of the USSR in the mid to late 1980s. You're going to have to explain the relevance.

The relevance is to the existence of a cultural revolution in the Soviet Union of the early 1930s, whose aim was precisely to achieve that transformation of people's consciousness which the author of the article claims was absent in the Soviet system, an absence which led to that system's demise.

[Maxim Litvinov]

And before you say, 'Stalin's purges'

Why would I say that?

I think there are two things to say though: [1] it's hard to measure enthusiasm and [2] a lot has to do with Brezhnev's thaw and attempts to 'correct' it or restart the economy.

The traditional "legitimation crisis" riff has nothing much to do with art and a lot to do with the economy. In the short-term (ie. looking from 1984-1991), the major problems with legitimacy were kicked off by glasnost', perestroika and demokratisatsiya being seen as tacit admissions from within that the system as it stood was flawed and needed improvement. They were developed as policies by the elite to deal with economic slow-down.

[Potemkin]

[1] it's hard to measure enthusiasm

As the author of the article points out, it actually is possible to measure enthusiasm in the Soviet system, since it led directly to economic growth. Much Soviet labour was on a voluntary basis.

and [2] a lot has to do with Brezhnev's thaw and attempts to 'correct' it or restart the economy.

Brezhnev's what? The 'Thaw' was launched by Khrushchev in 1955 and lasted barely two years, until he took fright at the Hungarian Revolution.

The traditional "legitimation crisis" riff has nothing much to do with art and a lot to do with the economy. In the short-term (ie. looking from 1984-1991), the major problems with legitimacy were kicked off by glasnost', perestroika and demokratisatsiya being seen as tacit admissions from within that the system as it stood was flawed and needed improvement. They were developed as policies by the elite to deal with economic slow-down.

A growth rate of over 3% is actually quite respectable, and is better than we're doing right now. And by the 1980s, almost everyone in the Soviet Union knew that there were problems with the system; by admitting it, and advancing possible remedies, Gorbachev was trying to restore the Soviet people's confidence in the system.

[Maxim Litvinov]

As the author of the article points out, it actually is possible to measure enthusiasm in the Soviet system, since it led directly to economic growth. Much Soviet labour was on a voluntary basis.

First, linking enthusiasm to economic growth is not particularly attractive for any system. Second, not many would agree with you about non-voluntary labour. Subbotniks and voskresniks felt far from voluntary for many Soviet workers.

Brezhnev's what?

Sorry - stagnation. Zastoi.

And by the 1980s, almost everyone in the Soviet Union knew that there were problems with the system; by admitting it, and advancing possible remedies, Gorbachev was trying to restore the Soviet people's confidence in the system.

I agree. Gorbachev's position made sense and his policies were enacted with the best intentions. It was somewhat a case of too quickly, too late though.

[U184]

Maxim Litvinov/Potemkin, why nay say the obvious?

The USSR built a mighty army, while ignoring their Countries infrastructure and their peoples needs. Their economy was crap and they had problems feeding their people and keeping the heat on. Russia had zero international exports and the reserve hit zero, creating full scale bankruptcy.

Several smaller parties sprang up to support their local areas and that took away from the power of the central government, or what was left of it. In response to lack of basic staples Russians looked to foreign imports for their needs. Between being cold, hungry and getting their ass kicked in Afghanistan, heart and hope was lost, both in their military might and in their confidence in the government.

Then if that was not enough, the USSR decided to get into a pissing match with the USA. They matched us step for step, bomb for bomb, bullet for bullet and dime for dime, then the money was, well and truly, gone.

The Russian Government lost wars, lost the confidence of their people and lost the arms race, cumulative affect caused the collapse, but the basis was economical.