[Maxim Litvinov]

The analogy is very pretty, but it's not really accurate. Gorbachev had a high degree of flexibility about what happened in the end. He was not some puppet being manipulated by a svengali. The USSR could have avoided perestroika altogether had it wanted. It could have pursued a path more like that of Deng. It could have continued on with the policy in place over the eastern Bloc. It could have failed to democratise. It could have started perestroika and then cracked down on taken things back to business as usual.

The possibilities were limitless and very few of the possible paths seem to take one to the position of collapse. Although this makes for subjunctive history, the logical conclusion is that the specific nature, extent and timing of *changes* in the late 1980s led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.


S_C: you seem to be rather off-topic. What next: predicting the breakdown of the UK on the basis of how pretty No. 10 and Chequers are?

[Beren]

It could have pursued a path more like that of Deng.

In theory perhaps, but the USSR was a very different country with a very different social structure and traditions and a quite different communist party. However, if they had began to reform the system in the late 70's like Deng did, then the USSR could have been saved perhaps, but it's very hypothetical and ahistoric.

[Maxim Litvinov]

The point isn't to think about what if Russia turned into China. The point is that there were many many big reforms from 1985 onwards that were not inevitable or considered "necessary" or necessary to carry out at the order or in the timescale they were. Each one of these reforms had an impact and the total impact was the collapse of the USSR.

Given the enormity of the reforms, their apparent impact on politics in the Soviet Union and the fact that none of the individual reforms were 'inevitable' and many of them were highly unorthodox or new in their nature (and resisted by large numbers of Party leaders), putting the idiosyncrasies of the Gorbachev reforms down as the primary cause of the Soviet Union's collapse is not only reasonable but the only sensible option.

[Social_Critic]

Off topic? I've been discussing the reasons why I think the Soviet Union disappeared. I'm sorry if you think the reasons I give or the way I write are not up to your standards, but I am, after all, a mere witness who was bouncing from place to place in an almost accidental fashion. I'm not an intellectual expert, I only observe and report, and read to try to understand.

And I think the events in Cuba today bear a certain similarity. Both systems, failing and their backs to the wall, changed leaders but maintained the overall state structure. In the USSR's case, the moves led to its disappearance. You are right when you say other moves could have been made, but they weren't. This is like saying Hitler would have done a lot better if he had taken his army straight down to Baku and avoided Stalingrad.

But I don't agree with you when you say it could have gone back to what it was. It really couldn't. These systems decay over time. I already mentioned an observation I've made: because the party is the only vehicle one has to career growth and power, many join the party and play the game because they seek power, not because they believe in communism or dialectic marxism and the other garbage they used to peddle in school. They didn't think socialism was the natural progression of things, they just wanted the jeans for Nadieshda, the Zhiguli, and the dacha in Arkhangelskaya or Barvikha with the nice hot water supply and that glorious view of the Moscow river at sunset.

Litvinov, I don't even know if you were there, or you are just reading books about it. But it was really really corrupt. The only places I saw running more or less OK were the high class military establishments. Sevmash, Kirovsky, places like that.

[Beren]

The point isn't to think about what if Russia turned into China.

You mentioned another time and another place. The Chinese began their reforms just in time, the USSR was 10 years late at least when Gorbachev came to power and that was the primary reason of the collapse of the USSR, not Gorbachev and his reforms. The USSR was a lost case then already.

[Social_Critic]

Beren, you are so right. And then there's the USSR's lack of cohesion. It was made up of Republics, many of which didn't have a drive to be in the USSR in the first place. This applies in particular to the Central Asian Republics. As it is, the Russians have had to work very hard to keep Ukraine within their sphere of influence, and Ukraine is truly vital to Russia's survival. China, on the other hand, was a lot more monolithic. And they did go about change a lot smarter. For example, I remember when, in the late 1970's, they started the move to send Chinese students to our schools in the US, to learn real subjects instead of the poppycock they had called economics. So when they started their JV corporations in the 1980's, they had their young educated MBA's and economics PhDs starting to roll off the production line. This was critical for the move they made towards "market socialism", or the fascist style system they are implementing.

[Beren]

And then there's the USSR's lack of cohesion.

There was enough cohesion till the socio-economic system worked. The primary reason of the 'successful' collapse was that they began the reforms when the system was already collapsing, they would have had to be preventive instead.

The US might be the same case.

[Social_Critic]

Huh, you mean there was enough cohesion while the socio economic system worked, right? But cohesion was also based on repression. And the repression factor evaporated when Yeltsin took over Russia and said the USSR was a goner. So everybody could go their own way, right?

Right about that time, I remember a ceremony held in a fairly remote place. An envelope came in from Moscow, with Russian decals for our helicopters. They were supposed to be placed on top of the hammer and sickle decals. The commander of the helicopter detachment held a meeting in the main hangar, and took a vote. Everybody raised their hand, voting to cover the hammer and sickle with the new Russian flag decals.

So each helicopter pilot and his crew got their decals, went out, put them on their machine, and that was it. To them, the Soviet Union was dead. And not one of them protested, or shed a tear. They were sick and tired of it. I went into my cabin, and had a drink, and toasted. So indeed it was easy for the Soviet Union to die. Nobody cared for it, as far as I know.

[Maxim Litvinov]

We're not getting any further... It doesn't seem we will until there's some attempt to deal with the fact that Gorbachev changed things.

[Beren]

But cohesion was also based on repression. And the repression factor evaporated when Yeltsin took over Russia and said the USSR was a goner. So everybody could go their own way, right?

Yeltsin could have taken over Russia, because the USSR was a de facto goner already. The repression factor evaporated due to the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and its dictatorship, which was a direct consequence of the collapse of the Soviet-Socialist socio-economic system.

[Smilin' Dave]

(I was in the business before many of you were born)

Aww spare me this crap! I was there, so despite the massive flaws in my claims, I'm right. I'm old, so I'm right. I don't actually know very much about the Soviet system in the 1980s, so I'll keep referring to Cuba in the 21st century instead. At least you haven't dropped any more meaningless names or appealled to cartoonish parables.

You know what? Since nothing I can say can convince you (since I'm not older, more there, or more knowledgeable about Cuba ) and doing so seems to only prompt another spray of rubbish on your part, I'm not responding to your rubbish further.

Gorbachev was too late and he tried to save a socio-economic system and country unstoppably collapsing.

Gorbachev himself didn't actually think that he inherited a collapsing system. His actually called it a "pre-crisis situation".

I don't think any of that, but Gorbachev could have become the leader of the USSR and he had to do what he did because the country and its socio-economic system were in crisis and collapsing due to inner failures and Cold War.

Gorbachev may have been required to act to improve the situation, but the specific solutions he chose were not actually the result of the economic situation. Everyone forgets that Gorbachev didn't go to Perestroika (restructuring) staight out the gate, instead he went to Uskorenie (acceleration) pretty well until 1987. Uskorenie bore a lot of similarity to Andropov-era efforts at improving economic performance, which figures since Gorbachev owed a lot to Andropov. Since Uskorenie failed to have the desired impact he sought liberal solutions, in essense his second personal preference. Glasnost wasn't really required to resolve the economic problems (see the PRC as a counter-example), but somehow he decided to include that anyway.

You mentioned another time and another place. The Chinese began their reforms just in time, the USSR was 10 years late at least when Gorbachev came to power and that was the primary reason of the collapse of the USSR, not Gorbachev and his reforms. The USSR was a lost case then already.

There really isn't any feeling about the Soviet collapse however that suggested they somehow ran out of time or resources, so I don't agree that the timing of reform was the key element. Instead I think it is clear that Gorbachev's reforms got out of control, largely because of his style of non-intervention (demonstrated by the Sinatra doctrine) and the particular mechanisms he lost by chosing the style of political reforms. So Gorbachev was unable to intervene in the economy, to deal with the contradictions created by his hybrid system. Gorbachev was unable to shape the new debates that emerged. And so on.

Even Gorbachev and the Soviet Union wasn't totally stuffed by runaway reform until the August coup attempt. Given the large representation of the defence and intelligence complex in the Gang of Eight I think it might even be a bit too far a stretch to pass this off as simply the last gasp of the old nomenklatura. Espcially since Gorbachev, in another stellar act of decision making, promoted most of them to their positions of authority prior to the coup.

[Beren]

Gorbachev himself didn't actually think that he inherited a collapsing system. His actually called it a "pre-crisis situation".

Politicians are always euphemistic in situations like that. And it was capitalism of course that was always in crisis.

[Oxymoron]

Incredible corruption, laziness, and greed.

[The Clockwork Rat]

Well, yes, but the thread is concerned with how those arose. Some people seem to think that these are inherent tendencies of socialist societies and others believe that they are due to the circumstances out of which the USSR was born and developed.

[Naxzul]

The Soviet Union was not Socialist or Marxist in anyway in case some are confused. The basic tenant of that philosophy was that the workers control the means of production. Under the Soviets though workers were virtually slaves with no rights. A big part of the collapse was when Pres. Carter decided to draw the Soviet Union into Afghanistan. Drawing together and training all the Muslim fanatics they could find to start attacking the Soviet Union, even carrying out attacks inside the Soviet Union. In the words of his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski it was to draw them into their own Vietnam. The costs were very high and it helped it's collapse.

On a side note, I don't think the Soviets lost the cold war as much as lost first. The US is losing as well now. Focusing a country on war has benefits but its short-sided in the long run.

[Andropov]

It might have been cool if it liberalized but was still the Soviet Union and not Russia.

[Ombrageux]

I think Maxim is right. Ultimately the Soviet Union's collapse as a state - as opposed to the erosion of its economy due to military spending, or the loss of its Eastern European satellites - is due to the poor handling of its multinational character.

I think in particular Gorbachev's major mistake was holding fully democratic elections in the Republics rather than at the Union level. As a result, Yeltsin and all the other Republic presidents had more legitimacy than he did. They were then free to nationalize Union resources, impose new taxes, and generally disrupt and ultimately completely destroy the Soviet Union's centrally-planned economy. With the economy collapsing, soo too did Gorbachev's authority, and it was only a matter of time until the Republics gained their sovereignty and independence.

The fact that so many Communist states broke up (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechslovakia) suggests that particular kind regime somehow eliminates the possibility of a multiethnic state. Leninism and diversity cannot coexist in the long run. Yet at the same time, I think the Soviet Union could have persisted and certainly the disaster that befell Russia in the 1990s could have been avoided.

If I could be so bold as to prescribe:
* Massively cutting military expenditure, ending the arms race with the West, negotiating Eastern Europe's withdrawal from the Soviet sphere.
* Reconcile with the West, get trade, aid and investment.
* Reform (basically privatize) agriculture, particularly for small farmers, make small and medium enterprises possible.
* Do not democratize until major gains are made in, if absolutely necessary, only allow semi-competitive Union-level presidential elections (not local ones until later).

Obviously hindsight is 20/20. I think this pattern would have allowed the Soviet Union and its economy to survive, possibly it would have recovered substantially, and the country would be following (with far less economic insecurity and social inequity) the pattern Putin's Russia is following. Thoughts?

[Smilin' Dave]

Thoughts?

Sure!

* Massively cutting military expenditure, ending the arms race with the West, negotiating Eastern Europe's withdrawal from the Soviet sphere.

Cutting military expenditure is an issue partly because since it was a failed economic power, the Soviets kind of wanted to at least be a military superpower. The ability to threaten some for of trouble let them have a say in a lot of world events and I think this was politically important. Even the perception of being part of a great power was pretty important to the general public, a source of pride.

* Reconcile with the West, get trade, aid and investment.

The Soviets had been trying this for decades prior to collapse. The obstacles were the unusual legal status of Soviet companies and political objections to throwing money/aid at the 'evil empire'. On the former point, consider how reluctant a company would be to invest in Soviet industry or whatever knowing that the government could randomly seize profit/equipment/whatever without compensation or recourse to a higher authority. Had the Soviets been more dependent on trade, then the threat of losing future clients might restrain them... but who wants to be the first to try the waters?

* Reform (basically privatize) agriculture, particularly for small farmers, make small and medium enterprises possible.

One of the problems with hybrid economies is that exploitation of the system and incompatibilities can emerge. These were apparent in Gorbachev's time as well as for the Chinese. For example your private farmer is free now. Then he wants to buy a new tractor... unfortunately the tractor works is still state owned and they can't get a decent machine from them. Or consider the flip side, the private sectore might be so awash with profits that it can buy up all the production of the factory... leaving the state-run enterprises with nothing.

Privatisation based on scale can also be a bit fraught. How big is too big after all?

* Do not democratize until major gains are made in, if absolutely necessary, only allow semi-competitive Union-level presidential elections (not local ones until later).

While local elections backfired a bit, Union-wide elections could have their issues too. The hypothetical reformer probably wants a free hand to make the changes necessary, some of which are going to hurt certain interests. Does he really want to give opposition a lever to remove him? Will the elected presidency clash for authority with non-elected positions in the party or state apparatus (like Gorbachev vs. Yeltsin)?

[Ombrageux]

And that is the difference between a politician and a statesman! George Washington understood that accepting limits on his personal power would allow him to build institutions, indeed a nation, in a far more lasting way. Napoleon Bonaparte did not understand this, or rather, his legacy is in many ways less significant than Washtington's because he was so keen on personal power in his own lifetime.

In the case of Gorbachev, he couldn't really imagine himself taking the risks that a typical Western politician takes every few years in elections. In clinging to his office defensively, personalizing power, he was not only deprived of the democratic legitimacy needed to reform the Union and hold it together, but he was unable to install the habits and create the institutions that would have made for a truly lasting legacy.

[Smilin' Dave]

But as I noted, Gorbachev did have a competitor, someone to share legitimacy/power with, in the form of Yeltsin. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union wasn't just a regional problem, but also a central one with people like Yeltsin in a position to quickly replace Gorbachev. It is also not too great a stretch to point to challenges within his own party to his power and legitimacy. So it wasn't like Gorbachev was hording the position, or that his defence was entirely unmerited.

I think it is also a bit of a stretch to argue that such a change at the centre would have necessarily impacted on the broader institutions simply by virtue of existing. Such a cultural change either had to come from below (and I think there wasn't a strong push in that direction) or from above. If it has to come from above, you have the problem of the top needing the power to get such things done while also representing the new values, which brings us back to why any devolution of authority could backfire.