[Sans Salvador]

The horses became ill due to deteriorating conditions in the countryside. This was clearly a natural factor.

How does this even begin to make sense? Where do you get the idea that deteriorating conditions were a result of natural factors? Certainly, this is not what Davies and Wheatcroft argue and present evidence for (either on the deteriorating conditions as a whole or their topic on the livestock disaster).

[Stasi]

Where do you get the idea that deteriorating conditions were a result of natural factors?

Part of the reason why horses fell into illness was due to the conditions of the counrtryside that brought about poor management of resources. Stop with this kind of petty skepticism.

[Sans Salvador]

Petty skepticism? I don't see what you're tlaking about. Certainly, there is every reason to believe that state policy was involved in the famine, albeit unintentionally of course. Wheatcroft and Davies' book certainly confirms this.

I wouls also suggest you become more clear.

Part of the reason why horses fell into illness was due to the conditions of the counrtryside that brought about poor management of resources.

Do you mean natural conditions of the countryside? If so, say so.

[Maksym]

then you have to add the figures from Kazakhstan which amount to another 1.5 million

The graph provided by Stasi places the number of deaths in the Kazakh ASSR for 1933 at 560, 223. This is slightly above the average of 500 000 deaths per year, so how do we arrive at 1.5 million? This huge number is even more ludicrous since the number of registered Kazakhs was only 4 million.

[N]

At the time most of kazakhs were nomads and in 1933 due to the famine from 600,000 to 2 million (there are different estimates) of them had emigrated to China, Afganistan, Mongolia, Iran.

[Stasi]

"Unfavourable climatic conditions in a number of districts of Ukraine and North Caucuses led to a loss of part of the harvest"---Pravda, February 26, 1933.

Walter Duranty, the immensely demonised correspondent of "New York Times" to Moscow, who reported that perhaps 2 million died in Ukraine, was correct all along. The real liars are those who have engaged in Nazi-type slander towards the SU while concocting a flatulent death toll that any logical person would be skeptical toward.

There were numerous instances when the State and Party of SU reduced collection quotas and allocated grains to famine-stricken areas. Between February and July 1932, no less than 35 decisions and decrees of the Politburo and Sovnarkom authorised allocations of grain for food.--- Pg. 214 of Davies's "Years of Hunger"

In regard to the decree of August 7, 1932, enormously misinterpreted by Western Cold Warriors as calling for executions for even a hint of thievery, there were several measures taken to weaken this decree. The bulk of those prosecuted under this decree were deprived of liberty for 5-10 years. Amendements to this decree that called for the death penalty to be sentences to "active saboteurs" i.e organised groups and habitual offenders.

According to a report of the head of the Supreme Court, by January 15, 1933 as many as 103,000 people had been sentenced under the provisions of the Aug. 7 decree. Of the 79,000 whose sentences were known to the Supreme Court, 4,800 had been sentenced to death, 26,086 to ten years' imprisonment and 48,094 to other sentences.

In regard to allocations of grain to the countryside, Stalin stated this in a response to Sholokhov of Veshenskii district in the North Caucuses: "We will do everything required. Inform size of necessary help. State a figure". --- Pg. 317

In another response, Stalin scolded Sholokhov for, "You have sent an answer not by letter but by telegram. Time was wasted"

On May 31, 1933, there was a request by Chubar and Kosior of allocations to grain. They called for 200k puds to Kharkov, 150k puds for Kiev and Vinnitsa each, and 30k for Chernigov. Deliveries of grain were carried out soon after to these areas.

On May 8, 1933, Stalin and Molotov signed an instruction for the removal of 400,000 persons from prisons.---Pg. 224

Furthermore, it is reasonable to state that the bulk of those excess deaths during 1933 were not due to actual starvation but through disease accompanied by famine.

Cases of infectious disease (in thousands):

1929: Typhus, 40; Typhoid Fever, 170; Relasping Fever, 6; Small Pox, 8; Malaria, 3000
1933: Typhus, 800; Typhoid Fever, 210; Relasping Fever, 12; Small Pox, 38; Malaria, 3000

In regard to the much hyped exports of grain, what must be understood is that the SU was at the time in a deep foreign trade crisis that obstructed the acquisition of additonal tractors. Grain exports in 1932 and 1933 were far below those of previous years.

(thousand tons of grain)
1930: 5832
1931: 4786
1932: 1441
1933: 2319

[Sans Salvador]

Furthermore, it is reasonable to state that the bulk of those excess deaths during 1933 were not due to actual starvation but through disease accompanied by famine.

The earth revolves around the sun, too. As I mentioned earlier, in no famine do a significant amount of people die because their bodies have insufficient caloric intake to stay alive. They always die of disease as the famines weaken immune systems.

And I cna't help but laugh at your wildly irrelevant asides about how the Soviet government did not intend to cause a famine. That is true, and no one here disputes that. Only total chumps or right wing ideologues believe the famine was intentional. You seem to use your rants against them as a way to ignore some of your more ridiculous claims about the causes of the famine.

[Stasi]

You seem to use your rants against them as a way to ignore some of your more ridiculous claims about the causes of the famine.

Are you saying that undesirable weather and a decline in plaughing which is the essential factor for sowing, cannot contribute to famine? It seems like you are criticising me just for the sake of it.

[Sans Salvador]

I do not disagree. However, natural factors were certainly a lesser cause of the famine than governemnt policy (which is what problems with plowing should primarily be addressed to). Also, as wheatcroft and Davies' book shows, policy restricted the flexibility to get around the problems with the weather when they appeared.