Soviet terror of 1930s - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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Inter-war period (1919-1938), Russian civil war (1917–1921) and other non World War topics (1914-1945).
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By pikachu
#13441917
It's time to revisit the topic.
What was the cause of such massive repressions?
Did anti-government/anti-stalin conspiracies really exist? (well, they always exist but were they anywhere near as widespread as the trials claimed?)
Was the paranoia about conspiracies/potential conspiracies the real cause for the repressions? Evidence from the show trials seems to indicate that the prosecutors did not believe a thing they were doing, but they did it anyway.
If not, what was the real purpose? Who were responsible and what interests were they pursuing?

List your theories.

I have no real comprehension of this event. The scale of the terror as well as the fact that the focus of the repressions was on the party members and state leaders seems to indicate a massive power struggle of some sort, but there is also hardly any evidence of one. Normally a dictatorship can be expected to operate without resorting to such massive violence, so what was wrong with the Soviet state at the time that it appeared to be fighting a mini civil war against itself?
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By pikachu
#13455698
Bump.
I guess either nobody has any idea whatsoever about this event, or nobody visits this subforum any more. Or perhaps I am just asking something so obvious and self-evident that nobody cares for responding. Though something tells me that if I asked if Earth was round, I'd get at least a handful of replies. :)
By Smilin' Dave
#13456794
Forgot this was here.

What was the cause of such massive repressions?

Well Stalin was probably the trigger, but exactly why he wanted to do it (and at that time) is a bit of a mystery to me. There seems to have been a lot of tension/rivalry at the lower levels that helped to sustain the campaign, but the signals coming from the top were what put the accelerator/brake on the matter. If one accepts the 'self perpetuating purge' over a 'centrally managed plan', I suppose you could argue that Stalin had specific people in the upper levels that he wanted to target. People who used to be in opposition to him mainly, people who hadn't supported harsh penalties against his enemies in the past etc. So Stalin takes the opportunity to get them, and this starts the process which percolates down the chain. Stalin, Yezhov and perhaps others at the top encourage this for various reasons. Perhaps they believe that even if the evidence being generated is rubbish, that there really might be some broad based opposition within the party. Maybe a bit of careerism. Maybe plain vicious/nutty behaviour.

Did anti-government/anti-stalin conspiracies really exist? (well, they always exist but were they anywhere near as widespread as the trials claimed?)
Was the paranoia about conspiracies/potential conspiracies the real cause for the repressions? Evidence from the show trials seems to indicate that the prosecutors did not believe a thing they were doing, but they did it anyway.

The trials themselves were propaganda, but not necessarily about the accused. For example the Shakty mining trials was propaganda about failings of the industrialisation push, and later show trials emphasised the 'enemy outside' by hyping the role of foreign agents. I've heard it claimed that there might have been a real plot in the military to remove Stalin, but have seen no proof of this. I doubt there was any serious political conspiracy, the high profile victims were already comprehensively defeated. Zinoviev for example had only just been allowed back into the party in 1933 (?) after an extensive self criticism, and wouldn't have had any base left.

The scale of the terror as well as the fact that the focus of the repressions was on the party members and state leaders seems to indicate a massive power struggle of some sort

As suggested above, the power struggle might not necessarily have been a question of winners and victims, but of competing agencies/individuals, sometimes with others caught in the middle.

Normally a dictatorship can be expected to operate without resorting to such massive violence, so what was wrong with the Soviet state at the time that it appeared to be fighting a mini civil war against itself?

Civil war requires someone to fight back.

It's generally argued that violence had been a big part of Soviet politics in the early years, with the civil war and later on collectivisation etc. But as to why the commonplace violence against enemies outside the party was able to exceptionally switch to those within the party, I don't know. It's tempting to point to Stalin again, but I don't think that answers the question. Stalin's calls for death/gulag for his enemies had been resisted in the past successfully, as in the case of Ryutin. Some say the Kirov assassination was a turning point... but again, this seems somewhat inadequete, particularly since the 'evidence' didn't actually point to Old Bolsheviks at all so it's not like people thought this was now the reasonable course of action.
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By pikachu
#13457256
I suppose you could argue that Stalin had specific people in the upper levels that he wanted to target. People who used to be in opposition to him mainly, people who hadn't supported harsh penalties against his enemies in the past etc. So Stalin takes the opportunity to get them, and this starts the process which percolates down the chain. Stalin, Yezhov and perhaps others at the top encourage this for various reasons.
But like you've said, the main enemies and have already been driven out or eliminated in one way or another, and there was no real opposition. Were they afraid that the opposition will inevitably re-emerge unless they act decisively? Could it be, perhaps, that Stalin considered the contingent of the old VKP(b) to be unreliable for some reason, and wanted to refresh party membership, but seeing them as a potential threat even if they are expelled from the party, decided to physically eliminate them instead?
I can see how rank-and file party members could support this out of plain careerism at first, and indeed they seemed all too eager to go on with it, but it's strange that they would not realize that ultimately it isn't in their interests either since everybody becomes a target. You might climb as high as Yezhov and still be shot in a year's time. But they couldn't have done it without being given the mandate from the top, and the purpose of that still looks vague.
I mean, what seems so strange is that as far as I know, most dictatorships out there can remain in power without ever having to resort to such massive violence, particularly against their own party members. This only seems to have happened in the Stalinist/Maoist countries - the Cultural revolution in China for example, appears to be a similar phenomenon. Even Hitler never had to deal with anything like it to my knowledge. The closest event was probably the "Rohm putsch", but that was quick, waay less bloody, and most of the people targeted were actual enemies or threats in one way or another.

For example the Shakty mining trials was propaganda about failings of the industrialisation push
As far as I know it wasn't that much of a failure though, was it? And even if they fell short of the plan, you know they could have still done the usual thing and praised the achievements and make it seem as if everything was going great. Unless the country was facing an imminent economic crisis and the problems were undeniable, which wasn't the case, there was no particular reason to go down the route of "the situation is bad because there are enemies among us."

But as to why the commonplace violence against enemies outside the party was able to exceptionally switch to those within the party, I don't know.
AFIAK it wasn't just that it switched, it was also the scale. More people have been executed in the period of 1936-1938 than at any point since the end of the civil war.

I've heard it claimed that there might have been a real plot in the military to remove Stalin, but have seen no proof of this.
Indeed. When advocating a purge of the military Stalin directly referenced the situation in Spain, suggesting that if the counterrevolutionaries are not rooted out, the Soviet Union will have a similar military uprising. One can only wonder what made him think that.
By Smilin' Dave
#13458967
But like you've said, the main enemies and have already been driven out or eliminated in one way or another, and there was no real opposition. Were they afraid that the opposition will inevitably re-emerge unless they act decisively?

I think there was probably a bit of that, after all Zinoviev had last been kicked out for receiving a copy of the Ryutin platform. If you work from the approach of Stalin having a unique role, there is also the suggestion that physical destruction of his enemies, for revenge, was a deep seated need of his.

But they couldn't have done it without being given the mandate from the top, and the purpose of that still looks vague.
I mean, what seems so strange is that as far as I know, most dictatorships out there can remain in power without ever having to resort to such massive violence, particularly against their own party members.

I think this is why the "Stalin" explanation is so attractive. Anomalies can be easily explained by pointing to an exceptional individual. On the other hand we could work on the assumption that Stalin's formative political years shaped this mentality, and thus others might have worked on the same principles. Perhaps the constant bloodless purges, and the reason/propaganda surrounding them, the seemingly constant re-emergence of opposition, lead some to the 'logical' conclusion of a blood purge.

This only seems to have happened in the Stalinist/Maoist countries - the Cultural revolution in China for example, appears to be a similar phenomenon.

The Cultural Revolution was different in a number of ways. One, Mao had almost been sidelined from power before he warmed up the 'machine', while we find Stalin almost at the peak of his powers. Second the Cultural Revolution had a broader, communal aspect. Not only were party members to be targetted, or at least people accused of having political motives, but the Cultural Revolution targetted things like the 'Four Olds' (IIRC), which while couched in political terms targetted decided unpolitical activity at times. So the Cultural Revolution had a deliberate transformative aspect, while the Stalinist purges don't appear to have been intended to change anything, only 'secure' the status quo. In terms of execution, the Red Guards were also fairly novel. The Soviets relied on their own security apparatus, but Mao essentially raised his own political militia from the youth.

Even Hitler never had to deal with anything like it to my knowledge. The closest event was probably the "Rohm putsch", but that was quick, waay less bloody, and most of the people targeted were actual enemies or threats in one way or another.

The SA and other individuals collected during the Night of Long Knives tended to be more obvious opposition figures. Also motive/function plays a role again, with Hitler trying to surpress a chaotic element while it seems Stalin wanted to harness a 'chaotic' element in encouraging accusations throughout society.

Off the top of my head Saddam Hussein had a fairly big blood purge when he took official power. Still more focused than the Stalinist purges, it appears Saddam himself was the only one making accusations. The Stalinist approach of accusations from anyone and everyone suggests a social aspect... and perhaps its end result and unique nature endorse the idea that this was a run-away machine.

As far as I know it wasn't that much of a failure though, was it? And even if they fell short of the plan, you know they could have still done the usual thing and praised the achievements and make it seem as if everything was going great. Unless the country was facing an imminent economic crisis and the problems were undeniable, which wasn't the case, there was no particular reason to go down the route of "the situation is bad because there are enemies among us."

Oh they certainly praised their limited successes, and generally the problems were not so serious they endangered the whole economy. Though some of the reshuffling for the second plan highlights some concerns. I think the goal was to say on one hand "we are doing the right thing, it works" while saying that anything that did go wrong "wasn't our fault, in fact it is the 'enemys' fault". So one can complement the other.

AFIAK it wasn't just that it switched, it was also the scale. More people have been executed in the period of 1936-1938 than at any point since the end of the civil war.

I don't have the numbers in front of me, but things like the peasant uprisings in the 1920-1921 period tended to be very bloody affairs. Decossackisation was also pretty big in scale, if not directly as bloody.
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By Potemkin
#13459052
So the Cultural Revolution had a deliberate transformative aspect, while the Stalinist purges don't appear to have been intended to change anything, only 'secure' the status quo.

I fundamentally agree with your analysis, but I think it should be pointed out that Stalin's purges were intended to transform Soviet society as well as solidify (one faction of) the ruling elite in power. The Soviet government was, after all, a revolutionary government. There was a parallel (though usually less bloody) purge among the artistic intelligentsia at the same time, from 1934 onwards. The imposition of socialist realism as the only permissible method of artistic creation was part of a general 'cultural revolution' (and yes, they actually called it that) in the early 1930s, which led to many artists and writers being marginalised, forced out of business, or even arrested. The aim of this 'cultural revolution' was similar to that of the Chinese cultural revolution thirty years later, though it never got out of control or expanded beyond the intelligentsia in the same way Mao's cultural revolution did.
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By pikachu
#13459199
On the other hand we could work on the assumption that Stalin's formative political years shaped this mentality, and thus others might have worked on the same principles.
Maybe mentality is really a more meaningful way to approach the subject. The Soviet Union being a country founded on the institutionalized belief in the bad intentions of its neighbors, as well as large sections of its own population, having just barely survived a civil war which served as evidence of the conspiracy of both, and with a ruling class which, once again, according to doctrinal beliefs, must be comprised not of the well-off, educated, and experienced class of aristocrats or bourgeoisie, but of those who come from poor backgrounds, thus having grown up in tough environments and not necessarily received proper education, it seems rather likely that as soon as the old guard of intellectual Bolsheviks starts to lose power, the true nature of the regime will become apparent and paranoia about conspiracies among the percieved internal and external enemies will set in, followed by bloody reprisals. [sorry for this run-on sentence]

Maybe also the top leadership, Stalin included of course, did not see itself as having true legitimacy in the eyes of the people and their fellow party members, perhaps thanks to Lenin's testament, as well as the whole Trotsky affair that followed. The legitimacy of the Bolshevik party itself was dubious enough, and half the country took up arms against it in the civil war, but it's not like all the former enemies evaporated or emigrated after the civil war was over - the most prominent leaders did, but the people who supported them, not necessarily. When to this was added the uncertainty regarding Stalin's own legitimacy, which might have been the cause of all those opposition groups emerging over and over (the opposition groups in the politburo could not have emerged without support from the low-rank party members, and those in turn could not have emerged without some kind of support of the population - dictatorship or not, this factor always plays a role), it's possible that Stalin felt that until some legitimizing mythology is established (which ultimately became the victory in the Great Patriotic War), systematic violence and terror was the only way to remain in control of the situation, and thanks to the poor institutional structure of the Soviet state as well as the issues of ideology and mentality which I described above, he was allowed to go on with it.
By Smilin' Dave
#13459934
Potemkin wrote:The imposition of socialist realism as the only permissible method of artistic creation was part of a general 'cultural revolution' (and yes, they actually called it that) in the early 1930s, which led to many artists and writers being marginalised, forced out of business, or even arrested. The aim of this 'cultural revolution' was similar to that of the Chinese cultural revolution thirty years later, though it never got out of control or expanded beyond the intelligentsia in the same way Mao's cultural revolution did.

That's interesting thought. I don't suppose you could direct me to further reading on this area (the Stalin era isn't really my area of interest)? :)

pikachu wrote:it's possible that Stalin felt that until some legitimizing mythology is established (which ultimately became the victory in the Great Patriotic War)

I think Shelia Fitzpatrick suggested an inadvertant source of legitimacy created by the purges, which was the room it created for upward social mobility for many. Essentially having wiped the occupants out, the purge left those positions open to people who traditionally would have had little hope of achieving them. Brezhnev and even Khrushchev got a big boost in this period by filling in other people's jobs. So the purges helped to legitimise the Bolshevik claims to be creating a society where the lower classes could prosper. Combined with Stalin's 'deal' with the middle class you also have the material reward for those less interested in the ideological justification.
By pugsville
#13460010
From what I've read I gather that there was a great fear among some bolsheviks that the biggest threat to socialism was the emergence of a middle class. It's argued by some (got some books but too tired to look it up) That the economic policy was more about moulding the population. The peasant naturally seeks more land/livestock, and the sucessful peasant becomes middle class very conservative and he natural foe of socialism. Soviet policy in it's heavy handed way, was determined to eliminate any chance of this sucessful peasant emirging as a threat to the revolutionary regieme. Thus the whole "Kulak" boggy-man obessesion and the forced collectivization. I think Stalin was more than a little paraniod. Russia was emerging from a brutal civil war, it was in no way a normal country in a normal situation. The Bolshevik ruling clique was pretty small and had by a dint of good luck and managment ruled the country, but certainly had problems as far as keeping control.
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By Potemkin
#13460073
That's interesting thought. I don't suppose you could direct me to further reading on this area (the Stalin era isn't really my area of interest)? :)

By a strange coincidence, I wrote an essay on socialist realism a few years ago (it was going to be one of the chapters of my PhD thesis, but I eventually decided to omit it because I ran out of space). You can read it here. I examine the effects of the imposition of socialist realism specifically on Soviet montage cinema, so you might want to skip over those particular passages. :)

As for 'proper' textbooks, I think Ermolaev's Soviet Literary Theories 1917-34: the Genesis of Socialist Realism, though published way back in 1963, is probably still the best textbook on socialist realism. You might also find Arvon's Marxist Esthetics useful as background reading. Truth be told, there's actually very little theoretical writing from Western scholars on socialist realism - it simply wasn't taken seriously in the West, and still isn't. Soviet textbooks on socialist realism are voluminous but of little academic value.

Socialist realism is actually a very interesting aesthetic theory in its own right. When I started studying it during my PhD, I didn't expect much, but I was astonished at the theoretical complexity and subtlety behind the concept of socialist realism, despite the crudity and simplicity of many of the actual artistic works labelled 'socialist realist' (and the Soviet government itself was aware of this problem - the Soviet leaders were disturbed by the low quality of most socialist realist works). Socialist realism deserves more serious investigation by Western scholars, which it will probably never receive. :hmm:
By Smilin' Dave
#13464026
A thought struck me while reading your chapter: you mention three 'fronts' of the revolution (political, economic and cultural), but it almost seems that the political front threatened, and in the case of culture subverted, the other fronts. So for example the purges had a significant effect on the outcomes of the second five year plan, since the engineers etc. were either being locked up or became terrified of such a fate. Similarly the socialist realist movement ended up being turned into a base propaganda, with films needing to show an idealised Soviet Union rather than 'typical people in typical situation'. Which kind of brings me back to an earlier point about how Mao's Cultural Revolution had a method that also reflected the goal, that the actions taken were to form the basis of the new culture, a sort of popularised and permanent struggle. The Soviet purges however used a far blunter instrument which did not itself have much in the way of ideological under-pinnings. About as close as you get in the 'egalitarian' principle that anyone can accuse anyone. Undeniably... efficient... but not productive. Perhaps this disconnect resulted in the subsequent damage done?
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By Potemkin
#13464442
A thought struck me while reading your chapter: you mention three 'fronts' of the revolution (political, economic and cultural), but it almost seems that the political front threatened, and in the case of culture subverted, the other fronts.

I think that's essentially correct. The Soviet Union became one of the most politicised societies in human history, despite the fact that Marxism predicted that under Communism politics as we currently understand it would cease to exist. This is merely one of the ironies of Soviet history. This relates of course to the need in the late 1920s and early 1930s to re-emphasise the importance to Marxist theory of voluntary human agency, of which politics is the vehicle for society as a whole. Mechanistic materialism had de-emphasised voluntarism and elevated a reflex-driven, involuntary model of human behaviour. Stalin reversed this trend by trashing mechanistic materialism and elevating a more Hegelian brand of dialectical materialism as the state ideology, to justify one of the most pro-active and voluntarist governments in human history. Politics therefore expanded and threatened to devour the whole of civil society, a remarkable state of affairs for a society which claimed to be organised along Marxist principles.

So for example the purges had a significant effect on the outcomes of the second five year plan, since the engineers etc. were either being locked up or became terrified of such a fate. Similarly the socialist realist movement ended up being turned into a base propaganda, with films needing to show an idealised Soviet Union rather than 'typical people in typical situation'.

Precisely. The exigencies of day-to-day political necessities meant that in practice any theoretical or ideological subtlety underlying socialist realism (which did exist) was quickly abandoned in favour of artistic crudity and crass propaganda.

Which kind of brings me back to an earlier point about how Mao's Cultural Revolution had a method that also reflected the goal, that the actions taken were to form the basis of the new culture, a sort of popularised and permanent struggle. The Soviet purges however used a far blunter instrument which did not itself have much in the way of ideological under-pinnings. About as close as you get in the 'egalitarian' principle that anyone can accuse anyone. Undeniably... efficient... but not productive. Perhaps this disconnect resulted in the subsequent damage done?

In my view, this 'disconnect' between the actual policies and behaviour of the Soviet government and its ideological basis was unavoidable. There was a similar disconnect in the 1920s, though in the opposite direction (with the NEP, etc); it's only the nature of that disconnect which changed in the 1930s. But however disconnected the ideology and the policies of the Soviet government became during the 'cultural revolution' (aka 'the revolution from above') of the 1930s, that ideological underpinning was indispensable to the Soviet government. It became the same kind of 'ideology' underlying capitalist society which Marx criticised and which Althusser later analysed in psychoanalytic terms in the 1960s, and was just as essential to the Soviet system's continued existence as it is to capitalism's continued existence.
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