[KurtFF8]

Stalin 'planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact'

Source

Stalin was 'prepared to move more than a million Soviet troops to the German border to deter Hitler's aggression just before the Second World War'

By Nick Holdsworth in Moscow
Last Updated: 1:14AM BST 19 Oct 2008

Papers which were kept secret for almost 70 years show that the Soviet Union proposed sending a powerful military force in an effort to entice Britain and France into an anti-Nazi alliance.

Such an agreement could have changed the course of 20th century history, preventing Hitler's pact with Stalin which gave him free rein to go to war with Germany's other neighbours.

The offer of a military force to help contain Hitler was made by a senior Soviet military delegation at a Kremlin meeting with senior British and French officers, two weeks before war broke out in 1939.

The new documents, copies of which have been seen by The Sunday Telegraph, show the vast numbers of infantry, artillery and airborne forces which Stalin's generals said could be dispatched, if Polish objections to the Red Army crossing its territory could first be overcome.

But the British and French side - briefed by their governments to talk, but not authorised to commit to binding deals - did not respond to the Soviet offer, made on August 15, 1939. Instead, Stalin turned to Germany, signing the notorious non-aggression treaty with Hitler barely a week later.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after the foreign secretaries of the two countries, came on August 23 - just a week before Nazi Germany attacked Poland, thereby sparking the outbreak of the war. But it would never have happened if Stalin's offer of a western alliance had been accepted, according to retired Russian foreign intelligence service Major General Lev Sotskov, who sorted the 700 pages of declassified documents.

"This was the final chance to slay the wolf, even after [British Conservative prime minister Neville] Chamberlain and the French had given up Czechoslovakia to German aggression the previous year in the Munich Agreement," said Gen Sotskov, 75.

The Soviet offer - made by war minister Marshall Klementi Voroshilov and Red Army chief of general staff Boris Shaposhnikov - would have put up to 120 infantry divisions (each with some 19,000 troops), 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces, 9,500 tanks and up to 5,500 fighter aircraft and bombers on Germany's borders in the event of war in the west, declassified minutes of the meeting show.

But Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, who lead the British delegation, told his Soviet counterparts that he authorised only to talk, not to make deals.

"Had the British, French and their European ally Poland, taken this offer seriously then together we could have put some 300 or more divisions into the field on two fronts against Germany - double the number Hitler had at the time," said Gen Sotskov, who joined the Soviet intelligence service in 1956. "This was a chance to save the world or at least stop the wolf in its tracks."

When asked what forces Britain itself could deploy in the west against possible Nazi aggression, Admiral Drax said there were just 16 combat ready divisions, leaving the Soviets bewildered by Britain's lack of preparation for the looming conflict.

The Soviet attempt to secure an anti-Nazi alliance involving the British and the French is well known. But the extent to which Moscow was prepared to go has never before been revealed.

Simon Sebag Montefiore, best selling author of Young Stalin and Stalin: The Court of The Red Tsar, said it was apparent there were details in the declassified documents that were not known to western historians.

"The detail of Stalin's offer underlines what is known; that the British and French may have lost a colossal opportunity in 1939 to prevent the German aggression which unleashed the Second World War. It shows that Stalin may have been more serious than we realised in offering this alliance."

Professor Donald Cameron Watt, author of How War Came - widely seen as the definitive account of the last 12 months before war began - said the details were new, but said he was sceptical about the claim that they were spelled out during the meetings.

"There was no mention of this in any of the three contemporaneous diaries, two British and one French - including that of Drax," he said. "I don't myself believe the Russians were serious."

The declassified archives - which cover the period from early 1938 until the outbreak of war in September 1939 - reveal that the Kremlin had known of the unprecedented pressure Britain and France put on Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler by surrendering the ethnic German Sudetenland region in 1938.

"At every stage of the appeasement process, from the earliest top secret meetings between the British and French, we understood exactly and in detail what was going on," Gen Sotskov said.

"It was clear that appeasement would not stop with Czechoslovakia's surrender of the Sudetenland and that neither the British nor the French would lift a finger when Hitler dismembered the rest of the country."

Stalin's sources, Gen Sotskov says, were Soviet foreign intelligence agents in Europe, but not London. "The documents do not reveal precisely who the agents were, but they were probably in Paris or Rome."

Shortly before the notorious Munich Agreement of 1938 - in which Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, effectively gave Hitler the go-ahead to annexe the Sudetenland - Czechoslovakia's President Eduard Benes was told in no uncertain terms not to invoke his country's military treaty with the Soviet Union in the face of further German aggression.

"Chamberlain knew that Czechoslovakia had been given up for lost the day he returned from Munich in September 1938 waving a piece of paper with Hitler's signature on it," Gen Sotksov said.

The top secret discussions between the Anglo-French military delegation and the Soviets in August 1939 - five months after the Nazis marched into Czechoslovakia - suggest both desperation and impotence of the western powers in the face of Nazi aggression.

Poland, whose territory the vast Russian army would have had to cross to confront Germany, was firmly against such an alliance. Britain was doubtful about the efficacy of any Soviet forces because only the previous year, Stalin had purged thousands of top Red Army commanders.

The documents will be used by Russian historians to help explain and justify Stalin's controversial pact with Hitler, which remains infamous as an example of diplomatic expediency.

"It was clear that the Soviet Union stood alone and had to turn to Germany and sign a non-aggression pact to gain some time to prepare ourselves for the conflict that was clearly coming," said Gen Sotskov.

A desperate attempt by the French on August 21 to revive the talks was rebuffed, as secret Soviet-Nazi talks were already well advanced.

It was only two years later, following Hitler's Blitzkreig attack on Russia in June 1941, that the alliance with the West which Stalin had sought finally came about - by which time France, Poland and much of the rest of Europe were already under German occupation.

[Roland]

Wow. This is why you should never send diplomats that you don't trust to make binding deals in your name. If that means going yourself, you go yourself, but damn. This could have changed the entire course of history.

[Dave]

Yeah, Europe would've gone communist all the way to the Bay of Biscay since the Germans wouldn't have bled the Soviets white and the allies wouldn't have built the kind of strength they did.

Ironically history's most evil man may have saved half of Europe from Soviet slavery.

Truman had the right idea, "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them thinks anything of their pledged word."

[Thoss]

I'm not convinced that this is all that ground-breaking, aside from the details on Soviet preparations.

"This was a chance to save the world or at least stop the wolf in its tracks."

Its funny how we have a Soviet apologist suggest that this was the crucial opportunity for the Allies to stop the Germans when it was in fact the Soviet pact that in large part facilitated the German conquest of Europe. It ignores any Soviet culpability and suggests that Soviet action, both strategic and moral, was dependent on the west.

Admiral Drax said there were just 16 combat ready divisions, leaving the Soviets bewildered by Britain's lack of preparation for the looming conflict.

Lack of preparation and a different, if poorly suited, strategic outlook was a problem for the British. But they weren't over their Great War syndrome, yet.

It shows that Stalin may have been more serious than we realised in offering this alliance."

From the literature I have seen, many historians already assumed Stalin was sincere about his offer, and that the British and French absolutely bumbled their courtship of the Soviets. But, I think the Anglo-French rationale is somewhat explainable.
As mentioned in the article, few western planners had any faith in Russian forces after the First World War. The performance of the Red Army against Poland in the early 20s did not act to change their opinion. Finally, the near-complete liquidation of the Soviet General Staff did not instill confidence.

"It was clear that the Soviet Union stood alone and had to turn to Germany and sign a non-aggression pact to gain some time to prepare ourselves for the conflict that was clearly coming," said Gen Sotskov.

This suggests that Soviet foreign policy at this time was almost clairvoyant. This is silly.

The Soviets were just as eager to appease the Germans, though in this case through the M-R NAP. The deal gave Germany and the Soviets what they wanted, but it also provided the Germans with a boon of resources, temporarily 'appeasing' German's war resource requirements. Soviet apologists are trying to turn their self interested (and rightfully so self-interested) foreign policy in to some sort of far-seeing policy of preparation and rescue of the western allies.

A desperate attempt by the French on August 21 to revive the talks was rebuffed, as secret Soviet-Nazi talks were already well advanced

So, if the Soviets were so pre-disposed to finding an arrangement with the western allies, would not the final offer by the French be a sufficient opportunity to form that anti-Nazi coalition? Stalin found an arrangement that would best protect the Soviet Union, in his opinion. I don't disagree with that. It was self-interest, and I admire what the Soviets initially obtained. But to suggest that this was some how, 'Stalin's plan all along' is quite absurd. Like every other policy maker, Stalin was able to react to events, engage in short-term opportunities and leave himself open to future opportunities. But he wasn't able to accurately predict events months and years into the future. His prediction of, and the actual outcome of the war in the west, and Babarossa, demonstrate that.

[Dave]

Lack of preparation and a different, if poorly suited, strategic outlook was a problem for the British. But they weren't over their Great War syndrome, yet.

Britain's defense posture was largely appropriate to its defense needs, that is, the protection of the British Empire and the maintenance of SLOC. Aside from the Great War Britain traditionally did not field large land armies for extended periods of time on the Continent and tended to fight in a coalition and attack the periphery. 16 divisions were appropriate. And really, the French Army was larger and better equipped than the German Army in 1939 as it was. The RAF should've been larger, but it ultimately proved adequate in the hour of need.

[guzzipat]

Dave Posted: Tue Nov 18, 2008 7:40 pm

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thoss wrote:

Lack of preparation and a different, if poorly suited, strategic outlook was a problem for the British. But they weren't over their Great War syndrome, yet.


Britain's defense posture was largely appropriate to its defense needs, that is, the protection of the British Empire and the maintenance of SLOC. Aside from the Great War Britain traditionally did not field large land armies for extended periods of time on the Continent and tended to fight in a coalition and attack the periphery. 16 divisions were appropriate. And really, the French Army was larger and better equipped than the German Army in 1939 as it was. The RAF should've been larger, but it ultimately proved adequate in the hour of need.

Pretty good apreciation of the strategic facts facing the allies in 1939. Few people know that in terms of men and equiptment France was stronger, they certainly had better tanks. It was leadership and tactics that were wrong.
The tactics the Germans used were very risky, especially as their army was still mainly horse drawn and only a percentage could run with the armoured thrusts. Even half decent leadership and tactics would have beaten them, but all the French had were old guys still fighting WW1. Instead of a counter attack across the extended column, all they could think of was "sealing the break" and "re-establishing the line". By the time they did attack the column it was too late, but even a patchy and poorly coordinated attack stoped the Germans dead for 2 days. The speed and comrehensive nature of the German victory, given the balabnce of forces before the battle, can only be explained by a stategic and tsctical failure of the French forces. Sure the Brits can be blamed for getting out at Dunkirk, but it was already over by then.

[Igor Antunov]

Ironically history's most evil man may have saved half of Europe from Soviet slavery.

And ironically history's most evil regime would still be around controlling all of europe if it hadn't been for the soviets.

I'm sure you're dissapointed since you would have fit right in with hitler's extermination squads.

[Dave]

Exactly. The Nazis prevented the Soviets from dominating all of Europe, but the Soviets destroyed the Nazis. A pretty good outcome, although ideally both regimes would've been destroyed.

[Igor Antunov]

The opressive, totalitarian, inhumane soviet 'regime' somehow managed to cease to exist peacefully on the whole. All original member states were freely let go, without any bloodshed. they always had the right to leave, and they left peacefully.

So when you speak of the soviets imprisoning eastern europe, I find that laughable.

I'd like to see california leave the righteous free United States union, oh wait, she can't.

[pikachu]

Stalin was 'prepared to move more than a million Soviet troops to the German border to deter Hitler's aggression just before the Second World War'

That is rather well known actually.

Another fun fact: Before turning on Poland in early 1939, Hitler tried his best to befriend the country, offered it plenty of generous deals and proposed an alliance against the Soviets.

[Oxymoron]

Before turning on Poland in early 1939, Hitler tried his best to befriend the country, offered it plenty of generous deals and proposed an alliance against the Soviets.

Why didnt the Poles accept?

[Roland]

The view that you are promoting, Dave, is naive and looks only at the thinnest surface of the issue.

It's 1939, and the USSR, France, and Britain are united against Germany and Italy. Hitler either fights and is defeated in a short, bloody war, or waits a few years and attacks at a more opportune time. If he chooses the former option, the Soviet Union's relations with Britain and France are far better at the end of the war than they were historically, which may or may not last, but will certainly result in a different map of divided territory - the shorter war may even mean that Germany is allowed once again to keep its territory. Depending on whether Mussolini cuts free of Hitler before it's too late, post-1940 European politics are completely rewritten. And of course, the Soviet Union spends 1939-1945 building up its economy instead of fighting a major war.

And that's just Europe. Japan almost certainly would behave differently without Hitler in the picture, probably choosing to expand solely in Asia instead of taking on the United States - and that would result in there being three superpowers, not one, in 1945. The entire future of history would be completely rewritten - my guess is that sometime in the 60s or 70s a nuclear war would break out, because three-state politics are extremely unstable. This issue goes far, far beyond "history's most evil man may have saved half of Europe from Soviet slavery".

[pikachu]

All original member states were freely let go, without any bloodshed.

The Lithuanians, Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris in particular would beg to differ.

Why didnt the Poles accept?

For the same reason they refused the Soviet offer - they were afraid of German domination. The Polish strategy was "equal distance form Berlin and Moscow", they wouldn't want to get too close to either side.

[Potemkin]

For the same reason they refused the Soviet offer - they were afraid of German domination. The Polish strategy was "equal distance form Berlin and Moscow", they wouldn't want to get too close to either side.

And in the end they were carved up by both their enemies. What strategic genius!

[Oxymoron]

And in the end they were carved up by both their enemies. What strategic genius

Yes its like being in a dark alley in the middle of two Gangs ready to throw down ad saying you know what I am sure if I dont pick sides they will just let me be.

[Maxim Litvinov]

It was already fairly clear that the UK and France just weren't interested, pre-WWII, in allying with the Soviets in any meaningful way to take on Nazism - we already knew they didn't send a proper delegation to Moscow, didn't take the idea of an alliance seriously and even the delegation they did send was dispatched by a circuitous sea route. Now this data tends to suggest that such a move on the part of the West was even more reckless and poor a decision than historians had previously thought.

[Smilin' Dave]

Is there any record of Soviet attempts to negotiate a pro-Allied pact before August 1939? Britain and France may have bungled diplomatically by sending representatives without power (which sent the wrong message, and in hindsight there wasn't time for it), but perhaps the Soviets stuffed up by leaving this to the last minute? Sotskov claims that the Soviets were aware of the tenuous hold of appeasement in 1938, yet the negotations didn't start till August 1939?

On the other hand IIRC the Soviets made a similar offer to the Czechs in 1938, with the problem again being the need for passage of Soviet forces through another country (Romania and Poland being candidates).

Interestingly enough there is a similar claim of Britain and France failing with another potential ally: Italy. The theory goes that Italy feared Germany greatly and had even formed the earlier Stressa Front to stop the Germans from annexing Austria. Perhaps had the Allies been more open in 1939 Mussolini could have been an ally? The sticking point appears to have been Italian desires to given their alliance in exchange for colonial possessions (mostly at French expense). Similar to the threat of potential Soviet annexation of part or some of Poland?

On to the devil's advocate, Dave:

Yeah, Europe would've gone communist all the way to the Bay of Biscay since the Germans wouldn't have bled the Soviets white and the allies wouldn't have built the kind of strength they did.

Ironically history's most evil man may have saved half of Europe from Soviet slavery.

There isn't any evidence that the Soviet Union would have attacked Europe were it not for WWII. Even after WWII when the Soviets had the chance to take some softer targets (Greece being a well known example), they held back. There just isn't much of a record of straight Soviet external agression.

The Soviets happily set up pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe, but their forces were already in Eastern Europe. The opportunity was already there, if you wanted to think of it that way. In reality the most evil man in history did successfully pave the way for Soviet domination of the other half of Europe, rather than defend it. This was despite having 'bled' the Soviet military.

[Oxymoron]

There isn't any evidence that the Soviet Union would have attacked Europe were it not for WWII

It was pretty evident by the Soviet aggression against Baltics,Finland,and Poland.

[Maxim Litvinov]

Is there any record of Soviet attempts to negotiate a pro-Allied pact before August 1939? Britain and France may have bungled diplomatically by sending representatives without power (which sent the wrong message, and in hindsight there wasn't time for it), but perhaps the Soviets stuffed up by leaving this to the last minute?

First, the Munich Agreement in 1938 told the Soviets pretty much all they needed to know (or thought they needed to know) - that the West was simply not interested in collective security. The Soviets had been promoting the Popular Front against Fascism right from the early years and Litvinov had been a proponent of collective security and alliance to repel Hitler, but it came to nothing and made Stalin rather sceptical of continuing on that path....

Added to this, a pro-Allied pact might have been negotiated before August, but again the lateness of the negotiations is not at all a case of the Soviets not being interested, but of Western laxness. By sending Admiral Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax (author of Handbook on Solar Heating, apparently) by slow steamship, without authority to actually sign anything, that sent a rather strong signal to the Soviet leadership.

As it was, the death knell for serious pre-war alliance between Britain, France and the USSR had been signalled by earlier unwillingness of the West to negotiate anything but German expansion. With the annexation of all of Czechoslovakia and the inability to get anywhere with France and Britain, the Soviets, as Montefiore puts it, were only left with "one serious bidder" for their affections. As such, in May (I think, if memory serves), Maxim Litvinov (a Jew) was replaced as commissar by Vyacheslav Molotov.

[Smilin' Dave]

It was pretty evident by the Soviet aggression against Baltics,Finland,and Poland.

Read the text you took the trouble to quote Oxy. All of these actions took place in the context of WWII.

By sending Admiral Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax by slow steamship, without authority to actually sign anything, that sent a rather strong signal to the Soviet leadership.

You make a fair point there.

(author of Handbook on Solar Heating, apparently)

Well... I learnt something today

As such, in May (I think, if memory serves), Maxim Litvinov (a Jew) was replaced as commissar by Vyacheslav Molotov.

I don't suppose you know at what point the Soviets first approached the Germans for negotiations?