- 04 Mar 2020 23:50
#15072281
Is modern conservatism as liberal and individualist as modern neoliberalism? Is there much which defines it other than following Burkes contrasting between reason and tradition, between conflict (seeking change) and stability (defending a status quo)?
And does it merely appeal to an already dead tradition as opposed to ongoing/living traditions?
I ask this due to the grouping made by Alisdair MacIntyre.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/macintyre2.pdf
Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. IV and 222
And does it merely appeal to an already dead tradition as opposed to ongoing/living traditions?
I ask this due to the grouping made by Alisdair MacIntyre.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/macintyre2.pdf
(MacIntyre’s conception of liberalism, and his critique of it, generally extend to the “conservatism” of people like George W. Bush. It seems to me that liberal individualism, as MacIntyre understands it, encompasses the most essential features of mainstream conservatives such as Bush, though clearly in his case there are overlays of “traditionalism” and anti-liberal ideas.)
Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. IV and 222
That conservatism is in too many ways a mirror image of the liberalism that it professedly opposes. Its commitment to a way of life structured by a free market economy is a commitment to an individualism as corrosive as that of liberalism. And, where liberalism by permissive legal enactments has tried to use the power of the modem state to transform social relationships, conservatism by prohibitive legal enactments now tries to use that same power for its own coercive purposes.
...
We are apt to be misled here by the ideological uses to which the concept of a tradition has been put by conservative political theorists. Characteristically such theorists have followed Burke in contrasting tradition with reason and the stability of tradition with conflict. Both contrasts obfuscate.
For all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition; this is as true of modern physics as of medieval logic. Moreover when a tradition is in good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose.
So when an institution - a university, say, or a farm, or a hospital- is the bearer of a tradition of practice or practices, its common life will be partly, but in a centrally important way, constituted by a continuous argument as to what a university is and ought to be or what good farming is or what good medicine is. Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or dead.
The individualism of modernity could of course find no use for the notion of tradition within its own conceptual scheme except as an adversary notion; it therefore all too willingly abandoned it to the Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke's own allegiance, tried to combine adherence in politics to a conception of tradition which would vindicate the oligarchical revolution of property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the doctrine and institutions of the free market. The theoretical incoherence of this mismatch did not deprive it of ideological usefulness. But the outcome has been that modern conservatives are for the most part engaged in conserving only older rather than later versions of liberal individualism. Their own core doctrine is as liberal and as individualist as that of self-avowed liberals.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/For%20Ethical%20Politics.pdf#page90
-For Ethical Politics
-For Ethical Politics