Steve_American wrote:
2] Exactly, raise taxes and cut spending to have a surplus is how you pay-down to someday pay-OFF the debt.
With the economic crisis of 2019-2020 and then the pandemic, push-came-to-shove, and the Biden administration has been demonstrably *anti*-austerity. You're arguing for *austerity*.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Rescue_Plan_Act_of_2021#Key_elements---
ckaihatsu wrote:
Freakin' conservatives *always* fetishize the money supply itself.
Puffer Fish wrote:
Ironically it's actually progressives who do that.
The reason progressives are not clamoring so much about this issue is because their governments already have Central Banks to do all the monetary manipulation that progressives approve of. ("The Fed" in the US) Even then, constant opinions are still coming out of the news telling the Central Bank what they should do, and you can tell they are never conservative-hatched beliefs.
You're trying to make party-politics political *hay* out of this, and it's utter bullshit. On this thread you're showing yourself to certainly be as focused on *monetary policy* as any other economic nationalist, whether 'progressive' or otherwise.
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Steve_American wrote:
4] That economic theory forgets that 'money' is a store of value, among other things. This means that if the nation's gov. feeds deficit currency units into the economy at a rate that matches the savings rate (whether by nationals or by foreigners), then inflation will be low.
Puffer Fish wrote:
That's just an economic fallacy and is not even logical.
Inflation is not just determined by the amount of money floating around and exchanging hands, like you think.
(The Velocity theory of money is wrong)
It's because of *financialization* in the 1980s that capital has now come to expect steady profits -- from the hyper-exploitation of semi-colonial sweatshop labor in China and elsewhere -- even if those profits have to come from the U.S. government itself, through its cheap-government-money injections of liquidity into the markets.
In other words the money supply has to catch-up to the burgeoning *real value* from the exploitation of sweatshop labor. The U.S. dollar is not currently suffering from the effects of inflation because it's *not devaluing* -- it has been enjoying the assurances and direct foreign investment of the rest of the world.
The 'multiplier effect' / velocity of money is *one* factor, among others. Certainly if overall *volume* / velocity is down -- and it is -- then investment capital is, by definition, *parked* into secure assets like the U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasuries and real estate, *boosting* those paper valuations, but without 'velocity' there's no actual real economy of regular economic exchanges, so then no capitalism, and the government is called upon to inject liquidity in the form of deficit government spending.
Overall it's a Ponzi-scheme dynamic, generally -- regardless of the labor being exploited, and the commodity being produced, there's the inexorable ever-increasing *financialization* into the Ponzi scheme structure. That's capitalism. (See Evergrande.)
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late wrote:
“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.”
U.S. federal deregulation in the 1980s of many types of banking practices paved the way for the rapid growth in the size, profitability and political power of the financial sector. Such financial sector practices included creating private mortgage-backed securities,[14] and more speculative approaches to creating and trading derivatives based on new quantitative models of risk and value,.[15] Wall Street ramped up pressure on the United States Congress for more deregulation, including for the repeal of Glass-Steagall, a New Deal law that, among other things, prohibits a bank that accepts deposits from functioning as an investment bank since the latter entails greater risks.[16]
As a result of this rapid financialization, the financial sector scaled up vastly in the span of a few decades. In 1978, the financial sector comprised 3.5% of the American economy (that is, it made up 3.5% of U.S. GDP), but by 2007 it had reached 5.9%. Profits in the American financial sector in 2009 were six times higher on average than in 1980, compared with non-financial sector profits, which on average were just over twice what they were in 1980. Financial sector profits grew by 800%, adjusted for inflation, from 1980 to 2005. In comparison with the rest of the economy, U.S. nonfinancial sector profits grew by 250% during the same period. For context, financial sector profits from the 1930s until 1980 grew at the same rate as the rest of the American economy.[17]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financialization
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Puffer Fish wrote:
We all want high wages, we just seem to disagree what that means.
Printing more money to give people "high wages" isn't going to be helpful.
Neither so much is taxing the economy to "try to create more jobs".
You're being patronizing by saying 'we all want high wages', because you then go on to argue that such is 'impossible'.
Yours is a *reactionary* line because you're switching-in *monetary policy* as a decoy to distract from *fiscal policy*.
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Puffer Fish wrote:
[T]here will be intense pressure on Reserve Rates to go down (to expand the "money" supply in bank accounts), probably even sparking some sort of black market.
It's actually a somewhat complicated problem to try to mathematically analyse.
It's not a 'mathematical' issue -- again it's *fiscal*. What social interests should receive the benefit of government spending, in whatever form.
You're basically juxtaposing strong-dollar *nationalist* interests against *working class* interests.
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Puffer Fish wrote:
If the US had not expanded its money supply, each dollar would have simply become worth more.
Then people would need less money.
People's individual needs for 'money' are different than the *government's* needs for 'money', which are both different from *corporations'* needs for 'money'.
Social services spending is needed by individuals / people themselves, while *other* concerns may be for liquidity for the financial system, or for the country's currency strength (or weakness), versus its international trading rivals.
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Puffer Fish wrote:
I personally would still argue the country would have been better off if less money were printed and gradual deflation had been allowed.
This is a *nationalist* interest, and it amounts to economic *retrenchment* since a strong nationalist currency wouldn't be *competitive*, for exporting, compared to other exporting international rivals.
Puffer Fish wrote:
Those who keep claiming that Japan proves that a government can run up massive deficits without causing inflation do not really understand the economic history of what happened in Japan so well.
I will say that it must have definitely created inflationary pressure in Japan, even though that effect did not become manifest in the form of visible inflation.
(because it was also in the presence of a deflationary force)
Japan, along with the U.S., Europe, and other developed nations, have all been benefitting from the *labor exploitation* of global sweatshop labor, which provides the actual *value*, in the form of actual goods and services produced by them, and available on the world market. The First World currencies / money-supplies have been having to *catch-up* to that gargantuan provisioning of commodities *value*, by hyper-exploited sweatshop labor, with governments massively increasing their currency face-values -- while not experiencing inflation, as would normally be expected in a typical domestic situation of dollars-chasing-an-imploded-economy-of-shrunken-productivity.
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Steve_American wrote:
depreciation is to be avoided at almost any cost.
Your economic position keeps vacillating, SA -- here you're arguing for a nationalist 'strong dollar', while at other times you've argued for *liquidity*.
Here's from the history:
From 1980 to 1985, the dollar had appreciated by about 50% against the Japanese yen, Deutsche Mark, French franc, and British pound, the currencies of the next four biggest economies at the time.[8] In March 1985, just before the G7, the dollar reached its highest valuation ever against the British pound, a valuation which would remain untopped for over 30 years.[9] This caused considerable difficulties for American industry but at first their lobbying was largely ignored by the government. The financial sector was able to profit from the rising dollar, and a depreciation would have run counter to the Reagan administration's plans for bringing down inflation. A broad alliance of manufacturers, service providers, and farmers responded by running an increasingly high-profile campaign asking for protection against foreign competition. Major players included grain exporters, the U.S. automotive industry, heavy American manufacturers like Caterpillar Inc., as well as high-tech companies including IBM and Motorola. By 1985, their campaign had acquired sufficient traction for Congress to begin considering passing protectionist laws. The negative prospect of trade restrictions spurred the White House to begin the negotiations that led to the Plaza Accord.[10][11]
The devaluation was justified to reduce the U.S. current account deficit, which had reached 3.5% of the GDP, and to help the U.S. economy to emerge from a serious recession that began in the early 1980s. The U.S. Federal Reserve System under Paul Volcker had halted the stagflation crisis of the 1970s by raising interest rates. The increased interest rate sufficiently controlled domestic monetary policy and staved off inflation. By 1975, Nixon successfully convinced several OPEC countries to trade oil only in USD, and the US would in return, give them regional military support. This sudden infusion of international demand for dollars gave the USD the infusion it needed in the 1970s.[12] However, a strong dollar is a double edged sword, inducing the Triffin dilemma, which on the one hand, gave more spending power to domestic consumers, companies, and to the US government, and on the other hand, hampered US exports until the value of the dollar re-equilibrated. The U.S. automobile industry was unable to recover.
Effects
Trade deficit
While for the first two years the US deficit only worsened, it then began to turn around as the elasticities had risen enough that the quantity effects began to outweigh the valuation effect.[7] The devaluation made U.S. exports cheaper to purchase for its trading partners, which in turn allegedly meant that other countries would buy more American-made goods and services. The Plaza Accord failed to help reduce the U.S.–Japan trade deficit, but it did reduce the U.S. deficit with other countries by making U.S. exports more competitive.[4][better source needed] And thus, the US Congress refrained from enacting protectionist trade barriers.[7]
The Plaza Accord was successful in reducing the U.S. trade deficit with Western European nations, but largely failed to fulfill its primary objective of alleviating the trade deficit with Japan. This deficit was due to structural conditions that were insensitive to monetary policy, specifically trade conditions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plaza_Accord