[Xbow]

America has done the right thing in not pursuing General Ichii.

How so? In perusing a fruitless quest for controllable biological weapons that never materialized? One thing that is amazing is how quickly the USA & CCCP reoriented their defensive and offensive capabilities towards each other.

[Spouter]

I am happy to see that this topic has generated an eight page thread. Those who defend the atomic strikes against Japan should never allow themselves to become complacent. These bombings are one of the worst things that have ever happened. It may have been a relatively just and proper thing to do, but if you truly believe that, then you have a moral obligation to examine the arguments of your opponents, in detail. This was a terrible act of violence, one of the most notorious in all of recorded history. If you are absolutely comfortable with Truman's decision, if you have never entertained a serious doubt, then you are probably what psychologists call a "psychopath," or are afflicted with some other form of moral retardation.

I tend to accept the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki with these terrible weapons, but I am not at all comfortable with it. If Truman was a decent person, he was probably deeply troubled by this decision. I know I would be. In fact, that may be a good way to evaluate this event: put yourself in Truman's shoes, and ask yourself what you would do.

I think I would drop the bomb. What tips the scales for me is Okinawa.

U.S. losses were over 62,000 casualties of whom over 12,500 were killed or missing. This made the battle the bloodiest that U.S. forces experienced in the Pacific war.

This battle was very bad for the civilian inhabitants of the island, as well:

With the impending victory of American troops, civilians often committed mass suicide, urged on by the Japanese soldiers who told locals that victorious American soldiers would go on a rampage of killing and raping.

A ground invasion of Japan could be expected to produce similar results, I think, but on a much larger scale. The cost in terms of civilian casualties could have been truly appalling. That was a very real possibility, in any case. Any measure that could avert this should be given serious consideration - even an extreme measure like atomic attacks.

But why not organize a demonstration? Invite scientists and politicians from all over the world to assemble somewhere, drop the bomb on an unpopulated area for their viewing pleasure, and then publicize the effects of your powerful new weapon as widely as possible?

If Truman had done this, and if that had compelled an unconditional surrender, then that would make him one of the true heroes of history. Having an opportunity to use the bomb directly on the Japanese (which would greatly impress our emerging global enemy, the USSR), to then go on to refrain from using this powerful weapon, out of concern for civilian casualties - that would have been a truly brave decision. But it is a major gamble. What if it does not work? Keep in mind, you only have two of these bombs, and it may be quite a long time before you are able to make more. What if you use one in a victimless demonstration, and they do not surrender? There is no point in another demonstration at that point. You might as well go ahead and drop the other one on Hiroshima. But what if the Japanese command then says to themselves, "Well, they had a victimless demonstration the first time, and then they finally worked up the nerve to drop it on a real target. This makes them look weak, because they are unwilling to inflict casualties on our civilians. We can use this unwillingness to our own advantage. How many bombs can they have? One more, two more? We can accept that. Then they will have to invade by ground, which will cause great damage to our civilian population, and their little 'demonstration' shows that they are reluctant to injure our civilians. We are not so reluctant. Once the bloody invasion is underway, they will lose their stomach for it quite rapidly. If they are so disturbed by civilian casualties, we will show them civilian casualties!"

In other words, it might have backfired. If Truman had provided a demonstration of the bomb, and if that had not compelled surrender, then there would probably have been a ground invasion, anyway. In that case, Truman would have been a fool. Here you have this powerful weapon, but you use it in half-assed way, and you spoil its utility. Then we have an invasion anyway, which kills more Japanese civilians than two A-bombs would have. Keep in mind, if the demonstration does not work, the second bomb will be used on a civilian target anyway. So we still earn the "distinction" of being the first nation to use atomic weapons on civilians, but we also launch what might have turned out to be the most destructive ground invasion in the history of war on Earth.

I forget about the blockaid option - that might have produced an unconditional surrender without such damage to our own troops, eventually. But I believe the political/military leadership of Japan was quite capable of allowing their subjects to be starved into skeletons before they finally capitulated. Given this option, the war might have dragged on and on, until the world becomes witness to yet another atrocity on the level of the Holocaust: mounds of civilian corpses, reduced by slow starvation to skin and bones, proudly exhibited in the global press by the Japanese command as the effects of blockaid. Can you doubt that they would allow their civilians to starve in order to make a point, to sap our resolve through a massive propaganda campaign? They were willing to compel the suicide of thousands of Okinawan civilians merely in order to demoralize the US, after all.

Russia should also be entered into the calculations. Perhaps we could have lightened the load on our own troops through an alliance with Stalin, just as in the conquest of Germany. Perhaps the threat of a ground invasion involving Russia would break the will of the Japanese command - I am sure they would rather have surrendered to the US alone, versus an allied command that included Russia. Would you want Russia to have a say in how you govern your country, how you rebuild after a devastating war? If Russia has a say in your terms of surrender, you might not be able to keep your precious Emperor. Keep in mind how they slaughtered the Romanovs.

I see reason to cast some doubt on Truman's decision, but nothing decisive. It is possible that through a coordinated strategy of blockaid and diplomatic maneuvering, Truman could have achieved his goals in the Pacific without dropping the bomb. That would have been nice, I will admit. But, I don't think I would have gambled on it, if I had been in his shoes.

One point, I think, is above dispute. Unconditional surrender was the only way to go. Leaving aside all questions about the US entry into the war in the Pacific, once we are in it, we have to win. Anything short of complete capitulation is a copout. I think this comment from the thread says it all (said in response to an anti-A-bomber who suggested, "Why couldn't the war have ended with Japanese forces outside Japan eliminated, but the Japanese islands themselves left unoccupied?"):

Why couldn't they just leave Japan with a war machine capable or rearming and starting another war in a few years Are you serious? Do you think that anyone in that region wanted to leave Japan(a military dictatorship with a still huge army of 5 million soldiers) with the capacity to rearm and start another war?

The response of the anti-bombers shows some confusion with regard to the historical record:

Germany was clearly defeated in WW I. Yet it re-armed and launched WW II. Today, it isn't the presence of American troops that prevents Germans from re-arming offensively. It is the sentiments of the German people. Clearly, such sentiments can change over time.

There is no demonstrable correlation between imposing unconditional surrender, and reducing the probability that a bellicose nation re-arms itself.

Come on, man! Every schoolboy knows that the Germans did not surrender unconditionally in WWI. They did not surrender at all - the war was ended by armistice. This example actually helps the arguments of the pro-bombers: If the Allies had enforced an unconditional surrender on Germany in WWI, perhaps this would have prevented WWII.

My basic premise in all of these arguments is that it sometimes justifiable to use extreme measures, if it can avert something worse. In war, it is not good to use half measures. The reluctance to follow the attack through with a full commitment can often cause even worse suffering, to all the involved parties.

[Egreggorous]

Yes it was. The revisionist history aside, the Japanese were brutal, the fought to the death, never surrendered. An invasion would of killed far more people, far more civilians. I'm sure there was a show of force reason behind it to, but it was justifiable. Fire Bombings in Germany killed far more people than the A bombs. WWII was brutal

[Eran]

Spouter,
I haven't seen you address my main point, namely that it was Truman's duty to seriously explore Japanese willingness to entertain conditional surrender before deciding on either dropping A-bombs or directing a land-invasion of the islands.

It is entirely plausible that the Japanese would have agreed to such a surrender if it guaranteed the continued reign of the Emperor, together with democratically-controlled independent Japan, i.e. the very terms ultimately given by the US.

Absent such good-faith attempt, neither action could be justified.

[Spouter]

Eran,

In this thread you have been accused of simply restating your original assertions over and over again, subsequently ignoring all of the facts and arguments of your opponents, as if you had not even read their responses. I can see why:

I haven't seen you address my main point, namely that it was Truman's duty to seriously explore Japanese willingness to entertain conditional surrender before deciding on either dropping A-bombs or directing a land-invasion of the islands.

I saved this for the conclusion of my argument. You must have been in a hurry or something, and missed it:

One point, I think, is above dispute. Unconditional surrender was the only way to go. Leaving aside all questions about the US entry into the war in the Pacific, once we are in it, we have to win. Anything short of complete capitulation on the part of our enemy is a copout.

I directly quoted an earlier statement that addresses this question (with which I agree):

Godstud wrote:
Why couldn't they just leave Japan with a war machine capable or rearming and starting another war in a few years Are you serious? Do you think that anyone in that region wanted to leave Japan(a military dictatorship with a still huge army of 5 million soldiers) with the capacity to rearm and start another war?

I directly quoted your own response to the above (with which I disagree):

Eran wrote:
Germany was clearly defeated in WW I. Yet it re-armed and launched WW II. Today, it isn't the presence of American troops that prevents Germans from re-arming offensively. It is the sentiments of the German people. Clearly, such sentiments can change over time.

There is no demonstrable correlation between imposing unconditional surrender, and reducing the probability that a bellicose nation re-arms itself.

I tried to explain why I disagree:

Come on, man! Every schoolboy knows that the Germans did not surrender unconditionally in WWI. They did not surrender at all - the war was ended by armistice. This example actually helps the arguments of the pro-bombers: If the Allies had enforced an unconditional surrender on Germany in WWI, perhaps this would have prevented WWII.

I suppose you want me to expand on that a little?

In WWI, the Allies fought until Germany capitulated to an armistice. That is considerably less than unconditional surrender; in fact, it isn't even a surrender at all. What happened after that? A rearmed Germany rose once again to terrorize the world. The Great War was a disaster of unprecedented scope (at the time), but the one thing that could have brought something positive out of all this death and suffering is if effective measures had truly been taken to prevent it from happening again. We all know the Allies failed here, because the sequel to this disaster was even worse than the original - firebombing of civilians, the Holocaust, etc.. If the Allies had made the defeat of Germany more complete, even at a high a cost (say, another million deaths), would it not have been worth it, if that helped avert a second war (in which tens of millions died)?

Now, this is an academic discussion, really. By 1918, Britain and France were completely exhausted, and even with the contribution of relatively fresh US forces, it is doubtful that the Allies could have mustered the energy and will for the kind of effort that would have been necessary to compel the Germans to surrender without conditions. But if they had had this ability to force an unconditional surrender, and if they then agreed to an armistice just because they were lazy, because they lost their nerve, or for whatever reason, that would make the Allies look like complete and total creeps (if that would have helped avert a second catastrophe; I will explain shorty exactly how I think it could have helped). Having the power to prevent a second great disaster, they may have condemned 12.7 million Russian civilians to death, 5.4 million Polish civilians, 1.1 million German civilians, and so on (these are the lowball figures of civilian dead in WWII, from wiki).

In the Pacific Theater of WWII, the US did have the will and resources to force the Japanese command to surrender without conditions. It seems to me that they were willing to make a full commitment toward this end (whether they we would have been successful is an open question). Xbow informs us that the forces that were to launch the great invasion of the Japanese mainland were already being assembled at their staging points.

I agree with this full commitment. Let us say that the US had not followed through to complete victory in the Pacific (occupation of Japan, and unconditional surrender). Let us then say that a rearmed Japan rises again to terrorize the world in 1975, as Germany initiated a second war 30 years after the first. The grand total for all "direct" civilian deaths in WWI (due to military action, that is, versus disease and famine) was 950,248. There were 9.7 million military deaths on all sides, which gives us a ratio of 1 dead civilian to every 10 dead soldiers. After thirty years of technological development in armaments, avionics, and so on, a rearmed Germany started a second war which caused 16.5 million military deaths in only the three nations mentioned above (double the WWI military fatalities among all nations, besides the 19 million civilian fatalities already mentioned). Therefore, among these three nations, roughly 3 civilians died for every 4 soldiers. In other words, there were at least double the military fatalities, civilian fatalities increased at least twenty times over, and the proportion of civilian to military deaths was completely reversed (which perhaps makes WWII unique over all other wars... I am not an expert, however). That is the kind of difference that thirty years can make.

The exact numbers are not important. The point of this exercise is to show that if an undefeated Japan had rebuilt their military infrastructure and launched another war of imperial conquest in 1975, because of the pace of technological development in the 20th century, the second conflict could be expected to produce more death and destruction, perhaps by orders of magnitude, especially among civilians. Would you really want to risk that? There might be a kind of "Moore's law" for the development of military technology in the 20th century. Just as Moore observed that "the number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years (wiki)," it seems that the lethality of armaments doubles every year or so, especially to civilians. You can doubt my assertion of an exponential rate of growth in the lethality of armaments, but you cannot doubt that there has been a steady rate of growth. And in 1945, atomic weapons could be used without causing an atomic war. But, in 1975, we might as well expect a conflict with Japan to cause atomic war. It is possible that such a war could have destroyed a significant percentage of the world's population. WWII caused 2.5% of the world's population to die, but what if WWIII had caused a 10%, or even just a 5% rate of attrition? This should be avoided at all costs, don't you think?

I can already hear your libertarian gears grinding away, it seems. You are wondering, "Why was an unconditional surrender necessary to produce a peaceful Japan, solidly committed to democratic forms of government, allied with the West, as Japan is today? Could we not have produced this effect by allowing them to surrender with conditions?"

It has to do with the psychology of defeat. It is important for the Japanese command to realize that they have been utterly defeated. They must be forced to formally declare this, without conditions. We want them to throw themselves completely on our mercy, to actually expect us to kill their Emperor, to rape all their women, to exploit all of their natural resources, and to allow them no say whatsoever in how they govern their own nation. We have to reduce their command to such an abject state that they are still willing to completely capitulate and beg for mercy, just in the hope that they will be allowed to even live at all (let alone, to live well). Then, when we refrain from killing their Emperor, they will look at this as a merciful gift. We then say, we will allow you to keep your precious Emperor, but only as a figurehead, just like the King of England, and in the meantime, you must begin to construct democratic institutions on the Western model. And the defeated then say, why not submit to these demands? These round-eyes who we thought to be barbarians are quite magnanimous in their victory. They do not go on a massive rape and murder spree among our civilians, as we did in the places we conquered (like Nanking). They claim that their "democratic" institutions are better, and perhaps they are. They respect our cultural peculiarities. They pump money into our economy. We acted nothing like this when we defeated our own enemies. Perhaps these round-eyes are not all that bad, and we can even benefit from their benevolence.

Now look at the alternative scenario. They surrender with the condition that they are allowed to keep their Emperor, and without complete occupation of the Japanese homeland. Never forget that they are a very proud and combative people, and no one likes to think of themselves as a loser. They will then say to themselves, "They did not allow us to keep our Emperor because they are kind and merciful - they did that because they are weak. We demonstrated how hard it would to be conquer our homeland, and they buckled. They gave in to our demands, even though we would have never done this, if we had been in their shoes. That is because we are strong, and they are weak. We have been embarrassed, true. They overwhelmed us with men and material. We had to give in, but not all the way. That is because one Japanese is worth ten Americans, sub-human scum that they are. Right now, they have the edge, and so, right now, we will capitulate - we will play along. But they will become complacent and let down their guard, eventually. It may take twenty or thirty years, but we can wait that long, because we are a superior people. And then, when they least expect it, we will strike."

Why risk it? If we have the power to end this thing once and for all, why not? If we can spare future generations from massive wars of unparalleled destruction, even though this would take some extra effort on our part, would we not be selfish cowards if we failed to discharge this solemn duty?

[Eran]

In WWI, the Allies fought until Germany capitulated to an armistice. That is considerably less than unconditional surrender; in fact, it isn't even a surrender at all. What happened after that? A rearmed Germany rose once again to terrorize the world.

The terms of the armistice, if this is what you want to call Versailles that, would have been sufficient to stop Germany from rearming if the victorious nations had any appetite to stop that rearming.

The German nation was under no illusion that it wasn't defeated in the war. Rearming wasn't a result of the terms under which WW I ended. The terms of Versailles were, if anything, too harsh (much harsher than the terms that followed the unconditional surrender of WW II), rather than not harsh enough.

The point of this exercise is to show that if an undefeated Japan had rebuilt their military infrastructure and launched another war of imperial conquest in 1975, because of the pace of technological development in the 20th century, the second conflict could be expected to produce more death and destruction, perhaps by orders of magnitude, especially among civilians.

This is an unnecessary hypothetical. What I believe Truman should have explored was a conditional surrender. Still a surrender, with the US being free to insist, as part of the negotiations, on precisely the same terms that were imposed on Japan following its unconditional surrender.

My argument is that it is entirely plausible that the Japanese government would have agreed, in July 1945, to accept the very same terms (and thus with precisely the same subsequent history) as were eventually imposed on them.

It has to do with the psychology of defeat.

The Japanese had no doubt that they were defeated. The terms of surrender could have ensured the same pacifist constitution that was ultimately imposed, together with whatever limitations on subsequent armaments that the US felt necessary. Germany following WW I, while technically not having unconditionally surrendered, was psychologically defeated.

Your later assertions seem to suggest that you would have opposed the Potsdam Declaration which did promise a much more lenient treatment for the Japanese people than the potential one you described. With words like "We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation", and "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy..." and finally "The occupying forces... shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government".

Why risk it? If we have the power to end this thing once and for all, why not?

Because it would cause hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

And one can just as easily paint an opposite scenario. Having been bombed using atomic weapons, the Japanese retain a grudge against Americans, awaiting their day of revenge, secretly building nuclear weapons of their own, whereas being allowed a conditional surrender enables them to accept the peace without the sense that the loss of face requires revenge.

Deploying your logic, one could just as easily have demanded the complete annihilation of every single person of Japanese descent.

From a 1945 perspective, your scenario couldn't have been any more likely than mine.

[Rei Murasame]

All of this is completely ridiculous, mainly because everyone knows that 'round-eyes' - as Spouter calls them - were stomping around the planet for the longest time terrorising people long before Axis rose up to terrorise the terrorisers.

So all that stuff he's written above about 'the psychology of defeat' is completely inapplicable in Asia, because Asia in general - quite sensibly - doesn't believe that the world was at peace at any time before the First World War.

Right now, they have the edge, and so, right now, we will capitulate - we will play along. But they will become complacent and let down their guard, eventually. It may take twenty or thirty years, but we can wait that long, because we are a superior people.

This is what most people in Asian countries in the First World think, despite all efforts to cause the contrary. If you ask the average child in a Japanese or South Korean school what they think of the United States, they are indeed expecting that a day will eventually come when the USA will not have global hegemony.

[Spouter]

The terms of the armistice, if this is what you want to call Versailles...

I am beginning to realize that you are profoundly ignorant of historical facts.

"What I want to call it..."?!? That is what it is called. Look it up on wikipedia.

The armistice between the Allies and Germany was an agreement that ended the fighting in the First World War.

Do you think I am making this up? Do you inhabit a strange fantasy world, absolutely separated from the facts of history?

[Eran]

You can call it armistice, but the terms of Versailles weren't negotiated - they were dictated.

There was no question of negotiation. The Germans were able to correct a few impossible demands (for example, the decommissioning of more submarines than their fleet possessed) and registered their formal protest at the harshness of Allied terms. But they were in no position to refuse to sign.

So while technically an armistice, Versailles, for all intents and purposes, was equivalent to an unconditional surrender.

[Spouter]

What I believe Truman should have explored was a conditional surrender.

I find this to be profoundly foolish, even morally reprehensible. The war must be concluded decisively, without conditions, or you risk wasting the great sacrifices that have already been made.

My argument is that it is entirely plausible that the Japanese government would have agreed, in July 1945, to accept the very same terms (and thus with precisely the same subsequent history) as were eventually imposed on them.

The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, 1945. They were quite free to accept these terms at any time before August 6 and 9, when the US struck their cities with atomic weapons. They decided to hold out for better terms. Who knows how long that would have taken? Why let them dictate terms to us in the first place? They must not be allowed to imagine that they forced our hand, even on the smallest condition. Whatever conditions are granted should be due only to our benevolence, and not in any sense to their own strength. They have to be made to accept this without conditions. That is complete psychological defeat.

The German nation was under no illusion that it wasn't defeated in the war. Rearming wasn't a result of the terms under which WW I ended.

How do you know? You can't even tell the difference between the armistice signed on November 11, 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, which was not completed for six months, and was not registered with the League of Nations until October of the next year:

So while technically an armistice, Versailles, for all intents and purposes, was equivalent to an unconditional surrender.

You quote an article on the armistice, and then you start talking about Versailles. We all make mistakes, but I think this demonstrates your strange attitude toward the historical record. A historical fact seems to have less importance to you than it does to me:

And one can just as easily paint an opposite scenario. Having been bombed using atomic weapons, the Japanese retain a grudge against Americans, awaiting their day of revenge, secretly building nuclear weapons of their own, whereas being allowed a conditional surrender enables them to accept the peace without the sense that the loss of face requires revenge.

But that is not what happened, is it? You do not retain the privilege of using hypothetical scenarios here. We do not have to speculate about what would have happened if the US had forced an unconditional surrender on the Japanese command through the use of atomic weapons, because the US did these things, in reality.

Your argument is based on the idea that, if the US had not used not used A-bombs (which they did), and if the US war effort had not been directed towards unconditional surrender of the enemy (which it was), then we would still have the same peaceful and US-friendly Japan of the modern era. In other words, your whole argument is a hypothetical scenario. My argument, on the other hand, is based on the indisputable historical fact that the US did drop the bomb, and they did insist on unconditional surrender, and today we have a friendly and peaceful Japan. I would rather not travel back in time to do anything to threaten this outcome, even though it was purchased at such great cost. You would be willing to do this, it seems. The risk mean nothing to you. What about the potential damage that might have been caused by a rearmed Japan? But you refuse to even entertain the idea:

Because it would cause hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

But a rearmed Japan could cause millions of deaths. That means absolutely nothing to you, apparently. It is as if place no value on the great sacrifices that were made. You play with history as if it is a game. I can't believe you would place a hypothetical scenario on the same footing as a historical fact!

Different hypothetical scenarios can be put on the same footing. Therefore, I can ask you to consider a scenario opposed to your own, in which a rearmed Japan causes more death and destruction later down the road, because we did not seek unconditional surrender, and I can make arguments that my scenario has more verisimilitude than yours. But you cannot make the argument that a hypothetical scenario has more verisimilitude than the actual historical reality, can you?

To top it all off, although you coolly dismiss the risk that an unrepentant, rearmed Japan could have posed to the world, you accuse me of being some kind of bloodthirsty monster:

Your later assertions seem to suggest that you would have opposed the Potsdam Declaration which did promise a much more lenient treatment for the Japanese people than the potential one you described...

Where do you get that? My position is that Truman was right to force the Japanese command to accept the Potsdam Declaration, without conditions. This seems like the safest course for preventing another catastrophe. You irresponsibly dismiss all of the risks of a different course of action. You are the one, it seems to me, who casually ignores the risks here.

I am all for being generous and magnanimous to our defeated enemy. In fact, that seems like the wisest way to handle things, after the war has been concluded. There is less room for magnanimity and generosity while the war is actually going on, however. How can you fail to grasp this simple point: Sometimes, in war, when one employs half-measures, out of compassion, out of nobility, or for any other "virtuous" motive, what you end up doing is causing more pain and suffering to all sides in the conflict, when, if only you had employed the full-measures, then you might have greatly mitigated this suffering? Do you not recognize the principle as valid? If a child is bitten by squirrel, the only way to safely prevent a possible attack of rabies is a lengthy regiment of painful abdominal injections (I don't know if this is still the medical procedure, but just bear with me). I urge the absolute necessity of this preventative treatment, but you seem to be to upset by the manifestations of your child's distress. After only the first round of injections, you storm out of the doctor's office with the screaming infant in your arms and promise never to return. I implore you to reconsider: If we can avoid a painful death by rabies, why shouldn't we? You answer, because it causes the child pain, and besides, she probably won't contract the disease anyway. You know what - you are absolutely right. The child probably won't get rabies. But why risk it?

Your position is morally irresponsible. And instead of dealing with the risks that I mention, you would rather play word games with the terms "armistice" and "surrender."

Deploying your logic, one could just as easily have demanded the complete annihilation of every single person of Japanese descent.

That's like saying, instead of a painful medical procedure to prevent disaster in the case of a child bitten by a rodent, what I am actually saying is that we should beat the child to death with a baseball bat - that's the only sure way to prevent rabies. It is as if you have reasoned: it hurts the child to receive injections to the abdomen, it also hurts the child to be beaten to death; therefore, if we are to follow through with the rabies treatment, that is just as bad as subjecting the child to a fatal beating.

I will admit that the complete extermination of the Japanese would have ended the war. But that was impossible. Look at all the difficulties the Nazis had with exterminating a few million Jews, and they barely fought back at all. No, the only real way to subjugate this proud and combative people, well accustomed to the use of arms, was to win them over. They have shown over and over again through the course of the war that they respect nothing but force. If that is what it takes to make them respect us, so be it.

Japanese leaders had always envisioned a negotiated settlement to the war.

In other words, the policy you propose Truman should have followed, by allowing the Japanese to dictate to the US the terms of surrender, would have rewarded the Japanese for their imperialistic aggression, at least in part. I am willing to make concessions, up to a point. I see nothing wrong with allowing them to keep their emperor, at least as a symbolic figurehead. But they should not be allowed to expect this as a right or privilege, won through their bravery, their toughness, or through any superiority which they imagine they have over the US - here are the seeds of potential future conflict. They can trust in our benevolence in allowing them to preserve their emperor, but that is it. They should not be allowed to demand anything at all.

It is possible that this specific concession (preservation of the emperor) could have been explicitly stated in the Potsdam Declaration, and that may have compelled the Japanese command to accept it with enough promptness to avert the atomic strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Let us say that this would have worked, and that it could have produced an indistinguishable result (a peaceful and friendly Japan), with 95% probability. Still, one time out of twenty, a rearmed Japan propels the world into death and destruction once more, but this time, at a much higher cost. Are you willing to risk a hundred million lives on a 95% probability? What if a few hundred thousand lives can end it all right now, with much greater certainty? Your refusal to even consider these calculations demonstrates a certain callousness when it comes to human life. To make it even worse, you mask this insensitivity to suffering with a great concern for human rights and outrage at the "war crime" of dropping the A-bomb. If I did not know you better, I would call this hypocrisy. But, you are not consciously hypocritical, I don't think. The problem is that you use deductive reasoning to judge historical events, when you ought to suspend judgment according to your preconceived ideological principles, and try to judge the facts themselves, on a case by case basis (if there are principles to be found, they can only be arrived at through this inductive method).

The one thing that proves the wisdom of Truman's policy is the concrete result: a Japan that is still peaceful and friendly almost 70 years after the fact (I pray that they are recovering well from that terrible disaster last year). You would be threatening that outcome, with your ill-advised and unethical thought-experiments, in my opinion (thank God no one ever invented a time machine, or the libertarians would have destroyed the world ten times over, by this point).

The one thing that proves the foolishness of Versailles is that within 15 years the Nazis took over Germany, and before 20 years had passed, the most destructive war in the history of Europe had been triggered. That is the definition of failure, in my book. Your understanding seems to break down utterly at this point:

Germany following WW I, while technically not having unconditionally surrendered, was psychologically defeated.

20 years later, and the continent descended once more into destructive conflict. I don't want to be too condescending, but you are aware that Hitler was a distinguished veteran of the Great War, right? Does Hitler strike you as a man who was "psychologically defeated"?

Many Germans, just like Hitler, nurtured the fantasy that they had not been defeated on the field in a military sense, and that the defeat was actually caused by the politicians in the rear, who deceitfully betrayed the troops on the front with their armistice, which they considered equivalent to being "stabbed in the back." In other words, in their own estimation, they had not really been beaten. I can't help thinking that if the Allies had insisted on an unconditional surrender (probably impossible, after 4 years of conflict, since French and British forces were so exhausted), they could have disabused the resentful German people of this dangerous fantasy.

I know you can construct better arguments than this. Why don't you make more of an effort?

[The One.]

How so? In perusing a fruitless quest for controllable biological weapons that never materialized?

By this logic, we should simply scrap all unorthodox weapons program...

I think that in hindsight, it is easy to criticize,but fact of the matter is, biological warfare was seen as viable: both the US and the USSR kept and pursued biological stockpiles for decades after.

Furthermore, we don't exactly know exactly how BW agents would do in war because except for Unit 731's efforts in China, it has never been tried on a very large scale.

If the implementation is not always perfect, the idea was,at least correct: Paperclip & al. did not only produce only 'failed' programs:

Wernher Von Braun was not only pardoned, he was lauded.

One thing that is amazing is how quickly the USA & CCCP reoriented their defensive and offensive capabilities towards each other

Agreed... Or at least it is from the American point of view, who is slanted toward a Wilsonian view of the world.

[Xbow]

Wernher Von Braun was not only pardoned, he was lauded.

Granted! But.......the good SS Major wasn't dissecting living human beings for fun and profit in an assembly line operation either. However he was woefully ignorant of the fact that his SS buddy Hans Kammler was working Polish Jews to death in the Nordhausen V2 factory. Kammler was quite efficient in calculating even the minimum number of calories a slave would need to work 12 hours a day and survive for six months before succumbing to chronic malnutrition.

But Kammler was a brilliant man. He was the man that redesigned the crematoriums at Auschwitz, Birkenau and a number of other 'housing facilities' to be more mechanized and efficient. He didn't get scooped up by paperclip... they say. Myth has it that he purloined one of the three 10,000 mile range Me 264 bombers in existence along with a large amount of gold bullion and coins, a fine (stolen) art collection and the complete plans for a number of highly advanced German jet Aircraft and weapons. Strange that an experimental aircraft that resembled the Focke-Wulf Ta 183 the Mig-15 & F86 showed up soon after the war. (Focke-Wulf Ta 183 AKA The Pulqui II in Argentina)

Mig-15-----------------------------Focke-Wulf Ta 183---------------------------F86 Saber


Its good to have clean hands!

[youtube]QEJ9HrZq7Ro[/youtube]

[Locke II]

let me begin with the phrase "hindsight is always 20:20"
We realize now that the nuclear strikes on Japan was a horrible mistake, and a blockade or siege may have been much more effective. Truman had no Idea of the capabilities of the bomb (Joseph Stalin knew more about it than he did,) except that it could bring a faster end to the war. The effects had not been tested, so the long term effects of radiation were unknown. I'm surprised that nobody has brought up the Firebombing of Tokyo yet. THAT was unjustifiable.

[Godstud]

We realize now that the nuclear strikes on Japan was a horrible mistake, and a blockade or siege may have been much more effective.

NO. We do not know this, and you saying so only demonstrates no knowledge of the events that unfolded during that time. Read the whole thread, and concentrate on posts by Xbow.

Actually, lets see this evidence(sources please) that a blockade or siege would have been more effective. I'm interested in knowing where you came by this "insight".

[J Oswald]

NO. We do not know this, and you saying so only demonstrates no knowledge of the events that unfolded during that time.

I agree wholeheartedly with this statement.

[AFAIK]

I think the focus of the original question is too narrow but would like to share some thoughts.

Weapons are developed with the principle of inflicting more harm on your enemy whilst reducing the risk your forces have to endure. WWII was a “total” war in which entire societies were mobilized to contribute to the war effort (by working in munitions factories for example). Civilian populations came to be viewed as legitimate targets by some whilst others subscribed to the tactic of using terrorism to scare the enemy population into surrender (a common tactic in the 20th century). Thermo- nuclear bombs are the logical conclusion of weapons development as they allow for large scale destruction with minimal risk.

More people were killed by the B-52 bombings of Tokyo then Nagasaki and Hiroshima combined.

Nagasaki was bombed because the primary target, Kitakyushu was cloudy that day.

So is the question whether it is okay to attack population centers and in which circumstances? Or is the question about what weapons it is acceptable to use and in which circumstances?

I think people have an emotional reaction/ prejudice towards nuclear weapons (and power stations).

Final point- We are having this discussion retrospectively with plenty of hindsight. We are fully aware of the long term effects of radiation sickness and are not hindered by the fog of war. Since most of the quotes stating that the A-bombs were unnecessary were made after the fact I am inclined to give planners the benefit of the doubt.

[Eran]

So is the question whether it is okay to attack population centers and in which circumstances? Or is the question about what weapons it is acceptable to use and in which circumstances?

You are touching on an excellent point.

Far too much of the debate over the nuclear strike focuses on the peculiar nature of the weapon used, rather than on the nature of the target.

That creates the impression that while those last two bombs of the war may be suspect, everything that went on previously using conventional weapons was somehow beyond reproach.

I believe that the purposeful targeting of civilians, whether using nuclear or conventional weapons, whether in Japan or in Germany, is both wrong and counter-productive.

[Godstud]

The choosing of targets was mainly due to military objective, naval base, etc. it was not just an attack against a civilian target.

Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials.

Hiroshima had not been bombed, ascertaining the effects of the A-bomb would be relatively easy. Hiroshima also had a high concentration of troops, military facilities and military factories that had not yet been subject to significant damage.

[Eran]

The fact that neither city was subject to bombardments earlier in the war cast deep doubt as to the veracity of the "military target" narrative.

Viewed in the context of the overall conduct of the war, the picture is even clearer. The allies have routinely engaged in massive bombardments of purely or nearly-purely civilian targets in both Asia and Europe.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki fit neatly into this pattern.

[AFAIK]

Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials.

This sounds like a post facto justification to me. The A bomb was originally destined for Kitakyushu but was redirected due to the adverse weather conditions on the day.

Hiroshima had not been bombed, ascertaining the effects of the A-bomb would be relatively easy. Hiroshima also had a high concentration of troops, military facilities and military factories that had not yet been subject to significant damage.

Hiroshima was untouched until the A-bomb was detonated? It was such an important target that it was saved until a weapon worthy of it's import was ready? Your post suggests that you feel the presence of civilians is entirely arbitrary and not worth considering.

Hypothetical- USA has the opportunity to assassinate the leadership of imperial Japan but would also kill 100,000 US civilians who happen to be within the radius of the bomb. Do you push the button?

* The leadership is meeting with underground fascist groups in a US city and through a mix of recklessness and carelessness have aloud all their leaders to be in the same place at the same time.

I again state that this scenario is HYPOTHETICAL.