[Victoribus Spolia]

Acts 2:44-45

And all those who had believed were together and had all things in common; and they began selling their property and possessions and were sharing them with all, as anyone might have need.

Acts 4:32

And the congregation of those who believed were of one heart and soul; and not one of them claimed that anything belonging to him was his own, but all things were common property to them.

Acts 4:34-37

For there was not a needy person among them, for all who were owners of land or houses would sell them and bring the proceeds of the sales and lay them at the apostles' feet, and they would be distributed to each as any had need.

Were these voluntary associations? Yes or No?

Were these associations coerced by the state? Yes or No?

[ingliz]

Communism: a system in which goods are owned in common and are available to all as needed.

Peter said, "Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit and to keep back some of the price of the land?

Acts 5:3

[Victoribus Spolia]

Communism: a system in which goods are owned in common and are available to all as needed.

Peter said, "Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit and to keep back some of the price of the land?

Acts 5:3

Correct. He agreed to join a covenant community based on giving up all private goods, like a monastary, but lied to the Holy Spirit and broke his vow of commitment.

He was justly punished for this.

Likewise, you didn't answer my questions.

Furthermore, Christ upholds private property and familial responsibility.

Don't I have the right to do what I want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am generous?

(Matthew 20:15)

He answered them, “And why do you break the commandment of God for the sake of your tradition? For God commanded, ‘Honor your father and your mother,’ and, ‘Whoever reviles father or mother must surely die.’ But you say, ‘If anyone tells his father or his mother, “What you would have gained from me is given to God,”and he need not honor his father.’ So for the sake of your tradition you have made void the word of God.

(Matthew 15:3-7)

Here Christ is upholding the obligations of sons in the old testament law regarding primogeniture, which remains binding in the New Testament. The eldest son receives a double-portion of his inheritance in order to care for his parents in their old age and maintain the family lands.

[Albert]

So why are Communist so anti-Christian?

[SolarCross]

So why are Communist so anti-Christian?

Communists hate human beings, whatever one wants to say about Christians they are pro-human at least, so there is a basic conflict of interests right there.

[Victoribus Spolia]

So why are Communist so anti-Christian?

Because Marx believed Christians accept hierarchies and reject class consciousness because of their religious beliefs.

Instead of blaming the rich people for their plights, they trust in God's will and keeping on trucking. This impedes upon the working class revolution.

This is why Marxism hates Christianity, according to Marxism.

The real reason is that they are degenerates who are covetous of others and worship matter and money instead on the One True God.

[annatar1914]

At least your owning up to your hypocrisy and insanity. I am glad you left the ranks of this sort of cult @annatar1914

With certain caveats as I mentioned before, I am glad too that the dalliance is over. But as with anything great (I say ''great'', not necessarily ''good'') Marxist-Leninism is a Christian Heresy of sorts, and for the truths it contains, it draws it's strength, as Islam does also.

[Victoribus Spolia]

With certain caveats as I mentioned before, I am glad too that the dalliance is over. But as with anything great (I say ''great'', not necessarily ''good'') Marxist-Leninism is a Christian Heresy of sorts, and for the truths it contains, it draws it's strength, as Islam does also.

I don't disagree with any of this. great remarks.

[RhetoricThug]

@Victoribus Spolia

Freedom & Morality go hand-in-hand.

Freedom enters Kant's moral philosophy as the solution to a problem. The categorical imperative is not analytic, and disregarding its claims is therefore not inconsistent. Yet it is supposed to present us with a rational necessity. In order to show that morality is not a "mere phantom of the mind"(G 4: 445/64), Kant seeks to provide a deduction of (or a credential for iv) the moral law: he must link being rational to acting on the moral law. The third idea through which rationality and morality are linked is the positive conception of freedom. By showing, first, that a free person as such follows the moral law, and, second, that a rational person has grounds for regarding herself as free, Kant tries to show that insofar as we are rational, we will obey the moral law.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~kors ... reedom.pdf

Why Communists reject God
According to Marxism, morality is a ruling class ideology. Marxists attack God because it threatens dialectical materialism and their socioeconomic critique of Capitalism which is built around efficient cause (an axiom of causality) and the idea that morality is subjective. This is a curious thing, because Communism as a political theory is fundamentally a moral argument for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

[Victoribus Spolia]

According to Marxism, morality is a ruling class ideology. Marxists attack God because it threatens dialectical materialism and their socioeconomic critique of Capitalism which is built around efficient cause (an axiom of causality) and the idea that morality is subjective. This is a curious thing, because Communism as a political theory is fundamentally a moral argument for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Good summary.

Freedom & Morality go hand-in-hand.

Freedom enters Kant's moral philosophy as the solution to a problem. The categorical imperative is not analytic, and disregarding its claims is therefore not inconsistent. Yet it is supposed to present us with a rational necessity. In order to show that morality is not a "mere phantom of the mind"(G 4: 445/64), Kant seeks to provide a deduction of (or a credential for iv) the moral law: he must link being rational to acting on the moral law. The third idea through which rationality and morality are linked is the positive conception of freedom. By showing, first, that a free person as such follows the moral law, and, second, that a rational person has grounds for regarding herself as free, Kant tries to show that insofar as we are rational, we will obey the moral law.

Good insights.

You can be quite cogent when you are not trying to sell obscurity as profundity.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Sivad

I have debated ethics with you several times and I would like you to critique my argument below. I believe you to be philosophically competent and would greatly appreciate having a little debate on my proof here so I can refine my thought further.

Thanks.

The Case for Theonomic Anarcho-Capitalism As An Objective Moral System

[VS- Debate Post One]

In therefore laying out my general purposes and definitions, I shall now give my first official post (1/8).

PART I: The Establishment of Anarcho-Capitalism From Plain Reason.


1. The Corollary-Axiom of Human Argumentation and The Presupposition of Self-Ownership

Since my primary objective in this debate is to establish the existence of an objective morality as rationally and logically demonstrable and since I cannot stop merely there, but also wish to establish this objective morality as specifically anarcho-capitalist which is likewise theonomic, it is important in such a complex debate to lay down my first principle in the proof(s) that now follows.

I am going to posit now, for the purpose of this debate, an axiom, which is itself a corollary to another axiom.

A. The Axiom of Human Argumentation.

The axiom of human action is the basic proposition that all humans (acting as agents in any meaningful sense) purposefully utilize means over a period of time in order to achieve desired ends.

The axiomatic quality of this proposition is established in that it cannot be denied without engaging in action (the content of the axiom).

That being said, the corollary to this axiom, being itself a form of it, is that human argumentation is itself axiomatic in like manner to human action.

The axiom of argumentation, as a corollary to the axiom of human action, is the proposition that any truth claim, a claim connected with any proposition that is true, objective or valid, is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation.

The axiomatic quality of this proposition is established in that it cannot be disputed, for one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue; furthermore, one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true.

B. The Presupposition of Self-Ownership.

Argumentation is a non-violent (conflict free) form of human interaction. By being “conflict-free” it is ONLY meant that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. This is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation. Indeed, it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth, the contrary yielding only the disqualification of one’s own argument [you no longer claim to be making any argument].

Thus, we have from the corollary-axiom of human argumentation, the necessary presupposition of self-ownership.

2. The Establishment of Original Appropriation, Non-Aggression, and Private Property.


In proceeding in this compounding case, given what has been said in section one, the establishment of non-aggression and the right of original appropriation shall be demonstrated via an argumentum a contrario.

A. The Presupposition of Private Ownership by Original Appropriation.

If no one had the right to acquire and control (own) anything except his own body (the self-ownership of which has been demonstrated above); then all actual persons would cease to exist and the problem of human morality simply would not exist (as no legitimate acquisition could be made). Thus, the inherent right to control/own resources outside oneself via appropriation must be presumed. Thus, given this argument to the contrary, private ownership and what might be called original appropriation is directly inferred from the corollary-axiom of human argumentation.

B. The Inferred Principle of Non-Aggression.

That original appropriation is a right inferred from the axiom of argumentation; likewise implies that the aggressive interference in such a right was immoral, thus the NAP is confirmed, for aggression in violation of these rights (appropriation and private-ownership) would be an implicit denial of the logically required presumption of self-ownership which is itself inferred from the axiom of human argumentation (and human action).

Indeed, the existence of this problem is only possible because actual persons exist, and this existence is due to the fact that the right of appropriation of property and scarce goods next to and in addition to that of one's own self-ownership must be assumed to exist.

Thus, given the axiom of human argumentation (as being a corollary of human action) and the presumption of self-ownership; the right of original appropriation and the ownership of such (private property) is directly inferable; furthermore, arbitrary aggression would be seen as objectively irrational given the inferable nature of these rights from plain reason; hence, we have established the rational right of original appropriation and its corollary of private property and have inferred from this directly the principle of non-aggression as the contrary would be a violation of universal objective rights.

3. The Anti-Statist Implications of The Thesis Considered.

A state is a third-person monopolist of coercion which takes upon itself the authority to confiscate money from people for use to enforce its own laws, etc. Any entity that does this, violates the principle of non-aggression by denying the direct implication of self-ownership which is that of appropriation and private property.

Furthermore, any social contract further contradicts this notion as well, for if no specific consent is given by an individual, it is still enforced necessarily by aggression, indeed for this reason the social contract is a misnomer, as contracts imply voluntarism.

Likewise, by publicly owning any resources, social contracts deny the potential right of appropriation implicit in acting/arguing agents.

Hence, no definition of a state made thus far, is rational.

Given the conclusions made thus far, Anarcho-Capitalism is the only system that fulfills what reason requires, morally speaking.


PART II: The Secular Case for Divine Law.


1. The Pro-Natalist Master Argument Against Anti-Procreative Sexuality.

Under this heading the adjoined ethical system of theonomy shall be argued from plain reason, hence why it is intentionally and paradoxically (for purposes of rhetorical irony) called the secular case for divine law.

This argument however, does not claim to prove the entire corpus of theonomic law from a secular standard, indeed, the use of a secular standard precludes me from arguing certain religious aspects of this divine law, thus the scope of this argument is to demonstrate what reason allows me to do and to show that what reason demands correlates to a particular system of theonomic law. Given what might be called the “big three” of theonomic systems; Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, my only goal here is to show that the system demanded by plain reason most approximates one of these three as compared to the other two and that this is shown by a single disqualifying dis-junction between the argument made and the other two systems which fail to approximate reason’s demands.

[Note: If one is interested in a more exclusively theological case, then they are free to consider this argument in connection to my case for Trinitarian Phenomenal Idealism in my other debate thread].

For purposes of the debate, the most controversial and indeed the most “defining” aspects of divine law shall be the ones argued for, namely that the penology of old testament law for certain forms of human sexuality are not disproportionate to the severity of the legal infraction. Thus, for instance, murder is worthy of death, but so homosexuality, bestiality, child sacrifice, contraception, abortion, and adultery. It shall be argued that this hierarchy of moral gravity is consistent with the demands of reason (irrespective of whether one believes such a penal code ought to be enforced, this argument is only about moral-gravity.)

Further it shall be shown, in contrast to orthodox and historic interpretations of Judaism and Islam, that the orthodox Christian interpretation of Biblical law via the New Testament by the Fathers of the church, as prohibiting polygamy, is most consistent with what reason demands, thus implying that the ethical system demanded by reason most approximates Christian Law over-and-against Judaism and Islam.

The Pronatalist Master Argument

Syllogism One

Premise One. All (Intentionally Non-Procreative Sexuality) is (Potential Person Destroying).[All X is Y]

Premise Two. All Non-Potentials Are Non-Actuals.

Corollary To P2: All (Potential Person Destroying) is (Actual Person Destroying). [All Y is B]

Conclusion. All (Intentionally Non-Procreative Sexuality) is (Actual Person Destroying). [All X is B]

Premise One Explanation:

1- All intentionally procreative sexual acts are transitional acts of a potential person (who’s existence is implicit in procreative or “natural” sexual relations) being made into an actual person. This is given by (1) The natural course of events, and (2) all things being equal.

2- All intentionally non-procreative sexual acts are purposefully disruptive acts of stopping a potential person from transitioning into an actual person through procreative or “natural” sexual relations. This is given because to purposefully engage in such acts is to stop the natural consequence of procreation which is transitioning a potential person into an actual person.

3- The definition of destroying is an adequate descriptor of the effect in #2 above.

Premise Two Explanation (With Corollary):

1- For every potential-person there is a corresponding actual person. All actual persons were once potential persons who, through intentional or unintentional procreative sexuality, were transitioned (actualized) into actual persons.

2- If there is no potential person in a given situation, then there can be no, and is no, corresponding actual person. That is, if there never was a potential person, then there could never be an actual person, for all actual persons originate from being a potential person.

3- Therefore, to make a potential person become a non-potential person (see definition of “destroying” above) is to make the corresponding actual person to become a non-actual person. This is because, without a potential person, no actual person can come into existence by the natural order of events (see premise one explanation #1).

Conclusion:

This conclusion follows given (P1) and (P2). If X is Y, and Y is B, then X is B.


2. The Specifically Theonomic Implications of The Thesis Considered.

A. From NAP, to Theonomic Morality.

That aspect of the non-aggression principle that disqualified all statism as irrational (and therefore immoral) was established in PART I; however, this is only true for actual-persons who act and argue. Thus, the argument cannot be stretched beyond this from the axiom itself; furthermore, if a state is non-existent, morality must be determined from elsewhere, including a basis for its penology (note: penology can exist without a state through voluntary contracts and proprietorships, which are still consistent with the NAP just like self-defense and retaliation).

But this questions arises, does the NAP extend to beyond actual persons themselves, given the syllogism above, the answer is in the affirmative as potential-persons are logically the same as actual persons.

To be clear;

Pregnancy prevention is not: the elimination of circumstances by which procreation and conception could take place, but the use of semen for non-procreative purposes when procreation was not only possible but the circumstances also permitted it.

Thus, homosexuality and bestiality are anti-procreative as they are a volitional deviation from natural sexuality, they are a wasting of semen that could be used for procreation (no circumstance would make this permissible, except the possible non-existence of all women in the universe).

Similarly, contraception is a wasting of semen within the bounds of marriage wherein a heterosexual couple could produce offspring but instead deviates from that practice (contrastly sex acts which occur when conception was not possible would be exempt). Contraception, homosexuality, and bestiality must, therefore, all be regarded as anti-procreative on these aforementioned grounds.

If they are anti-procreative, then they are potential-person destroying, and if they are potential person destroying, they are acts of aggression that violate the NAP and must be regarded as immoral.

Hence, homosexuality, beastiality, pedophilia, abortion, contraception, and infanticide are equally murderous violations of the NAP and therefore liable to violent rectification on a universal and objective logical grounds.

In the context of Anarcho-Capitalism, the enforcement of such a morality is grounded not in a state, but either in a contract or proprietorship rooted in voluntarism, but either way, the moral principle is objective, universal, and logically based and everyone should therefore believe it anyway.

B. The Specifically Christian Character of This Theonomic System.

Now, it shall be shown that this system of morality is distinct from OT Judaism and Islam which both permit polygamy.

This ethic shall be demonstrated as consistent with historic catholic and orthodox interpretation which sees polygamy as immoral on certain grounds:

Namely, the rational case in conjunction with the pronatalist master argument simply rests on the general human sex ratio of 1:1, which shows forth the ratio of men to women in any given to society is always, roughly, a 50/50 split.

Given this reality, the permitting of polygamy (and thereby permitting it universally as a potential) would always threaten this proportion and thereby create conditions of increased anti-procreative sexuality which could not be corrected without likewise violating the NAP (state coercion); hence, monogamy is the only rational contract for heterosexual relations and the particulars of which are themselves governed by the same principles of appropriate sexuality; hence, adultery is always a violation of the NAP in potential for the same reason as polygamy, but is additionally a breach of contract; further, certain sex acts are only permitted during times when procreation was not ordinarily possible.

For instance, if a couple is unable (by the observable laws of nature) to produce offspring (I.e. during pregnancy, menstruation, or post-menopause) then non-procreative sex acts between them would not be ipso facto immoral because such acts would not be anti-procreative or an act of pregnancy prevention (no circumstance of actualization exists and therefore the semen may be used but is not "wasted"). [Hence, getting your dick sucked when your wife is on the rag, is pregnant, is breastfeeding (for most women) or is post-menopausal, would not be an anti-procreative sex act under the above definitions, no matter whether she spits or swallows.]

These qualifications being made, given that the inferred laws match Christian, Jewish, and Islamic theonomies, the fact that only monogomy is rational only matches the strict monogamous interpretation of Christianity (as Judaism is theoretically pro-polygamy, atleast until the 11th century A.D., wherein it changed only due to political reasons in some branches; whereas, Islam clearly permits it even still), it can be said that Christian theonomy most closely approximates that which is demanded by reason of the three systems discussed which together have compelled the largest % of human beings.

This now concludes my argument.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Wellsy

feel free to answer the argument in the above post.

[Sivad]

any truth claim, a claim connected with any proposition that is true, objective or valid, is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation.

Is the claim here that the only way to raise and settle a proposition is through argumentation with another person or just that a proposition can't be settled until it's been fully rationally assessed?

Argumentation is a non-violent (conflict free) form of human interaction. By being “conflict-free” it is ONLY meant that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. This is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation. Indeed, it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth, the contrary yielding only the disqualification of one’s own argument [you no longer claim to be making any argument].

Does this mean that just initiating argumentation with another person commits us to affirming the rationality and good faith of that person and thereby permanently de-legitimizes any initiation of force from that point forward?

If no one had the right to acquire and control (own) anything except his own body (the self-ownership of which has been demonstrated above); then all actual persons would cease to exist and the problem of human morality simply would not exist (as no legitimate acquisition could be made).

I'm not sure the right to acquire is sufficient, if people don't have a pre-appropriative right to at least the natural resources necessary for them to exist then they don't have a right to exist, and if we deny the right to exist then we are effectively denying all human morality.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Sivad,

Thanks for showing up to help me work out my argument and refine it, I always enjoy debating with you because you, like me, are well-read in philosophy, logic, etc. I do not intend to let this get combative if possible, so be sure to take my tone in the course of this discussion in a gracious light. I am sure we will poke and spar, but the point of this is to test my ideas.

I appreciate it.

Let me now begin.

Is the claim here that the only way to raise and settle a proposition is through argumentation with another person or just that a proposition can't be settled until it's been fully rationally assessed?

The former, but let me explain this a bit:

A contested public proposition, a claim of truth, can only be settled this way; however, a logician alone in his cabin could work on a proposition by itself via analysis; however, the point here is that a truth claim has been set forth in an "out-there" manner, thus in the contesting of it, the settling of the contest requires argumentation.

Indeed, the logician alone in his cabin, if challenging his own proposition will be attempting to mimic this process (creating a counter argument against his own claim) by imagining a counter-argument from a counter-agent's perspective. This of course only proving the point, that in challenging a proposition, one must engage in argument and we must either presume agency, or imagine one (as in the case of self-critique/devil's advocate).

In essence, you cannot refute a claim (proposition) without engaging that claim in the process of refutation (argumentation). Thus, argumentation is axiomatic.

Does this mean that just initiating argumentation with another person commits us to affirming the rationality and good faith of that person and thereby permanently de-legitimizes any initiation of force from that point forward?

No, at this point in the argument that proposition alone couldn't carry that conclusion; that takes place further down the chain of inferences.

However, what is being claimed is that we are rationally obligated to presume agency in the course of argumentation over a contested proposition and that this agency presupposes the notion of self-ownership; which is nothing more than the admission that YOU are the one making the argument (the presumption of control).

What is implied by this agency will lead (further down the inference-chain) to the logically inferable "rights" to life, liberty, and property.

I'm not sure the right to acquire is sufficient, if people don't have a pre-appropriative right to at least the natural resources necessary for them to exist then they don't have a right to exist, and if we deny the right to exist then we are effectively denying all human morality.

How would that "Pre-Appropriative" right to "life" be actualized though?

This argument is starting with no other presumptions about the world or society etc at this point, so saying that a person has a right to that which would be necessary for his survival is really only to say that he has the right to get what he needs for himself (appropriation). If man needs food, shelter, etc, for personal survival, he has the right to go and get it.

So, I think you might be making a distinction without a difference that could not be separately inferred at this point anyway.

This inference only claims, that if we don't AT LEAST presume that people can own (exclusively control) more than themselves, then no people could exist. Thus, the most fundamental right inferred from this is atleast the right to have ownership of something other than oneself as might be necessary for survival (the right to appropriate).

Unless of course, you are arguing here that the right to pursue one's own needs implies a right to the guarantee of survival, but that is simply is not true; that man CAN control more than himself is NECESSARY for agency, for without it one could not control a drop of water or morsel of food that was not produced from one's own body, but that is nothing but a right to appropriate such things, not a guarantee of universal success. Indeed, human history bears this out; as without the guarantee of human survival, we still have others to argue with; however, if none could control anything outside of their own person, we would none be here to have this conversation.

[Wellsy]

@Sivad

I have debated ethics with you several times and I would like you to critique my argument below. I believe you to be philosophically competent and would greatly appreciate having a little debate on my proof here so I can refine my thought further.

Thanks.

Here's my quick thoughts


Objective Morality Link
1. Human Action
I like emphasis on human action and it being with purpose ie goals/aims, this is amicable to my sense of activity (https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/chat/index.htm#action).
Although one important aspect in the Marxist tradition is that all action is mediated by objects of some sort. Which is a problem in pragmatism (the philsophical school) which treats individual to individual interactions as the basis of sociology.
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/p/r.htm#pragmatism

Further, Pragmatism, as an American doctrine, is tied to individual experience, and it is here that it parts company most decisively with Marxism, which understands practice above all as socially mediated activity. Even individual practice mobilises the entire available culture in even the simplest practical act, using the available tools, to ends provided by the culture, understood with language provded by the culture with senses trained by a life within society. No practice therefore is genuinely individual. The individualist character of Pragmatism leads to an unduly dismissive attitude to social constructs (ideas, ethics, language, productive forces), and supports a somewhat short-sighted and unprincipled rationale for practice: thus the meaning associated with Pragmatism in day-to-day language.

George Herbert Mead’s Social Psychology is an application of the Pragmatic idea to social theory, centering around the idea of self-consciousness, “I,” being derived from knowledge of “Me,” the object one learns about by means of the actions of other people towards “Me.” Thus self-consciousnes is achieved through interaction with other individuals. (This is an application of Hegel’s idea in the Master-Slave dialectic.) Again, Mead’s theory suffers from individualism in that he does not involve cultural products such as language, religion, production, class structure, etc., in the formation of social consciousness, but instead tries to derive it from simple, unmediated person-to-person (intersubjective) interactions.

https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Williams-Missing-Mediation-v3.pdf
This emphasis on mediation is crucial for freedom and free will I believe. That generally mans freedom is indirect, that our conscious intervention into the world to change it to our aims allows us to shape the influence of nature unto ourselves in a way we wish.
Im still fleshing this idea out atm for elsewhere but a good read here might be this short piece I found on influence of Spinoza on Vygotsky where truth of things is entwined with free will.
[url]lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Mail/xmcamail.2015-06.dir/pdf9UQ7dqv45X.pdf[/url]
Here one finds a distinction of quality in action.

A concern I have with the axiom of human axiom is it’s a priori-ness, again the disregard for the empirical reality and purposeful neglect. Although you may think you yourself are personally concerned with the empirical, if you’re finding affinity with the Austrian school, it will hinder such a desire methodologically/philsophically.
https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Praxeology

Praxeology starts from the undeniable axiom that human beings exist and act, and then logically deduces implications of this fact. These deduced propositions are true a priori; there is no need to test them in the way that a physicist might test a proposed "law" of Nature. So long as a praxeological statement has been derived correctly, it must necessarily contain as much truth as the original axioms.[1]

Which I believe is a distinct approach from Marx who investigates the empirical and applies to it a particular logic adopted from Hegel’s method.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.

Such a difference I worry it seems to leave purpose/aim of any individual outside of consideration, something of an issue in regards to some schools of economics that leave it outside their scope as if it’s a strictly sociological matter.

Spoiler: show

https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/law-of-value-8-subjectobject/

Desires are taught, socially constructed, and can’t be understood independently of society. How do subjectivists respond? They say “Yes desires may be constructed but this is out of the scope of economics so we don’t have to consider it.” In fact, this is how modern economics deals with all criticism- it ignores it and says it’s the topic of another discipline. How convenient! It’s like saying that we don’t have to consider the fact that the earth is round because that’s beyond the scope of flat-earth theory.

We can’t understand desire without also understanding the ways in which we go about attaining our desires. Here’s where the abstraction of Subjectivist Island breaks down. On the island Eugene attains his desires by directly acting to get the things he wants. But these are not the sort of choices we make in a capitalist society. In capitalism we have to sell our labor to someone else so we can make a wage that we can then spend on the things we want, but only after we’ve given most of our wage to the landlord, the mortgage company and the state. Subjective value theory has to prove that it can move this abstract model of choice from Subjectivist Island to a full-scale capitalist economy. It does this through the fantasy of barter.

https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/marginal-futility-reflections-on-simon-clarkes-marx-marginalism-and-modern-sociology/

In abstracting away the social relations of capitalism marginalism must assume that these abstract individuals enter exchange with given needs and given resources. Where do these needs and resources come from? The marginalist answer is that this question is outside the sphere of economics- that it doesn’t matter to economic theory where these needs and resources come from. But what if our economic system actually reproduced these needs and resources? If we could show that capitalism produced the hedonistic consumer as well as the conditions of scarcity the consumer confronts then we could expose a disastrous feedback loop at the core of marginalism. It seems that when we just assume given needs and resources we are actually only pretending to abstract away from capitalist social relations. While on the surface marginalists appear to be talking about a universal individual in universal conditions, in actuality they are sneaking all of the social relations of capitalism in the back door.

Not that I should expect such detail in your want for a axiomatic system, but I think it is unconcerned with investigating human actions/activity at all and just wants to use it as part of a conceptual system where human action offers a universal human characteristic only to assert a performative contradiction.

2. The idea of self-ownership seems attractive though I imagine it not really a humanized sense as it likely reflects what C. B. Macpherson dubbed Possessive Individualism.
https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2011/08/possessive-individualism.html

Here we have the heart of the theory of possessive individualism: the individual as solely an owner of himself. Here is his formulation late in the book:
What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others.
Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own interest.
The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to society.
Although the individual cannot alienate the whole o fhis property in his own person, he may alienate his capacity to labour.
Human society consists of a series of market relations.
Since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human, each individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure the same freedoms for others.
Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of orderly relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves. (263-4)

It epitomizes a sense of liberalism where one is to be protected from others.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/#2.1

Liberal rights and ideas of justice are premised on the idea that each of us needs protection from other human beings who are a threat to our liberty and security. Therefore liberal rights are rights of separation, designed to protect us from such perceived threats. Freedom on such a view, is freedom from interference. What this view overlooks is the possibility — for Marx, the fact — that real freedom is to be found positively in our relations with other people. It is to be found in human community, not in isolation. Accordingly, insisting on a regime of rights encourages us to view each other in ways that undermine the possibility of the real freedom we may find in human emancipation.

Which as a side note I suspect has a basis in the stereotypical SJW based on a shared need for protection from others and hence the constant call for rights to defend ones self from the intrusion of others.
http://www.lacan.com/freedom.htm

This notion of the subject as an irresponsible victim involves the extreme Narcissistic perspective from which every encounter with the Other appears as a potential threat to the subject's precarious imaginary balance; as such, it is not the opposite, but, rather, the inherent supplement of the liberal free subject: in today's predominant form of individuality, the self-centered assertion of the psychological subject paradoxically overlaps with the perception of oneself as a victim of circumstances.

https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/523/against-multiculturalism

Why should I, as an atheist, be expected to show respect for Christian, Islamic or Jewish cultures whose views and arguments I often find reactionary and often despicable? Why should public arrangements be adapted to fit in with the backward, misogynistic homophobic claims that religions make? What is wrong with me wishing such cultures to "wither away"? And how, given that I do view these and many other cultures with contempt, am I supposed to provide them with respect, without disrespecting my own views? Only, the philosopher Brian Barry suggests "with a great deal of encouragement from the Politically Correct Thought Police".

But back on point, this basically sounds like the nature of private property as applied to the individual.
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/p/r.htm

Private property is the right of an individual to exclude others use of an object
…
Private property is essentially the denial of the private property of others and finds its ultimate expression only in the relation of wage-labour and capital.

This sounds pretty much like the earlier summary of possessive individualism and I think this is because private property has become essentialized as human nature.

Spoiler: show

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/third.htm

To this enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private property – the subjective essence of wealth, the adherents of the monetary and mercantile system, who look upon private property only as an objective substance confronting men, seem therefore to be fetishists, Catholics. Engels was therefore right to call Adam Smith the Luther of Political Economy [See Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy]. Just as Luther recognised religion – faith – as the substance of the external world and in consequence stood opposed to Catholic paganism – just as he superseded external religiosity by making religiosity the inner substance of man – just as he negated the priests outside the layman because he transplanted the priest into laymen's hearts, just so with wealth: wealth as something outside man and independent of him, and therefore as something to be maintained and asserted only in an external fashion, is done away with; that is, this external, mindless objectivity of wealth is done away with, with private property being incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognised as its essence. But as a result man is brought within the orbit of private property, just as with Luther he is brought within the orbit of religion. Under the semblance of recognising man, the political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this tense essence of private property. What was previously being external to oneself – man's actual externalisation – has merely become the act of externalising – the process of alienating. This political economy begins by seeming to acknowledge man (his independence, spontaneity, etc.); then, locating private property in man's own being, it can no longer be conditioned by the local, national or other characteristics of private property as of something existing outside itself.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/needs.htm

Skarbek distinguishes the individual powers inherent in man – intelligence and the physical capacity for work – from the powers derived from society – exchange and division of labour, which mutually condition one another. But the necessary premise of exchange is private property. Skarbek here expresses in an objective form what Smith, Say, Ricardo, etc., say when they designate egoism and self-interest as the basis of exchange, and buying and selling as the essential and adequate form of exchange.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations. It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property, all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But I reject the present external form internalized as that which is universal to the mankind across time. Such is the thinking of any time which can’t see beyond its own status quo and universalizes the status quo as natural. Hence the manner in which the perceived essence of people is but a reflection of their present circumstances and activity within society.
So this self-ownership, which on the face of it I have no problem with as the sovereign individual is a useful concept that shouldn’t be done away with. What is useful in it is that it is based on acknowledging others as moral equals which seems to be something situated in your axiomatic ethics.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/kant.htm

‘Sovereign’ does not therefore mean that the subject is ‘free’ in the negative liberal sense of being able to act without restraint and without taking into account the will of other subjects. On the contrary, it means that subjects must deal with other subjects as ‘moral equals’, neither subordinating another to their own will, nor subordinated to the will of any other.

This is something of great interest to me in regards to opposing the hegemonic rule of some subjects over others, which I believe Andy Blunden finds a good example among the subjects of Greek States where the value of a thing itself is the basis for unity over and above shared self-interest, an object becomes a universal good.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/amphictony.htm

The remarkable success of the amphictonies must cause us to reflect on their significance for our own times. The establishment of an amphictony recognises that the relevant subjects do not intend to make an alliance or union, but are prepared to deal with each other as moral equals and make common sacrifices in order to protect and maintain something of common value to them all, and are prepared to continue doing that even when at war with one another. Participation in an amphictony in no way sacrificed the sovereignty of the participating states, since maintenance and protection of the sacred site was the only responsibility of the amphictony, even though that duty could have profound repercussions for any state.

The inclusion in the scope of an amphictony of the inviolability of water sources gives us a clue as to what a modern amphictony would mean. It is the institutionalisation of the recognition by subjects, that there is something which transcends them and whatever may separate them. The nearest thing to a modern amphictony would be a league of independent sovereign subjects which accepted the responsibility to protect the environment or a particular feature of the environment relevant to them.

Amphictony provides for bonds with other subjects with whom we would not form an alliance or even make a peace, but which is in many senses stronger and more long-lasting than an alliance. An amphictony can be exceptionally long-lasting because the object to be protected defines its continuity, rather than the parties.

An amphictony differs from a hegemony because the controlling entity (on one hand the hegemon, on the other the sacred site) is outside, and it is not a subject. Amphicton, the mythical founder of the Great Amphictonic League was born of the soil of the sacred site. The maintenance of shared festivals (like May Day) and institutions (the unions) are possible examples, but above all of course, protection of the environment, create opportunities for the establishment of amphictonies.

At a deeper level, what the amphictony represents is the collaboration of mutually sovereign and independent subjects in a common project, itself a sovereign and independent project outside or above the life of each participating subject. The shared religious rituals and beliefs of the Greek people provided this opportunity, just as do shared religious beliefs and institutions today, though it is stewardship of the environment which is more paradigmatically modern.

This is particularly important in a political landscape of alliance politics where people are of different views and values (no guiding value for a unified movement such as anti-racism - civil rights). Instead there are particular issues in which people come together to collaborate against on their terms/willingness.
A good summary of this outlook is found here: https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/seminars/hegel-critique.htm

But this self-ownership which is just an extension of modern private property and doesn’t go far enough due to how private property alienates humanity from its human side.
Marx elaborates on what private property does to human sensibilities here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#44CC6
That human senses get replaced by the immediacy of having things. And else where, in his comments on James Mill, expresses how private property and trade presuppose a relation between objects and so objects have value but not yet people.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/index.htm#081

Our mutual value is for us the value of our mutual objects. Hence for us man himself is mutually of no value.

Basically private property stunts the social and human relationship we might have one another as everything loses its practical existence as being for human beings as much as it ends up commodified. But this relates more to Marx’s sense of human nature and the value of its realization. So won’t dwell on it any more, just note the difference in approach as I see in the Austrian school more a focus on enshrining private property than deducing that it is what is best for people as private property has primacy. But this is debatable as seen with Marx’s critique of the political economy.

A concern I have due to this universalizing of that which is historically particular is that one doesn’t quantify the difference between private property as it originally existed with how it exists in the modern society. Originally private property used to the exclusion to others was merely mans appropriation of nature for himself and kin, but this isn’t synonymous with its forms through its development up to its epitome with wage-labour and capital.
As noted in the communist manifesto, "private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths.”
Which is a quite different sort of relation than all of mankind’s direct appropriation of nature unmediated by a state/laws and only within communal/tribal living. Without distinction in the quality, things become conceptually muddled and may explain the existence of things that presuppose certain relations and modes of existence for humans that aren’t the typical and dominant form in our modern societies. Thus not archetypal, but exceptions that aren’t foreseeable as becoming universal necessarily. The commodity relation was originally an exception but becomes universal under capitalism, so exceptions aren’t without significance.
So self-ownership as implied by the nature of private property would be done away with, although if one actually displaced the dominance of exchange value over everything. One would have most likely realized a world which allows the free and creative development of humanity such that each person could have a rich individuality and isn’t subjugated by means of economic coercion or whatever.


And in terms of original appropriation, this sounds characteristic and unproblematic of tribal times but not in the modern day where the private property now owned by capitalist class came about through force, as coined by Marx as Primitive Accumulation. So the justness of someone being an owner because of their appropriation doesn’t seem to be based on being first but requires a standard that is derived from the mode of production that then informs the limit and nature social relations of a society. Within capitalism, such appropriation ends up being just now that it has already forced native people from their land (colonialism) and transformed majority of people into propertyless workers (enclosure in England). Now one argues that it’s wrong to take property forgetting how such property ended up in the hands of the few and how wrong it would be to take it back by force. In fact, it was such ideas of property which were used as an ethical appeal against the colonization of Australia by some, but ethical appeals meant little instrumentally.
To which Marx isn’t concerned with the ricardian socialist sense of labours getting paid in full for their labor, but of socializing the ownership of production to coincide with how capitalism socialized production itself. People no longer work strictly for themselves (private labour) in the majority of places but in an indirectly social way in which it becomes social once it realizes its value on a market.

To which I do like the emphasis on the voluntary nature of interaction between people but within the capitalist mode of production this is an ideological illusion which ignores the structural conditions which create the two classes. In neoclassical economics and variations of marginalism, typically the real and essential characteristics of capitalist production are abstracted from their models. Where the voluntary association of property owners coming together of their own will to exchange things doesn’t reflect the actual existence of people under capitalism as a mode of production.

Spoiler: show

https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/marginal-futility-reflections-on-simon-clarkes-marx-marginalism-and-modern-sociology/

Marginalism can abstract away all of society from economic theory because of its claim that capitalism corresponds to a formal rationality rather than a substantive rationality. Formal rationality is a purely technical calculation of means and ends as opposed to substantive rationality which is oriented around values or higher aims. For instance, in Human Action Mises claims that the basis of economics is the natural quantitative relations between objects… so much input can produce so much output, etc. For marginalism any constraints or limits to the system are purely technical, a result of natural scarcity in relation to our timeless wants, not social, and the market is the best mechanism for organizing these desires. This means that the marginalist model will fail if it can be proven that capitalist institutions have a ‘necessary substantive significance in subjecting individuals to social constraint’. In other words, if the limits and constraints of our society can be shown not the result of technical aspects like scarcity but rather the result of social institutions with particular values oriented toward the interests of certain groups of people (ie the capitalist class) than marginalism has not justification for its formal rationality, for its abstraction of society from economics, and the entire edifice of marginalism falls. It is not enough just to point to this abstraction as proof of the ideological nature of marginalism. We have to prove that it is an illegitimate abstraction. This is the common thread underlying all of Clarke’s specific critiques of different aspects of marginalism. (3)
…
In abstracting away the social relations of capitalism marginalism must assume that these abstract individuals enter exchange with given needs and given resources. Where do these needs and resources come from? The marginalist answer is that this question is outside the sphere of economics- that it doesn’t matter to economic theory where these needs and resources come from. But what if our economic system actually reproduced these needs and resources? If we could show that capitalism produced the hedonistic consumer as well as the conditions of scarcity the consumer confronts then we could expose a disastrous feedback loop at the core of marginalism. It seems that when we just assume given needs and resources we are actually only pretending to abstract away from capitalist social relations. While on the surface marginalists appear to be talking about a universal individual in universal conditions, in actuality they are sneaking all of the social relations of capitalism in the back door.
…
I like the way Clarke develop his proof this problem: Commodity exchange presupposes individuals with different needs and different resources because if everyone had the same stuff there would be no reason for exchange. Thus exchange presupposes differences. If exchange is systematic these differences must also be systematic. Thus the formal equality and freedom of exchange is founded on different resource endowments. This means that the content of exchange can’t be reduced to its form (free, juridically equal relations between people) but must be found outside of exchange in the realm of production and property.

http://college.holycross.edu/eej/Volume14/V14N4P299_318.pdf

Which is a problem because freedom for all people necessarily entails restrictions upon others having the freedom to subjugate other people to their wants.
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/f/r.htm#freedom

Freedom can be attained only in and through the community. The development of real freedom always and everywhere means the restriction of the freedom of others to oppress and do wrong. Freedom for the vast majority necessarily means restriction of the freedom of a small minority to exploit the labour of others, destroy nature monopolise the social means of production and communication.

So I can’t stand by a principle that is primarily about the freedom of a ruling class which is necessarily presupposed by a certain mode of production. Force against such a minority whilst not inherently justified, can be justified in the process of striving to achieve greater freedom and development for a larger portion of humanity.
As far as I can tell, your position is how I superficially characterize the Austrians, in terms of enshrining private property primarily. Your objective morality is simply an attempt at n axiomatic system which defends private property as it exists today as rational and opposition to its dispossession as unethical.
Added that I also doubt that capitalist private property can exist independent of a state to enforce against the working class for a capitalist class. Even if it was reduced to its most blatant and brutal character of military and police.

Also I skipped the procreation deal as I got lazy and want to move onto other subjects that press my mind.

[ingliz]

theonomy

But

[If] God does not exist, there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it.

Jean-Paul Sartre

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Wellsy,

A lot of your post was what might be called "descriptive analysis" and not so much in the way of "critique," and I am seeing this a lot in many of your posts.

Are you simply uninclined towards debate and just prefer to assess, describe, and share your own musings?



In any event, I tried to pick out stuff that actually warrants a response, as most of your post was simply a complilation of you "thinking out loud" and referencing other perspectives. So here we go.....

A concern I have with the axiom of human axiom is it’s a priori-ness, again the disregard for the empirical reality and purposeful neglect. Although you may think you yourself are personally concerned with the empirical, if you’re finding affinity with the Austrian school, it will hinder such a desire methodologically/philsophically.

Firstly, I would need a good reason to believe this was a problem. For instance, lets say that the Axiom of Human Argumentation is purely an apriori without any empirical basis......so what?

Secondly, I don't think the axiom lacks an empirical basis; after all, I described the axiom as a synthetic apriori statement. That is, the axiom cannot be known apart from experience, but is likewise not dependent upon experience for its validty (which comes from its apriori character).

Which I believe is a distinct approach from Marx who investigates the empirical and applies to it a particular logic adopted from Hegel’s method.

An area of concern I would suggest. Especially since any universal inferences made from empirical sets are nearly always fallacious; whether by the inductive fallacy, or by any one of the fallacies of causation (cum hoc/post hoc, et al.)

Not that I should expect such detail in your want for a axiomatic system, but I think it is unconcerned with investigating human actions/activity at all and just wants to use it as part of a conceptual system where human action offers a universal human characteristic only to assert a performative contradiction.

Well, as the basis of praxeological analysis, it would end up being concerned immensely with human actions. In fact, it would be the only logically unassailable basis for making inferences about sociology that would likewise give us a non-fallacious foundation for predicting all of mankind's socio-economic and even political conduct.

What is useful in it is that it is based on acknowledging others as moral equals which seems to be something situated in your axiomatic ethics.

I would say such are metaphysically equal, give the inferred anthropological conclusions of the axiom; thus, moral equality is understood only in the prior metaphysical sense regarding the nature and definition of man.

But this self-ownership which is just an extension of modern private property and doesn’t go far enough due to how private property alienates humanity from its human side. Marx elaborates on what private property does to human sensibilities here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/w ... #44CC6That human senses get replaced by the immediacy of having things. And else where, in his comments on James Mill, expresses how private property and trade presuppose a relation between objects and so objects have value but not yet people.

Surely you are not speaking about self-ownership as it is inferred in my argument?

My argument does not presuppose any "modern conception." Indeed, any conception of property that does not align with my argument should be critiqued on that basis.

Basically private property stunts the social and human relationship we might have one another as everything loses its practical existence as being for human beings as much as it ends up commodified. But this relates more to Marx’s sense of human nature and the value of its realization. So won’t dwell on it any more, just note the difference in approach as I see in the Austrian school more a focus on enshrining private property than deducing that it is what is best for people as private property has primacy. But this is debatable as seen with Marx’s critique of the political economy.

This of course, is untrue. What is best for people is what aligns with their rationally deducible nature, rights, and obligations. Hence, there is no higher criteria for either what man is, what he needs, or what he ought to do, then what my argument sets forth.

The commondization of man in our society and the subsequent alienation is not a result of the market or private property, its the result of the state.

A concern I have due to this universalizing of that which is historically particular is that one doesn’t quantify the difference between private property as it originally existed with how it exists in the modern society. Originally private property used to the exclusion to others was merely mans appropriation of nature for himself and kin, but this isn’t synonymous with its forms through its development up to its epitome with wage-labour and capital.

Except no universalization of the particular has taken place in my argument; only an inference from that which is logically undeniable. It is typical for a marxist to assume that some form of "dialectic of history" is taking place in their opponent's conceptions, but not here. I am not particularizing any mere historic conception of private property and attemping to build a rational forticication around it; rather, I am inferring a concept directly from certain axioms and giving them a label; namely (in this case), private property.

As noted in the communist manifesto, "private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths.”

One must wonder if its not Marx who is engaging in the universalization of a historical particularity. Especially since owning one's own home accounts for almost 7/10th's of the population in the U.S. alone.

Naturally, I am critical of the modern age, and it wouldn't bother me if 90% of the population with tenant farmers or peasants; however, the logic of the matter is what it is.

And in terms of original appropriation, this sounds characteristic and unproblematic of tribal times but not in the modern day where the private property now owned by capitalist class came about through force, as coined by Marx as Primitive Accumulation. So the justness of someone being an owner because of their appropriation doesn’t seem to be based on being first but requires a standard that is derived from the mode of production that then informs the limit and nature social relations of a society

Obviously irrelevant, as the right of appropriation is not conditioned on any current historical context. That is, whether appropriation is practical, convenient, or even possible in this current time has no bearing on whether its a logically deducible right that underpins further inferences in the syllogism.

Appropriation is a natural right that underpins the inference that one owns what he claims (mixed with his action of appropriating); and if its not claimed in the sense of an "original appropriation," then it is claimed via appropriation which comes through the means of exchange without a direct act of aggression (which would violate the rights of others). Thus, though man rarely appropriates what is his via the act of original appropriation
; what he has is still his if he has appropriated in any sense whatsoever that was not explicitly an act of violent aggression.

To which I do like the emphasis on the voluntary nature of interaction between people but within the capitalist mode of production this is an ideological illusion which ignores the structural conditions which create the two classes. In neoclassical economics and variations of marginalism, typically the real and essential characteristics of capitalist production are abstracted from their models. Where the voluntary association of property owners coming together of their own will to exchange things doesn’t reflect the actual existence of people under capitalism as a mode of production.

Propaganda.

Ultimately irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of the syllogism.

So I can’t stand by a principle that is primarily about the freedom of a ruling class which is necessarily presupposed by a certain mode of production.

Your feelings are quite irrelevant, you are rationally obligated to stand by this principle irrespective of whatever class you think it protects or does not protect because of the logic of the syllogism.

If you have a critique of the inferences made, i'd like to see them.

Further, as a point of note, the "ruling class" you critique would largely not exist if the conclusions of my syllogism were implemented or somehow came to pass (which I believe as a historical inevitability); after all, no monopolies and mega corporations can exist in ancapistan (without a state).

Your objective morality is simply an attempt at n axiomatic system which defends private property as it exists today as rational and opposition to its dispossession as unethical.

False.

My objective morality is logically binding on all mankind and enshrines only what it infers; which is quite contrary to our modern order.

Added that I also doubt that capitalist private property can exist independent of a state to enforce against the working class for a capitalist class. Even if it was reduced to its most blatant and brutal character of military and police.

If you mean mega corporations and monopolies, then I agree completely as they are dependent on the state for their subsidies, loop-holes, exemptions, copyright laws, patent laws, etc.

HOWEVER, private property as it exists for the majority of Americans (70% of which are private property owners); does not require a state; nor has this historically been the case (the feudal era, the american frontier, etc).

Not to mention; irrespective of your historical speculation, the fact remains that a state as defined in my argument is irrational and therefore immoral. period.

Our thoughts about what would obtain in its absence being entirely irrelevant.

Also I skipped the procreation deal as I got lazy and want to move onto other subjects that press my mind.

The reason i asked you in the Immaterialist thread to come and examine this argument was mainly because of how the procreation segment (as part of the broader syllogism) infers directly an essential human nature from logical axions; contra your claims in the immaterialist thread about us inferring a "concrete universal" from how we observe people in the "now."

Thus, you skipped what was largely the entire point for me having you come over here in the first place and thus remain ignorant of my entire theory of gender and the sexes.

[Victoribus Spolia]

But[If] God does not exist, there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. Jean-Paul Sartre

Good thing He exists. As I have already proven elsewhere.

[ingliz]

Good thing He exists. As I have already proven elsewhere.

Don't be silly.

"I refuse to prove that I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith, I am nothing."

[Victoribus Spolia]

"I refuse to prove that I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith, I am nothing."

I must have missed that passage.