Potemkin wrote:Google ‘Jeremy Bentham’. Essentially, it’s a moral philosophy which assumes that a moral calculus is both possible and desirable.
Thank you for the recommendation. I will, and I agree with the tenet of your definition. I’ll just add that I think a moral calculus is not only desirable, but an innate biological drive. Like all DNA based organisms, we Homo Sapiens also strive to survive and replicate ourselves.
Morality is just one of our methods of intellectualizing and determining what’s best for us.
The old railway tracks thing. You know the one. :)
Well, before I even try to give what will probably be a weak answer to a complex question, I’d like to go back to the original question and say that if reason cannot give a solid answer to that, I certainly see no reason why superstition can solve that conundrum.
Superstition and religion certainly have a purpose. Among other things, they fill in the gaps and provide solace when all else makes no sense, but I digress.
As for the railroad tracks, yes, I’ve heard of it, and I’ve never found it a particularly puzzling conundrum. Based on the myriad of variables that should be taken into account, I think good enough answers to the moral questions related to it can be found.
If it’s a choice between an adult and a child, then I believe we should probably choose the child to live. The adult already had their chance. I’d certainly like to think that I would be brave enough to die for a child if the time came.
If it’s a choice between one and many people, then once again, it’s probably better if the one dies for the many. I don’t believe any one human being has the right to decide who lives and who dies, but I don’t find it a stretch to believe that better choices do exist when given such a melancholic task.
As to the question of inaction versus inaction, once again, I think all the variables must be taken into account. I think evil obtained through action is generally worse than evil permitted through inaction. I think it’s fair to conclude that we all have a stronger moral obligation not to do evil than we do to prevent it.
So if someone allows the many to die instead of the one, or a child to die instead of an adult because they couldn’t deal with the stress of taking on such a responsibility, then I think it’s reasonable to be more lenient towards them than to someone who premeditatively and consciously commits sin.