Thanks for the thread, which I find stimulating. Although the philosophy of justice is not really my thing, the model of Rawls is crucial for economic and sociological theories. Therefore I like to make some comments, preceded by the facts as I know them. Note that Rawls presents a contract theory, and thus he employs the liberal approach. This contrasts with the communautarian approach. For instance, Rawls does not consider the general interest or morality. See also Eran:
Eran: We each have responsibility to (indeed we cannot help but) develop our own moral standards.
Rawls assumes that all individuals act in a rational way. Civil (negative) rights have the highest priority. They guarantee the individual freedom and integrity. The social justice is secondary and leads to the principle of equal opportunities. It prevents discrimination, and requires for instance access to education for all. The distribution comes only in the third position. The idea of the veil of ignorance results in the choice for the difference principle. The benefit of the poorest people should get priority in policy, and this benefit is measured by means of an index of primary goods (income, access to rights). Just institutions will lead to solidarity. Solidarity, trust and cooperation will also benefit the richest groups. Note that Rawls does not apply his model at the global level. So it is not obligatory to favour the poorest states.
The ideas of Rawls are opposed by Robert Nozick, who defends the traditional liberal position. He does not acknowledge social rights. I do not sympathize with his point of view. But he does show that the assumptions of Rawls are not universally accepted.
Now let me make my comments. First, Rawls supposes obviously, that people are averse to risks. They are not guided by the expected social wealth, but by the worst possible case. This is indeed in accordance with human nature, but not without limits. For if the odds are overwhelmingly in their favour, then people are willing to take a chance.
Second, the difference principle resembles the maximin strategy, but not completely. For the former uses the index of primary goods as a measure, whereas the latter uses the individual utility. This has important consequences. For instance, science states that people are averse to inequality and to a lack of reciprocity. This means that the poorest people will be unhappy in an extremely unequal society, even if their absolute income of primary goods is made maximal.
Obviously some of the forum members believe that the poorest people should control their inclination for equality (or jealous impulses; equality seems to be the scientific term). See SpaciousBox:
SpaciousBox: I have no issue with people being rich, just as long as their riches have come from honest work, without exploitation, coercion, or anything that might negatively effect those around them.
This adheres to the ideal of human rationality. Personally I think that the human capacity to control natural impulses is limited. Therefore, since excessive inequality harms the poorest people, it must be forbidden (as a negative right).
Thus I prefer the maximin strategy instead of the difference principle. Since the maximin strategy takes the utility as her measure, she accounts for the violation of the just (in)equality. So I whole-heartedly support the remark of Spin:
Spin: Inequality may be deemed to harm the self respect of the poorest in the society and may be considered to have a questionable impact on institutions.
Third, could the difference principle lead to a dictature by the poorest? Eran writes:
Eran: It is easy to imagine a scenario in which slightly improving the lot of a tiny minority deemed "worst off" comes at the price of bringing the rest of society down to their level.
As long as the lot of the poorest is measured by their consumption of primary goods, this problem may be controllable. For instance, it is obvious that capital gains and investment are indispensable for economic growth. See also JohnRawls:
JohnRawls: But for example if a manufacturer purchases more efficient production machine that are more clean and help his workers be healthy, then its okay. Since although the best off is growing in a sense of production and asset numbers but the workers recieve also more by having more health and being productive themselves a lot more.
However, Eran may have a point for the minimax strategy. Clearly the application of utility as a measure has far reaching consequences. For instance, since satisfaction or utility in the broad sense is partly determined by morals, the strategy could cause a domination of social ethics by the poorest.
Apparently, there are quite a number of arguments, that the social justice of Rawls is not the definite answer to the social problems. At its best it is an interesting first approximation.