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Sanctions: Myth & Reality
Originally published in Iraq Under Siege, South End Press, 2002
*Footnotes will be available shortly
Myth 1: The sanctions have produced temporary hardship for the Iraqi people but are an effective, nonviolent method of containing Iraq.
Sanctions target the weakest and most vulnerable members of the Iraqi society–the poor, elderly, newborn, sick, and young. Many equate sanctions with violence. The sanctions, coupled with pain inflicted by US and UK military attacks, have reduced Iraq’s infrastructure to virtual rubble. Water sanitation plants and hospitals remain in dilapidated states. Surveys by the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (Unicef) and the World Health Organization (WHO) note a marked decline in health and nutrition throughout Iraq.
While estimates vary, many independent authorities assert that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children under five have died since 1990, in part as a result of the sanctions and the effects of the Gulf War. An August 1999 Unicef report found that the under-five mortality rate in Iraq has more than doubled since the imposition of sanctions.
In 1999, the United Nations observed:
In addition to the scarcity of resources, malnutrition problems also seem to stem from the massive deterioration in basic infrastructure, in particular in the water-supply and waste disposal systems. The most vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit, especially children under five years of age who are being exposed to unhygienic conditions, particularly in urban centers. The World Food Program estimates that access to potable water is currently 50 percent of the 1990 level in urban areas and only 33 percent in rural areas.
The UN sanctions committee, based in New York, continues to deny Iraq billions of dollars worth of computer equipment, spare parts, medical equipment and medicines, books and periodicals, all necessary elements to sustaining human life and society. Agricultural and environmental studies show great devastation, in many cases indicating long-term and possibly irreversible damage.
Others have argued that, from a North American perspective, sanctions are more economically sustainable than military attacks, since sanctions cost the United States less. In fact, hundreds of millions of US tax dollars are spent each year to sustain economic sanctions. Expenses include monitoring Iraqi import-export practices, patrolling the "no-fly" zones, and maintaining an active military presence in the Gulf region.
Sanctions are an insidious form of warfare, and have claimed hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.
Myth 2: Iraq possesses, and seeks to build, weapons of mass destruction. If unchecked, and without economic sanctions, Iraq could, and certainly would, threaten its neighbors.
The final report of the UN Special Commission (Unscom) in 1999 stated that Unscom succeeded to a remarkable degree in finding and destroying Iraq’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs. There are, however, still unanswered questions regarding Iraq’s biological program. What is certain is that no government has produced any hard evidence proving a biological weapons program exists, or if it does, that Saddam Hussein is planning to use biological warfare on his neighbors or the United States.
Hans Blix, head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (Unmovic), the new UN weapons inspection agency that has replaced Unscom, has said he "does not accept as fact the US and UK’s repeated assertions that Baghdad has used the time to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction," adding, "It would be inappropriate for me to accept and adopt this position, but it would also be naïve of me to conclude that there may be no veracity–of courseit is possible, I won’t go as far as saying probable."
Scott Ritter, a former chief Unscom weapon’s inspector, has also said that, based on his extensive work in Iraq, he sees no evidence that Iraq currently possesses the capability to produce or deploy chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
The United States only became concerned with Iraq’s military potential in 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait. In fact, the United States supplied Iraq with many of its weapons. The United States and Britain were the major suppliers of chemical and biological weapons to Iraq in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War, in which the United States supported both sides with weapons sales.
Moreover, the United States possesses, and keeps on alert, more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined. Many Iraqis feel that it is disingenuous of the United States–sitting atop the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, refusing to comply with international treaties or allow its weapons programs to be inspected by international experts, and being the only nation in the world ever to drop an atomic bomb–to tell Iraq what weapons it can and cannot possess.
Myth 3: Iraq has acted in violation of UN resolutions, while the United States has not.
While the US singles out Iraq for its failure to comply with UN resolutions and human rights standards, Washington maintains profitable relationships with almost all of Iraq’s neighbors. In recent years, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel with billions of dollars in weapons . The United Nations, Amnesty International, and even the State Department have condemned all of those countries serious violations of human rights and UN resolutions.
UN Resolution 687, paragraph 14, calls for regional disarmament as the basis for reducing Iraq’s arsenal. By arming Iraq’s neighbors in the Middle East, the US government is contravening the same UN resolution that it cites to justify continuing the sanctions.
Israel maintained a position of "nuclear ambiguity" until 1986, when a then-technician Mordechai Vanunu exposed photographs and details about Israel’s nuclear weapon’s program. Vanunu was sentenced to 18 years in high-security prison for treason. The extent of Israel’s nuclear capability is still uncertain, but the country is believed to have more than 200 nuclear warheads and has violated scores of UN Mandates, yet the US remains silent with regard to this violation of international law.
Myth 4: The Iraqi government has weakened and undermined the UN weapons inspection program, in part by kicking out inspectors in December 1998, thus forcing the United States and United Kingdom to undertake "Operation Desert Fox."
The Iraqi government, knowing that the United States favors Saddam Hussein’s ouster and will impose sanctions until a "regime change" occurs, has no incentive to cooperate with the United States or intrusive weapon’s inspections. Top US administration officials have said publicly for more than a decade that sanctions will remain intact until Saddam Hussein is out of office, even though this is not stipulated under the UN resolutions enforcing the sanctions.
Unscom director Richard Butler removed inspectors from Iraq prior to the December 1998 bombardment of the country, contrary to what is still commonly–and mistakenly–reported. The US government claims Iraq "threw out" inspectors. In fact, the opposite occurred. According to Butler’s own records, his team of weapons inspectors made numerous unimpeded visits the week before the December bombing. On only a few intentionally provocative visits were inspectors prevented from inspecting a site.
Butler himself confirmed that he was in constant communication with the US military the week before the bombing. He often took his cues from Washington. Furthermore, the US government admitted (after an embarrassing Washington Post story) that it had been using Unscom to spy on Iraq. Iraq had previously charged Unscom with spying–a claim that had been vehemently denied by the US government. The irony is that Iraq pays for the entire UN operation in Iraq through oil revenues, thus financing UN workers to spy under United States cover.
In the past, efforts at negotiation with Iraq have produced cooperation and an opening for dialogue. Establishment of a clear timetable for ending inspections and recognizing progress made by the Iraqi government would provide clear incentives for future dialogue and compliance.
Myth 5: The Iraqi government is deliberately withholding and stockpiling food and medicine to exacerbate the human suffering for political sympathy and to draw attention to the need to lift sanctions.
The US State Department frequently alleges that Iraq appears to be warehousing and stockpiling medicines, with malicious intent. Yet United Nations which heavily monitors the warehousing of medicines contradicts this view. Tun Myat, the humanitarian coordinator and head of the UN’s "oil-for-food" program in Baghdad from 2000—2002, praised Iraqi distribution of essential goods. He told the New York Times, "I think the Iraqi food-distribution system is probably second to none that you’ll find anywhere in the world. It gets to everybody whom it’s supposed to get to in the country."
According to local UN administration and staff, the gaps in delivery that do exist are caused by logistical problems stemming from twelve years of sanctions and lingering Gulf War damage. Periodic UN reports on the humanitarian programs in Iraq list many technical issues that complicate providing medicine and other vital resources to a country of 22 million people. Obstacles to efficient distribution include the low wages of Iraqi warehouses workers, insufficient transport, and the poor condition of Iraqi warehouses in the provinces.
The United Nations conducts frequent inventories of the food and medicine stored in Iraq. Former humanitarian coordinator Hans von Sponeck (who resigned from the post in 2000 in protest against the sanctions) and his deputy, Farid Zarif, have repeatedly called for the "depoliticization" of distribution, arguing that stockpiling is the result of Iraq’s damaged infrastructure, rather than malice on the part of the Iraqi government.
In many cases, Iraq must purchase goods from foreign suppliers. Items come in pieces; for example, dental chairs arrive but compressors must be ordered from another company, or syringes arrive but needles take longer to be processed. Moreover, the UN sanctions committee takes longer to approve some orders than others, thus forcing Iraq to keep medicine in storage until the complements are approved.
Temperatures in Iraq during summer often reach 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Air-conditioned trucks are therefore essential for shipping perishable goods, including cancer medication, surgical gloves, and foodstuffs. Yet air-conditioned trucks are practically nonexistent in Iraq, since the sanctions committee has barred them under "dual use" considerations. While it is certainly true that air-conditioned trucks could be used for military purposes, they are also necessary to ship medication.
The infrastructure is so degraded throughout Iraq that medicine and even spare parts are "Band-Aids to a huge problem," according to von Sponeck. "You can give all the food and medicine you want," Says Tun Myat, "but living standards would not improve unless housing, electricity, clean water and sanitation, and other essential services were restored." Reconstructing Iraq’s essential infrastructure could cost as much as an estimated $50 to $100 billion.
After allocations are taken out of Iraq’s oil revenues to finance Gulf War reparations, UN administrative costs, and other mandated expenses, the amount of money from the oil-for-food program that trickles down to the average person in Iraq is completely insufficient. Prior to May 2002, "[T]he total value of all food, medicines, education, sanitation, agricultural and infrastructure supplies that have arrived in Iraq has amounted to $175 per person a year, or less than 49 cents a day," according to von Sponeck.
Iraq cannot afford to rebuild its infrastructure under the oil-for-food program or under the new provisions of so-called smart sanctions. Water sanitation facilities, electrical grids, communication lines, and educational resources will remain permanently degraded until the sanctions are lifted.
Myth 6: The Iraqi leadership uses money intended for humanitarian purposes to build palaces and enrich itself.
In the years before the oil-for-food program began, it is important to recall that the Iraqi government was distributing food to its civilian population. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) said in 1995 of the Iraqi rationing system that began in September 1990: "The food basket supplied through the rationing system is a life-saving nutritional benefit which also represents a very substantial income subsidy to Iraqi households."
Iraq is pumping almost as much oil today as it did before the Gulf War, but is making less money because of the change in oil prices and the dramatic rise of inflation since 1990. When one considers that three Iraqi dinars could buy $1 in 1990, and today it takes more than 2,000 dinars, the difference in purchasing power between 1990 and today is significant. While Iraq is permitted to sell as much oil as it can pump, these funds are not at the discretion of Saddam Hussein, but are kept in a UN escrow account with the Bank of Paris in New York City.
The sanctions, though intended to weaken Iraq’s elite ruling class, only strengthen its political hegemony. With Iraq’s population decimated by hunger, disease, and fear of US and UK bombs, the development of civil society is hampered, as are hopes for pluralism. Iraq’s elite is empowered by a lucrative black market. With the continued devastation caused by sanctions, the Iraqi government can better rally popular support and bitterness against the US government.
Myth 7: The distribution in northern Iraq–where the United Nations is most heavily involved–is better than in the south, proving that the Iraqi government is failing to adequately distribute food and medicine to its people.
Sanctions are simply not the same in the north and south of Iraq. Differences in Iraqi mortality rates result from several factors: the Kurdish north has been receiving humanitarian assistance longer than other regions of Iraq; agriculture in the north is better; evading sanctions is easier in the north because its borders are far more porous; the north receives 22 percent more per capita from the oil-for-food program than the south-central region; and the north receives UN-controlled assistance in currency, while the rest of the country receives only commodities. The south also suffered much more direct bombing, including attacks using depleted-uranium tipped bullets, during the Gulf War.
Myth 8: In May 2002, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to adopt "smart sanctions" on Iraq, demonstrating a determination to meet the needs of the Iraqi people.
Resolution 1409 (the "smart sanctions" resolution) is a hollow solution to an urgent humanitarian crisis. US and UK proponents of the resolution claim that by lifting restrictions on Iraq’s ability to import civilian goods and focusing narrowly on preventing Iraq from importing or building weapons of mass destruction, the suffering in Iraq will be diminished.
But the change was mostly aimed at winning a public relations battle, not relieving ordinary Iraqis’ suffering. "The resolution was intended to blunt any drive to end the sanctions altogether and to deflate criticism that the measures are hurting ordinary Iraqis more than their leader," Somini Sengupta reported in the New York Times. "It also seemed part of the diplomatic groundwork the Bush administration is seeking to lay as it presses its case that Mr. Hussein should be removed from power, perhaps by force."
In the word of the New York Times Magazine, the UN sanctions were "creating a P.R. nightmare of hungry children," particularly for the US government, "but smart sanctions created the impression of doing something."
Under the proposed smart sanctions, the United States will still be able to use its power in the UN to block essential goods by citing "dual use" concerns, blocking access to items that are badly needed in Iraq but which any modern society could also use in a chemical or biological weapons program.
At the time Resolution 1409 was adopted, $5 billion in contracts were "on hold," largely because of holds placed by the United States in the UN sanctions committee. Still, US and British officials place all of the blame on the Iraqi government, "Under the Oil for Food Program it has always been possible to get humanitarian and civilian goods into Iraq, and I think the principal obstacle has been the refusal of the Iraqi regime to spend its own resources for the importation of those items," claims John D. Negroponte, the US permanent representative to the United Nations.
UN workers on the ground on Iraq have a very different perspective, "The [oil-for-food] distribution network is second to none," Adnan Jarra, a UN spokesperson in Iraq, recently told the Wall Street Journal. "They [the Iraqis] are very efficient. We have not found anything that went anywhere it was not supposed to."
The Security Council’s own humanitarian panel reported in March 1999 that for Iraq to recover, "the oil for food system alone would not suffice and massive investment would be required in a number of key sectors, including oil, energy, agriculture and sanitation."
This will be impossible under "smart sanctions," which prohibit foreign investment into Iraq’s war-damaged infrastructure, guaranteeing the prolonged collapse of the Iraqi economy.
As Hans von Sponeck notes, "Without massive investment to rebuild the war- and embargo-shattered infrastructure, most Iraqi families cannot earn income to purchase the civilian goods promised. Like all previous revisions, ‘smart sanctions’ leave the root cause of their troubles–strangulation of the civilian economy–unaddressed."
Myth 9: The US and UK fighter planes patrolling the "no-fly" zones are protecting Iraqi minority groups. Since the end of the December 1998 bombing campaign, there has been no "collateral damage" in these regions.
Since the December 1998 bombing campaign against Iraq, US and UK fighter planes have flown thousands of sorties over the northern and southern "no-fly" zones, allegedly to protect northern Kurds and southern Shiites. They patrol the Iraqi airspace, they say, so that Iraq cannot attack its own people, as it did during the 1980s. While UN resolutions do call for the protection of Iraqi minorities, there is no stipulation for military enforcement of the zones.
According to the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, US and UK planes have killed hundreds of innocent civilians, and injured many more. For example, on January 25, 1999, a guided missile killed more than ten people in Basra when it struck a civilian neighborhood. While the Pentagon denies any civilian casualties, eye-witness accounts describe encounters with scores of children and families wounded and killed when bombs missed their targets.
While the US claims to be protecting northern Kurds from the Iraqi government, the US is silent when Turkey flies into Iraq, over the "no-fly" zone, to bomb Kurdish communities, because Turkey is a US ally.
The bombing also complicates the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations. Aid workers have been forced to cancel trips into Kurdish and Shiite regions, and many civilians have been accidentally wounded, further burdening hospitals that are struggling to cope with daunting incidences of illness and preventable diseases.
Myth 10: There is no realistic alternative to the current policy.
The alternative to economic sanctions is termination. Termination combined with capital investment to enable the Iraqi government to rebuild the country’s capacity for electric power that is essential for the potable water, sanitation, and health care–all of which are required (as in any modern urbanized country) to keep children and adults alive and well. Likewise capital is needed for all the other sectors of the economy from transportation through agriculture, industry through education and technology.
Any alternative policy would have to take into account the welfare of ordinary Iraqi people, who have suffered dramatically under a failed policy of depravation and violence, not simply the political interests of the United States and its allies.
The US, UK, and UN must offer incentives for Iraq to cooperate with its neighbors. A first step towards such a policy would be the beginning of a "confidence-building process, initially at a low level and behind closed doors, with all protagonists at the table."
The isolation of Iraq, its people, and its economy must be ended to restore this international partner, sadly once so cozy to the United States and other countries when they applauded and actively supported its bloody and tragic war against Iran.
Domestically, Iraq must improve its human rights record dramatically, and institute arrangements for the Kurds to be an integrated and prosperous part of the country’s economy. The government must allow the people of Iraq to make their own choices and in due course–and with restoration of Iraqi’s standard of living, as well as the elimination of the external focus for Iraqi’s anger–opportunities for political change would increase.
The United States and other members of the Security Council must also take partial responsibility for the arming of Iraq in the decades leading up to the Gulf War, as well as the enormous suffering of the Iraqi people since the Gulf War in the name of Iraq’s disarmament.
An alternative policy should also be concerned not only that Iraq’s acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but with those countries and corporations who seek to arm Iraq–and its many neighbors in the region–for profit. Change in Iraq, to be effective, will need to be linked to broader regional changes.
Myth 11: US and UK plans to attack Iraq have nothing to do with oil interests.
Iraq possesses the world’s second largest proven oil reserves, currently estimated at 112.5 billion barrels, about 11 percent of the world total, and its gas fields are immense, as well. Many experts believe that Iraq has additional undiscovered oil reserves, which might double the total when serious prospecting resumes, putting Iraq nearly on a par with Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s oil is of high quality and it is very inexpensive to produce, making it one of the world’s most profitable oil sources. Oil companies hope to gain production rights over these rich fields of Iraqi oil, worth hundreds of billions of dollars. In the view of an industry source it is "a boom waiting to happen."
As rising world demand depletes reserves in most world regions over the next 10 to 15 years, Iraq’s oil will gain increasing importance in global energy supplies. According to one industry expert: "There is not an oil company in the world that doesn’t have its eye on Iraq."
Geopolitical rivalry among major nations throughout the past century has often turned on control of such key oil resources. Five companies dominate the world oil industry, two US-based, two primarily UK-based, and one primarily based in France. US-based Exxon Mobil looms largest among the world’s oil companies and by some yardsticks measures as the world’s biggest company. The United States consequently ranks first in the corporate oil sector, with the UK second and France trailing as a distant third.
Considering that the US and the UK act almost alone as sanctions advocates and enforcers, and that they are the headquarters of the world’s four largest oil companies, we cannot ignore the possible relationship of sanctions policy with this powerful corporate interest.
US and UK companies long held a three-quarter share in Iraq’s oil production, but they lost their position with the 1972 nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The nationalization, following ten years of increasingly rancorous relations between the companies and the government, rocked the international oil industry, as Iraq sought to gain greater control of its oil resources. After the nationalization, Iraq turned to French companies and the Russian (Soviet) government for funds and partnerships.
Today, the US and UK companies are very keen to regain their former position, which they see as critical to their future leading role in the world oil industry. The US and the UK governments also see control over Iraqi and Gulf oil as essential to their broader military, geostrategic, and economic interests. At the same time, though, other states and oil companies hope to gain a large or even dominant position in Iraq. As de-nationalization sweeps through the oil sector, international companies see Iraq as an extremely attractive potential field of expansion. France and Russia, the longstanding insiders, pose the biggest challenge to future Anglo-American domination, but serious competitors from China, Germany and Japan also play in the Iraq sweepstakes.
During the 1990s, Russia’s Lukoil, China National Petroleum Corporation and France’s TotalFinaElf held contract talks with the government of Iraq over plans to develop Iraqi fields as soon as sanctions are lifted. Lukoil reached an agreement in 1997 to develop Iraq’s West Qurna field, while China National signed an agreement for the North Rumailah field in the same year. France’s Total at the same time held talks for future development of the fabulous Majnun field.
US and UK companies have been very concerned that their rivals might gain a major long-term advantage in the global oil business. "Iraq possesses huge reserves of oil and gas – reserves I’d love Chevron to have access to," enthused Chevron CEO Kenneth T. Derr in a 1998 speech at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, in which he pronounced his strong support
for sanctions. Sanctions have kept the rivals at bay, a clear advantage. US-UK companies hope that the regime will eventually collapse, giving them a strong edge over their competitors with a post-Saddam government. As the embargo weakens and Saddam holds on to power, however, stakes in the rivalry rise, since US-UK companies might eventually be shouldered aside. Direct military intervention by the US-UK offers a tempting but dangerous gamble that might put Exxon, Shell, BP, and Chevron in immediate control of the Iraqi oil
boom, but at the risk of backlash from a regional political explosion.
In testimony to Congress in 1999, General Anthony C. Zinni, commander in chief of the US Central Command, testified that the Gulf region, with its huge oil reserves, is a "vital interest" of "long standing" for the United States and that the US "must have free access to the region’s resources." "Free access," it
seems, means both military and economic control of these resources. This has been a major goal of US strategic doctrine ever since the end of World War II. Prior to 1971, Britain (the former colonial power) policed the region and its oil riches. Since then, the United States has deployed ever-larger military forces to assure "free access" through overwhelming armed might.
A looming US war against Iraq is only comprehensible in this light. For all the talk about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and human rights violations by Saddam Hussein, these are not the core issues driving US policy. Rather, it is "free access" to Iraqi oil and the ultimate control over that oil by US and UK companies that raises the stakes high enough to set US forces on the move and risk the stakes of global empire. As Investor’s Business Daily notes, if the US were to occupy Iraq, it would not only "gain a central staging base for future [military] operations," but "It would take control of 11 percent of the world's oil reserves, too. That 11 percent would help pay for the occupation" and "could also be leverage against oil-dependent Arab nations -- just as the U.S. used cheap oil in the 1980s to bankrupt the USSR."
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