[cowofzot]

Known as the Persian corridor. Southern route was favored by Raeder, Goering & Kessering. Dolpho said maybe later after Russia falls. Big boo boo there.

Southern route strategy involves Operation Felix, ( taking Gibralter & closing west end of Med), & sending 20 panzer divisons to Libya to drive through Egypt, ( don't tell me there wasn't enough fuel trucks, as the ones not used for Barbarossa would be used here instead), after Egypt, there are no major natural obstacles, ( British even built a railway from Egypt into Iraq WW 1), & oil fields of Iran/Iraq are in German hands. Turkey then has little choice but to join the Axis whereby allowing Germans use of their rail system to roll into Baku. Turkish rails are different guage, but the rail system was enlarged between the wars & Germans built lines from Turkey into Syria during WW 1.

Iranian ports are open to trade with Japanese & are closed to Lend Lease shipments to Russia.

There used to be a good link on this, see if I can find it.



This ain't it, but a good reference source for the area.

On 22 Jun 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, who instantly became an ally of Britain. The two nations co-operated with regards to Persia, which was invaded by the British on flimsy pretext on 25 August 1941. Not only did Persia have valuable oil resources, but physical occupation of the country allowed precious war materiel to be shipped to the Soviet Union via this route.

http://members.shaw.ca/madorosh/campaigns.htm

[killim]

This will end in stupid theoretical paper wars.

[cowofzot]

Not really when one considers Rommel had 2 Panzer divisions, 20 or even 10 dramatically changes the face of the North African theater. These were sitting Idle after battle of France.


From a fuel perspective, early/mid 1940 was the best time to launch.



From a purely fuel standpoint, the fall of France has to be considered the greatest victory of the war for Germany. That is, for the first and only time, Hitler ended a campaign with more oil than he had when he started.

The German army and air force had learned enough from the Polish campaign to build up significant reserves for the war in the West. When that blitz was over, the Wehrmacht had captured more than 20 million barrels of oil from the French, Belgians and Dutch
http://www.eiaonline.com/history/bloodforoil.htm

Norway also netted 1/2 million barrels or more.

[killim]

Yeah and the A-bomb would be tested on *drum roll* Berlin...

Far more important Germany had no transport capabilities, no control over the Med, Spain was neutral, this would have given Russia more time to prepare, the industrial output disadvantage was pretty clear right from the beginning and this would only have made it severe, the Allied support would have been redirected towards the Arabian peninsula instead of towards Russia etc.

[Smilin' Dave]

taking Gibralter & closing west end of Med

This would be hard to do without Spanish support, which you won't get. Franco was tired of war and didn't want to fight potential trade partners.

sending 20 panzer divisons to Libya to drive through Egypt

The ports available to the Axis in North Africa couldn't have possibly supported a force of that size, and frankly I doubt Rommel had the skills at that stage needed to command a force of that size. He was a good micro-manager, but I can't imagine such a tendency would work well on a larger front. The logictic limitations are discussed by Ellis in his book, Brute Force.

don't tell me there wasn't enough fuel trucks, as the ones not used for Barbarossa would be used here instead

...except there wasn't enough trains/trucks for Barbarossa. Not to mention you have to ship the things there, and they'll use up most of the petrol getting to the front line.

after Egypt, there are no major natural obstacles, ( British even built a railway from Egypt into Iraq WW 1)

That railroad would be sabotaged/ripped up, or the Germans won't have the rolling stock for it (again, see Barbarossa). No natural obstacles? You don't think the Bekaa Valley or the Euphrates count? What about the deepest deserts of the Arab Penninsula?

oil fields of Iran/Iraq are in German hands

Assuming they are not blown up, the Germans have not way of getting the oil home because they lack shipping. IIRC they didn't have have a tanker fleet.

Turkey then has little choice but to join the Axis

Neutrality would be quite viable, unless the Wehrmacht wants to fight a guerilla war in Turkey while pursuing these wild objectives being set.

use of their rail system to roll into Baku.

Since you stripped the assets from Barbarossa, you can expect to face a prepared Red Army against your 20 divisions. That's 20 if you assume they have nothing else to do which seems highly unlikely.

From a fuel perspective, early/mid 1940 was the best time to launch.

Given losses of German shipping in the Norwegian campaign and the political stance of Italy at the time (and hence it's willingness to lend its navy and ports), it's a terrible time.

[cowofzot]

Germans lost 21 out of 370 ships in Norway invasion.

A German Panzer expert was sent to Africa & determined 10 Panzer divisions no prob.

Prepared Red army against 20 divisions? Who said that? An attack against Baku would likely be more than that & Red army wasn't well prepared for anything in 41 or even early 42.

Turkish neutrality not likely, after Axis rolls up from Egypt into Syria,( rails are easy to repair by the way), Turkey has little choice in the matter. Rolling stock a decent point. Italian rail ferries were used as transport across Med to Africa.


Trucks not used for Barbarossa will instead be used in Africa.

Franco? What has he got to resist Op Felix with? Spain was exhausted from the war it had just gone through.

[killim]

So tell me how do you expect to get the might fleet into Northern Africa without control over the sea and air and the bottle neck Gibraltar?

Look at the terrain in the south and think about mechanized infantry warfare over there. Far more important what would an Axis force slowly approaching from the south mean to Stalin, while the German eastern front is exposed and western/central Europe bombed into the ground by the Allies?

Far more important it isn't enough to conquer the room you have to hold it and the numbers were already bad in '41.

Funny thing to claim that railways are easy to repare. You can block them far easier and far more important you can't transport mechanized units on them since it was a light railway. The logistics for 20 divisions would have been a nightmare and unsustainable given the lack of air superiority, save shipping routes and transport capacity. The italian ferries were continously raped by the British and this despite the fact that it was an unimportant theater, which would have changed under this circumstances.

Franco was very expierienced in guerilla warfare and besides that the Axis would have been forced to protect the whole sea line against Allied operations. Far more important Spain was big enough and with the natural barriers/fortifications in place they would have been able to resist long enough to be supported by the Allied forces.

Plus you didn't take into account that the A-bomb would have been fallen on Berlin or more likely the Ruhrgebiet.

[cowofzot]

German would have air superiority with no Barbarossa. East Med ports would solve logistics issues.

British didn't get real good at sinking Axis shipping til 42.


A bomb is a late 45 thing, not really relevant to 41-42 maneuvers.




During all of 1941, there were only seven days when the aerial convoys, composed of about 25 Ju-52s on the Sicily-to-Tripoli flight, encountered fighters from Malta, usually a single twin-engine Blenheim or Beaufighter, and no transports were shot down.



During the last months of 1941, merchant ships sunk by the British averaged at least 20 percent of the convoys. By the end of the year, the average hovered around 50 percent. If the British had maintained that rate, they could have scored a tremendous strategic victory, starving the Afrika Korps and obliging the Germans to fall back without being able to fight another desert battle.

Unfortunately for the British, at the start of 1942 Kesselring showed his strong hand. He sent Fliegerkorps II, a large group of fighters and bombers recently transferred from the Russian Front, to pound Malta into impotence, and he also brought 10 U-boats into the Mediterranean to harass the Royal Navy. Italian convoy losses dropped off dramatically, and Rommel received enough supplies to begin another victorious advance.

Kesselring also stepped up air transport. It was not only faster but also completely under German control. Another advantage was that, so far, German transport planes had received little attention from the British.


http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii- ... africa.htm

[killim]

Germany would i no way have had any kind of air superiority. The industrial disadvantage would have been the same.

The British didn't get many ships sunk earlier, because the Germans either stayed in Germany or we are talking about subs. Even the battlecurisers and destroyer weren't able to break the blockade how shout a shipping passage work, especially trhough bottlenecks like the channel and Gibraltar.

You were asuming that Germany would win the WW2 with it. This means till '45 and beyond.

Of course there was no problem. But now consider the case when you have to supply 10 or 20 (as you suggested) divisions. This means mainly domestic supply and no on sight substitution. This would mean that the Allies would be able to shift their focus to the Med too, where they had excellent opportunities to hassle the supply routes towards the theater and in the theater. Simply remember the logistical problems the "Afrika Korps" had despite their small size. You say the Axis was able to get some additional support from the eastern front and therefore were able to reopen the transitline. Yeah that right, but only temporarily and only because it wasn't the main focus of the Allied forces. Far more important even during that time of relative stability the "Afrika Korps" was in no way fully supplied despite is small size.

Thats what i mentioned in the beginning with paper wars. Just like in economics your opponent is adaptive or even proactive, what makes the situation really complex. Just like the cross price elasticity in the price competition.

The plannin staff (dunno if its the right word for "Planungsstab") of the Wehrmacht knew rigth from the onset of WW2 with its mathematicians that they would only be able to win the war if they would be able to reach the ratios and speed they reached in the campaigns against Poland, France, England (in the beginning) and the logistical supply by the USA. The CCCP was only able with the help from Japan, which didn't happen.

[cowofzot]

British only gained air power in 42, with no Barbarossa Germany has control of the air no doubt in Med. You have to add Italian airforce to Luftwaffe. US not a factor til Nov 42.

Africa Corps never fully supplied because all the supplies went to Russia, situation reverses with no Barbarossa.

[Smilin' Dave]

Germans lost 21 out of 370 ships in Norway invasion.

I should probably clarify that in losses I was including ships that were damaged and put out of action for a long period of time. Given that 21 that were lost included some quite sizeable ships (crusiers and destroyers), there weren't a small loss either.

A German Panzer expert was sent to Africa & determined 10 Panzer divisions no prob.

What Panzer expert was this, and what was his expertise in shipping? Why does his opinion outweight that of someone in possession of all the information after the war? Why are you suddenly talking 10 divisions when you started with 20 divisions?

Prepared Red army against 20 divisions? Who said that? An attack against Baku would likely be more than that & Red army wasn't well prepared for anything in 41 or even early 42.

Even Stalin isn't stupid enough to sit there while the Axis encircle his country. No logical explanation for Stalin's behaviour in 1941 would allow a repeat in the event of all of the southern USSR somehow being under threat as well. And the idea that the Red Army, properly prepared, couldn't stop a few dozen divisions is laughable. Maybe you missed it, but they ended up stopping multiple Army Groups, despite massive disadvantages.

rails are easy to repair by the way

So why didn't they fix up the railroads in the USSR huh? The reality is that there wasn't much in the way of materials of production capacity, never mind manpower, to spare. And guerilla warfare would make rebuilding difficult... again, like in the USSR.

Trucks not used for Barbarossa will instead be used in Africa.

You still haven't explained how the port facilities available at the start of the timeframe you established, could handle this influx of material.

Franco? What has he got to resist Op Felix with? Spain was exhausted from the war it had just gone through.

You know, I'm sure Napoleon thought knocking out Spain would be easy too. Nothing would re-unite the people of Spain faster than a Nazi invasion, I'm not even sure the Italians would be too happy to assist after such a show. Or is Germany going to invade that ally too?

German would have air superiority with no Barbarossa.

Just like the Battle of Britain! Oh, wait a second...

East Med ports would solve logistics issues.

Have to be captured and cleared first. Have a look at the delays forced on the far better equipped and prepared Allies in capturing ports after Normandy.

British didn't get real good at sinking Axis shipping til 42.

Straits of Gibralta would be like fish in a barrel. Or like the Kriegsmarine off Norway.

A bomb is a late 45 thing, not really relevant to 41-42 maneuvers.

His point is all this Wehrmacht-wank results in the same broad outcome (defeat), and probably a more specifically horrid post war.

During all of 1941, there were only seven days when the aerial convoys, composed of about 25 Ju-52s on the Sicily-to-Tripoli flight, encountered fighters from Malta, usually a single twin-engine Blenheim or Beaufighter, and no transports were shot down.

Yet Rommel struggled through 1941 for this apparent ease in getting supplies to Africa. Reality check: heavy units need supply by ship, not planes.

1942...Rommel received enough supplies to begin another victorious advance.

Which ended with a decisive defeat at El Alamein. Whoops!

Africa Corps never fully supplied because all the supplies went to Russia, situation reverses with no Barbarossa.

False. Statistics prove plenty of material was arriving at the ports for the units then fighting, the problem was getting to the front on a single stretch of road by truck.

[cowofzot]

But Whoops! in 42 he captured Tobruk! Whoops!

False, Rommel never got enough supplies, his battle was considered at backwater compared to Barbarossa.

Hint, supply by air is augmentation to supply via ship.


Wehrmacht-wank. War could have been over before 45 is the point.


Battle of Britain? As if the British could/would transfer all their fighters from home Island & to Egypt thereby leaving it defenseless. Absurd.




Why didn't they fix the railroads in Russia? They did.
http://www.feldgrau.com/articles.php?ID=15

Few dozen divisions? Germans would give em all they got. They couldn't stop anything circa 41, they got smashed. Even the Finns opened a can of whoopass on em in 39.



Luftwaffe pounced on targets further to the rear and on the Red Air Force. By noon, they had knocked out dozens of Soviet airfields, blasted their fuel dumps, cut their supply lines, pulverized troop units as they attempted to assemble, and destroyed 1,200 Soviet airplanes-800 of them on the ground. They ranged as far east as Sevastopol, where they bombed one of the most important Soviet naval bases. The Germans lost only 10 planes.
http://junebarbarossa.devhub.com/blog/category/history/



Straights of Gibralter???

Supply issue covered previously. East Med ports in addition to Alexandria, plus extra cargo planes, in addittion to extra fuel trucks not used at Barbarossa. I have addressed it.

[cowofzot]

This book covers a good bit of this topic.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and the navy, thinking in global rather than continental terms, were adamant that Britain had first to be knocked out of the war, and that this goal could best be achieved not by a cross-channel invasion, but by defeat in Egypt and the Mediterranean.


There were still two outstanding issues. The first was that of how substantial the commitment to North Africa should be. Once the second option was adopted it was clear that it would be modest. Absolute priority had to be given to building up the largest

possible reserves of men and matériel for the massive attack on the stronghold of Jewish Bolshevism and the foundation of a vast racially purified eastern empire.
http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/c ... 718&ss=exc
Modest the key word in all that. 98 divisions sent to Russia, 2 to North Africa.

[Smilin' Dave]

But Whoops! in 42 he captured Tobruk! Whoops!

That was not a decisive victory. On the other hand Rommel was forced to retreat quite a long way after El Alamein, and he never got near Egypt ever again after that. If you can't tell the difference between winning a battle and losing the campaign, then there is no hope for this discussion.

Hint, supply by air is augmentation to supply via ship.

Like air supply to the troops encircled at Stalingrad? The Luftwaffe's heavy lift capability was never particularly good, and Hitler had good reason to distrust them after the Dunkirk affair.

War could have been over before 45 is the point.

What a great point of divergence, ending the war in the same year. Perhaps a few months later. With a mushroom cloud over Berlin.

Battle of Britain? As if the British could/would transfer all their fighters from home Island & to Egypt thereby leaving it defenseless. Absurd

No more absurd than some of the equipment/resources transfers you have been proposing (stripping the material on the Eastern front, transferring the navy away from Britain etc). And the point, which you missed, is that the British could contest German air superiority in 1940-41. Your plan depends on German air superiority, which isn't guaranteed at all.

Why didn't they fix the railroads in Russia? They did.

Yet the supply situation on the Eastern front, for all the resources available (and comparatively easier to bring in from Germany), there were huge problems with maintaining the forces available. Yet you think the same formula of trucks and trains, in a part of the world that was probably even less well developed in terms of infrastructure than the USSR, will be a winner somehow.

Few dozen divisions? Germans would give em all they got. They couldn't stop anything circa 41, they got smashed.

I seem to remember your invincible Wehrmacht in retreat after the Battle of Moscow in 1941. Pretty good effort for the Soviets considering the Red Army's starting disadvantages, disadvantages which likely would not apply in your scenario. I also think it highly unlikely that the Germans would have been able to over-run all of the Middle East, including Turkey, and still have time to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. So in reality, you have given the Soviets an extra year to re-arm and re-organise. And the US will enter the war by that stage.

Even the Finns opened a can of whoopass on em in 39.

By 1940 the Finns were confronted by a competant Soviet general, and were forced to concede pretty well everything the Soviets demanded originally. Note also the Finns had the defensive home ground advantage. The Germans will be fighting in terrain and environments they are entirely inexperienced in. The Soviets meanwhile have relatively recent combat experience in the area as a result of the Civil War.

Luftwaffe pounced on targets further to the rear and on the Red Air Force. By noon, they had knocked out dozens of Soviet airfields, blasted their fuel dumps, cut their supply lines, pulverized troop units as they attempted to assemble, and destroyed 1,200 Soviet airplanes-800 of them on the ground. They ranged as far east as Sevastopol, where they bombed one of the most important Soviet naval bases. The Germans lost only 10 planes.

You are still missing the point. This situation was for the Red Army a surprise attack. An avoidable one, resulting from Stalin's own misunderstanding of the situation. He believed the British still constituted a front that the Germans could not avoid. The strategic threat your successful invasion of the Middle East represents to Stalin, who always feared being encircled by his enemies, won't allow a repeat of those circumstances.

Supply issue covered previously. East Med ports in addition to Alexandria

You would have to capture those first. Ironically the Axis forces can't capture them without the logistics support they offer.

plus extra cargo planes

What was the number and condition of the airfields like in North Africa? As I recall the western Allies had to make significant improvements to those airfields to sustain the air campaign against Italy. If there are not enough airfields, then it's just as bad as a lack of ports. If there are airfields but they are of poor quality, attrition of aircraft/pilots will quickly bring the air fleet down.

in addittion to extra fuel trucks not used at Barbarossa.

Without sufficient roads and ports, those trucks will use more fuel than they deliver. Rommel faced this problem. The western Allies, who had more trucks/planes etc. from day one, had the same problems in western Europe (which had better infrastructure). You have offered no real solution to this problem.

I have addressed it.

You have in fact dismissed it because you obviously don't understand it properly.

You haven't named your previously claimed 'panzer expert'. I hope you were not making that up.

[pugsville]

The Luftwaffe principle fighter the me109, was very short ranged and was not good at landing on rough and ready airstrips (narrow undercarriage). The JU52 was not a great transport lacking in range and capacity.

The railways of the middle east were pretty darn dodgy at best, rail capacity was a problem for the axis at the best of times, running serious supplies over hostile/rough terrain through bad roads/rails was not going to easy. Logistical concearns about what is truely doable are not understood by many, looking at the map making talk about running 10-20 divisons at the end of significantly extended and dodgey supply lines , it's just not going to be very easy.

Whatever route is proposed, there are difficult problems, trucks, rail, air, shipping, there is a general lack of the required equipment, poor infrastructure in the region, and insecure routes.

The Russians would have no real troubles other than what they already had, they had significant garrisions in the caucus region and would be operating in a region they knew , were prepared to fight in, and with significantly less supply problems.

As for the cult of panzer divisions, they were ahead of the opposition and the best formation early war, but does not mean they were suited to battle in all conditions.

furthermore the British were pretty adaptable and embracing non-regular warfare approaches, the SAS or similar operating against these enormorsely long and vunerable supply lines could inflict damage way above their numbers.

[cowofzot]

Historically, the Russians fought poorly in the Caucusus. Germans captured Mt Elbrus & were only withdrawn when Stalingrad was encircled. Germans were good in open terrain, not as effective in house to house fighting where tanks & maneuver well not relevant.

British were very unadaptable to modern warfare in the desert. Long range desert group had to fight tooth nail & hair to even exist, let alone get supplies for missions. British couldn't get one victory of Rommel in 18 months. It was only after these hard trials they began to "adapt" to fast mobile desert warfare. Lidell Hart was one of the few that understood what time it was & he met huge resistance from British military higher ups.




Hart explains that one should not employ a rigid strategy revolving around powerful direct attacks nor fixed defensive positions. Instead, he prefers a more fluid elastic defence, where a mobile contingent can move as necessary in order to satisfy the conditions for the indirect approach. He would later cite Erwin Rommel's Northern Africa campaign as a classical example of his theory.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._Liddell_Hart

SAS fought hard to get anyone to listen & were the best British thing in the desert.

[Smilin' Dave]

Historically, the Russians fought poorly in the Caucusus. Germans captured Mt Elbrus & were only withdrawn when Stalingrad was encircled. Germans were good in open terrain, not as effective in house to house fighting where tanks & maneuver well not relevant.

First of all, this contradicts an argument you deployed in another thread, claiming that the Germans were somehow halted in the Caucasus by airpower (apparently augmented by Lend Lease). So the temptation is to ask which statement was true. Secondly, the idea that the Caucasus is open terrain is laughable. Honestly, your key example is a fight over a mountain!

British were very unadaptable to modern warfare in the desert. Long range desert group had to fight tooth nail & hair to even exist, let alone get supplies for missions. British couldn't get one victory of Rommel in 18 months. It was only after these hard trials they began to "adapt" to fast mobile desert warfare. Lidell Hart was one of the few that understood what time it was & he met huge resistance from British military higher ups.

Hart explains that one should not employ a rigid strategy revolving around powerful direct attacks nor fixed defensive positions. Instead, he prefers a more fluid elastic defence, where a mobile contingent can move as necessary in order to satisfy the conditions for the indirect approach. He would later cite Erwin Rommel's Northern Africa campaign as a classical example of his theory.

All very nice theory, but in North Africa operational/strategic mobility was limited by the shortage of good roads and the presence of a few key strategic features. Fuel trucks can't drive of anything, and without those the tanks eventually stop. Rommel found himself unable to be 'fluid' at El Alamein, because those 'unadaptable' British were strongly defending all the ways forward.

SAS fought hard to get anyone to listen & were the best British thing in the desert.

Theoretically yes, but in practice a lot of the early SAS raids were failures with high casualty rates. British victories against Rommel were not won by LRDG or the SAS, but by regular military forces. Monty's troops might not have had the tactical flare of Rommel's, but Rommel's troops didn't win in the end.

[cowofzot]

Never said Germans were halted there by airpower.

Rommel could not be fluid at El Alamein because it was a 40 mile wide chokepoint with Med sea on one side, & Quatarra depression on the other. No one can be fluid in a narrow sector such as that, physically impossible.

The position near El Alamein was a chokepoint that had been selected by the Allies as an emergency fall-back position, only 40 miles long from the coast to the massive impassable Qattara Depression on the south end. http://gregpanzerblitz.com/El_Alamein.htm







1st SAS raid was failure, 2nd was success.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Air_Service

Rommels troops didn't win in the end because British outnumbered them in every category, tanks, men, artilerry, aircraft etc. Plus Ultra.


Nothing laughable about the open terrain in Caucusus region.
scroll down & see map.
http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazi ... egacy.html

Look where it says Russian Federation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cauca ... _baseb.gif

[pugsville]

Hart was an over-hyped crackpot. Some of his stuff is reasonable but his theories were pretty wild. His school of almost pure armoured forces was deeply flawed, some Germans found inpsireration for deep penetration tatics in his writings, but it was more credit to them than to him. The British chose to spend on the air force and the Navy between the wars rather than the army. The Army needed a complete overhaul, the regiment remained almost the sole focus. Leading to good small unit elan but bad organization of the army in general, the development of real corps and general staff organization was just ignored and there simply wasnt the money to develop armoured forces. The British army was envoled in colonial conflicts and with their limited resources it became there near total focus.

[cowofzot]

He was one of a few that thought outside the staid military thinking box that was the state of affairs in the British army late 30's early 40's. Along with David Stirling & others.