- 29 Dec 2012 04:48
#14138164
You know "Destroyer" is short for "Torpedo Boat Destroyer" ? Destroying torpedo boats is what that class of vessels was designed to do. The numbers are not good. Jan 1940 Germany has 22 torpedo boats (British 27) another 27 in construction (British 50) in September 1940 the RN had 30 Destroyers on permanent anti invasion duties (out of 200, 100 in home waters, they could be quickly reinforced) out numbered by Destroyers torpedo boats are really no match, and are really strike weapons, thee are not going to be good in the escort role. 10 Destroyers and 30 minutes and there would be no invasion fleet. British Torpedo and Gun boats, as well as submarines would also be a prime threat against barges and landing craft.
9 Months is a crash program building your first design off the drawing boards with little scope for fixing the problems (early British efforts were very un seaworthy). They are around 400 tons. 20,000 man hours. 600 LCT = 240,000 tons of steel (or 6 bismarks, or 6000 tanks make no mistake it would be a serious impact on production of other stuff) 12,000 skilled metals workers. LCT go around 8 knots, better than barges (though with the infantry and supplies on barges they would be in convoy at barge speeds) but still sitting ducks for destroyers, submarines could stalk under water and keep pace, very easy targets.
How does this massive crash LCT program not reduce significantly other armaments production? Where are the reductions you propose for this? This would be in direct competition for the same resources used to produce destroyers, torpedo boats and u boats either these would be scaled back to nothing, or massive cuts (completing halting tank production might get enough resources to build the LCTs. you wouldnt but thats the scale of impact) You obviously need to build more of these things too which is another large redirection of resources. You taking about more aircraft, more u boats, more LCTS well this stuff dont come from no where, building additional capacity would take too long (9 months most new factories are simply not gong to be operational and the Germans were short of man power anyway) for the time frame it most be diversion from other parts of of the war economy, if the Navy and Air force have huge new programs them the army must be cut back severely. Aircrew and U Boat crews take a long time to train, and performance is greatly determined by crew proficiency (U Boats in particular, 5% of the boats did 90% of the damage and as a rule the prewar very well trained crews were the ones) rapid crash programs to get more U boats and aircraft will only be effective if more crew are trained. The Training of personnel was one of the Great weaknesses of the German Blitzkrieg. Here I'm using the strategic concept of short sharp wars , The Germans planned short wars, personnel were trained and new equipment developed between wars. The Luftwaffe system of aircraft/aircrew use maximized front line strength right now, at the cost of reserve aircraft and aircrew training, the British system carried much more spares and reserve aircraft, regularly rotated aircrew to reserve/training duties. The RAF was a much more robust organization able to sustain performance .
The British coal fields were almost all out of German fighter range unless you want to just feed the Luftwaffe force to the RAF it would be foolish. Most of the Port capacity too (the British had vast amounts of port capacity, it wasnt port infrastructure short, it was through put unloading / loading which was mainly manpower and as such could be switched between ports). Railways were not a big weak point, overall Britain had a large surplus capacity (they were much better off than the Germans) still used for the civilian economy. I;m not saying a port/rail campaign would not eventually bite into British productive capacity but it's not a big weak point and would take a sustained offensive of many months (rather than say weeks) to have a significant impact, during this time the Luftwaffe is being suffering at the hands of the RAF which is growing stronger.
in 1940 Britain out produced Germany by 50% in aircraft 15,000 to 10,000. How is the RAF not well on the way to air superiority at this point?
In September 1940 the serviceable single engined fighters available was around 712.
In March 1941 it was 814.
(see
1940 http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se280940.htm
1941 http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se29341.htm
)
Best British estimates I can find
http://www.scribd.com/doc/85616206/RAF- ... nds-AIR-22
1.4.1941 1064 (though 1000 is single engined includes some beaufighters etc ) up from around 700 in September 1940.(And while those beufighters were mostly night fighters, the aircraft was one of the great marine attack aircraft of the war, this isnt France 1940's with fairly battles being used, beaufighters would be Ideal invasion attack aircraft)
Need to shoot down another 300+ British fighters (many pilots would bail out and be available again) just to break even, due to British reserve system, they actually had plenty of spare parts and reserve aircraft, aircrew determined operational strength. Again to reduce effective RAF strength aircraft manufacture is a long suit rather than short suit.
Also in the period sept 1940 may 1941 squadrons were being sent to other places like the western desert, increased axis resources focused on Britain would naturally mean more British resources remaining in Britain,
9 Months is a crash program building your first design off the drawing boards with little scope for fixing the problems (early British efforts were very un seaworthy). They are around 400 tons. 20,000 man hours. 600 LCT = 240,000 tons of steel (or 6 bismarks, or 6000 tanks make no mistake it would be a serious impact on production of other stuff) 12,000 skilled metals workers. LCT go around 8 knots, better than barges (though with the infantry and supplies on barges they would be in convoy at barge speeds) but still sitting ducks for destroyers, submarines could stalk under water and keep pace, very easy targets.
How does this massive crash LCT program not reduce significantly other armaments production? Where are the reductions you propose for this? This would be in direct competition for the same resources used to produce destroyers, torpedo boats and u boats either these would be scaled back to nothing, or massive cuts (completing halting tank production might get enough resources to build the LCTs. you wouldnt but thats the scale of impact) You obviously need to build more of these things too which is another large redirection of resources. You taking about more aircraft, more u boats, more LCTS well this stuff dont come from no where, building additional capacity would take too long (9 months most new factories are simply not gong to be operational and the Germans were short of man power anyway) for the time frame it most be diversion from other parts of of the war economy, if the Navy and Air force have huge new programs them the army must be cut back severely. Aircrew and U Boat crews take a long time to train, and performance is greatly determined by crew proficiency (U Boats in particular, 5% of the boats did 90% of the damage and as a rule the prewar very well trained crews were the ones) rapid crash programs to get more U boats and aircraft will only be effective if more crew are trained. The Training of personnel was one of the Great weaknesses of the German Blitzkrieg. Here I'm using the strategic concept of short sharp wars , The Germans planned short wars, personnel were trained and new equipment developed between wars. The Luftwaffe system of aircraft/aircrew use maximized front line strength right now, at the cost of reserve aircraft and aircrew training, the British system carried much more spares and reserve aircraft, regularly rotated aircrew to reserve/training duties. The RAF was a much more robust organization able to sustain performance .
The British coal fields were almost all out of German fighter range unless you want to just feed the Luftwaffe force to the RAF it would be foolish. Most of the Port capacity too (the British had vast amounts of port capacity, it wasnt port infrastructure short, it was through put unloading / loading which was mainly manpower and as such could be switched between ports). Railways were not a big weak point, overall Britain had a large surplus capacity (they were much better off than the Germans) still used for the civilian economy. I;m not saying a port/rail campaign would not eventually bite into British productive capacity but it's not a big weak point and would take a sustained offensive of many months (rather than say weeks) to have a significant impact, during this time the Luftwaffe is being suffering at the hands of the RAF which is growing stronger.
in 1940 Britain out produced Germany by 50% in aircraft 15,000 to 10,000. How is the RAF not well on the way to air superiority at this point?
In September 1940 the serviceable single engined fighters available was around 712.
In March 1941 it was 814.
(see
1940 http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se280940.htm
1941 http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se29341.htm
)
Best British estimates I can find
http://www.scribd.com/doc/85616206/RAF- ... nds-AIR-22
1.4.1941 1064 (though 1000 is single engined includes some beaufighters etc ) up from around 700 in September 1940.(And while those beufighters were mostly night fighters, the aircraft was one of the great marine attack aircraft of the war, this isnt France 1940's with fairly battles being used, beaufighters would be Ideal invasion attack aircraft)
Need to shoot down another 300+ British fighters (many pilots would bail out and be available again) just to break even, due to British reserve system, they actually had plenty of spare parts and reserve aircraft, aircrew determined operational strength. Again to reduce effective RAF strength aircraft manufacture is a long suit rather than short suit.
Also in the period sept 1940 may 1941 squadrons were being sent to other places like the western desert, increased axis resources focused on Britain would naturally mean more British resources remaining in Britain,